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Abstract 
This study demonstrates the convergence of three disciplinary fields: hypertext 
theory, feminist epistemology, and feminist rhetoric. My central thesis is that the 
conjunction of hypertext theory and feminist epistemology allows for a rearticulation of 
feminist rhetoric. 
The core of this study consists of an analysis of five female-authored hypertexts, all 
ofwhich were composed with Eastgate Systems' Storyspace hypertext-authoring 
software: two long hyperfictions, Carolyn Guyer' s Quibbling (1992) and Shelley 
Jackson' s Patchwork Girl (1995); two short hyperfictions, J. Yellowlees Douglas ' s "I 
Have Said Nothing" (1994) and Mary-Kim Arnold's "Lust" (1994); and Diane Greco's 
hypertext monograph Cyborg: Engineering the Body Electric (1995). The Storyspace 
read-write interface allows the user to intervene in the text, or to take on the role of 
reader-writer. Hence, I have used Storyspace's read-write interface to write my own text, 
consisting of commentary, analysis, and personal reflection, within each of these five 
hypertexts. 
The major humanities-based hypertext theorists (e.g., George Landow, Richard 
Lanham, Jay David Bolter, Michael Joyce, J. Yellowlees Douglas, Johndan Johnson-
Eilola) have each explained how hypertext functions, and they have articulated the ways 
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in which conventional text and hypertext differ. We now know that hypertext must be 
understood on its own terms, rather than as a simple extension or evolution of print. Yet, 
insofar as they have adhered to gender-neutral methodologies, the above-named scholars 
have left vast areas ofhypertext theory and practice unmapped. Hence, by employing a 
feminist methodology, this study aims to take the scholarly discourse on humanities-
based hypertext in a new direction. 
A second strand of this study examines the implications of a feminist theorization of 
hypertext for composition pedagogy, as well as for higher education and contemporary 
discussions of literacy and new media. Thus, this study situates hypertext theory within 
the discursive contexts of feminist pedagogy and the institutional politics of American 
higher education. 
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CHAPTER! 
Foundations for a Feminist Theorization of Literary Hypertext 
In 1988, sociologist Dorothy Smith argued that women's lives are characterized by a 
"disjuncture between experience and the forms in which experience is socially 
expressed" (50). Admittedly, to speak of"women's lives" or "women's experience" 
elides differences along the axes ofrace, class, sexual orientation, age, and so forth. 
Nonetheless, if we temporarily bracket the univeralist assumptions of the term "women," 
Smith's statement has important implications for a feminist theorization of hypertext. 
Historically, in articulating their diverse perspectives and agendas, feminists have had to 
rely on traditional, masculinist modes of discourse (e.g., oratory and print publication). 
Insofar as they are overdetermined by an objectivist epistemology, conventional textual 
media and mainstream scholarly genres, such as the single-authored essay and the 
monograph, have also constrained feminist expression. Moreover, the major theorizations 
of hypertext have been articulated within the contexts of mainstream, masculinist 
epistemology and rhetoric. 
In this three-pronged study, I argue for a convergence of the fields of hypertext 
theory, feminist epistemology, and feminist rhetoric, much like Richard Lanham, in 
focusing on digital technologies, argues for a convergence of social, technological, and 
theoretical pressures in higher education. I maintain that a feminist methodology, 
informed by feminist epistemology and feminist rhetoric, has the power to take hypertext 
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theory to the "next step." My central thesis, however, is that the conjunction ofhypertext 
theory and feminist epistemology allows for a rearticulation of feminist rhetoric. A 
rearticulated feminist rhetoric, in turn, may serve to bridge the gap between experience 
and expression that Smith speaks of. 1 
The core of this study consists of an analysis of five female-authored hypertexts, all 
of which were composed with Eastgate Systems' Storyspace hypertext-authoring 
software: two long hyperfictions, Carolyn Guyer's Quibbling (1992) and Shelley 
Jackson's Patchwork Girl (1995); two short hyperfictions, J. Yellowlees Douglas's "I 
Have Said Nothing" (1994) and Mary-Kim Arnold's "Lust" (1994); and Diane Greco's 
hypertext monograph Cyborg: Engineering the Body Electric (1995). Thus, I have 
selected hypertexts authored by women, each of whom writes from a critical, feminist 
perspective.2 That is, each of these authors, in her own way, appears to be invested in 
overturning the conventions of the print-based, Western literary canon. 
One strategy for healing the disjunction between feminist experience and expression 
is for feminist readers to write themselves into the texts they read. Accordingly, I have 
used the read-write capability of Storyspace to write my own text, consisting of 
1 I understand that, in the spirit of postmodemism and pluralism, it may be more appropriate to speak of 
hypertext theories, feminist epistemologies, and feminist rhetorics, as opposed to using those terms in the 
singular. Thus, rather than treating these complex, contested fields of inquiry as unitary abstractions, the 
plural suffix allows one to foreground the concrete, contextualized specificity of ways of thinking, 
constructing knowledge, communicating, and so forth. While singular terms tend to erase differences, I 
have nonetheless opted, for purely stylistic reasons, for the singular in most cases. I do use the plural forms 
on occasion, but unless I refer to a particular hypertext theory, a particular feminist epistemology, or a 
particular feminist rhetoric, the singular forms should be read as implying plurality as well. 
2 On further consideration, I am not certain that Douglas's "I Have Said Nothing" can be classified as a 
feminist text, although this is not to say that it is in any way anti-feminist. And, of course, it is amenable to 
a feminist reading. 
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commentary, analysis, and personal reflection, within each of the five hypertexts. While 
these hypertexts may be read without Storyspace in a read-only mode, Storyspace acts as 
an interface to allow the user to intervene in the text. 3 With Storyspace I am able to write 
myself into the text, as opposed to remaining on the outside looking in. Thus, the read-
write capability of Storyspace allows the user to truly become a reader-writer, or 
wreater. 
4 The significance of this textual intervention is elaborated later in this chapter 
and in subsequent chapters. As a logistical move, I have opted to store all five hypertexts, 
including my commentary, on a single rewritable compact disc. 
The outline of this study is as follows. Chapter 1 contains the rationale for the study 
and a broad overview of hypertext theory, feminist epistemology, and feminist rhetoric. 
In Chapter 2, I argue that the conjunction ofhypertext theory and feminist epistemology 
leads to a rearticulation of feminist rhetoric. In Chapter 3, I present and defend the 
methodology of the study, focusing closely on the methodological underpinning ofthe 
section composed with Storyspace. Chapter 4 consists of a discussion ofthe five 
hypertexts and a narrative-analytic reflection, which I will refer to henceforth as a 
"narranalysis" or the "narranalytic section," on the experience writing myself into these 
3 The word text is often used in this study as a shorted form of hypertext. The rationale for this choice is 
that it lessens the binary opposition between print text and hypertext. 
4 In earlier drafts of this chapter I used the words "wreader" and "wreading" to signify the blurring of the 
reader/writer distinction in hypertext. I took these neologisms from Pamela K. Gilbert's "Meditations of 
Hypertext: A Rhetorethics for Cyborgs" (262). Gilbert states that she does not know who coined these 
terms. I have now decided, however, to change the d to a t because I believe wreater and wreating more 
effectively capture the sense of reading and writing as overlapping, inextricable activities. Additionally, 
when spoken, "wreader" and "wreading" cannot be distinguished from reader and reading. I use the terms 
reader, reader-writer, and wreater interchangeably. As much as possible, though, I have opted for wreater. 
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texts.
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In Chapter 5, I discuss the implications of the study for composition pedagogy. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, a short chapter, I sum up my principle arguments and draw 
conclusions. The hypertext section may be read at any point, though I suggest that it be 
read between Chapters 3 and 4. 
Background for a Feminist Hypertext Theory 
When surveying the short history of hypertext, four names stand out: Vannevar 
Bush, Theodor Holm (Ted) Nelson, Tim Berners-Lee, and Marc Andreessen. 6 In his 
1945 Atlantic Monthly article, "As We May Think," Bush described his vision of the 
memex: 
Consider a future device for individual use, which is a sort of mechanized private 
file and library. It needs a name, and, to coin one at random, "memex" will do . A 
memex is a device in which an individual stores all his books, records, and 
communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with 
5 As far as I know, the term "narranalysis" has not been used before, although I would not be surprised to 
learn that I am not the originator of this term. This term appeals to me because it allows me to get past 
binaristic logic. 
6 Additionally, several researchers have been credited with playing major roles in the development of the 
pre-World Wide Web Internet, or ARPANET. Among this group are J.C.R Licklider, Larry Roberts, Bob 
Taylor, Paul Baran, Donald Davies, Douglas Engelhart, Frank Heart, Len Kleinrock, Vint Cerf, Will 
Crowther, and Bob Kahn-all men. Since the core of this study is based on five stand-alone literary 
hypertexts, I will not devote much attention to the history of the Internet. The work ofBerners-Lee and 
Andreessen, by contrast, deals directly with hypertext. It is important to understand that the Internet is not 
in itself hypertextual, although the distributed network of nodes and links is amilogous to hypertext. For a 
history of the ARPANET, see Kati Hafner and Matthew Lyon. Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins 
of the Internet. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. 
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exceeding speed and flexibility. It is an enlarged intimate supplement to his 
memory. (106) 
Bush's memex, then, was to be memory aid-an information storage and retrieval 
technology much like a book, but exponentially larger and organized associationally 
rather than in a hierarchical-unilinear manner. In 1965, Ted Nelson, who was directly 
inspired by Bush, coined the term "hypertext" for the concept of an associational, or 
nonhierarchical, document organization system. Nelson coined the term "hypermedia" as 
well. Nelson's Project Xanadu, which was effectively superseded in 1990 by the World 
Wide Web, was to revolutionize document publishing and copyright law (Nelson).7 The 
code for Nelson's still-unrealized Project Xanadu was made open source in 1999 (Griffin, 
unpaginated). 
Prior to the World Wide Web, hypertext had existed only in self-contained form, 
such as Apple Computer's HyperCard, Brown University's Intermedia, and early 
iterations of Storyspace. But in 1989, Tim Bemers-Lee, a researcher at CERN in 
Switzerland, proposed "a distributed hypertext system" as a global information 
management system for scientists at CERN and across the globe.8 Tentatively called 
"Mesh," Bemers-Lee changed the name to "World Wide Web" when he wrote the actual 
code in 1990. The WWW came online in 1990 in its text-based, Lynx form. Three years 
later, Marc Andreessen created Mosaic, the first Web browser to integrate graphics with 
7 My source for Ted Nelson's views on hypertext is Nelson's homepage: http://www.sfc.keio .ac .jp/-te~. 
Accessed 22 Jan 02 . Nelson recently moved his homepage to ted.hyperland.com. As of July 19 2002, this 
site appears to be still under construction. . 
8 CERN is the European Organization for Nuclear Research; they are located onlme at 
http://public.web.cem.ch/Public/. Accessed 19 July 2002. 
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alphanumeric text, and, with the aid of Andreessen's University of Illinois colleagues, 
Mosaic soon evolved into Netscape (Bolter 40; Griffin, unpaginated). 
The first two major works of humanities-based hypertext theory were Jay David 
Bolter's Writing Space (1990/revised 2001) and George P. Landow's Hypertext (1992), 
revised as Hypertext 2.0 (1997). Although Landow presents hypertext, for the most part, 
as a tool to make postmodern, academic literary studies more efficient, his most 
insightful remarks have to do with the radical transformation of print-based scholarship 
and copyright principles. Bolter's Writing Space, unlike Landow's work, is not wedded 
to the "discourse of efficiency" (Johnson-Eilola 85), yet Bolter maintains a gender-
neutral stance and an objectivist methodology. Among others working in hypertext 
theory, Espen Aarseth, Johndan Johnson-Eilola, and Silvio Gaggi have made substantial 
contributions; yet none of these scholars have departed significantly from the gender-
neutral standards of print-era scholarship. Michael Joyce's two essay collections, Of Two 
Minds and Othermindedness, are innovative and quite provocative, and they even touch 
on feminist issues. Joyce's primary concern, however, is hypertext poetics, rather than 
feminist epistemology or feminist rhetoric. Over the last decade, several journal articles 
sketching out feminist theorizations ofhypertext have been published (e.g., Gilbert, Page, 
Sullivan, LeCourt & Barnes, Haronian), but no book-length studies have yet appeared. 
The most important recent work on hypertext theory written by a woman, J. Yellowlees 
Douglas's The End of Books-Or Books Without End, is not a feminist study but an 
analysis ofliterary hypertext from the perspectives ofnarratology reader-response theory. 
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In this study, I work within gaps of the above texts. The major theorists on hypertext 
have each articulated the ways which conventional text and hypertext differ, and we now 
know that hypertext must be understood on its own terms, rather than as an extension or 
evolution of print. Yet, insofar as they have adhered to a gender-neutral methodology, the 
above-named scholars have left vast areas of hypertext experience unmapped. Hence, it is 
now time to take this project in a new direction by articulating a feminist theorization of 
hypertext. To this end, I depart from conventional practice by inquiring into the 
relationships between hypertext and people-specifically, people who read and write 
literary hypertext. This study, in other words, does not compare and contrast two different 
textual media but examines my own interactions with hypertext. 
Literary hypertext represents a form of discourse-multi vocal, multiperspectival, 
nonhierarchical- that has been suppressed throughout Western history, particularly since 
the mid-seventeenth-century initiation of the Enlightenment project, also known as 
modernism. 9 Thus, I maintain that a feminist theorization of hypertext, founded on the 
tenets of feminist epistemology, may contribute to the project of integrating feminist 
experience and expression, or healing the disjunction Smith speaks of. 
The Enlightenment project, which many feminist scholars (e.g., Bordo, Code, Keller, 
Harding, Tanesini) have characterized as androcentric and misogynistic, was founded on 
an objectivist epistemology that places human beings in the position of detached knowers 
or investigators of an objective world. This tradition also rests on a reverence for 
9 Enlightenment modernism must be distinguished from the early-twentieth-century artistic movement 
known as Modernism. · 
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unilinearity, singular narratives, and hierarchy. The attraction of hypertext, for many 
contemporary writers, critics, and scholars (e.g., Page, Haronian, Greco, Guyer), is that it 
disrupts, subverts, and decenters this cluster of mainstream assumptions. Hypertext 
theory may be thought of detecting a gap in mainstream Western thought and sliding it 
open wide enough for historically suppressed ontologies, epistemologies, and rhetorics to 
take hold and thrive. And the prospect of the liberation of suppressed ways ofbeing, 
knowing, and communicating is likely to be appealing not just to feminists, but to persons 
inhabiting marginalized positions of every sort. 
Any time there is a disjunction, or gap, between accepted theory and experience, an 
aporia (i.e., a sense of puzzlement or cognitive dissonance), arises, and a new theoretical 
move is needed to resolve the aporetic experience (Aarseth 125). Hence, one of the main 
research problems that I address in this study is the gap between current humanities-
based hypertext theory and hypertext experience, particularly hypertext as experienced by 
feminists. While a few feminist hypertext theorists have begun to work within this gap, a 
great deal of work remains to be done before we have a significant understanding of the 
experience of reading and writing hypertext. 
As a final prefatory comment, I must acknowledge up at the outset my own 
epistemic location as a male feminist. I am well aware that a feminist argument made by 
a male-particularly a white, relatively privileged male-may be deemed theoretically 
incoherent, illogically, or contradictory; however, such contradictions are to be expected 
in a contradictory world, especially in a world undergoing such rapid change at the dawn 
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of the twenty-first century. As Sandra Harding writes, from a theoretical perspective, 
"tensions, contradictions, and ambivalences within and between theories are not always 
bad. Coherent theories in an obviously incoherent world are either silly and uninteresting 
or oppressive and problematic, depending on the degree of hegemony they manage to 
achieve" (164). From another perspective, however, there is nothing especially 
contradictory about a man wanting to end the oppression of half of the world's 
population. As a number of male feminists (e.g., Tom Digby, Harry Brod, Brian 
Pranger,) have observed, many men see gender justice as a moral imperative very much 
like racial and economic justice. Furthermore, as Patrick D. Hopkins agues in an essay 
included in Digby' s Men Doing Feminism collection, gender itself a learned 
p erformance, not a property possessed by virtue of biology (37-41). 10 Hence, rather than 
differentiating between women's ways of knowing and men's ways ofknowing, we may 
speak of cultural way of knowing-that is, ways ofknowing, or epistemologies, 
inculcated within specific social contexts. Although, in the mainstream West, certain 
ways of knowing, which I will elaborate in the course of this study, have historically been 
identified with women, these "feminine" epistemologies are also evident in many 
traditional, non-western, or indigenous cultures-cultures obviously composed of women 
and men; therefore, feminism may be practiced women and men. My epistemic location 
is complex, partial, and in many ways contradictory, and while I, like anyone else, 
10 I realize that many feminists, perhaps most notably Judith Butler, have made this argument. Hopkins 
cites Butler's Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge, 1990. 
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undoubtedly have substantial blind spots, my own unique mixture of blindness and 
insight may allow for a productive feminist theorization of hypertext. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three broad sections wherein I review 
the scholarly literature on hypertext theory, feminist epistemology, and feminist rhetoric. 
Within these three sections, I also begin to articulate my own feminist theorization of 
hypertext. 
Hypertext Theory 
Hypertext may be described as topical as well as topographic, based on the fact that 
it consists of a network oftextual "places" (i.e., topics, Gk. topoi). Bolter writes that 
"hypertext consists of topics and their connections, where the topics may be paragraphs, 
sentences, individual words, or indeed digitized graphics and segments of video" (35). 
While all prose works all topical, in order to be characterized as topographic a text must 
be amenable to a coherent, meaningful reading in many different orders. In other words, 
topographic texts do not have predetermined, or default, reading paths. Textual topics, or 
topoi, have also been referred to as lexias, following the usage of Roland Barthes in S-Z. 
Topical texts, by contrast with topographic texts, usually follow a sequential or serial 
format-that is, topical texts do have default readings. Topographical texts may be 
distinguished by their associational character; readers are encouraged to make 
associationallinks across the texts and read "out of order." Hence, we might substitute 
the words "serial" and "associational" for topical and topographic. This alternate 
terminology is appealing to me personally because I wish to distance myself from the 
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traditional spatial metaphors that have been applied to hypertext. While a hypertext may 
be visualized topographically or even observed with the graphic views offered by 
Storyspace, the text itself is read one lexia at a time- that is, unlike with print or even 
most electronic texts, the reader cannot quickly skim or scroll through a hypertext 
because it only appears on the computer monitor in chunks or pieces. Although a 
Storyspace hypertext may be observed and studied synchronically on a map, tree map, or 
outline view, it is actually read diachronically, or in time. Thus, rather than privileging 
space, I seek to articulate an understanding of hypertext that accounts for space and time, 
or space-time. I argue this point in depth later in this chapter and in subsequent chapters. 
Topographic text is far from new. Since the invention of the printing press in the 
mid-15 1h century, the conventional text has featured a spatial, or topographic, 
organization designed to optimize nonlinear information access (Corns 96-1 00). The 
typical nonfiction prose text is organized topographically-with titles, chapter headings, 
subheadings, and indices, as well as standard indentions, margins, gutters, and so on. 
Topographic page layout is now intuitive-that is, hardly noticed. By contrast, pre-print 
manuscripts were far less topographically sophisticated or reader-friendly. As Walter 
Ong has observed, manuscripts were not easy to read. For instance, relocating 
information, or reading recursively, was not encouraged by the page layout (119). Earlier 
still, the scroll followed a strictly serial format, thus imitating speech; only with great 
difficulty could a reader skip around in a scroll, or read topographically. Among 
contemporary texts, the novel is a special case, inasmuch as it lacks a subject index, as 
well as, in most cases, subheadings and similar "navigational" markers. Of course, the 
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conventional novel-in contrast to a topographic novel such as Nabokov's Pale Fire-is 
designed to be read serially; yet even novels usually feature chapter headings, making 
these texts amenable to non-serial or associational reading. It would be a mistake, then, to 
classify conventional print text and hypertext as topical and topographic, respectively. 
Thus, given the greater precision of the terms serial and associational-along with my 
bias against spatial metaphors-in most cases I will employ these terms rather than 
follow Bolter's use of the terms topical and topographic. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as hypertext may be expressed in both digital form and in 
print media, it should not be considered in opposition to print. For, as a number of critics 
(e.g., Landow, Bolter, Joyce, Aarseth, Hayles) have demonstrated, print texts can be quite 
hypertextual (e.g., Jacques Derrida's Glas, Roland Barthes' S-Z), whereas a text 
published on the World Wide Web may not necessarily be hypertextual. Joyce goes so far 
as to claim, somewhat controversially, that "the web is more hierarchical than 
hypertextual" (Othermindedness 52). Nelson has made similar comments on the World 
Wide Web, claiming, in short, that the Web is hierarchical rather than, as Nelson's would 
have it, parallel (Nelson, unpaginated). As far are as possible, then, I avoid the 
hypertext/print false dichotomy. In brief, I define hypertext in opposition to conventional 
(i.e., nonhypertextual) text, rather than in opposition to print. 
Moreover, I focus for the most part on literary hypertext, by which I mean hypertext 
narrative, also known as hyperfiction. I have not undertaken a study of hypertext in 
general, which would encompass "functional hypertext" (e.g., word processor help files, 
databases, commercial websites, discussion lists, etc.) and various multimedia 
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applications. I must note that Greco's Cyborg: Engineering the Body Electric is not a 
hyperfiction, but a nonfiction scholarly work, or what I have called a "hypertext 
monograph." Yet, the simple fact that Cyborg is a hypertext lends it a sense of 
literariness that is foreign to the conventional monograph; that is to say, conventional 
nonfiction strives for transparency, as the "content," rather than "form," is foregrounded; 
whereas in nonfiction hypertext both form and content are of interest, although form is 
often privileged over content. As the Russian formalists argued early in the twentieth 
century, a literary text is of interest for its language, not merely for the information 
transmitted; literary language is not a transparent medium, but is characterized by various 
levels of opacity. The hypertext medium falls on the opaque end of a 
transparency/opacity spectrum; therefore, hypertext tends to make even a scholarly 
monograph literary. I will have more to say on the transparency/opacity spectrum in 
chapter three. 
The form/content binary itselfbelongs to the domain of print; it is founded on the 
"conduit" model of communication, which assumes that information, or content, is 
packaged and travels across a conduit, or medium, from source to destination (Lakoff and 
Johnson 10-13). On this view, information is the content packaged in language or 
between the covers a book. But such outmoded, mechanistic thinking does not even 
describe conventional text adequately, and it definitely does not fit hypertext; therefore, 
to divide texts between literary and nonliterary, on the assumption that literary texts focus 
on form as well as content and nonliterary texts privilege content, perpetuates a false 
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dichotomy. Thus, I am comfortable including Greco's nonfiction work in a study of 
literary hypertext. 
At this point, drawing on post-structuralism and reader-response theory, I wish to 
make a distinction between two terms: work and text. I define the work as the copyrighted 
material artifact produced by the author, the publisher, and the printer. The text may be 
defined as the moment-to-moment instantiation of the text in the act of reading. 
According to Roland Barthes, "the work can be seen (in bookshops, in catalogues, in 
exam syllabi), the text is a process of demonstration[ ... ] the work can be held in the 
hand, the text is held in language" (901). In the text, writing and reading come together, 
or as Barthes writes, "the text requires that one try to abolish (or at least try to diminish) 
the distance between writing and reading" (904). The reading process may even be 
construed as an act of writing, in the sense that to interpret a text is to write it, as least in 
one's imagination. Stanley Fish claims that texts change "not because they are being read 
differently, but because they are being written differently" (989). That is to say, texts are 
written, in a hermeneutic sense, by the reader. 
But as the parenthetic statement in the second quote from Barthes suggests, the 
distance between reading and writing cannot be entirely eliminated. As Reed Way 
Dasenbrock has argued, Fish goes too far in conflating reading and writing. To insist on 
the power of readers to write the texts they read is to impose the beliefs and values of the 
reader onto the text, as opposed to listening carefully to and engaging with the text. What 
the imposition ofthe reader's will on the text amounts to is that the otherness of the text 
is not respected; the reader interprets the text according to a pre-existing interpretive 
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frame, rather than listening carefully to what the text has to say (Dasenbrock 244). Thus, 
the conflation of reading and writing is revealed as a thoroughly masculinist ideal. 
I prefer the metaphor of reading as performance, as in the performance of a musical 
score. A musician is not free to interpret a composer's score any way she11 chooses, even 
if the musician has learned her skills within an interpretive community. 12 One note 
cannot be freely exchanged for another, particularly if the musician is a member of an 
orchestra. We may also compare the act of reading to an actor's performance, or 
interpretation, of a playwright's script. The words on the page cannot be interpreted 
according to the whims of a particular school of actors or interpretive community. The 
reader/performer is under an obligation, based on a contract freely entered into, to 
perform the script as written. Of course, some "artistic license" of acceptable, and all 
dramatic interpretations, like all readings of a poem or novel, will differ to some extent, 
yet these differences do not negate the words on the page-and the words on the page are 
what I am calling the work. In constructing a text, then, the reader enters into a 
relationship with a writer's work, and neither party is free to dominate the relationship. 
There appears to be a space, or gap, between the work and the reader where the text 
comes into being. Wolfgang Iser refers to this space as the "virtual dimension of the 
11 Inasmuch as this is a feminist study, I have opted in most cases to use a feminine pronoun when a 
"nonsexist" or "gender-neutral" language might be expected. 
12 Fish is on more solid ground when he discusses interpretive communities, arguing that texts are 
interpreted, or read/written according to community-based standards, or ~t~rpr~tive str~tegies. Texts are 
constituted by interpretive communities (i.e., readers who have learned sumlar u:terpretive strategies(, and 
each interpretive community "perceives the text (or texts) its interpretive strateg1es demand and call mto 
being" (Fish 989). 
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text," and he argues that the text "arises from the meeting between the written text [or 
work] and the individual mind ofthe reader" (Iser 958, 962). The relationship between 
the reader and the work develops in this in-between space, and the text is constituted by 
this relationship. The te"?Ct, in other words, is intangible; it is function of interpretation. 
In sum, despite my criticism ofthe notion of the reader "writing" the text, I find the 
distinction between work and text quite helpful with respect to hypertext. Hence, I refer 
to published hypertexts (e.g., Carolyn Guyer 's Quibbling, Mary-Kim Arnold ' s "Lust," 
etc.) as works, and I refer to readings, or instantiations, of those works as texts. If a 
hypertextual work, like a conventional work, is to manifest as a text, it must be 
instantiated as such by a particular reader; however, the difference between a hypertext 
and a conventional work is that a hypertext must be instantiated in order to exist as 
anything other than computer code. An unread book still exists as tangible object. I draw 
a distinction, then, between the hypertextual work as it exists in coded form, or in 
potentia, and the text realized by a reader. I explore the fine points of this claim in later 
chapters. 
This terminological issue gets slightly more complex when it comes to the "blurring 
of the boundaries between reading and writing" (Landow 4). A read-write hypertext 
interface such as Storyspace allows the reader to edit text, write new text, add and delete 
links, and change the hypertext on a structural level. This type of textual intervention 
goes well beyond "writing" the text in a hermeneutic sense. Nevertheless, in such cases I 
will still treat what the wreater creates as a text rather than a work. I will reserve the term 
work for the artifact that is published and protected by copyright law, even though the 
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hypertext work is essentially computer code. Again, I articulate the fine points of this 
argument more fully in a later chapter. 
Works and texts differ according to other standards as well. To recapitulate a point 
made earlier, a hypertext consists of topics and links. Conventional literary works, 
however, also consist of topics and links-not hyperlinks, but links nonetheless. To quote 
Bolter again, "topics may be paragraphs, sentences, individual words" (35). Links in 
conventional text take the form of transitions and headings, rather than hyperlinks. While 
all prose works are topical, one may read a text topographically by making associational 
links (i.e., links across the text and into other texts), rather than merely following the 
linear transitions. Readers create intertextuality by making associationallinks across 
texts, whereas making associationallinks within a text creates intratextuality. Thus, while 
the work is invariably topical, the text (that is, the work as read) tends to be topographic 
due to the associational character of reading. 
It would most likely be extremely difficult to find a reader who reads in a strictly 
serial manner, or never reads a text "out of order." While conventional works of fiction, 
like hyperfictions, are written as linked topoi, most authors of print-based fiction do their 
best to see that their works are read serially. In a conventional literary work the links, or 
transitions, between sentences, paragraphs, pages, and chapters are determinate, that is, 
fixed in a definite context or sequence by the author. Writers of non-fiction, on the other 
hand, often compromise between serial and associational, or topographic, organization. 
Heading, subheadings, footnotes, endnotes, indices, and so forth are associational 
features . 
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While serial text enforces a singular, or unilinear, path through a text, associational 
text offers multiple paths, or what amounts to "readings" rather than texts (Bolter 125). 
Thus, rather than merely following linear, transitional links, reading a hypertext entails 
making choices between various reading paths. Accordingly, Joyce has defined hypertext 
as "reading and writing in an order you choose where the choices you make change the 
nature of what you read or write" (Othermindedness 38). Hypertext, then, embodies the 
postmodem principle ofthe text-that is, the text as constructed by the reader. As Iser 
claims, modem [and postmodem] literary texts "are often so fragmentary that one's 
attention is almost exclusively occupied with the search for connections between the 
fragments" (959). The object of the reading process then becomes to "make us aware of 
aware of our own capacity for providing links" (Iser 959). 
Most theorists and commentators on hypertext have insisted on the associational 
character ofhypertext. Vannevar Bush, in discussing his vision of the memex, referred to 
"associative indexing, the basic idea of which is a provision whereby any item may be 
caused at will to select immediately and automatically another" (107). In Bush's memex, 
associational indexing (i.e., linking across, or horizontally and diagonally) was to 
supplant hierarchical (i.e., vertical) indexing, and although the memex was never built, 
the concept of associational indexing was eventually embodied in hypertext. 
Espen Aarseth uses the term ergodic to refer to the user-participation called for by 
hypertext and other "interactive" media. While, of course, even conventional texts require 
reader participation in the form of linguistic decoding, the visual scanning of text, 
retaining text in memory, and physically holding the text and turning the pages, ergodic 
18 
texts require (rather than merely invite) the additional action of selecting links between 
nodes. The primary distinguishing feature of hypertext is that the reader, or wreater, 
instantiates a text through the choices she makes in selecting links between nodes. The 
hypertext author writes many potential texts, and the reader must instantiate, or actualize, 
a particular text by assembling the textual fragments the author has provided. Without the 
wreater's participation, the text remains a mere potentiality. 
To extend on comments made previously, a hypertext must be performed by the 
wreater in time as well as space. The work can exist for the most part in space, as an 
object on a shelf, but the text is realized in space and time. The pages, lexias, or topics of 
a text exist in a spatial dimension; therefore, texts are experienced in space and time-
this is true for conventional text and hypertext. Experiential, or lived, reality is spatial and 
temporal. 
The instantiation of a hypertext, however, goes beyond what is called for with 
conventional text. Douglas asserts that "hypertext has more in common with dance that it 
has with novels[ . .. ]. Until a reader assembles it, performing it, the text exists only as a 
set of potential motions, a sequence of steps and maneuvers that become actualized only 
at the instant that the reader selects a segment of text or fulfills a condition for 
movement" (EOB 31 ). 13 Again, conventional literary works as well as hypertexts are 
instantiated by the reader, and texts must be instantiated in time as well as space; that is 
to say, the temporal dimension is integral to the process of realizing, or actualizing, a 
13 EOB stand for J. Yellowlees Douglas's The End of Books-or Books Without End. 
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text. As Fish claims, "Everything depends on the temporal dimension" (983). Similarly, 
Iser writes, "In every text there is a potential time sequence which the reader must 
inevitably realize, as it is impossible to absorb even a short text in a single moment" 
(960). I will have more to say on the subject of time and space in subsequent chapters. 
For now, the point Douglas, Aarseth, and other hypertext theorists make regarding reader 
participation or the performance of the text is that hypertext requires reader participation 
above and beyond what the conventional text calls for. Again, without reader 
participation, hypertext remains mere computer code. 
The Living Text 
In what will likely be construed by some as a radical proposal, I maintain that a 
hypertext, or an instantiation of a hypertextual work, is best conceptualized 
metaphorically as a "living organism," and I draw on the resources of feminist 
epistemology to substantiate this claim. Hypertext, with its mutable, dynamic, unstable 
nature, is analogous to a living organism, and living organisms cannot be known, at least 
not deeply or ethically, as objects. As feminist epistemologist Lorraine Code writes, 
"Knowledge, as the [objectivist] tradition defines it, is of objects; only by assimilating 
people to objects can we hope to know them" (RS 52). In proposing the metaphor of 
hypertext as a living organism, I am explicitly rejecting the conventional spatial metaphor 
of hypertext as landscape, which Pamela Gilbert has associated with masculinist, colonial 
narratives (258). 
The primary limitation of spatial, geographic, topographic, or cartographic 
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metaphors is that space-time (notjust space) moves; that is to say, the background of our 
lives, which is inseparable from ourselves, is in constant motion; it doesn't stand still as 
we move through it or over it. One's experience of space-time is relational, and insofar as 
one's relationships with others (animate and inanimate) are in flux, space-time moves. 
Discourses, the objects of rhetorical and literary scholarship, are also in constant motion, 
and shifting discursive terrains cannot be mapped-or only very tentatively mapped. Of 
course, hypertext space (or hyperspace) moves, too. Again, Douglas's dance metaphor is 
appropriate. One way the movement of hypertext space is manifested is through a 
writer's use of the Storyspace guard fields. For example, the default link from lexia 1 
may go to lexia 2, but after the reader has gone from lexia 1 to 2 once the default link can 
change to lexia 3. In this case reader expects to hit enter and go once again from lexia 1 
to lexia 2, but she is surprised to find herself at lexia 3 instead. Hence, the reading path or 
text moves somewhat like tectonic plates shifting under one's feet. I return to this theme 
of mobile, shifting space later in this study. For example in chapter 3, in the context of a 
discussion of Cubist painting, I cite art critic John Berger's statement that the "Cubists 
were concerned with movement and wanted to prove that space itself was a process" 
(Toward Reality 1 02). For now, though, I must flesh out the metaphor of hypertext as a 
living organism. 
Hypertext space moves like a living organism. An intriguing methodological 
example, which I have followed in this study, was set by the late American geneticist and 
Nobel laureate, Barbara McClintock (1902-92), who is known for her belief in cultivating 
a "feeling for the organism," which may be a chromosome, a cell, a kernel of com, or any 
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other entity. In cultivating this feeling, McClintock transgressed the conventional 
scientific boundaries between subject and object. For instance, in discussing her 
groundbreaking work in genetic transposition, the process by which genes transfer their 
positions on chromosomes, McClintock referred to the chromosomes under her 
microscope as "friends." As she reported to Evelyn Fox Keller, her biographer, '"when I 
was working with them I wasn't outside, I was down there. I was part of the system[ .. .]. 
I actually felt like I was down there and these were my friends"' (A Feeling, 165). Keller 
explains that the "crucial point for us is that McClintock can risk the suspension of 
boundaries between subject and object without jeopardy to science precisely because, to 
her, science is not premised on that division. Indeed, the intimacy she experiences with 
the objects she studies[ . . . ] is a wellspring of her powers as a scientist" (164). 
In what may be seen as a convergence with the organic thinking practiced by 
McClintock, the field of Artificial Life ("AL" or "Alife") offers a perspective on 
computer systems as living organisms, or self-contained, ecological systems-even 
"universes." According to Anthony Liekens, 
Artificial life is the name given to a new discipline that studies 'natural' life by 
attempting to recreate biological phenomena from scratch within computers and 
other 'artificial' media. Alife complements the traditional analytic approach of 
traditional biology with a synthetic approach in which, rather than studying 
biological phenomena by taking apart living organisms to see how they work, one 
attempts to put together systems that behave like living organisms. 
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I have opted to follow a similar synthetic approach in this study of hypertext. However, 
while Artificial Life researchers claim to have created actual living organisms inside 
computers, I use the term "living organism" in a different sense. In brief, I do not claim 
that a text "lives" as an autonomous, separate entity; it lives only in relation to a reader, 
just as people live genuinely as human beings only insofar as they are engaged in 
relationships with others-other people, nonhuman life forms, information technologies, 
and so on. Again, without a reader to instantiate it, a text is not a text; it is just a work. 
Here I draw heavily on the work ofN. Katherine Hayles, who writes, "Beginning 
with relation rather than pre-existing entities changes everything" ("FM" 3). 14 Such a 
relational ontology differs radically from the ontology of liberal humanism, which is 
premised on individuality, autonomy, objective distance, and so forth. Hayles argues, 
"We do not exist in order to relate; rather, we relate in order that we may exist as fully 
realized human beings" (31 ). Additionally, on the user side, the reader of a hypertext 
operates through an "extended mind," or a process of"distributed cognition," a condition 
in which the ego boundary of the skin breaks down (Hayles 7-8). On this view, 
"cognition is a systemic activity distributed throughout the environment and actuated by a 
variety of factors, only some of whom are humans." Hence, as the hypertext wreater 
begins to construct patterns in what is initially experienced as the randomness of a text, 
her mind extends into that text. 
14 Henceforth, I will abbreviate Hayles "Flesh and Metal: Reconfiguring the Mindbody in Virtual 
Environment" as "FM" and "Virtual Bodies and Flickering Signifiers" as "VB." 
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A distinction must be drawn at this point between the body and embodiment. 
According to Hayles, "The body is the human form seen from without, from a cultural 
perspective striving to make representations that can stand in for bodies in general. 
Embodiment is experienced from the inside, from the feelings, emotions and sensations 
that constitute the vibrant living textures of our lives" ("FM" 2). Although Hayles 
transcends the body/embodiment binary with the concept of the "mindbody," a concept I 
will return to later, the distinction between the body and embodiment remains 
theoretically productive. In brief, the experience of the extended mind, or the wreater's 
sense of inhabiting the text, may be understood as a different type of embodiment-a 
virtual embodiment (Hayles, "VB" 91). Donna Haraway also writes, "Feminist 
embodiment[ ... ] is not about fixed locations in a reified body, female or otherwise, but 
about nodes in fields, inflections in orientations, and responsibility for difference in 
material-semiotic fields of meaning" (195). 
In focusing on the human-machine interaction, or feedback loop, what emerges is a 
vision of a cyborg literacy-i.e., the reading and writing practices of a "cybernetic 
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism" (Haraway 149). The human user and the 
hypertext function together through a cybernetic feedback loop (Hayles, "FM" 5, 8), with 
the user changing the text and the text changing the user-and it is in this sense that I 
claim that a hypertext is a living organism. In cyborg literacy, we move from the one-way 
information flow that characterizes the conduit model of communication to a two-way, 
reciprocal relation. As a cybernetic system, "the impact of information technologies on 
the mindbody is always understood as a two-way relation, a feedback loop between 
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biologically-evolved capabilities and a richly engineered technological environment" 
(Hayles, "FM" 8). The life of a text, then, is a product or function of"relationality"; no 
text lives as a separate, autonomous entity. 15 
Treating a text as a living organism is not such as novel idea as one might at first 
suspect. Object relations theorists, such as Nancy Chodorow and Jane Flax, have argued 
that women's productive and reproductive labor leads them to relate to other things or 
entities in the world as living beings, rather than as the "dead" objects featured in 
mainstream science and epistemology (Harding 147). Again, if we bracket the 
universalist assumptions the word "women," object relations theory is relevant to a 
feminist theorization of hypertext, insofar as it suggests an experiential basis for treating 
a text a living organism. 
Of course, such a relational, organic perspective is not restricted to women or to even 
to feminists. The metaphorical construction of artistic creation as a process of giving birth 
is quite familiar, and probably quite ancient. Poets, novelists, and artists-women and 
men-often speak of creative projects in terms of gestation and birth. Ideas and projects 
may conceived in a flash of insight or inspiration; then the work is nurtured and protected 
until it is ready to be released into the world to stand on its own two feet before an 
audience of friends, patrons, fans, critics, and outright enemies. 
Thinkirlg of the text as a living organism takes us back to a world view that has been 
labeled, variously, pre-industrial, pre-mechanical, pre-modem, pre-Enlightenment, or 
15 Hayles uses the term "relationality" on page 8 of "Flesh and Metal." The term essentially n:eans that 
entities must be understood in terms of their relations, rather than as isolated, autonomous umts. 
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pre-seventeenth-century. Susan Bordo speaks of the Cartesian "intellectualjlight from the 
female cosmos and the 'feminine' orientation toward the world." Bordo claims that while 
the feminine orientation "had still played a formidable role in medieval and Renaissance 
culture," in "the seventeenth century, it was decisively purged from the dominant 
intellectual culture, through the Cartesian[ ... ] restructuring ofknowledge and the world 
as masculine" (641). Considered in this historical context, the text as a dead object to be 
pinned down and dissected may be recognized as a masculinist, modernist construction. 
A possible argument against this methodology is that treating the text as a living 
organism is a projection, as if we are simply creating the text in our own image; however, 
an often unrecognized fact is that the objectivist paradigm is also a projection-a 
projection of the autonomous, distanced, masculine ego (Keller, Reflections 69-70, 79). 
The connection with hypertext theory is that the conventional literary work, which, in the 
New Critical orthodoxy of the mid-twentieth century, is inviolate, unified, and separate 
from both author and reader, may well be a projection of the fully individuated, 
autonomous, objectivist, modernist man. According to this paradigm, 
[T]he relation specified between knower and known is one of distance and 
separation. It is that between a subject and an object radically divided [ .. .]. 
Masculine here connotes, as it so often does, autonomy, separation, and distance. 
It connotes a radical rejection of any commingling of subject and object, which 
are, it now appears, quite identified as male and female. (Keller 79) 
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We may choose, then, between a masculinist projection and a feminist projection. The 
former yields a separate, autonomous text, while the latter yield a living, connected text. 
Whether we choose one ofthese two projections or some other projection, the projection 
itself is unavoidable. 
First-Generation Hypertext 
The five hypertexts I have selected for this study were published between 1992 and 
1995. In one sense, this is an historical study, even though it definitely looks toward the 
future of rhetoric and composition theory. These five hypertexts may be classified as 
"first-generation" hypertexts, inasmuch as they were all published in the first half ofthe 
1990s. These are text-rich hypertexts, meaning that the graphics and multimedia features 
are quite limited in comparison to hypertexts published since 1996. Although one can 
find graphics among first-generation hypertexts, and they are usually quite integral to the 
work, among the hypertexts I've chosen, the most notable in terms of graphics is 
Patchwork Girl. Stuart Moulthrop's 1991 hypertext Victory Garden also uses graphics 
quite innovatively and effectively. Nevertheless, first-generation hypertext remains 
primarily alphanumeric text, and as such it does not represent a radical break from 
conventional literature. The transition between conventional text and hypertext is actually 
rather smooth and even somewhat conservative. The text still consists of relatively 
familiar-looking, rectangular "pages" of alphanumeric text with few graphics or 
multimedia. The main difference is that the pages, or lexias, are organized as a dispersed, 
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hyperlinked network. Also, insofar as the text can be read coherently in various 
sequences or directions, the links are indeterminate. 
By focusing on text-rich, first-generation hypertexts, I do not mean to imply that the 
graphical or visual experience is unimportant even in a completely alphanumeric text, far 
from it. One merely has to consider the word topographic to be reminded of the intensely 
visual nature of hypertext. A network of lexias may be visualized mentally. Or in a 
textual environment like Storyspace the four graphical representations of the structure of 
the text (i.e., map view, treemap view, chart view, and outline view) may be consulted 
(See Figures 1.1-1.3). These views each compliment the text view, offering important 
cues for reading the text. 
Storyspaces's four graphical views compensate for the linear arrangement of 
alphanumeric text, for even multilinear hypertext is, after all, linear; it is not "nonlinear," 
as some commentators have suggested. Graphical representations of textual structure 
allow readers and writers to move between whole and part in the manner of the 
hermeneutic circle. When the integrated whole, or gestalt, is perceived, the parts often 
fall easily into place. Likewise, when the parts and the links between them are seen, the 
whole may be comprehended. However, one must be careful in speaking of the "whole 
text" in reference to a hypertext. Any wholes perceived or constructed are tentative at 
best because the hypertext medium tends to break wholes into fragments. 
Text-rich hypertexts have been advocated as the antidote for the current "post-
literate," multimedia culture. In 1988 Joyce stated that "hypertext is the word's revenge 
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on TV" (OTM 47). 16 Text-rich hypertext, in other words, counters the iconic medium of 
television. Elsewhere Joyce wrote, "I put my trust in words. Media seers may talk about 
how we won't need stories since we will have new, virtual worlds, but soon these new 
worlds, too, will have their own stories and we will long for new words to put them into" 
(Othermindedness 184). In other words, while narrative is at home in an alphanumeric 
text, television and film often struggle to match the narrative nuance of a text-rich 
medium. 
With regard to writing pedagogy, in the not too distant future hypertextual 
multimedia will likely encroach further into the space traditionally occupied by 
alphanumeric text, and this movement will be reflected in mainstream composition theory 
and practice (see Kress 70-77). Nevertheless, I still believe there is place for words sans 
multimedia. For the present, alphanumeric text still dominates scholarly writing; 
therefore, this mode of writing will continue to be taught in English composition. Thus, 
aside from an historical study being valuable in itself, by limiting this study to first-
generation hypertexts I hope to make a significant contribution to contemporary 
composition studies. For, as Douglas has demonstrated, hypertext theory concerns not 
just hypertext; it sheds light on literacy practices in general (EOB 27-30). 
Text-rich hypertext offers a degree of conceptual subtlety and narrative power that 
cannot be matched by an iconic medium such as film or television. Another factor to 
consider when weighing the merits of incorporating graphics or multimedia into a 
16 OTM stands for Michael Joyce 's Of Two Minds: Hypertext Pedagogy and Poetics. 
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hypertext is that verbal and iconic signs tend of compete with each other for the viewe.r's 
attention. As Silvio Gaggi discusses, the reader or viewer tends to assume that one 
semiotic mode must be privileged over the other. For example, on a page with text and 
graphic images one may be uncertain whether the image illustrates the verbal text or the 
text functions as a caption for the image (Gaggi 7). Such confusion is obviously not an 
issue when a page or screen contains only text. 
The goal of feminist hypertext or a feminist theorization of hypertext need not be the 
replacement of the conventional literary work with hypertext, in the manner oflinear, 
agonistic rhetoric. The primary value of a feminist articulation of hypertext, as I see it, is 
that it throws into relief conventional, dominant literacy technologies. As a marginal, 
though emergent, technology, hypertext represents a "privileged" standpoint from which 
to understand the conventional literary work. Once one has been exposed to hypertext, 
conventional literacy no longer goes without saying; the neutrality, invisibility, and 
taken-for-grantedness of conventional writing are called into question. As Landow writes, 
"even a brief experience of reading and writing in a hypertext environment denaturalizes 
and demystifies the culture of the printed book" (307). Similarly, Douglas argues that 
"reading hypertext fiction reminds us of just how complex the act of reading is, a 
condition to which a lifetime of immersion in a highly conventionalized, print-saturated 
environment has made us virtually immune" (EOB 35). 
Literary hypertext has a way of re/minding a person--or making one more aware or 
mindful-of what reading and writing are all about. In other words, hypertext might 
function as the other that provides a unique insight into the practices of conventional, 
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print-based literacy, allowing us to see conventional literacy and conventional literary 
works as though for the first time. Although for the "foreseeable" future we will likely 
continue to use print texts and pens, pencils, and paper, if only for their convenience, we 
will be less likely to conceive of these technologies as natural, historically inevitable, 
apolitical, or ideologically "innocent" (Haraway 157). In other words, these technologies 
will no longer be treated as transparent media or tools. 
Patterns and Recurrence 
The relationship between the text and the reader is premised on the active 
construction of patterns. But, of course, the construction or recognition of patterns is vital 
to human cognition, particularly when it comes to the sciences. For instance, according to 
quantum mechanics, "the only thing that truly exists in the universe is pattern; the 
substance that supports these patterns is, in some fundamental sense, inessential" 
(Helmreich 76). Human beings actively construct patterns out of chaotic sensory 
impressions. Hence, "the patterns the ear hears (like the patterns the eye sees) are patterns 
its perceptual habits make available" (Fish 986). Of course, this principle of pattern 
making is not new. A more novel idea is that the construction of patterns produces the 
sensation of dwelling inside the object of one's contemplation, or being incorporated into 
(or embodying) those patterns in the manner of Hayles's "extended mind," as mentioned 
above. 
Readers of all types of text construct patterns during the interpretive process. But in 
the case of hypertext, this process is taken to another level. Inasmuch as a hypertext is 
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composed of many textual fragments, with some lexias being no more than a few words 
in length, the reader must work hard to construct a coherent text. A reader may have to 
explore a hypertext for several hours before any sort of coherent text begins to emerge. 
And in accord with the principle of the extended mind, as patterns are constructed, the 
wreater' s consciousness may be said to extend into the text, and the wreater may 
experience a sense of being present in, or inhabiting, the text. 
From Presence to Pattern and Back 
In a 1993 article, Hayles argued that information technology was producing a shift 
from the ancient polarity of presence/absence to pattern/randomness: 
Money is increasingly experienced as informational patterns stored in computer 
banks rather than the presence of cash; in surrogacy and in vitro fertilization 
cases, informational genetic patterns compete with physical presence for the right 
to determine the 'legitimate' parent; [ ... ] criminals are tied to crime scenes 
through DNA patterns rather than eyewitness accounts verifying their presence; [ . 
. . ] sexual relationships are pursued through the virtual spaces of computer 
networks rather than through meetings at which the participants are physically 
present. ("VB" 71) 
Increasingly, then, as inhabitants of information-rich societies, we are more likely to ask 
whether something is patterned or random rather than whether it is present or absent. 
Relationships between individuals might even be said to be more interesting than the 
individuals themselves-and the same goes for texts and other entities. Furthermore, 
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although I have claimed that a hypertext may be treated as a living organism, we are now 
in a position to see living organisms primarily as patterns rather than presences. Even a 
deceased human being can "live on" as a pattern-i.e., as a pattern of influences felt by 
posterity. In fact, it would be unusual if a deceased individual did not somehow live on as 
a pattern in at least a few people's lives. 
Hayles also intimates that there may be a complex, complementary interaction 
between two fundamental polarities: presence/absence and pattern/randomness ("VB" 
91). Although, to my knowledge, Hayles does not pursue this provocative idea further, 
her suggestion of a complementary interaction between these two polarities implies that 
as a person begins to recognize patterns, she begins to feel present, or part of, what she is 
contemplating, which may be a text, an institution such as a university, a religious 
tradition, a family, or anything else that may be experienced as patterned. By contrast, 
when a person perceives only randomness, she is likely to feel alienated from a text, 
institution, or tradition. I am not arguing that the wreater is actually physically present in 
the text. Rather, as the wreater begins to recognize patterns in the text and even 
contributes her own text and reorganizes the textual structure-or writes herself into the 
text-she begins to feel that she is part of the text rather than alienated from it. In accord 
with the principle of the cybernetic feedback loop, recognizing and constructing pattems 
in a text produces changes in the text and changes in the reader. There is a sense of 
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"border crossing" as the wreater lives in the text and the text lives in the wreater. 17 The 
boundaries, then, between text and wreater are thoroughly permeable. 
In addition to pattern, another key term in hypertext theory is recurrence. 
Hypertextual wreating is quite recursive; there is typically a great deal of rereading as the 
same lexia or group of lexias is encountered in different contexts. But, as Stuart 
Moulthrop notes, "It is crucial to distinguish recursion from return to simple repetition" 
(2516). When we read recursively we reread text with a different perspective; we read the 
same text from a different epistemic position. According to Hayles, "Pattern can be 
recognized through redundancy or repetition of elements. Ifthere is only repetition, 
however, no new information is imparted; the intermixture of randomness rescues pattern 
from sterility" ("VB" 78). Particularly in the early stages of reading a hypertext, as the 
reader is trying to work her way into the text, the same lexias may be read over and 
over.
18 Recursive reading, then, supplants unilinear reading or the unilinear narrative. 
When Joyce, in discussing hypertext poetics, speaks of"the power of recurrence" (20) 
and "the rhythm of recurrence" (Othermindedness 120), the rhythm in this case is the 
perception of pattern-a sense of order or pockets of coherence amid chaos and 
incoherence. 
17 See Gloria Anzaldua's Borderland!La Frontera: The New Mestiza (19-35) for an eloquent discussion of 
"border crossing" as metaphor and reality. 
18 In theorizing hypertext from a feminist perspective, we can also draw a parallel between hypertextual 
recurrence and the daily round of"women's work," as defmed by traditional cultures all over the world. I 
make this argument in chapter 3. 
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Analogously, other human beings are mostly mysteries to us when we initially meet 
them, but the more time we spend with a particular person, observing recurrent patterns 
ofbehavior and attitude, the better we understand them. Very much like the act of 
reading a hypertext, we always meet other people in medias res. And we cannot be sure 
when a personal relationship will come to an end, just as we do not know when or where 
a hypertext will end. In fact, the text ends for each reader when she decides she has read 
enough, or in other words, when the narrative, or the relationship between reader and 
text, has run its course. The reader of a conventional text knows how many pages are in a 
book or article; she knows when she has read every word on every page and there is 
nothing more, on the surface anyway, to see. Of course, there may be allusions that are 
missed and various degrees of misunderstanding, but the reader can be sure that she has 
read the complete text-and read it in the sequence intended by the author. But with 
regard to hypertext, reading the "entire text" has no meaning. Whatever text is 
instantiated in a particular reading is the text for that reading; the remainder of the 
material coded in the work can only be instantiated as other texts. 
Since the pages are not numbered or organized sequentially, the reader of a literary 
hypertext never knows exactly where she is in the text. As Shelley Jackson writes in 
Patchwork Girl, 
When I open a book I know where I am, which is restful. My reading is spatial 
and even volumetric. I tell myself, I am a third of the way down through a 
rectangular solid, I am a quarter of the way down the page, I am here on the page, 
here on this line, here, here, here. But where am I now? I am in a here and a 
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present moment that has no history and no expectations for the future. ("this 
writing") 19 
Jackson's language here is the language of mathematics, particularly geometry. But in a 
hypertextual environment one's reliance on mathematics and measurement breaks down. 
Books may be measured in words, lines, paragraphs, pages, chapters, and so forth. But a 
spatially dispersed hypertext is not measured in any meaningful sense at all. 
Consequently, geographic and cartographic metaphors do not transfer well to hypertext 
theory. A hypertext cannot even be quantified as computer memory, because the size of 
the file changes as the wreater writes herself into the text. 
Empiricism, the hallmark of the modernism, is based almost entirely on 
measurement. What cannot be measured is unimportant, or perhaps even nonexistent, for 
the empiricist. Luce Irigaray refers to the Western obsession with mathematical 
measurement as she writes of"the mystery that [woman] represents in a culture that 
claims to enumerate everything by units, inventory everything by individualities. She is 
neither one nor two" (1468). It is arguable, though, that in terms of what is most 
significant to us as human beings, things that can be measured are not very important at 
all. Love, passion, compassion, curiosity, and similar human experiences are not 
measurable. Which brings up another reason for choosing the organism metaphor over 
the landscape metaphor for hypertext: landscapes are inevitably measured and mapped, 
19 Since hypertexts do not generally have page numbers, Storyspace lexias, or writing spaces, are labeled. 
The parenthetic citation for "this writing" indicates the label of a writing space in Patchwork Girl. 
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while a hypertext, like a living organism, cannot be reliably measured. The Cartesian 
coordinate system does not work with hypertext. 
A corollary of measurement is exclusion. In order to measure something, we must 
draw lines and borders and exclude what doesn't fit our measurement criteria (e.g., the 
exclusion of interpersonal skills from IQ tests). But hypertext differs from the 
conventional literary work in that hypertext is not premised on exclusion; hypertext is not 
a zero-sum game. Douglas writes, "Print mostly works in much the same way as a legal 
decision: a zero-sum game that settles conflicting claims and narratives constructed by 
each side with a single decision, inevitably validating one version or the events while 
entirely suppressing the other (20). But with hypertext, since multiple texts may be 
instantiated, there do not have to be winners and losers among texts or readings. 
Hypertext works against the modernist dichotomies that, Code argues, necessarily 
produce "closures and exclusions" (RS 194). By contrast, the conventional work follows 
the Aristotelian logic of noncontradiction, which requires closures, exclusions, and 
impermeable boundaries. 
Feminist Epistemology 
The second part of this three-pronged study, feminist epistemology, is relevant 
because I treat the act of reading and writing hypertext as a way of knowing, or 
epistemology, that differs significantly from the mainstream epistemology.20 Mainstream 
20 The phrase "women's ways of knowing" was popularized by Mary Field Belenky eta!. in Women 's Ways 
of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1986). 
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epistemology, in turn, is associated with conventional literacy. In other words, knowledge 
mediated by conventional text and knowledge mediated by hypertext differ substantially. 
It is vital to understand that there is no pure, unmediated knowledge; all knowledge 
is mediated. As Haraway writes, "There is no unmediated photograph or passive camera 
obscura" (190). There is no direct access to truth or reality. Knowledge is mediated by 
language, culture, power relations, technologies, and so forth; therefore, hypertext, as a 
medium, inevitably influences the act of knowing. Of course, I am not the first person to 
suggest that hypertext is a way of knowing. Joyce, for example, has stated that "some see 
hypertext as an other way of reading; some see it as a new way of knowing-yet what is 
read and who should know are both in dispute" (OTM24). One purpose ofthe present 
study is to elucidate just "what is read" when one reads a hypertext, along with how 
gender shapes or influences what is read. 
An Overview of Feminist Epistemology 
On the following pages I present a brief overview of feminist epistemology, 
beginning with how feminist epistemology differs from mainstream epistemology. 
According to Code, "Mainstream Anglo-American epistemology [has] defined itself 
around a conviction that its principle task [is] to determine the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for objective, uniformly valid 'knowledge in general'" ("Epistemology" 173). 
Feminist epistemologists differ from the masculinist mainstream of their field in arguing 
that knowledge is always contingent, tentative, partial, and politically interested. 
Knowledge is also validated within epistemic communities, as opposed to resting solely 
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on individualistic appeals to observational or empirical evidence. Thus, in feminist 
"revisionist empiricism, inquirers are answerable as much to the epistemic community as 
to the evidence; details of a knower's epistemic location and interests count among the 
conditions that make knowledge possible, and are likewise open to critical scrutiny" 
(Code, "Epistemology" 177); that is to say, "In many feminist stories of knowledge 
production, objectivity is as much a consequence of negotiation and communal criticism 
[ . . . ]as of scrupulous attention to 'the evidence'" (Code, RS 182).21 
In many accounts, feminist epistemology begins with a deconstruction of the 
Cartesian autonomous, rational knower-the individual epistemic agent, or subject, who 
knows the external world, or object, from a safe distance. The Cartesian knower relies 
heavily on binaries, particularly the mind/body split and the subject/object split. As Diana 
M.A. Relke writes, "The scientific method is not so much a method as an epistemology, a 
dualistic and hierarchical way ofknowing the world .. . . It determines the questions 
science asks, what evidence is persuasive in answering them, and what counts as 
legitimate knowledge."22 Thus, while mainstream Western science holds to an objectivist 
way of knowing, many feminist epistemologists, as well as rhetoricians, argue that 
knowledge is both objective and subjective, or a hybrid of subjectivity and objectivity. 
Feminist epistemology, in other words, does not do away with objectivity-just 
objectivism, the ideology that strives to cleanse knowledge of all traces of subjectivity. 
21 RS stands for Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations. 
22 Unpaginated online text: Diana M.A. Relke. "Feminist Pedagogy and the Integration of Knowledge: 
Toward a More Interdisciplinary University." A lecture delivered at the University of Saskatchewan, 1994. 
19 July 2002. <http://www. usask.ca/wgst/journals/con£3 .htm>. 
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There is no need for epistemologist to choose between objectivity and subjectivity. 
In feminist epistemology, the masculinist either/or paradigm is replaced by the both, and 
(or both, and, and) paradigm (Douglas, "Understanding" 125). As demonstrated by the 
work of Keller, Code, Hartsock, and others, feminist epistemologists strive to break down 
the classical Western binaries of mind/body, reason/emotion, objective/subjective, 
internal/external, masculine/feminine, fact/belief, and so forth. And in this interrogation 
ofbinaristic thinking, feminist epistemologists share some, though certainly not all, ofthe 
concerns of postmodernists and deconstructionists. 
Femini.st epistemology is situated, embodied, and relativistic-but not relativistic in 
the conventional, caricatured sense according to which no real or reliable knowledge is 
possible. Reliable knowledge is never neutral and disinterested, but neither is it wholly 
arbitrary or nonobjective. Given that a number of feminist epistemologists (e.g. , Keller, 
Harding, Haraway) are also scientists and, consequently, have a personal stake in a 
qualified empiricism, it makes sense that they would insist on a physical reality that 
imposes constraints on what is possible. Most feminist epistemologists differ from 
schools of thought, such "ludic" post-structuralism, that treat human reality as an abstract 
play of signifiers. The oppression of females, along with other others, in contemporary 
society is not a play of language, but a concrete reality that must be actively resisted, 
subverted, and ultimately abolished. 
Far from dooming scholarship or science to a politically enfeebling relativism, taking 
subjectivity into account, as feminist epistemologists urge, promises to bolster the 
validity of scholarly work. Haraway advocates a dynamic, feminist objectivity, as she 
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states that "feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges" (188). Such a 
situated stance contextualizes scholarship rhetorically, making it richer or "thicker." 
Taking subjectivity into account creates what Keller calls "dynamic objectivity," which 
acts as a corrective for instrumental ethics. "Dynamic objectivity aims at a form of 
knowledge that grants to the world around us its independent integrity but does so in a 
way that remains cognizant of, indeed relies on, our connectivity with that world. In this, 
dynamic objectivity is not unlike empathy" (Keller, Reflections 117). I prefer the term 
situated objectivity; this term expresses the principle that both Haraway and Keller 
describe. A feminist ethics of care and respect may be founded on situated objectivity, 
and this stance may supplant instrumental ethics. 
Mainstream Anglo-American epistemology, as Code explains, is founded on a 
paradigm of knowing medium-sized objects, or objects visible to the naked eye and 
manipulable by human beings. And when knowledge ofmedium-sized objects (e.g., 
Newton's apple, billiard balls, bullets) is taken as exemplary knowledge, a strict subject-
object epistemology results. In contrast, Code advocates an epistemology founded on the 
experience of knowing other people. Code argues that knowing other people is more far 
more exemplary than knowing medium-sized objects. After all, human infants come to 
know other people, especially their primary caregivers, long before they gain a practical 
understanding of medium-sized objects. "Developmentally, learning what she or he can 
expect of other people is one of the first and most essential kinds of knowledge a child 
acquires" (Code, RS 45). Knowledge of other people differs from propositional 
knowledge. As Code writes, 
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The fact that it is acquired differently, interactively, relationally, differentiates it 
both as process and as product from standard propositional knowledge [ ... ]. The 
contrast between its multi-dimensional, multiperspectival character and the stark 
simplicity of standard paradigms requires philosophers to reexamine the practice 
of granting exemplary status to those paradigms. (RS 47). 
Perhaps, in part, to ease the concerns of scientists, Code goes on to point out that "taking 
knowledge of other people as a model does not[ .. . ] require scientists to begin talking to 
their rocks and cells [ . . . ]. It calls, rather, for a recognition that rocks and cells, and 
scientists, are located in multiple relations to one another, all of which are open to 
analysis and critique" (RS 50). Again, subjectivity does not replace objectivity; these two 
modes of knowing together form a dynamic, or situated, objectivity. 
Although knowing another person does not offer the scientific precision obtainable 
when studying medium-sized objects, knowing other people is probably more necessary 
to a healthy, satisfying life. In fact, "the items a person knows quite unequivocally, as she 
knows that a cup is on the table, comprise a small part of her-or anyone's-knowledge" 
(Code, RS 3). Additionally, knowing that an apple is red or that water freezes at zero 
degrees centigrade is safely apolitical knowledge (Code, RS 37); it is generally 
noncontroversial and ethically neutral. Of course, when it comes to how bullets, nuclear 
missiles, or similarly dangerous medium-sized objects are used, politics is definitely a 
factor-but only because their use has become a human relations issue. By contrast, 
relational knowledge, or knowledge of other living organisms, is in itself eminently 
political and fraught with ethical questions. 
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A familiarity with the tenets of feminist epistemology leads to the suspicion that 
literary works, at least in formalist schools of criticism, have often been treated much like 
other medium-sized objects, or located on the same ontological plane as apples, chairs, 
and billiard balls. Under this model, the reader's activities are ignored because "the text is 
taken to be self-sufficient (Fish 982). This practice has encouraged critics to attempt to 
know literary works in an objective, "scientific" way. In fact, "establishing the fixed text 
has been the humanistic raison d'etre since the Renaissance. To nail it down forever and 
then finally explain it, that has been what literary scholars do" (Lanham 7). Inasmuch as 
the literary text is assumed to be concealing secrets, objectivist schools of literary 
criticism strive to extract these secrets from the text. According to this view, great authors 
are those who are highly skilled in the use of ambiguity, indirection, and symbolism, and 
the task of the critic is to explain the text to the fullest extent possible. But for the post-
structuralist critic, "there are no fixed texts but only interpretive strategies making them" 
(Fish 989). In other words, if the text is constructed by the reader rather than the author, it 
is not the text that needs to be explained, but the interpretation. 
As Fish argues, interpretive strategies are learned within interpretive communities 
(989). Furthermore, historically, many (perhaps even most) interpretive communities 
have been situated within patriarchal cultures. Consider, for instance, the violence of the 
nailing-down metaphor, connoting as it does nailing down a victim. Janice Hocker 
Rushing has linked hunting with scholarly criticism, stating that "the critic uses methods 
to investigate text(s) like a hunter employs the weapon to down the prey" (158). Rushing 
argues further that texts are coded feminine and criticism is coded masculine (161). And 
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if texts are coded feminine, it follows that what is "nailed down" are not simply texts, but 
f emaleness-the elusive, slippery, cultural ideal of woman, the other in patriarchal 
societies. 
But far from hunting and controlling the text as prey, engaging with a hypertext is 
more like knowing another person, or at least knowing another living organism of some 
sort. Texts are indeterminate, shifting, and resistant to final interpretation. Beyond the 
indeterminacy at the level of interpretation, in the case of hypertext, the actual marks on 
the page (or pixels on the screen) are too "slippery" to ever be nailed down, as a medium-
sized object might be. A good analogy might be trying to nail down mercury. Human 
beings are also mercurial, shifting, sliding texts; we shift as we move into different 
contexts. Hence, knowledge ofhuman begins is never final or unequivocal. 
Knowledge of other people has perhaps not been deemed as important as knowledge 
of medium-size objects because interpersonal knowledge cannot be based on 
measurement. One issue is that the measurer would have to be measured as well. But 
aside from the problems of measuring a relationship, living beings themselves cannot be 
measured in the way that medium-sized objects can be. Of course, the human body is 
subject to measurement, and the female body has probably been measured and weighed 
more than any other "object" in history; the body, however, is far from identical to the 
person. As Greco writes, "The body is, among other things, a social question" 
("potent").23 The living, changing person, or the subjective experience of embodiment, 
23 This quote is taken from the writing space, or lexia, called "potent" in Cyborg: Engineering the Body 
Electric. 
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cannot be measured. Thus when shifting from mainstream objectivism to an 
epistemology founded on knowing other people, one gives up the ideal of perfect 
scientific precision but gains a far richer, more nuanced kind of knowledge. 
Only dead things, like dead languages, can be justifiably objectified. And while a 
knowledge of human beings (and texts) can be attained, it is not like knowing that apples· 
fall toward the earth or that water freezes at zero degrees centigrade. But an interesting 
fact is that while knowledge of other people is always partial, it is usually "good enough" 
for human beings to interact with and trust one another. There is no need for scientific 
precision when it comes to interpersonal relationships or knowing other living organism. 
Moreover, an ethics of care and respect depends on the realization that we are all partial, 
imperfect, or flawed. 
Knowledge of medium-size objects is, for the most part, propositional knowledge, as 
indicated by the "S-knows-that-p" formula of mainstream epistemology. "S-knows-that-
p" is shorthand for subject knows that proposition (e.g., A child knows that apples are red 
and round). Propositional knowledge is knowing that something is or is not true, that 
something is or is not possible, and so forth. This kind ofknowledge differs radically 
from knowledge of human beings. Thus, feminist epistemology goes beyond the 
paradigmatic "S-knows-that-p" formula. As Code argues, "Knowledge of other people 
develops, operates, and is open to interpretation at different levels; it admits of degrees in 
ways that knowing that the book is red does not. Hence it is qualitatively different from 
the simple observational knowledge commonly constitutive of epistemological 
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paradigms" ( WCSN 3 7). 24 Knowledge of other people is far too equivocal to be 
"grasped" by mainstream epistemology. 
As indicated by the foregoing, mainstream epistemologists conceive of knowledge 
quite differently than do feminist epistemologists. In the still influential positivist-
empiricist tradition, knowledge may be defined as 
the propositional product of a perceptual confrontation between a sentient creature 
(a subject} and an insentient item (an object) that is accessible to the creature's 
sensory apparatus [ ... ]. [T]he subject is able to utter statements about [the object] 
that name or quantify some of its properties or indicate how they are spatially 
interrelated. Those statements become the elements of knowledge when/ifthere is 
'sufficient' evidence to support the conclusion that the object is just as the 
propositions state. (Code, RS 166) 
If a hypertext is anything like a living organism, then propositional knowledge is 
inadequate for a sophisticated theorization hypertext. Hypertexts are not quantifiable, 
measurable objects; they cannot be adequately described in spatial terms; nor are they 
separable from their readers and writers. 
Feminist epistemology, as should be evident from even this brief overview, intersects 
quite productively with hypertext theory. And the borders of both hypertext theory and 
feminist rhetoric also intersect in interesting ways with feminist rhetoric, as I hope to 
make clear in the following section. 
24 WCSN stands for What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. 
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Feminist Rhetoric 
Feminist rhetoric is distinguished from the mainstream tradition by virtue of taking 
gender as a primary analytic category. Yet gender is not the exclusive concern of feminist 
rhetoricians. In 1989, Andrea Lunsford and Janice Lauer stated that the multiple modes 
of inquiry engaged in by scholars in rhetoric and composition may be classified under 
three headings: historical scholarship, rhetorical or theoretical inquiry, and empirical 
research ("The Place of Rhetoric" 1 06). Of course, feminists are included among these 
scholars; therefore, in the following pages I organize my review of feminist rhetoric 
according Lunsford and Lauer's three categories. 
Feminist historical scholarship in rhetoric, like feminist epistemology, is founded on 
a critique of a received rhetorical tradition- in this case the canon that, following Tisias, 
Corax, and perhaps Gorgias, begins in earnest with Plato and Aristotle and continues up 
to the present, largely sidestepping female and other nonprivileged, culturally peripheral 
voices. The received tradition, in other words, is premised on the elision of troublesome 
gaps, the very gaps that feminist historiographers work within. Lunsford, for example, 
speaks of feminist scholars of rhetoric who 
attempt to [ ... ] interrupt the seamless narrative usually told about the rhetorical 
tradition and to open up possibilities for multiple rhetorics, rhetorics that would 
not name and valorize one traditional, competitive, agonistic, and linear mode of 
rhetorical discourse but would rather incorporate other, often dangerous moves: 
breaking the silence; naming in personal terms; employing dialogics; recognizing 
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and using the power of conversation; moving centripetally towards connections; 
and valuing-indeed insisting upon--collaboration. ("On Reclaiming" 6) 
The emphasis on conversation is important to hypertext theory, as will be increasingly 
evident in later chapters of this work. In brief, a read-write interface such as Storyspace 
produces a shift from classical oratorical rhetoric to a more conversational mode, and 
these conversations are multiple and multilinear. I will reserve a more detailed discussion 
of the connections between feminist rhetoric and hypertext theory for subsequent 
chapters. 
With respect to historical scholarship, Cheryl Glenn writes, "In concert with 
historiography, feminist research has also worked to resist the Western paternal narrative 
of rhetoric- a narrative Corbett described as 'one ofthe most patriarchal of all the 
academic disciplines'-by recovering and recuperating women's contributions in the 
broad history of culture making" (9). Yet feminist historical scholarship in rhetoric is not 
just a matter of inserting (token) female or other historically silenced voices into the 
received history of Western rhetoric. Nor should the "great man" history of rhetoric be 
matched by a "great woman" tradition.25 We need to do much more than merely write 
women into an individualistic tradition. Raymie McKerrow proposes that "we reverse the 
phrasing-instead of writing women into the history of rhetoric, let us proceed to write 
rhetoric into the history of women" (317). Thus, the history of rhetoric must be "fitted" to 
25 The flaw in my view, of the methodology of texts such as Cheryl Glenn's Rhetoric Retold and Reclaimin~ Rhetorica, edited by Andrea Lunsford, is that it is premised on a "great woman," individualistic 
historiography of rhetoric. A more productive history of feminist rhetoric might focus instead o_n 
collaborative work and social movements, rather than exceptional individuals. Here I concur With Barbara 
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women's lives, -rather than vice-versa. As Susan Jarratt argues, what are called for are 
rhetorical histories, not histories of rhetoric. "Traditional histories of rhetoric could be 
defined at those histories having taken as their subject matter chiefly documents 
explicitly calling themselves 'rhetorics' : i.e., pedagogical treatises concerned with the 
composition and delivery of persuasive orations" (13). Such histories do not include 
poetic, scientific., or philosophical genres. And, for proponents of the received tradition, it 
goes without saying that cookbooks, etiquette manuals, letters, diaries, and other 
historically "feminine" texts are not rhetorical. 
Under the heading of rhetorical or theoretical inquiry, Lunsford and Lauer's second 
category, feminists have interrogated the hegemonic rhetorical theory of the West and the 
mainstream, objectivist epistemology it is founded on. In particular, feminist revisions of 
rhetoric have called into question the agonistic character of mainstream rhetoric. 
Consequently, classical persuasion (i.e., moving an audience to action or changing an 
audience 's mind) has been dislodged from its central position rhetorical theory. Erika 
Lindemann departs from the classical agonistic paradigm when she defines rhetoric as "a 
form of reasoning about probabilities, based on assumptions people share as members of 
a community" (42). The emphasis on community is an important revision of the "great 
man" tradition of rhetoric, or the "good man skilled in speaking" (Quintilian). 
Accordingly, feminist rhetoricians have advocated collaborative and dialogic rhetorics, 
sometimes referencing the ideals of the Greek sophists (see Jarratt). As indicated above, 
Biesecker's well-known argument in "Coming to Terms with Recent Attempts to Write Women into the 
History of Rhetoric." I take up this argument again in chapter 2. 
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in feminist rhetorical theory, metaphors of conversation replace militaristic, conquest 
metaphors that construct rhetoric as a win/lose, right/wrong, us/them proposition. The 
shift to a conversational rhetoric is thus a critical move that makes room for multiple 
rhetorics. 
In a 1995 article, Lunsford, Ede, and Glenn explored the intersecting borders of 
rhetoric and feminism. Due to the importance and comprehensiveness ofthis article, I 
summarize it here at some length. The major part of the article is organized under the five 
canons of classical rhetoric: invention and memory, arrangement, style, and delivery-
the first two being linked because of a rich overlap between and inquiring (inventio) and 
knowing (memoria) ("Border Crossings" 410). Feminist readings ofthe rhetorical 
tradition expose the political and ideological assumptions that inform acts of invention 
and memory, such as who is considered capable of inventing and remembering 
arguments and what counts as knowledge. Traditional images of the rhetor must be 
interrogated, for "until recently, the figure of the rhetor has been assumed to be 
masculine, unified, autonomous, and capable of acting rationally on the world through 
language" (412). Regarding arrangement, for over 2500 years patterns of rhetorical 
arrangement have been based on the agonistic "conquest model," which aims to triumph 
over an opponent (415). Feminists, by contrast, often opt for dialogical, collaborative, 
and open-ended discursive patternings-opening up texts to multiple voices and styles 
( 416). The canon of style historically, and particularly under modernism, has been both 
gendered and classed-that is, negatively associated with women and the persuasion of 
popular audiences ( 422). Yet many feminists resist stylistic conventions that dichotomize 
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public and private, that devalue personal experience in favor of "objective" fact, 
"rational" logic, and established authorities ( 423). In terms of delivery, throughout most 
of Western history women have been barred from public discourse, which led many to 
alternate media, as in speaking indirectly through secondary sources, translations of male 
authors, mystical visions, autobiographies, letters, and so on ( 431 ). Hence, these 
nontraditional sources (e.g. , translations of male authors, and so on) ought to studied for 
the light they may shed on rhetoric, or on humanity as the "symbol using animal" (Burke, 
Rhetoric of Religion 40) . . 
In "Toward a Mestiza Rhetoric," Lunsford presents an interview she conducted with 
teacher, theorist of writing, accomplished rhetorician, and prolific author Gloria 
Anzaldua. The primary theme of the interview is Anzaldua's "personal triumph over the 
'tradition of silence' and her ability to imagine, enact, and inhabit spaces that go beyond 
dichotomies of all kinds." Anzaldua, author of Borderlands/La Frontera, envisions the 
self as a process allows for nonbinary identity, for new states of "mestiza" consciousness, 
and for multiple writing strategies-what Lunsford calls a "mestiza rhetoric" (2). 
Mestiza, in other words, is one name for the rhetor who embraces multiplicity and 
multilinearity, and in this sense "mestiza rhetoric" may contribute to a feminist 
theorization ofhypertext; therefore, I return to this theme in subsequent chapters. 
Feminist empirical scholarship in rhetoric deals, in large part though not exclusively, 
with the teaching of writing, with one of the most researched topics being collaborative 
writing. Based on their ground-breaking research on collaborative writing, Ede and 
Lunsford identified two modes of collaboration that were of most interest to them as 
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women and collaborative writers: the hierarchical mode and the dialogic mode. In the 
hierarchical mode, "collaboration is linearly structured, driven by highly specific goals, 
and played out by people who play clearly defined roles" ("Rhetoric in a New Key" 235). 
This style of collaboration is "typically conservative" and "predominately masculine" 
(235). The dialogic mode, by contrast, is "loosely structured, and the roles enacted within 
it are fluid" (235). Lunsford and Ede characterize the dialogic mode as "predominately 
feminine" (236). In a 1992 article, Lunsford and Ede critiqued the mainstream, 
expressivist notions of collaborative writing, stating that "collaborative learning theory 
from its inception has failed to challenge traditional concepts of radical individualism and 
ownership of ideas" and has operated in a traditional and largely hierarchical way" 
("Collaborative Authorship" 695). 
The feminist emphasis on collaborative writing is relevant to this study despite the 
fact that I have selected only single-authored hypertexts. The Storyspace interface is quite 
amenable to collaborative writing, and I will explore this topic most fully in the final 
chapter of this study, which focuses on the implications of hypertext theory for 
composition pedagogy. But aside from the type of collaboration familiar to 
compositionists, there is another kind of collaboration whereby the reader of a hypertext 
collaborates with the author to extend the text; that is, the reader collaborates with the 
author in writing herself into the text. Furthermore, if one wreater passes a hypertext 
along to another wreater, the collaboration becomes multiple. 
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Sophism, Skepticism, and Feminism 
Another fact to consider is that both feminist rhetoric and feminist epistemology are 
deeply skeptical of absolute, noncontextualized truths. As mentioned above, feminist 
rhetorics, as well as epistemologies, have been traced back to the 51h century BCE Greek 
sophists, e.g., Protagoras of Abdera, Gorgias ofLeontini, Prodicus Hippias, and others. 
The sophists "believed and taught that notions of 'truth' had to be adjusted to fit the ways 
of a particular audience in a certain time and with a certain set of beliefs and laws" 
(Jarratt xv). In other words, kairos, or the right time and place for a rhetorical encounter, 
was a primary concern of the sophists. Thus, sophistic rhetoric was situated rhetoric. 
The sophists, despite the enmity displayed toward them by Plato and Aristotle, likely 
influenced later thinkers, such as members of the Skeptic school of philosophy, including 
founder of Skepticism, Pyrrho ofElis (circa 365-275 BCE), Cameades (circa 214-129 
BCE), and Sextus Empiricus (circa 200 CE). The link between the sophists and the 
skeptics is suggested in Jarratt's observation that the "restoration of good opinion [for the 
sophists] began in the nineteenth century with Hegel, who saw the sophists as a 
necessary, skeptical antithesis to the Presocratics, eventually synthesized in the idealism 
of Plato" (xx-xxi, emphasis added). Skepticism, then, acts as a counterpoint to the 
abstractions and generalizations characteristic ofPlatonism. 
The skeptical focus on the particular over the general has definite associations with 
feminist epistemology as well as feminist rhetoric. In comparing skepticism to feminist 
epistemology, Code refers to "skepticisms which are resourceful, not defeatist." Thus, the 
"ancient skepticisms ofPyrrho and Sextus Empiricus were declarations not of nihilism, 
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but of the impossibility of certainty, ofthe need to withhold definitive judgment" (Code 
RS 55). The relevance of such historical information to the present study is that feminist 
rhetoric and epistemology, like philosophical skepticism and sophistic rhetoric, are not 
hopelessly relativists, subjective, or nihilistic. By extension, a feminist theorization of 
hypertext would be expected to foreground the creation of a new way of reading and 
writing, not the destruction of conventionalliteracies or conventional texts. 
As should be evident by now, the sophistic/skeptic stance is thoroughly appropriate 
for a hypertextual environment that can never be known, or mapped, with certainty. It is 
noteworthy that in 155 BCE Cameades was sent as a member of an embassy to Rome. 
While there, he lectured on skepticism, allegedly asserting that knowledge is impossible 
and that truth has no criterion. The Roman statesman, Cato the Elder, however, believed 
the Skeptic philosophy was dangerous to the youth of Rome, and he impelled the Roman 
Senate to banish Cameades (Radical Academy). 26 I read this episode as emblematic of 
the fate of epistemologies and rhetorics that have dared to challenge the Western 
Platonic-Aristotelian hegemony. Hence, my argument is that the late-twentieth-century 
emergence of hypertext technologies and theories, along with feminist epistemology and 
feminist rhetoric, should be contextualized within the postmodemist resurgence, or 
indeed explosion, of historically suppressed ways of thinking, communicating, and being. 
Such an explosion cannot be contained, but it may be theorized for the benefit of twenty-
26 The Radical Academy. "Adventures in Ancient Philosophy." Available online: 
btt:p://radicalacademy.com/adiphilethical.htm#skeptics. Accessed 15 Dec 01. 
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first-century compositionists and their students, along with general readers (or wreaters) 
of literary hypertext. 
In the next chapter I articulate in more detail the implications of a theory and practice 
that sits at the crossroads of hypertext theory, feminist epistemology, and feminist 
rhetoric. Specifically, I argue that a hypertext theory informed by feminist epistemology 
leads to a rearticulation of feminist rhetoric. Thus, the first two elements of this three-
pronged study push the third element in a new direction. 
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CHAPTER2 
Guilty Texts, Guilty Wreaters, Guilty Women 
As I argued in the previous chapter, feminist literary hypertext represents a mode of 
discourse (i.e., multivocal, multiperspectival, nonhierarchical) that has historically been 
excluded from mainstream Western discourse. Literary hypertext is typically judged by 
the standards ofthe default textual medium, which is conventional print text. Yet voices 
that are excluded, suppressed, and silenced inevitably break out, often in seemingly 
jarring tones-i.e., tones that jar the mainstream out of its complacency. Hence, feminist 
literary hypertext may be seen within the larger context of the cacophony oflong-
suppressed, long-silenced voices-voices that sound "shrill"-i.e., or lacking in dignity, 
decorum, or propriety (or property, the phallic marker) 
Faced with the necessity of assimilating, embracing, appropriating-or simply 
dealing with-these new, discordant voices, many theorists within the field of rhetoric 
and composition are now coming to terms with new modes of writing and generic 
transformations. Myka Vielstimmig, for instance, observed, "The new essay seems to 
have its own logic: intuitive, emergent, dialogic, multiple-one grounded in working 
together and in re/presenting that working together" (90). 1 These new modes of writing 
are facilitated by new media, such as hypertext. Yet all literary texts, not just literary 
hypertexts, are fundamentally multiple. As Iser argues, "the reading process is selective 
1 Myka Vielstimmig is the collaborative pen name of Kathleen Yancy and Michael Spooner. 
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and the potential text is infinitely richer than any of its individual realizations" (959). A 
feminist theorization of hypertext must therefore account for textual indeterminacy and 
plurality. 
My argument in this chapter is that that the conjunction of hypertext theory and 
feminist epistemology leads to a rearticulation of feminist rhetoric. I devote a large part 
of this chapter to exploring metaphors that relate to hypertext, feminist epistemology, and 
feminist rhetoric. I also discuss a number of arguments that either have been or could be 
made either to support or to discredit hypertext. More specifically, my rhetorical strategy 
in much ofthis chapter is to (1) present arguments or metaphors that either have been or 
might potentially be used to account for hypertext, (2) demonstrate why these arguments 
or metaphors either do or do not adequately account for hypertext, and (3) present 
alternative metaphors and arguments to displace those that do not advance our 
understanding of hypertext. But ultimately, the purpose for this wide-ranging exploration 
of hypertext is to reassess arguments and metaphors that have commonly been applied to 
feminist rhetoric. 
My rationale for focusing so extensively on metaphors in this chapter is that 
metaphors have great heuristic value. I treat the heuristic process as the counterpart of 
hermeneutics; which is to say that discovery, or rhetorical invention, and the 
interpretation of texts go hand in hand. While my analysis of the five literary hypertexts 
involved hermeneutics, in mapping the relatively uncharted territory where hypertext 
theory, feminist epistemology, and feminist rhetoric intersect, I must rely heavily on 
heuristics. By playing with metaphors, a rhetor may discover an argument-and scholars 
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are essentially rhetors when it comes to publishing or presenting their work. I must also 
note that although I speak of"metaphors or arguments" or "metaphors and arguments," 
the fact is that many metaphors are also arguments-condensed arguments, but 
arguments nonetheless. It is now generally acknowledged that metaphors are not merely 
decorative; metaphors influence thoughts, attitudes, and actions; thus, they are rhetorical 
(Lakoff and Johnson 3-6; Eubanks 92-93). For example, the metaphor "Time is money" 
is a condensed argument, and its rhetorical power derives from capitalistic cultural codes. 
Such an argument would be unpersuasive, and probably meaningless, in a non-capitalist 
culture. Hence, in exploring, analyzing, and "listening to" metaphors, I am engaging in 
rhetorical criticism. 
Taxis, Hypotaxis, and Parataxis 
Much of the discussion in this chapter is undergirded by an analysis of three classical 
rhetorical terms: taxis, hypotaxis, and parataxis. Richard Lanham, in A Handlist of 
Rhetoric Terms, gives the literal meaning of the Greek term taxis as "arrangement, order" 
(150).2 Another source defines taxis as "to divide a subject into its various components or 
attributes" (Burton). 3 Taxis, then, is roughly equivalent to the canon of arrangement in 
classical rhetoric. The second term, hypotaxis ("subjection") is defined as "an 
2 Taxis originally referred to the arrangement or order of troops on a battlefield. For rhetoricians, ~axis 
denotes the arrangement of an argument. Although the agonistic, masculinist foundations o~ c.lassrcal 
rhetoric are evident in this terminology, the concept of parataxis is quite amenable to a femmrst 
theorization of hypertext. 
3 Unpaginated website: Burton, Gideon 0. "Silva Rhetoricae." Brigham Young University. 
http: / !humanities. byu.edu/rhetoric/silva.htm. Accessed 30 May 2001. 
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arrangement of clauses or phrases in a dependent or subordinate relationship (87). 
Lanham cites the finely crafted prose of Samuel Johnson as exemplary for hypotactic 
syntax. Finally, parataxis ("placing side by side") is defined as "clauses or phrases 
arranged independently (a coordinate, rather than a subordinate, construction). [ ... ] 
Opposite of hypotaxis."4 Parataxis, additionally, may be "essentially an oral syntax, as 
opposed to the literate balance and subordination ofhypotaxis" (1 08). 
For feminists and other critics of hierarchical social formations, the phrase 
"dependent or subordinate relationship" in Lanham's defmition of hypotaxis has 
significance far beyond the realm of syntax. The syntactic patterns of elite, modernist 
literary discourse reflect political ideologies rooted in late-seventeenth and eighteenth-
century Western Europe. In other words, hypotaxis is the syntax of the Enlightenment; 
therefore, this mode of rhetorical arrangement is deeply gendered, classed, and raced. 
Although changes at a linguistic level do not necessarily produce deeper changes in the 
"grammar" (i.e., rules and regulations) of a society, sociolinguistics have demonstrated 
that changes at the level of written language (e.g., editorial guidelines for nonsexist 
language) often serve as an index of social and ideological changes already underway. 
Furthermore, accentuating these linguistic changes may serve to quicken these changes or 
to intensify the destabilization of social hierarchies (Romaine 15 5-166). 
4 A hyperbolic, or perhaps self-parodic, example of parataxis may be quoted from ~icha~l Joyce: "The . 
gesture of the parenthetical, the dialectic, the thematic, the rhythmic, the fugal, the 1sobanc: ~he met_onym1c, 
the list, the link, the litany, as well as any and all other-whether em-dashed or no--appos1t10nal st1tchery 
constitutes the space ofhypertextuality" (Othermindedness 156). 
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Insofar as lexias are arranged side-by-side or simply dispersed nonhierarchically, 
parataxis is the syntax of hypertext. Hence, employing hypertext to destabilize dominant 
syntactic patterns may be a step in the right direction for feminism. As Barbara Page 
wrote in 1996, literary hypertexts composed by women indicate that "resistance is 
possible at least at the level of syntax and structure" (14). Although hypertext may not 
actually be "intrinsically anti-hierarchical" as Landow claims (227), it can easily be 
deployed in a nonhierarchical way; that is to say, the paratactic structure of hypertext 
may contribute to the destabilization of gendered hierarchies. 
Feminist Articulations of Hypertext 
Feminists frustrated by modernist strictures are increasingly experimenting with 
different modes of writing and reading, as well as different media. Below, I very briefly 
survey the scholarship in this area as it relates to hypertext, beginning with a statement 
from a 1995 article by Lunsford, Ede, and Glenn: "At least some electronic media, such 
as hypertext, seem to allow for feminist concerns of inclusion, participation, and 
dialogue, and here we find the potential, at least, to allow full audience engagement in the 
establishment of the text itself' ("Border Crossings" 436). Inclusion ofhistorically 
peripheral voices and the facilitation of dialogue are central tenets of feminist approaches 
to literature and language studies. Page observes that a number of female experimental 
writers "take for granted that language itself and much of canonical literature encode 
hierarchies of value that denigrate and subordinate women, and, therefore, they 
incorporate into their work a strategically critical or oppositional posture, as well as a 
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search for alternative forms of composition" (2). Page goes on to assert that "feminist 
theory and textual practice can be of particular pertinence to theorists ofhypertext who 
recognize a radical politics in the rhetoric and poetics of hypertextual writing" (16). 
Laura Sullivan also referred to the political implications of hypertext, observing in a 1999 
article that "recent postmodern feminists are urging us to transcend [the Western] 
binaristic way of thinking altogether. Hypertext, with its linked form, provides us with a 
unique textual form through which to realize this transcendence" (33). In other words, 
hypertext may be an effective means of subverting binaristic, hierarchical ways of 
thinking, reading, and writing, along, of course, with the oppressive social structures 
supported by traditional rhetorics. 
The fundamental premise underlying my feminist theorization of hypertext is that 
writing-all modes of writing, not just hypertext-is gendered, and a secondary 
assumption is that all writing is political. Feminist hypertext theorists Donna LeCourt and 
Luann Barnes argue that 
social transformation is best executed by disrupting the gendered nature of 
writing. Because these forms of feminist intervention, or textual politics, rely on 
deconstructing text and creating new forms of textual space, they seem ideally 
suited for the differently ordered writing of hypertext, which alters reader-writing 
relationships and allows for expression of multiple perspectives. (56) 
Feminist hypertext, in other words, is transgressive; it crosses borders and creates new 
ways of reading and writing, as well as new approaches to narrative. In a1996 article, 
Mary-Jo Haronian applauded women who "write beyond the old endings to delegitimate 
61 
the romance plot's usual conclusions, and to envision new paths for lives as well as for 
stories" (32). Haronian envisioned a novel "of simultaneous and interwoven sub-plots, 
following no set order and allowing for infinite stories with infinite uses: something like a 
rich Victorian novel in Hypertext software" (32). Of course, in 1996 such hypertexts 
were already on the market, although, given their heterogeneous, "genre-busting" styles, 
they have been difficult to categorize as novels. 
Cyborg Politics and Epistemology 
The work of Donna Haraway is helpful in theorizing hypertext from a feminist 
perspective, particularly in terms of the politics and epistemology ofhypertext. And in 
referencing Haraway, I take my cue from a statement made by Pamela Gilbert: "It is 
surprising that the early key printed works on hypertext and literary theory[ . . . ] do not 
address Haraway--or indeed, feminist theory generally. In fact these printed works deal 
almost entirely with issues of structure, reducing political components to issues of canon 
formation" (264). I agree with Gilbert that a critical politics and ethics must be central to 
a feminist theorization of hypertext, hence the relevance ofthe cyborg principle. 
According to Haraway, "Cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle 
against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, 
the central dogma ofphallogocentrism" (176). Hypertext, as I have argued previously, is 
a cyborg literacy, and as such it is fundamentally political. 
Hypertext is dispersed, multiple text; it is not singular or unified, and it never was. 
Of course, I am speaking of native hypertext- i.e., hypertext that begins as a hypertext 
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rather than as conventional text that is later chopped up into lexias and turned into a 
hypertext. Like native hypertext, feminist arguments and perspectives are never 
absolutely consistent or totalizing. Thus, Haraway's critique ofthe Edenic, utopian myth 
of original wholeness and innocence may be effectively appropriated by feminist 
hypertext theorists. Haraway writes, "The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never 
finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched together 
imperfectly" (193). We could easily substitute the word hypertext for "knowing self' in 
the above quote. Hypertext is always partial; it is stitched together imperfectly and, 
therefore, resists the teleological urge to achieve what Haraway calls "perfect 
communication." Perfect communication is totalizing, whereas imperfect communication, 
or imperfect language, is, in Haraway's words, "a language that is not whole; it is self-
consciously spliced" (175). Perfect communication, by contrast, follows a linear, goal-
~ 
directed, noncontradictory logic. 
The life of a cyborg, like a hypertext narrative, has no discernable beginning or end. 
According to Haraway, the "cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense.[ ... ] An 
origin story in the 'Western', humanist sense depends on the myth of original unity" 
(150-51). The notion of an original or authoritative reading implies that there was a time 
before contested interpretations, before a fall into difference and multiplicity. But literary 
hypertexts have no original reading. The reader always begins in medias res. Thus, there 
is no need to (re)construct an original intention or authoritative interpretation. There is no 
original story because all readings are different, on the surface of the text as well at 
deeper hermeneutic levels. 
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Given its "non-Edenic" creation, the cyborg offers a way out of the active-
masculine-writer/passive-feminine-reader binary. In mainstream Western cultures, 
activity and passivity are coded, respectively, as masculine and feminine, but the "cyborg 
is a creature in a post-gender world" (Haraway 150); that is to say, one aspect of the 
cyborg's gender-free nature is that it blurs the lines between activity and passivity.5 
Rather than being the passive object of another creator, the cyborg actively participates in 
its own creation, splicing new "body parts" and "prostheses" into its body all the time-
in this way fighting off death or entropy. Moreover, following the logic of the cybernetic 
feedback loop, it is not clear "who makes and who is made in the relation between human 
and machine" (Haraway 177). In the feedback loop between machine and animal, metal 
and flesh, mind and matter, creation is not linear or one-way. Cyborg creation cycles; it 
doesn't begin or end. 
If it is true that "[ w ]riting is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs" (Haraway 
176), then it follows that hypertext must be also a cyborg technology, especially 
considering its facility in foregrounding semiotic gaps and disallowing perfect 
communication. Haraway argues, "The feminist dream of a common language, like all 
dreams for a perfectly true language( ... ] is totalizing" (173). The "common language" 
implies, in linguistic terms, identity between signifier and signified; that is, the signified 
is present in the signifier. But hypertext, being full of gaps, is inherently partial. Thus, 
5 cf. Barbara Biesecker's claim that "If feminists working in the history of Rhetoric could deconstruct the 
all-too-easy bipolarization of the active and the passive, we would go a long way toward dismantling the 
ideology of individualism that monumentalizes some acts and trivializes others" (146-47 ). 
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hypertextual partiality prevents perfect communication; there is no original text to re-
present or "re-member" (Haraway 150). As Haraway asserts, "The cyborg is resolutely 
committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity" (151) 
Yet conventional literary text is also partial. As Iser claims, a text's "configurative 
meaning can be nothing but a pars pro toto [partial] fulfillment of the text" (963). In this 
case, the "configurative meaning" is what I, following Bolter, call a reading. Inasmuch as 
literary texts are multiple, any reading is a partial fulfillment of the text. Similarly, in 
distinguishing between work and text, Barthes writes, "The work closes in .on a signified. 
[ ... ] The text, on the contrary, practices the infinite deferment ofthe signified" (902). Of 
course, Iser and Barthes are speaking of literary texts, in particular "modem" literary 
texts, as opposed to texts that purport simply to communicate facts, truths, or moral 
lessons, and to do so as clearly or efficiently as possible. 
The "permanent partiality" of the (literary) text has important implications for a 
feminist theorization of hypertext. In a hypertextual space, the Aristotelian logic of 
noncontradiction is radically subverted. Hypertext foregrounds contradiction, border 
crossing, and perspectival pluralism. Analogously, Irigaray claims that women "desire at 
the same time nothing and everything" (1470). This apparently illogical, contradictory 
process is, Irigaray claims, "the multiple nature of female desire" (1470).6 As an 
analogue to female desire, a single hypertext often harbors a number of contradictory 
texts. In like manner, Sullivan argues that the "multivocality and fragmentation made 
65 
possible by hypertext[ ... ] enable the hypertext creator to foreground the different parts 
of her self and to document the contradictions within which females in our culture live" 
(3 7). Contradiction and fragmentation, then, are accepted as facts of life, as well facts of 
the multiple text. Contradiction need not be erased in the name of perfect communication. 
Within this gynocentric "economy of desire," the hypertext wreater goes in circles 
and follows curves and tangents, rather than heading directly toward a predetermined 
goal. Hypertext is not premised on unmasking a singular truth or reality, or seeing 
through a surface to a "more real" depth. Hypertextual wreating, in other words, is 
motivated not by discovery, but by attentive listening, along with the articulation of 
fragmented, dispersed texts. The wreater articulates the fragments (i.e., joins them 
together) and then listens for the voices that emerge from the text. We might also say that 
the feminist wreater draws new voices out of the text, or even speaks the text herself. 
Perfect communication (or "perfect communicators") may not even recognize 
imperfect communication as communication at all; it is perceived or interpreted as the 
absence of communication. Phallogocentric (i.e., masculinist, objectivist, unilinear) 
communication, then, is constructed, to varying degrees, as present, while all other forms 
of communication are constructed as absent. Irigaray writes, "Contradictory words seem 
a little crazy to the logic of reason, and inaudible for him who listens with ready-made 
grids, a code prepared in advance" (1469, emphasis added). Different modes of 
communication have different logics, and feminists who have found classical, 
6 I should note that Irigaray is speaking here as a cultural feminist-i .e., as a feminist who foregrounds, and 
often celebrates, gender differences. Irigaray also, again as a cultural feminist, tends to essential women 
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Aristotelian logic uninspiring or even oppressive have often chosen to experiment with 
alternate logics. Experimentation and innovation often then lead to calls for pedagogical 
reform. As Lunsford remarked to Anzaldua, "the logical has had a stranglehold on the 
teaching ofwriting. You have to start with A and end with Z. You can't start with Q" 
("Toward" 24). In hypertext, of course, one is free to start and end anywhere. 
Hypertextual Affinity and its Political Implications 
An important theme in feminist rhetoric and epistemology is affinity. Hence, in 
departing from mainstream epistemology, Haraway argues for "affinity, not 
identification" (155). She states that because the partial self is stitched together 
imperfectly, it is "able to join [or articulate] with another without claiming to be another" 
(193). The difference between these two principles, in a linguistic context, is that in 
affinity there are always semiotic gaps-the articulation is imperfect-whereas with 
identification the bond between signifier and signified is complete and total. Hayles's 
principle of "relationality" is also premised on the existence of gaps ("FM" 8). 
Relationality, unlike complete identification, leaves gaps, or spaces for new connections 
and affiliations, as well as the flexibility to disengage from current connections. 
Relational bonds, or links, can be easily broken and reassembled in new ways. By 
contrast, complete identification without gaps is static and totalizing. Relationality, in 
other words, is founded on affinity rather than identification. 
across races and social classes. 
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At this juncture I must point out a terminological difficulty. For readers familiar with 
Kenneth Burke, there may be some confusion when they encounter Haraway's argument 
for "affinity, not identification" (155). Identification is the key term in Burkean rhetoric. 
Successful rhetoric, or the successful rhetorical text, forges a sense of social 
identification, or solidarity, among a collection of people. Rhetoric also forges an 
identification between rhetor and audience. But even when Burke speaks of 
identification, he appears to be referring to the same principle that Haraway calls 
"affinity." In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke wrote, "A is not identical with his colleague, 
B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B" (20). Burke, then, 
makes a firm distinction between being identified with and being identical to, and being 
identical to (i.e., identity) is what Haraway refers to dismissively as "identification." 
Thus, the terminological confusion between Burke and Haraway is cleared up if we read 
(or misread) Haraway's words as affinity, not identity. For Burke as well as Haraway the 
condition of being identified with another is rhetorically preferable to be identical to 
another. 
Affinity, or Burkean identification, loosely binds collectivities together. The 
audience of a particular rhetorical performance may feel a sense of kinship based upon a 
shared experience. Affinity also (loosely) binds political movements and organizations 
together; consequently, affmity plays an important role in feminism. A collectivity based 
on affinity may also be quite temporary or opportunistic (i.e., kairotic), insofar as it 
comes together for a tactical purpose and disbands once the purpose is met. However, the 
realization of affinity may be problematic in a hypertextual environment. That is, the 
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multiple text may hamper or at least complicate the development of affinity between 
readers, inasmuch as each reader instantiates her own text and different texts may be 
mutually contradictory. 
At this point a question arises: If in the encounter with a hypertext each reader (or 
wreater) instantiates her own text in the act of reading and no two texts are ever alike, 
how is a communal experience, or communication, possible? Sacred texts and stories 
have always bound communities together, and secular texts (e.g., The Declaration of 
Independence, The US. Constitution, The Communist Manifesto)7 have served as the 
foundation of nations. But is the primeval, "magical," community-building ritual of 
listening to myths and folktales or reading a common text negated in a hypertextual 
space? And in political terms, how is collaborative feminist action possible if each 
individual is reading a different text? These questions boil down the problem of whether 
hypertext contributes to social fragmentation, which would then exacerbate oppression by 
powerful groups who are not handicapped by fragmentation. If hypertext isolates 
individuals, then readers of hypertext could be very easily divided and conquered. 
Since its inception, feminism has been furthered by rhetorically effective texts (e.g., 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments, "The 
Yellow Wallpaper," The Second Sex, The Feminine Mystique, "The Laugh of the 
Medusa," and of course many, many more). But can a literary hypertext such as Shelley 
Jackson's Patchwork Girl, Carolyn Guyer's Quibbling, or J. Yellowlees Douglas's "I 
7 I recognize that many people might consider The Communist Manifesto and similar texts sacred. Thus, 
there is some slippage in the secular/sacred binary. 
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Have Said Nothing," do the same? In short, how can "the text" function rhetorically or 
politically if there is no text but only readings? 
This dilemma is rooted in a misunderstanding of the identification process that 
occurs by reading the same work. The text itself is a function of interpretation, and the 
"notion of' same text' is the product of the possession by two or more readers of similar 
interpretive strategies" (Fish 988). Fish claims that "perfect agreement[ ... ] would 
require texts to have a status independent of interpretation" (989). The goal, then, as I see 
it, is not to read the same text- that is, to interpret a text in the same way-but to map 
the intersections and divergences among readings. If a group of readers, such as members 
of literature seminar, engages with a hypertext narrative, they will each instantiate a 
different text from their particular readings. And if at points during the reading process, 
the group comes together to discuss their individual readings, this process, for the most 
part, would logically consist of exploring intertextual and intratextual gaps, as opposed to 
constructing a single consensus reading. There is no need to fully bridge the gaps or 
"suture" them tightly together. On the contrary, the readers' time would be better spent 
listening for the voices that become audible when textual fragments edge against each 
other or when textual gaps slide open. As I argue later in this chapter, tightly sutured gaps 
serve to silence a text, or to impose a single, hegemonic reading upon a text. In a tightly 
sutured text, "still, small voices" cannot rise to the surface and escape like, at the risk of 
mixing metaphors, oxygen carried in bubbles. 
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For contemporary feminists, a unified, consensus reading of a text is not always 
useful. A text, in other words, does not necessarily have to forge a sense of collective 
unity. In Haraway's words, "The permanent partiality of feminist points of view has 
consequences for our expectations of forms of political organizations and participation. 
We do not need to work as a totality in order to work well" (173). This statement 
suggests that the assumption that feminist politics must be based on a single, tightly 
bound feminism is passe. Just as feminism has become feminisrns, multiple texts are now 
welcomed. 
If the "text is plural," as Barthes claimed (902), then feminist praxis does not 
necessarily have be to be founded on a stable, unified, or original text. The plural text is, 
paradoxically, full of gaps; it is stitched together imperfectly. In other words, the 
"intertextual in which every text is held[ ... ] is not to be confused with some origin of 
the text" (Barthes 903 ). Origins, in fact, are not always relevant. Hence, the point I wish 
to make is that multiperspectival, multilinear hypertext is not necessarily politically 
inefficacious. In fact, insofar as it promotes an interrogation of dominant modes of 
textuality, such as by emphasizing parataxis, hypertext can be quite rhetorically and 
politically subversive. 
Hypertext as Mestiza 
The work of Gloria Anzaldua, which I have touched on previously, also has much to 
tell us about the principles of partiality and multiplicity. Singular perspectives may be 
deconstructed, or taken apart, and then perhaps reconstructed with loose connections that 
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will facilitate further deconstruction when the need arises. Anzaldua stated, "The act of 
writing for me is [a] kind of dismembering of everything I am feeling, taking it apart to 
examine it and then reconstituting it or recomposing it in a new way" (1 0). The 
dismembering, or perhaps emasculating, ofthe text is not an end in itself, but merely part 
of the process writing/reading. 
Anzaldua's view of the rhetor diverges sharply from the mainstream, masculinist 
prototype. "The rhetor that Anzaldua makes central to her rhetorical theory is the mestiza, 
the woman of mixed blood who straddles multiple cultural boundaries" (Foss, Foss, and 
Griffin 112). In stark contrast to the public man, the ultimate insider, for Anzaldua the 
most legitimate rhetor is the outsider. Hence, Anzaldua's rhetoric is characterized by 
deconstruction through a radical reversal of the binary oppositions that support cultural 
hegemonies. "Anzaldua gives centrality, legitimacy, and agency to [the] 'strangers' or 
'others' who have been denigrated by the dominant culture. Ultimately[ .. . ] Anzaldua's 
notion of the rhetor expands to include anyone who is an outsider" (Foss et al. 112). In 
discussing Anzaldua' s "mestiza rhetoric," Lunsford writes that "living in and rendering 
such contradictions and transformations calls for a new kind of writing. In Anzaldua's 
case, this means a rich mixture of genres [ ... ] weaving images and words from her 
multiple selves and from many others into a kind of tapestry or patchwork quilt of 
language ("Toward" 2). 8 Similarly, Page wrote that the "notion [ . .. ] of textuality as 
weaving (a restoration of the root meaning of 'text') and of the construction of 
8 The term "patchwork quilt" will have obvious associations for readers of Shelley Jackson's work. 
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knowledge as a web that has figured prominently in the development of hypertext has 
also been important in feminist theory" (2). Multilinear hypertext, then, is amenable to 
the linguistic, metaphorical "weaving" engaged in by writers such as Anzaldua. 
Imperfect communication, as discussed by Haraway, is also a prime characteristic of 
what Anzaldua refers to as a "Borderland," and the main feature of mestiza rhetoric is 
that the mestiza synthesizes the divergent voices of the Borderland.9 According to 
Anzaldua, the mestiza must continually "shift out of habitual formations; from 
convergent thinking, analytical reasoning that tends to use rationality to move toward a 
single goal (a Western mode), to divergent thinking, characterized by movement away 
from set patterns and goals and toward a more whole perspective, one that includes rather 
than excludes" (Making Face 378-79). The issue of inclusion/exclusion in important for 
hypertext theory because, as I have argued previously, hypertext is, for the most part, 
inclusive; it works against the modernist dichotomies that produce "closures and 
exclusions" (Code, RS 194). Conventional binaries, such as exclusion/inclusion, 
outside/inside, public/private, masculine/feminine, writing/reading, and center/margin, 
may be readily deconstructed in hypertextual spaces. 
9 Anzaldua's tenninology can be somewhat confusing, however, because she distinguishes between 
borderlands with a small band Borderlands with a capital B. Written lowercase, the word refers to a 
geographic site, such as the 2000 mile long Mexico-U.S. border, "where the Third World grates against the 
first and bleeds" (Anzaldua 25). Written uppercase, the word is used metaphorically to signify "a state that 
exists whenever cultural difference exists, whether those cultures involve physical differences such as race, 
class, or gender or differences that are less tangible-psychological, social, or cultural" (Foss et al. I 06). 
Yet in both kinds of Borderland/borderland communication breaks down and new languages are created. 
Anzaldua writes that "the Borderlands are physically present wherever two or more cultures edge each 
other, where people of different races occupy the same territory, where under, lower, middle and upper 
classes touch, where the space between two individuals shrinks with intimacy" (19). Since I am most 
concerned with the Borderland as a metaphor, I have opted to use the uppercase form of this term. 
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Hypertext is a Borderland technology; it has come into being at a site where, in 
Anzaldua's words, "two or more cultures edge each other" (19). The Borderlands are, in 
other words, zones of articulation or "contact zones" (Pratt 584). The two primary 
cultures in this case are the cultures of print literature and computer technology, but 
postmodem literary theory, feminist rhetoric, feminist epistemology, and similar cultural 
phenomena may also be tossed into the multicultural mix. Furthermore, the notion of 
edging is paratactic, insofar as side-by-side, nonhierarchical writing spaces edge each 
other. As Joyce writes, "the web links edgewise" (Othermindedness 172). The mestiza 
principle, then, may be combined with hypertext theory and feminist epistemology to 
generate a new articulation of feminist rhetoric. 
Phallomorphism and the Guilty Text 
Another way hypertext contributes to a rearticulation of feminist rhetoric is by 
transforming conventional narrative patterns. A primary assumption underpinning the 
argument I make in this section is that the traditional literary narrative reflects, at least to 
some extent, male genital anatomy and sexual response. This "phallomorphic" narrative 
follows the well-worn, linear pattern of initial scene setting, character introduction, plot 
complication, climax, and resolution. The methods of science, rhetorical criticism, and 
literary criticism may also be characterized as phallic. Janice Hocker Rushing notes that 
the scientific method has metaphorical associations with the hunt, artistic discovery, and 
sexual penetration (157). And insofar as the disciplines of rhetorical, cultural, or literary 
criticism aspire to the status ofthe "hard" sciences, the "critic, above all, must be in 
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control (Rushing 160). The good, masculinist critic must stay "on top" ofthe text; he 
must successfully "nail" its meaning. In speaking of the aggressiveness of criticism, 
Rushing refers to "ever more sophisticated theoretical lenses that 'open up' what the text 
is presumed coyly to conceal" (160). Thus, rather than following the aggressive practice 
of conventional criticism and scholarship, we might choose to articulate textual fragments 
and watch for sparks of insight to fly up. This process amounts to a joining of 
hermeneutics and heuristics; which is to say that textual interpretation works in 
partnership with invention. It must be emphasized that textual seams or gaps need not be 
forcefully pried open. In other words, we may distinguish between listening to a text and 
the more aggressive, invasive searching for meaning or compelling a text to "talk," or 
even to "talk!" 
Mainstream academic criticism is a product of the Enlightenment, and it should be 
analyzed in this historical context. Yet in any critique of the Enlightenment or modernist 
ideology, we must acknowledge that the scientific method and modernism have brought 
innumerable blessings for women as well as men, e.g., modem sanitation and healthcare, 
democracy, civil liberties, state-supported education, and so forth. 10 In speaking of the 
scientist as a hunter, Rushing argues that "the Enlightenment and its afterglow have made 
things better for humankind in innumerable ways. But a radical reversal happens in the 
scientific era when the hunter is less concerned with sacred rites, and so feels less and 
less connected to the prey or to his weapon as a part of himself' (157). The scientific 
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method becomes oppressive when the scientist slips into the role of voyeur and sadist-
that is, when the ancient sacredness of the hunt is profaned and transformed into a 
sadistic urge to dominate and, ultimately, to destroy one's prey. 
Under the influence of the Cartesian subject/object split, the traditional scientist is, 
first of all, a voyeur because he privileges vision above the other senses. Hence, what 
Freud called "scopophilia," pleasure in looking or gazing, is central the Cartesian 
worldview. Scopophilia is, of course, deeply gendered. As Laura Mulvey claims, " In a 
world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between 
active/male and passive/female" (1448). Moreover, the Cartesian likes to control what he 
watches and, as the urge to control increases, the voyeur becomes a sadist (Rushing 154-
55). In short, the ancient sacredness of the scientific enterprise, known by alchemists such 
as Paracelsus, is largely forgotten by the modernist. II Under the influence of modernism 
and its ever-advancing technology, science has become hard, rigid (or rigorous), and 
aggressive-that is, phallic. 
Guilty Texts and Guilty Women 
The tenets of modernism have given rise to a phenomenon that I refer to as the guilty 
text, i.e., the text that is assumed to be hiding a secret, and therefore must be 
10 I must note here that the advances of the West have often been gained at the expense of Third World 
nations and indigenous peoples. See Linda Tuhiwai Smith 's Deco/onizing Methodologies: Research and 
Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books, 1999). I refer to this text later in this study. 
11 Paracelsus was the most famous sixteenth-century alchemist, as such participant in the ancient hermetic 
tradition. For a history of the battle between the scientific visions of Francis Bacon and the Paracelsian 
seventeenth-century alchemists, see Evelyn Fox Keller 's Reflections of Gender and Science, chapter 3. 
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"interrogated" until it gives up, or "puts out," all that it contains. The guilty text must be 
compelled to tell the truth. Mulvey, drawing on Lacanian theory, writes that "voyeurism 
[ ... ] has association with sadism: pleasure lies in ascertaining guilt (immediately 
associated with castration), asserting control and subjugating the guilty person through 
punishment and forgiveness" (1450). Thus, the modernist has all the attributes of the 
patriarchal superego (1452). Mulvey's parenthetic comment on castration makes it clear 
that the guilty text is coded feminine, or at least is emasculated. 
The text may be construed as an extension of nature, as suggested by Susan Bordo's 
statement that "the medieval cosmos whose destruction gave birth to the modern 
sensibility was a mother-cosmos, and the soul which Descartes drained from the natural 
world was a female soul" (642). A growing body of scholarship has shown that nature 
under the Enlightenment was transformed from a mother to a whore-no longer 
worshipped as the giver and sustainer of life, but investigated, controlled, an 
commodified, all in the same of scientific progress (Bordo 642-46; Keller, Reflections 33-
65 . According to the modernist view, nature generates disease, such as the plague that 
decimated seventeenth-century Europe; therefore, she must be tamed by scientific 
methods. Nature, whose microcosm is human nature, is also responsible for war, 
starvation, and brutality. As such, nature lacks order and reason. As a "whore," nature has 
been thoroughly commodified, in the post-gender world of the cyborg, "[n]ature and 
culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or 
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incorporation by the other" (Haraway 150). But, again, the cyborg is not the passive 
creature or commodity of another. 
The guilty text, like the guilty woman, is found lacking-that is, lacking the phallic 
signifier. Mulvey writes, "The paradox of the phallocentrism [ ... ] is that it depends on 
the image of the castrated woman to give order and meaning to its world. [ . .. ] it is her 
lack that produces the phallus as a symbolic presence" (1445). That is, feminine absence 
makes possible masculine presence. Mulvey goes on to claim, "Ultimately, the meaning 
of woman is sexual difference, the visually ascertainable absence of a penis" (1450). By 
extension, hypertext, insofar as it is found lacking with respect to linear organization and 
coherence, is apt to be treated as a guilty text. The reason for this negative judgment is 
that hypertexts, like women, are judged according to a hegemonic, masculine standard-
the masculine default value. As long as the penis is the great signifier, ma.'l will be coded 
positive and woman negative. Likewise, as long as linear organization is a primary 
attribute, or signifier, of a rhetorically effective text, then hypertext will be found lacking. 
Hypertext, according to conventional logic, would not be classified as text at all, but 
rather as the absence of text. To redress these prejudices, women and hypertext must be 
accepted on their own terms, not judged according to an arbitrary external standard. Just 
as woman is not not-man, hypertext is not not-print. 
While the phallomorphic narrative is unilinear or singular, the hypertext narrative is 
multilinear. A number of writers, men as well as women, have experimented with 
narratives that feature multiple climaxes and deferred closure, which is arguably more 
congruent with female erotic experience. Irigaray, for instance, premises much of her 
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rhetoric on the dispersed, multiple, decentralized quality of female sexuality. According 
to Irigaray, "woman does not have a sex. She has at least two of them, but they cannot be 
identified as ones [sic]. Indeed she has many more of them than that. Her sexuality, 
always at least double, is in fact plural. [ ... ] Plural as the manner in which current texts 
are written" (1469). Admittedly, Irigaray uses the term "woman" in the abstract, but this 
usage allows her to exploit the metaphorical richness associated with Western 
conceptions of"the feminine." Irigaray plays with these metaphors, turning masculinist 
assumptions on their heads. 
If we follow Irigaray's argument, phallomorphic narrative is singular, while feminist, 
or "gynomorphic," narrative is plural and paratactic. Hypertext, with its inclusive quality, 
is very well suited for plural narrative, just as the decentralized quality of female 
sexuality is analogous to the spatial dispersal characteristic of multilinear hypertext. The 
plural text is produced through juxtaposition, or placing loosely connected elements side-
by-side. By "loosely connected" I mean one-to-many linking, which creates 
multilinearity, as opposed to the "tight" connections of one-to-one, unilinear linking. 
Multilinear hypertext, then, is not designed to reflect phallomorphism, which Irigaray 
defmes as "The one of form, the individual sex, proper name, literal meaning" (1468). 
Parataxis lends itself to multiplicity and dispersal, rather than the phallic singularity of 
12 one truth, one God, and one way to read a text. 
12 This line of thinking is not an endorsement of biological essentialism; it simply represents the application 
of a different metaphor. 1 do not take lrigaray's words to mean to women think or write in a certain way 
because of their genital anatomy. One caveat I have, though, is that Irigaray's dichotomization of female 
and male sexuality does not hold up to scrutiny. While it is true that men are not generally capable multiple 
orgasms, men, like women, do have many erogenous zones. What Irigaray says about women-i.e., that 
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Irigaray strives to deconstruct hegemonic masculinist metaphors, which is far from a 
trivial project. As I asserted earlier, metaphors are condensed arguments. Hence, as 
Anzaldua argues, changing the world may begin with changing our metaphors: "The 
basic rhetorical option Anzaldua advocates[ . . . ] is shifting metaphors. Shifting 
metaphors means changing perspectives-making new connections and seeing in new 
ways-through the creative use oflanguage" (Foss et al. 115). Metaphors, for Anzaldua, 
are created through Ia facultad, "the faculty to see in surface phenomena the meaning of 
deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the surface" (60). Similarly, with respect 
to metaphor, Page urges us to 
bear in mind that all language is shot through with metaphors, many derived from 
the body, and that some of the boldest interventions by innovative women writers 
have been through an insistence on speaking the body in new terms as a way of 
breaking the hold of traditional discourses that denigrate and demonize [i.e., judge 
guilty] the female body. (7) 
The body, in other words, is an extremely rich metaphorical terrain; therefore, focusing 
attention on these metaphors, deliberately shifting and reversing oppressive binaries, may 
be a productive means of changing social structures. 
they have sex organs just about everywhere ( 1469)-could also be said of men. It is just that men, insofar 
as they are conditioned by a phallic culture, focus most of their libidinal energy on the penis. Thus, a 
distinction must be drawn between male physiology and the cultural construction of male sexuality, or 
embodiment and the body. The physiological reality of sex and the cultural construction of gender are not 
identical, in other words. Nonetheless, within the domain of gender, Irigaray's metaphoric linking of ~rotic 
experience to textuality remains quite provocative, and I will continue to mine this metaphorical terram as I 
construct a feminist theory of hypertext. 
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Hypertextual Recurrence and Contiguity 
As indicated by my argument to this point, a rearticulation of feminist rhetoric 
informed by hypertext theory and feminist epistemology must pay particular attention to 
the principle of parataxis. Hypertext is a paratactic textuality. And two concepts closely 
related to parataxis are recurrence and contiguity. 
As Joyce, Landow, Douglas, Sullivan, and others have observed, hypertext involves 
a great deal of recurrence, or redundancy, as the reader returns to previously encountered 
lexias and then sets out in new directions. Joyce even argues, "Hypertext fiction in some 
fundamental sense depends upon rereading" ( Othermindedness 13 7). Although the 
hypertext wreater revisits familiar lexias, in different contexts the lexias are read 
differently-they signify differently. Even in the case of conventional text, the reader 
makes associations across the text, often thumbing backward through the text to locate a 
previously read, associated idea. Hence, even conventional reading is very often 
recursive. In the case of hypertext, however, recursive reading is taken to another level; 
that is, recursive reading becomes primary rather than secondary. 
Hayles writes, "Pattern can be recognized through redundancy or repetition of 
elements. If there is only repetition, however, no new information is imparted; the 
intermixture of randomness rescues pattern from sterility" ("VB" 78). Recurrence creates 
patterns, but hypertext involves a substantial element of randomness as well. Thus, 
hypertextual recurrence creates a patterned randomness that serves to subvert the 
logocentric unilinear narrative. As noted previously, Joyce invokes "the power of 
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recurrence" (20) and "the rhythm of recurrence" (Othermindedness 120). Hypertextual 
recurrence serves to create the sense of a relatively coherent, readable, if not unified text. 
Or stated differently, recursive reading allows one to construct patterns in the text, and 
these patterns may be read as several coherent texts within a single hypertext. Sullivan 
recognized the role of recurrence as she observed that feminists often "value 
contextualization and recognize that different contexts provide different perspectives on 
the same information. One way contextualization is accomplished in hypertext is through 
repetition" (34); that is to say, recurrence allows one to read the same lexia in different 
contexts, or from different epistemic locations, and thus experience a familiar lexia as if 
for the first time. Hypertextual wreating is, therefore, "multiperspectival" (Sullivan 34). 
Touching on Topoi 
Hypertextual discourse is recursive and dispersed, as the writer or speaker (or rhetor) 
touches on many items or issues rather than focusing exclusively on a single topic, or 
"sticking to the point." In an interesting parallel, Irigaray writes, "In her statements-at 
least when she dares to speak out-woman retouches herself constantly. She barely 
separates from herself some chatter, an exclamation, a half-secret, a sentence left in 
suspense-When she returns to it, it is only to set out again from another point of 
pleasure or pain" (1470). Irigaray goes on to write, "For when 'she' says something, it is 
already no longer identical to what she means. Moreover, her statements are never 
identical to anything. Their distinguishing feature is one of contiguity. They touch 
(upon). And when they wander too far from this nearness, she stops and begins again 
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from 'zero': her body-sex organ" (1470). The hypertext wreater repeatedly touches on 
lexias, just as "woman," according to Irigaray, repeatedly, or recursively, touches on her 
own statements. 
In Irigaray's prose, there is a sense of touching on an idea or topic, going off in 
another direction, and then returning to the previous idea (or place/tapas). Through this 
process, unilinear (phallomorphic) progression is subverted, and a shifting, sliding 
network of signifiers is constructed. Of course, this is exactly what occurs with hypertext: 
the wreater touches on one lexia, leaves to pursue a link, and often returns to the where 
she started, only to depart again on another tangent. Or, as an alternative to the 
conventional, spatialized journey metaphor, we might say that the wreater, rather than 
leaving and returning to lexias, simply brings lexias before herself in different sequences 
and places them in different contexts. But whatever metaphor one chooses, hypertextual 
wreating is highly tangential; finding the shortest distance between two points is not the 
goal. 
Along with recurrence or recursiveness, hypertext is structured according to the 
principle of contiguity, or paratactic juxtaposition, and as such hypertext is analogous to 
Irigaray' s representation of female sexuality. Irigaray writes, "A woman ' touches herself 
constantly without anyone being able to forbid her to do so, for her sex is composed of 
two lips which embrace continually'' (1467). We might say that these two lips have an 
affinity for one another, and the principle of affinity is analogous to contiguity as well as 
associative logic. Associated ideas have an affinity for one another, as if there were some 
sort of magnetic attraction between them. The principle of associative logic has been 
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associated with hypertext (or at least with the memex concept) from the start with Bush's 
concept of associative indexing. 
Insofar as it features associative contiguity, hypertext has a great deal in common 
with Barthes' modem literary text. Barthes claims, "The logic of the Text is not 
comprehensive (define 'what the work means') but metonymic: the activity of 
associations, contiguities (902). In connection with Irigaray' s imagery, two lexias, 
wherever they are in the hypertext-if we can speak of them being anywhere--can be as 
close together as the labia. When Irigaray describes "woman," she could just as easily be 
describing hypertext: "'She' [ ... ] is called temperamental, incomprehensible, perturbed, 
capricious-not to mention her language in which 'she' goes off in all directions and in 
which 'he' is unable to discern the coherence of any meaning" (1469). Irigaray goes on to 
characterizes woman as "never being simply one," and she compares woman with "a sort 
of universe in expansion for which no limits could be fixed and which for all that, would 
not be incoherency" (1470). In these statements, Irigaray is describing a paratactic 
structure. 
Rhetoric itself may be characterized as preeminently paratactic. Jarratt explains that 
the Aristotelian rhetorical proofs (i.e., enthymeme, analogy, and maxim) "are often seen, 
especially from the point of view of philosophy or science, as inferior, incomplete 
distortions of the purer logic of the Organon, and the hypotactic structures of formal 
logic becomes the distinguishing feature of rational discourse" (xxii). Thus, in the 
Aristotelian view, the rhetorical proofs are to the logical proofs as women are to men, 
inasmuch as women were said to be underdeveloped men. Moreover, parataxis has the 
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all, but a temporal gap, or pause ("Conclusions" 196). No matter how fast the connection 
or how "seamless" the link, there will always be a pause between lexias or web pages. 
"The pause may be measured by ever-smaller fractions of a microsecond, but it is 
ultimately irreducible, because it has priority over the spatiality of the lexias it joins" 
(196). In other words, the spatial gap between lexias, which we are familiar with from our 
experience with print, may be eliminated by hyperlinking, but the temporal gap, like the 
poor, will always be with us. 
The pauses between lexias are similar to the pauses in conversation; that is, 
following a mouse click, the reader must wait for the text to "answer" with a new lexia. A 
simple example may clarify this trope: In Joyce's afternoon, at the bottom of the first 
lexia, labeled "Begin," the text poses a question to the reader: "Do you want to hear about 
it?" A different lexia appears next depending on whether the reader clicks on yes or no. 
But these kinds of overt devices are not necessary to produce the conversational quality 
of hypertext. Indeed, every lexia features an implicit question: Do you want to continue 
reading? The main difference between this implicit question in hypertext and the same 
implicit question asked on every page of a conventional book is that with hypertext there 
is no promise that the reader will ever reach completion or closure. Literary hypertexts 
usually cycle rather than concluding. Thus, the real unspoken question is, Even though 
you will never find an end to this text, do you still want to continue? Another question, 
which has to do with the principle of recurrence, is, Even though you have already read 
this lexia, do you want to read it again? 
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Hypertextual wreating is not motivated by a singular goal, and in this sense wreating 
is like play- the play of conversation. As Barthes writes, "the Text is bound to 
jouissance, that is the pleasure without separation" (904). 14 By extension, hypertext is 
analogous to female autoeroticism, or a woman deriving sexual pleasure from herself and 
for herself rather than being "use-value" for a man. Irigaray writes that "woman is 
traditionally use-value for man, exchange value among men. Merchandise, then. [ ... ] 
How can this object of transaction assert a right to pleasure without extricating itself from 
the established commercial system?" (1471). Lesbianism might be also seen in this light 
as an expression of play-perhaps a serious, subversive kind of play that extricates a 
woman from patriarchal bondage. 
Plural texts are full of gaps and internal contradictions; they are not a seamless. Like 
many feminists , Richard Miller, in the following quote, emphasizes the importance of not 
glossing over contradictions: 
When students are presented with the idea that successful mastery of the writing 
process produces a smooth voyage to clarity, they come to understand that 
anything that stands in the way of clarity must be expunged: ambiguity, obscure 
references, contradictions, paradoxes, tangential thoughts-the fundamental 
material[ . . . ] oflived experience and of one's mental life. (23) 
Hypertextual wreating is not a "smooth voyage to clarity," and as such it subverts the 
perfectionist drive of modernism. In taking the possibility, as well as the desirability, of 
14 The French termjouissance may be translated as joy or bliss. 
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resources necessary for the maintenance or alteration of power" (315). The rhetor has 
knowledge and, according to modernism, knowledge is power. As Francis Bacon asserts 
in his Aphorisms, "Knowledge and human power are synonymous." 15 Power, 
furthermore, is typically defined as ability to control one's environment, which is coded 
feminine in Western culture (Rushing 161-62). But, as I have suggested repeatedly, it 
may be time now to shift metaphors. As I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of this 
chapter and in subsequent chapters, it is possible to speak of empowerment without 
resorting to masculinist rhetoric. 
Within the field of rhetoric and composition, the principle of empowering student 
writers has been articulated predominately within the context of expressivist pedagogies 
(e.g., the work ofPeter Elbow and Donald Murray). Jarratt observes that the work of"the 
expressivist school of the sixties and seventies advanced the democratic goal of giving 
students a voice" (85). And, despite conservative reversals since the 1970s, "many 
compositionists continue to explore the role of the writing classroom in empowering 
students as participants in democracy'' (Jarratt 85). 
The limitations of expressivism and other individualistic composition theories have 
to with negotiating the space between the individual and the various, often intersecting 
communities that individuals live, and find meaning, within. Jarratt notes that a 
"powerful ideology of individualism works against a sense of community both in the 
classroom and outside" (88). Citing the research of Linda Flower and John Hayes, whose 
15 Novum Organun. Aphorisms 3: 345-37. Available online: http://history.hanover.edu/texts/ 
Baconlaphor.html. 
89 
cognitive model focuses on the single individual, Jarratt speaks of the "priority of mental 
activity over group communication" (89) Jarratt goes on to speak of"a general approach 
to writing instruction today [ 1991] which, in tune with a society immersed in an ideology 
of individualism, looks too narrowly at the single writer as the site oflanguage 
production" (89). Similarly, Lunsford and Ede claim that for Elbow, "expressing personal 
authenticity requires not social interaction but mining the depths of the self, searching 
inside the self for a unique voice" ("Collaborative Authorship" 691). Not only is such 
pedagogy epistemologically suspect, but it ignores the preeminent role of collective effort 
in democratic politics. Insofar as they do not address social power and control, 
individualistic composition pedagogies, like the epistemology of medium-sized objects, 
are politically naive; that is, expressivism and mainstream epistemology may claim to be 
apolitical, but they are not. 
Individualists appear to disagree with Aristotle's notion of human beings as political 
creatures, and Aristotle's socio-political orientation relates to his definition of rhetorical 
power. According to Sharan Daniel, "Aristotle defined rhetoric as a dynamis, translated 
as 'faculty' (at the height of faculty psychology) but also as 'power.'[ . . . ] Rhetoric in 
this tradition is[ ... ] the art that powers our communal life." By contrast, the liberal 
humanist notion of empowerment is rights-centered; it is concerned primarily with 
"enabling individuals to claim their rights and only secondarily with issues of collective 
concern" (Daniel, personal communication). Power, in other words, is constructed as 
property, something that can be owned, shared, lost, or taken (Gore, "What" 57-59). 
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Feminism is about much more than claiming personal rights. 16 As I argued in the 
previous chapter, feminism is a different way of thinking. Yet under late capitalism, 
empowerment is typically equated with consumer power, and the rhetoric of rights, in 
slighting duty and responsibility, often boils down the right to consume more or higher 
quality goods and services; however, consumerism does not translate well to feminist 
political engagement. 
The rhetoric of empowerment has been part of hypertext theory since its inception. 
In "As We May Think," Vannevar Bush wrote, "Of what lasting benefit has been man 's 
use of science and of the new instruments which his research brought into existence? 
First, they have increased his control of his material environment" (101). Bush then goes 
on to claim, "For mature thought there is no mechanical substitute. But creative thought 
and essentially repetitive thought are very different things. For the latter there are, and 
may be, powerful mechanical aids" (1 04). The memex, then, was to be a tool to lighten 
the mechanical aspects of scientific or intellectual work. The editor's introduction to 
Bush's article states, "For years inventions have extended man's physical powers rather 
than the powers ofhis mind[ .. . ] Now, says Dr. Bush, instruments are at hand which, if 
properly developed, will give man access to and command over the inherited knowledge 
of the ages" (101). The emphasis, in the rhetoric of Bush and the Atlantic Monthly editor, 
on placing knowledge under man's command and control, positions the concept of the 
16 In my critique of the rhetoric of empowerment, my position is closer to cultural feminism (e.g., Cixous, 
Irigaray, Kristeva) than to liberal feminism (e.g., Friedan). 
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memex is safely within the mainstream of Western scientific (or scientistic), as well as 
militaristic, thinking. 17 
Within the context of the dominant masculinist worldview, technology extends 
man 's power. Thus, the preoccupation with power enhancement or empowerment appears 
to be a characteristic of the machine age, or the industrial, modernist era, inasmuch as 
mechanistic force is measured in terms of power-horsepower, steam power, watts, and 
so forth. The more forcefully a machine can act on matter, or transform matter, the more 
power it has. Hence, the ideology of empowerment would appear to be rooted in 
mechanistic assumptions. For instance, in Bush's vision of the memex, information, 
knowledge, or scientific data appears to be a kind of matter. The memex, then, was 
envisioned as a tool to act on knowledge. My own position is that knowledge is a 
dynamic conversational pattern, a process rather than a product. Knowledge, in other 
words, is a constituent in a feedback loop between the self and others; it comes into being 
in the space between people, as opposed to being property that can be possessed or held 
inside an individual. Knowledge and power, then, are both relational. 
My argument is that theorizations of hypertext that employ the rhetoric of 
empowerment are essentially modernist theories, and thus of limited value in promoting 
17 Along with links to Francis Bacon, there are obvious military associations with the terms "command and 
control." Yet, aside from observing that Vannevar Bush, as an appointee of President Roosevelt, headed up 
America 's wartime scientific work, I am not prepared to explore this aspect of Bush's rhetoric at any 
length. In a preface to Bush's article, an Atlantic Monthly editor wrote, "As Director of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, Dr. Vannevar Bush has coordinated the activities of some six 
thousand leading American scientists in the application of science to warfare. In this significant article he 
holds up an incentive for scientists when the fighting has ceased. He urges that men of science should then 
turn to the massive task of making more accessible our bewildering store of knowledge" ( 101 ). 
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feminist aims. I believe that rather than asking whether or not hypertext empowers its 
users or how it can empower us, we ought to ask how it changes us-that is, how it 
changes individual readers and writers, pedagogies, educational institutions, and 
societies. Hypertext cannot simply be used a tool ; users (or wreaters) engage in a 
mutually transformative relationship with this technology. Hence, rather than 
constructing hypertext as a personally empowering technology, it would be more 
congruent with feminism to articulate hypertext as a relational technology. Like Barbara 
McClintock with her maize plants, the hypertext wreater develops a relationship with the 
text, as opposed to being engaged in a battle for control with a text or an author. As 
discussed above, the relationship between the wreater and the text features 
"conversational pauses." In this dialogue, the wreater develops a unique relationship with 
a living text. 
In addition to the pauses where a reader silently ponders or interprets the text, which 
occur with conventional text as well as hypertext, in a read-write interface such as 
Storyspace the wreater's contribution to the conversation may be visibly inscribed in the 
text. And the wreater's visible inscription within the text, or the ability of the wreater to 
write herself into the text, marks a major difference between hypertext and conventional 
text. Here is perhaps where the shift from the oratorical, or one-way, rhetoric of 
conventional print to the conversational mode of hypertext is most evident. While readers 
of a conventional text can write on the pages, they cannot write in the text. By contrast, 
hypertext wreaters are able to write in the text, not merely on the pages. I develop this 
argument at length in the next chapter. 
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The read-write hypertext interface allows the wreater to experience hypertext as a 
technology that opens up spaces for multiple, often contradictory voices. A literary 
hypertext often exhibits multiple narrative voices at the outset, and the wreater is free to 
write even more voices or divergent perspectives into the text. Thus, the conversation 
metaphor may be extended, inasmuch as the conversation between wreater and text is 
more like seminar or colloquy than a dyadic conversation; that is, the conversation, or 
discussion, becomes multiperspectival. From a feminist perspective, then, working within 
a loosely linked hypertext is more interesting or compelling than gaining power over a 
text or over an author. 
The notion of gaining power over a text, or the rhetoric of empowerment, is 
associated with the masculinist metaphor of the hunt. And following an interesting 
metaphorical logic, the scientific method becomes a weapon and nature becomes the prey 
(Rushing 158). More specifically, within the field ofrhetorical criticism, method equates 
to theory, and the text is the prey targeted by the theory-wielding hunter-critic. Rushing 
analyzes this metaphorical pattern on four levels: (1) the hunter uses a weapon to act on 
the prey; (2) the critic uses a method to act on the text; (3) the gazer uses a look to act on 
an object; and (4) the knower uses knowledge to act on the known (158). 
This metaphorical pattern can be further extended so that the hypertext-equipped 
computer becomes the weapon and online "content" the prey. The science-as-hunt 
metaphorical pattern, then, generates the following assertion: The wreater uses the 
computer to act on content. With Internet access, the computer may also be treated as a 
weapon, perhaps a net, for capturing knowledge/power. Such a metaphorical construction 
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is quite congruent with the paradigm that posits hypertext technology as a tool that 
empowers readers and increases their control over the text. Such an "empowered" reader 
acts on rather in the text. And acting on the text is associated with controlling the text. 
For Bush, Nelson, Landow, Lanham, and other theorists, hypertext technology 
enhances the reader's control over the text and, by extension, control over knowledge. 
Thus, a fundamental tenet of humanities-based hypertext theory is that hypertext is 
reader-centered; it frees the reader from the author's control, transforming the 
comparatively passive reader into an active wreater. Moreover, the reader-centeredness 
of hypertext goes beyond reader-response theory, according to which, even in the case of 
conventional print text, each reader constructs, perhaps even "writes," her own text. 
Thus, reader-centeredness is often associated with democratization and the dissemination 
of power, as in Landow's claim that a "fully implemented embodiment of a networked 
hypertext system[ .. . ] obviously creates empowered readers, ones who have more power 
relative both to the texts they read and to the authors of these texts than readers of print 
materials have" (273, emphasis added). 
As we should expect, not every hypertext theorist espouses the rhetoric of 
empowerment. J. Yellowlees Douglas, for instance, labels Lanham a "technological 
determinist" for his claim that hypertext is "inherently democratic" ("Nature" 326). 
Douglas argues that "hypertext is not inherently democratic or liberating or egalitarian 
any more than it is implicitly more limiting, more authoritarian than print" (EOB 147) 
Despite the ideological seductiveness, from a democratic or oppositional perspective, of 
the notion of the hypertext wreater wresting control away from a culturally privileged, 
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often white male, author, hypertext readers rarely have the same control over a text as an 
author does. A hypertext author may contrive to frustrate readers and limit the ways in 
which a text may be read; that is to say, a hypertext author can be every bit as dominating 
or controlling as the author of conventional print text. For instance, by using Storyspace 's 
guard field function, an author may prevent a reader from seeing lexia B unless she has 
first read lexia A. A particular author might find it enjoyable and/or aesthetically 
effective to devise quite complex guard fields, and such authorial control is not 
necessarily a bad thing, as many readers derive pleasure from "surrendering" to the 
language or "falling under the spell" of the author. As mentioned previously, aesthetic 
pleasure often derives from surrendering, or at least partially surrendering, to an artist's 
magical control. 
As Harpold discusses, the act of reading any text involves a contract between reader 
and text; the reader agrees to expend time and energy reading the text, and the text 
promises to reveal a relatively coherent meaning: "Our readings are founded on an 
implicit guarantee that our engagement with text will lead to an end, a resolution that 
repeats and informs the beginning" ("Conclusions" 194). In literature, film, and drama 
we engage in the well-known "willing suspicion of disbelief' because we expect a pay 
off in the end-i.e., an answer to a question posed by the work. 18 
18 We might compare Kenneth Burke's notion of a text as an answer to a question posed by a particular 
rhetorical situation (Philosophy of Literary Form 1). 
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Rhetorical Magic 
To experience aesthetic pleasure, we willingly submit to the power, or magic, of the 
artist. Magic is founded on relatedness or connections-i.e. , connections between spirit, 
mind, and body; between human beings; between human beings and Nature; between 
humans, animals, and plants; between humans and stellar bodies; between the living and 
the dead. Susan Bordo writes, "[T]he medieval sense of relatedness to the world, as we 
know from its art, literature, and philosophy, had not depended on 'objectivity' but on 
continuity between human and physical realms, on the interpenetration, through 
meanings, of self and world" (639). James George Frazer, in The Golden Bough, refers to 
this principle of relatedness as sympathetic magic, i.e., the belief that entities can affect 
one another at a distance without a material medium. But in the seventeenth century, 
Descartes took on the mission of wiping out what early-modem scientists deemed 
superstitious, irrational (or pre-rational) thinking, just as Plato had targeted the mythic 
thinking of Greek antiquity. 
Magic should not be overlooked by rhetorical studies. While magic has often been 
considered a primitive science, Burke characterized magic as "primitive rhetoric" 
(Rhetoric of Motives 43). While rhetoric, Burke claimed, is the "use of addressed 
language to induce action in people," magic is the "use of addressed language to induce 
motion in things ( 42). Magic, furthermore, is not merely used for affecting nature; it has a 
socializing, community-building function. Accordingly, Burke also referred to "the 
socializing aspects of magic" (43). The ancient rhapsode's magical stories and songs may 
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have had, above all, a socializing function; they served to pass along cultural lore and 
mores. 
But rhapsodic rhetorical "magic" appears to have evolved, under the sophists and 
later rhetoricians, into the principle of rhetorical power (Jarratt 22-23). And this practice 
later became institutionalized as administrative rhetoric (McKerrow 315). Rhetors, under 
this model, strove to control their audiences. In other words, "Power traditionally is 
conceptualized in rhetorical theory as the rhetor 's ability to dominate-to have the 
rhetor's beliefs prevail and to secure the adherence of audience members to the rhetor's 
point of view" (Foss et al. 188). 
Power and control, however, are not always directed outwardly. The converse of 
rhetorical power is self-control, the great virtue in the Platonic-Christian-Cartesian 
worldview. Moreover, being freed from another's control, or gaining self-control, is a 
very liberal-humanist concern. Self-control is not merely a democratic virtue; it is also 
associated with the "flight from the feminine," which is part of the "masculine epistemic 
stance, best manifested in detached and self-controlled objectivity" (Code, 
"Epistemology" 175). My argument, in brief, is that if we can regain an appreciation for 
ritual and relational magic, rather than fixating on the mechanistic principles of power 
and control, we may succeed in articulating a more humane rhetoric. The notion of the 
living text is, of course, central to this argument. 
Ultimately, the emphasis on a power struggle, or battle for control, between reader 
and author or reader and text participates in the tradition of agonistic rhetoric, which is 
central to mainstream Western thinking. In other words, the radical, liberatory potential 
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of hypertext appears to be founded on the ideology that it purports to deconstruct-i.e. , 
the ideology of Enlightenment humanism, whose ideal citizen is a rational, self-
interested, autonomous man. Far from subverting this ideology, the rhetoric of liberatory 
hypertext, by focusing on personal empowerment, actually reinforces liberal humanism. 
Thus, I do not wish to found my argument for feminist literary hypertext on a rhetoric of 
personal liberation or empowerment. Rather, I wish to focus on hypertext's potential for 
facilitating interpersonal connection. I am far more concerned with relationality than with 
personal empowerment. 
Varieties of Empowerment 
The rhetoric of empowerment, ultimately, comes down to a struggle for what 
Starhawk (a.k.a. Miriam Simas) has termed power-over. Starhawk discusses three 
systems of power: power-from-within, power-with, and power-over. I summarize these 
three systems of power below: "Power-from-within is akin to the sense of mastery we 
develop as young children with each new unfolding ability[ .. . ]. But power-from-within 
[ ... ] also arises from our sense of connection, our bonding with other human beings, and 
with the environment" (Starhawk 1 0). Power-with, or influence, is "the power of a strong 
individual in a group of equals, the power not to command, but to suggest and be listened 
to, to begin something and see it happen" (10). The third system of power, power-over, 
comes from the consciousness Starhawk has termed "estrangement: the view of the world 
as made up of atomized, nonliving parts, mechanically interacting, valued not for what 
they inherently are but only in relation to some outside standard" (9). Like classical, 
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agonistic rhetoric, power-over "is ultimately born of war and the structures, social and 
intrapsychic, necessary to sustain mass, organized warfare" (9). The problem, in terms of 
my critique of the rhetoric of empowerment, is that in "the dominant culture, power-with 
has become confused with power-over" (10). Although Starhawk refers to her first type 
of power, power-from-within, as "empowerment," under the influence of masculinist 
rhetoric, empowerment is tacitly assumed to mean power-over. In other words, both 
powerfrom-within and power-with tend to be confused with power-over. 
In the objectivist, masculinist worldview, there is but one type of power-power-
over; therefore, the reader and the author, as well as the reader and the text, are assumed 
to be in power struggle. Furthermore, Starhawk's discussion of"the world as made up of 
atomized, nonliving parts, mechanically interacting" is in perfect accord with Code's 
critique of the epistemology of medium-sized objects. In short, based on the rhetoric of 
personal empowerment, the reader is assumed to crave power over a medium-sized text-
object. 
I must stress that empowerment, per se, is not an anti-feminist principle; rather, it is 
liberal humanism's myopic focus on individual empowerment that I find problematic. 
Power is a necessary element of feminism because feminism is inherently critical and 
political. Feminist practices are designed to intervene in history, to change the world, not 
just to analyze reality from a safe, objective distance. I maintain, though, that the most 
genuinely feminist expression of power is power-with, the kind of power that comes into 
being in the space between people. More specifically, as feminists strive to destabilize 
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oppressive hierarchies and cultural hegemonies, I believe that power-with is the most 
effective kind of power. 
Under a feminist paradigm, the struggle for personal power might give way to 
dialogue. Ideally, feminism changes the world not through increased control but through 
better dialogue. Rather than applying power from a distance, as in the crudest form of 
magic, feminists change the world by engaging in social networks and influencing the 
connections within these networks. Evelyn Fox Keller claims that feminist action is 
"more of an acting in than an acting on the world" (Reflections 1 00); therefore, power-
with is premised on acting in rather than on. Traditional rhetors, following the model of 
administrative rhetoric, seek power-over, and they act on an audience rather than in a 
community. Acting in implies an ethics of responsibility, respect, and care because the 
rhetor must live with the consequences her or his words, while acting on implies 
objective distance, disengagement, and possible irresponsibility. 
Coming to terms with the rhetoric of empowerment boils down to a choice between 
granting ontological priority to entities or relations. Enlightenment humanism begins 
with entities rather than relations. And human beings, in their capacity as pre-existing 
entities, seek power-over before p.Jwer-with. However, as Hayles argues, "Beginning 
with relation rather than pre-existing entities changes everything" ("FM" 3). This 
relational ontology differs radically from the ontology of liberal humanism, which is 
premised on individuality, autonomy, objective distance, and so on. Hayles states further, 
"We do not exist in order to relate; rather, we relate in order that we may exist as fully 
realized human beings" (31). If relations are ontologically prior to entities, then power-
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over loses its rhetorical appeal. In short, my thesis is that hypertext theory, as well as 
Western culture in general, ought to shift from the rhetoric of personal empowerment to a 
rhetoric ofrelationality. With such a theoretical grounding, hypertext might actually be 
liberatory, but in a far different way than the liberal ideology promises. 
Rearticulating Feminist Rhetoric 
I discussed in the previous chapter Hayles ' argument that information technology is 
producing a shift from the ancient polarity of presence/absence to pattern/randomness. 
Not only are relationships patterns, but relationships between individuals, along with 
social movements founded on such relationships, may be more theoretically and 
experientially compelling than the traditional focus on individuals. And insofar as social 
movements are patterns, the shift from presence/absence to pattern/randomness provides 
a theoretical basis for rearticulating feminist rhetoric. For instance, the next history of 
feminist rhetoric might focus on social movements rather than exceptional individuals; 
that is to say, beginning with relations rather than individuals or entities allows us to go 
beyond the individualist, "great woman" histories of feminist rhetoric. In a much-
discussed 1992 article, Barbara Biesecker argued, 
[T]he rhetorical canon is a system of representation whose present form is 
predicated on and celebrates the individual. [ ... ] [But] entailed in the valorization 
of the individual is a mechanics of exclusion that fences out a vast array of 
collective rhetorical practices to where there belongs no proper name. The 
exaltation of individual rhetorical actions is secured by way of the devaluing of 
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collective rhetorical practices which[ . .. ] have been the most common form of 
women's intervention in the public sphere. (143-144) 
I agree with Biesecker's further claim that "a decidedly revisionary history of Rhetoric 
hinges at least in part on our articulating an alternative to the ideology of individualism" 
(145). 
The point I wish to emphasize is that feminist rhetoric is not present in individual 
women; rather, it comes into being in relationships-i.e., interpersonal relationships as 
well as large-scale social movements. Relationships are patterns. Furthermore, 
relationships between women need not be privileged over other relational dynamics. 
Feminist rhetoric may emanate from relationships between women and women, between 
women and men, and even between men. Feminism then becomes about gender rather 
than women. As Hopkins argues, "[F]eminism should be about gender and the structures 
of sexism and oppression that arise from hierarchical evaluations of gender, not about the 
problematic ahistorical category of woman per se" (51). Gender, of course, is relational. 
Gendered beings do not exit prior to relationships; we are born into relationships and 
thrust into ongoing conversations. Accordingly, conversation is where rhetoric comes 
into being; it is not generated ex nihilo by autonomous individuals. Iser argues that the 
text-as-read comes into being in a "virtual dimension" between the reader and the written 
text (958). Arguing from analogy, then, we might state that historiographers of feminist 
rhetoric would do well to focus on the virtual dimension between individuals, for it is in 
this dimension that both gender and rhetoric happen. 
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In the next chapter as I present and defend the methodology of this study. I also 
delve more deeply into a number of themes raised in this as well as the previous chapter. 
Ultimately, after I have (partially) traced the multiple intersections among feminist 
rhetoric, hypertext theory, and feminist epistemology, a new articulation of feminist 
rhetoric will emerge more fully. 
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CHAPTER3 
Methodology: Breaking Readerly Silence 
As I argued in the previous chapter, citing Evelyn Fox Keller, feminist action is 
"more of an acting in than an acting on the world" (Reflections 100). I believe this 
approach applies equally well to the wreater' s engagement with hypertext, and by 
changing the word act to write, I have a theoretical foundation for arguing that the 
engaged hypertext wreater writes in the text rather on it. The textual intervention enacted 
through a read-write hypertext interface, such as Storyspace, is significant on several 
levels. Most importantly, this approach directly addresses the modernist bias for studying 
literary texts in an objectivist, purely analytical manner. With conventional literary texts 
as well as literary hypertext, a feminist stance calls for active engagement with the text, 
rather than standing outside the text as a "disinterested" critic or theorist. 
In this chapter I present and defend the methodology undergirding the core of this 
study, i.e., the narrative-analytic account of my readerly relationship with Quibbling, 
Patchwork Girl, Cy borg: Engineering the Body Electric, "Lust," and "I Have Said 
Nothing." As mentioned previously, I have used the read-write capability ofStoryspace 
to write within these five hypertexts. One may read these texts without Storyspace in a 
read-only mode and, even when using Storyspace, one is certainly not obligated to write 
in the text; yet, from a methodological standpoint, my rationale for using the full 
functionality of the Storyspace interface is that it allows me to intervene in the text, 
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effectively writing myself into the text, as opposed to remaining on the outside looking 
in. I must emphasize that this dissertation is a rhetorical study, not a literary study. I have 
not undertaken a close reading of the five hypertexts listed above, for such a task would 
entail book-length study in itself. As a student of rhetoric, I am primarily interested in the 
shifting dynamics of writer, reader, and text in a hypertextual environment. 
As stated previously, feminist rhetors are engaged in "breaking the silence" 
(Lunsford "On Reclaiming" 6). I have also referred to Gloria's Anzaldua's "personal 
triumph over the 'tradition of silence"' (Lunsford, "Toward" 1). Hence, with respect to 
feminist rhetoric, the methodology of this study is premised on the need to counteract the 
silencing of the reader, which is encouraged by the conventions of print publication, 
classical rhetoric, and teacher-centered pedagogy. The tradition of classical rhetoric has 
relied heavily on the binary of the vocal rhetor and the silent audience. Consequently, 
reading and writing are typically treated as vastly dissimilar activities. We often hear of 
the importance of reading, and children are admonished to become good readers if they 
would succeed in contemporary society; however, writing is treated differently, as if it 
were an inborn talent, a mysterious gift, or somehow magical. But in adopting the term 
"wreater," I have been motivated by the desire to blur the boundary between reading and 
writing. My thesis is that by writing ourselves into our texts, feminist readers may break 
the readerly silence (i.e., the silence of the library and the traditional classroom) enforced 
by the conventional text and traditional Western rhetoric. 
The task of writing myself into the five hypertexts was accomplished as follows: As 
I read, I added my own text within the given hypertext. My additions, consisting of 
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commentary, analysis, and personal reflection, are linked to and from the "primary" text. 
For the reader's convenience, in each of the hypertexts, the new lexias are nested within a 
lexia labeled "Commentary." In addition to creating new lexias, I have occasionally 
added text, typically short notes, within existing lexias, italicizing the new text to set it 
apart. Finally, I have stored all five hypertexts on a single rewritable compact disc, or 
CD-RW. The material on the CD may be treated as data, and it may be read at any point 
among the five chapters of this study. Chapter 4 contains a more formal, or linear, 
narrative-analytic account of my encounter, or readerly relationships with, the five 
hypertexts. 
At this juncture a question arises regarding the appropriateness of the terms primary 
text and secondary text within a hypertext. By conventional standards, the text I have 
written into the five hypertexts would be considered supplemental text or marginalia. Yet, 
insofar as hypertext blurs the primary/secondary distinction, the text contributed by the 
wreater and the text composed by the copyright-protected author are of equal status. 
Because the center/margin binary opposition breaks down, the added text cannot be 
classified as notes, glosses, or marginalia. In fact, notes, glosses, and marginalia do not 
exist as such in hypertext. Such categories belong to the hierarchical environment of 
conventional text. 
I asserted in the previous chapter that readers of a conventional text can write on the 
pages, but they cannot write in the text, whereas hypertext wreaters write in the text, not 
merely on the pages. I flesh out this claim as the chapter unfolds; however, a legitimate 
question to ask at this point is why is writing in the text better than writing on the pages? 
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In brief, writing in the text, or writing oneself into the text, suggests intimate reader 
engagement rather than objective distance. I have argued for a feminism founded on 
situated objectivity, by which I mean that the subject is implicated in objective reality, in 
contrast to the liberal humanist valorization of individuality, autonomy, and objective 
distance: Such a philosophical stance is founded on a firm subject/object split. Hence, 
writing oneself into a text blurs the classical rhetorical divisions between text writer and 
' ' 
reader (i.e., the rhetorical triangle). In other words, a feminist theorization of hypertext 
blurs, or smudges, the borders on the map of classical rhetoric-i.e., the map that has 
excluded all non-mainstream, non-patriarchal rhetorics. 
Explanation and Understanding 
The encounter with hypertext is fundamentally different from the encounter with 
conventional text because hypertext calls into question mainstream subject/object 
dichotomies. Hypertext calls for engaged interpretation rather than distanced analysis. 
Consequently, the theorist would be well served by employing a self-reflective, 
hermeneutic approach, perhaps a kind of phenomenological hermeneutics in the 
Heideggerian tradition. A self-reflective, phenomenological hermeneutics implies a 
personally engaged researcher-that is, a researcher who does not assume the position of 
a subject dispassionately studying, or dissecting, an object or exploring a textual terrain. 
Rather, the researcher takes on the role of participant-observer, observing her/himself as 
much as the text. In sum, the wreater-critic-theorist of hypertext, if she or he is to be 
effective, must actively engage the text, rather than analyzing it from a safe distance. 
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The phenomenological hermeneutics tradition poses a problem, however, at least for 
the present study, inasmuch as it is not feminist, despite substantial intersections with 
feminist theory (Code, WCSN 145-49; Kruks 68). The positions taken by these 
continental philosophers (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Ricoeur) all rest on 
the mainstream assumption of the autonomous, unitary, rational man. The enlightened 
self, rather than social groups or communities, is the central concern of this philosophical 
school. But within a feminist epistemology, knowing "becomes a way of engaging with 
the world, where 'world ' is conceived as much circumstantially and socially as 
physically, materially" (Code, RS 184 ). The world, like the text, is a living organism that 
calls for active engagement by socially constructed participants. Thus, any application of 
a phenomenological hermeneutic approach, for the purposes of this study, must be 
reconceived within a feminist context, according to which each individual lives within a 
number of overlapping, shifting epistemic communities. Ultimately, connection rather 
than autonomy must be the central concern of a feminist hermeneutics. 
In critiquing mainstream, masculinist epistemology, we can draw distinctions 
between different types of knowledge. Paul Ricoeur drew such a distinction based on 
disciplinary boundaries, arguing that the natural sciences and the social sciences differ in 
terms of their goals as well as their methodologies. The goals, according to Ricoeur, of 
the natural sciences and the social sciences are, respectively, explanation and 
understanding ( 49). Natural laws are explained, not understood, by scientists. 
Explanation is a distanced, analytical type of knowledge, while understanding is more 
engaged and self-reflective. Hence, as long as the natural sciences hold to the objectivist 
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paradigm, the best they can hope for is explanation. And despite the fact that scientists 
are obviously human, they can learn virtually nothing about the lived realities of socially 
situated human beings from objectivist methodologies. However, rather than reifying the 
explanation/understanding binary, we might speak of "partial explanation" (Haraway, 
"SM" 160). Partial explanation would be a hybrid ofRicouer's explanation and 
understanding. The cyborg, as stated previously, is "resolutely committed to partiality" 
(Haraway 151 ). Both understanding and explanation are partial. 
To reiterate a point made earlier in this study, mainstream, objectivist epistemology 
takes knowledge of medium-sized objects (e.g., billiard balls, rocks, human bodies, 
nuclear missiles, etc.) as exemplary. Now, based on Ricouer's explanation/understanding 
distinction, it follows that medium-sized objects are typically explained rather than 
understood. Understanding is self-reflective; it takes subjectivity into account and, 
therefore, encompasses self-understanding as well as understanding of others. 
Explanation, by contrast, is founded on analytic methodologies. By extrapolation, then, 
we may conclude that acting on promotes, at best, explanation, while acting in facilitates 
understanding. Thus, in terms of methodology, I wish to make a case for a shift from 
objectivist analysis to engaged (partial) understanding. 
Art critic John Berger discussed explanation and understanding within the context of 
an essay on Cubism, a subject to which I return later in this chapter. Berger wrote, 
We begin with the surface, but since everything in the picture [Picasso's Bottle 
and Glasses] refers back to the surface we begin with the conclusion. We then 
search-not for explanation, as we do when presented with an image with a 
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single, predominate meaning[ ... ] but for some understanding of the 
configuration of events whose interaction is the conclusion from which we began. 
(The Moment of Cubism 24) 
Cubism and literary hypertext have a number of qualities in common, as I will argue 
below, but for now the commonality I wish to foreground is that both media call for 
understanding rather than mere explanation. 
Explanation and Representation 
Explanations are commonly represented; that is to say, in mainstream Western 
thought, knowledge is represented as explanation. Representation, then, is integral to 
objectivist epistemology. In literal terms, in order for knowledge or scientific discoveries 
to spread, knowledge that is present to one person--or more likely present to a collection 
of people or a discipline-must be made present, or re-presented, to others. Furthermore, 
knowers are assumed to be autonomous, self-sufficient individuals; therefore, knowledge 
must be transferred across the gap from one mind to another by means of 
representation-hence, the relevance of the "conduit metaphor" of communication, as 
discussed previously. From this perspective, knowledge is deliverable content, as if it 
were packaged for shipment. 
But this conception of the knower as a self-sufficient agent has been questioned by 
feminist epistemologists. For instance, Code makes the case for taking a "second-person" 
stance, which entails rejecting the principle of epistemic autonomy. Far from being an 
autonomous, self-sufficient whole, each person is partial. Rather than conceiving of 
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individuals as identical, interchangeable units in a totalizing, mechanistic system, 
"second persons" are each different yet socially connected. No person is complete in and 
of herself or himself; therefore, others are vitally necessary. It also follows that the 
otherness of the other ought to be respected ( WCSN, 80-87). Because we are all different, 
as opposed to identical, interchangeable cogs in a machine, we cannot hope to fully know 
another person. Perhaps most importantly, we are never fully present even to ourselves; 
that is, we cannot know ourselves completely or represent ourselves truthfully to others. 
All we can share are partial truths or opinions, what the Greeks called doxa. 
By extension, rejecting the principle of epistemic autonomy may provide an impetus 
for going beyond "great woman" histories of rhetoric, as discussed previously. Each 
person, inasmuch as she or he is a second person, is socially situated-that is, situated in 
an ongoing conversation. Consequently, conversations and social movements ought to 
take precedence over individual genius. After all, even geniuses are beholden to 
contemporary conversations and opinions. Understanding is a "situated knowledge" in 
Haraway's sense (188) . Or, as Ricoeur claims, "The first function ofunderstanding is to 
orient us in a situation" (56). Such understanding, furthermore, is a thoroughly rhetorical 
understanding; it is the basis ofphronesis, or practical wisdom, which I believe is central 
to feminism. Because feminism is political, it must be practical; it deals with probable 
knowledge and aims for partial victories. 
Extrapolating now to hypertext theory, the second-person stance encourages the 
hypertext wreater to think of her interaction with the text as a reciprocal relationship with 
another living being-an other that cannot be dominated by an aggressive reader or 
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investigator. The second-person stance has the potential, then, to go beyond mere 
explanation to yield understanding. Understanding allows the wreater to orient herself 
within the text, or within the hypertextual situation. In other words, rather than assuming 
an objective, analytical stance, the hypertext wreater inhabits the text like Heidegger's 
Dasein (there-being or being-there). Dasein is not the self-contained ego or subject but 
fully contextualized existence. As lain Thomson explains, for Heidegger, "existence is 
fundamentally a 'being-there, that is, a temporally-structured making intelligible of the 
place in which we find ourselves."' Thus, hypertext wreaters find themselves, and also 
write themselves, within texts. Or as Ricoeur, in commenting on Heidegger, writes, 
"What must be affirmed[ ... ] is the condition of inhabiting the world, a condition which 
renders situation, understanding and interpretation possible" (56). 
But again, we mustn't think in terms of autonomous individuals inhabiting the world, 
but rather partial, connected, socially situated actors-or performers. Ultimately, we are 
all performers. We are actors in a number of overlapping narratives, and we are also the 
narrators. 
1 The Thomson quote comes from an unpaginated website. Thomson, lain. "Martin Heidegger: a 
philosophical snapshot. Available online: http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/eands/ heid.htrnl. What follows is an 
extended quote from this site: 
"Being is grounded in the temporal structure of those beings ('Da-sein') who have an understanding of 
Being. With this famous reconceptualization of the self not as a subject, consciousness, or ego but as a 
"Dasein," Heidegger takes the German word for 'existence' (Dasein) and interprets it in terms of its basic 
semantic elements ("there" [Da] + 'Being" [Sein]) in order to illustrate his claim that existence is 
fundamentally a "being-there," that is, a temporally-structured making intelligible of the place in which we 
fmd ourselves. ('Dasein is its disclosedness, ' Heidegger says.) He understands this 'making-intelligible' as 
' truth ' in its most 'primordial' sense. As shown by the Greek word for truth, A-letheia (the alpha-privative 
+ Lethe, the river of forgetting) , truth is primordially a kind of 'un-concealment,' a 'dis-closing' or 
manifestation of presence which in fact any correspondence theory of truth must implicitly presuppose (in 
order even for there simply to be something to which to correspond)." 
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Time, Space, and Narrative 
The wreater who inhabits the text is narrated; that is to say, wreaters narrate 
themselves into texts, which is how the text and the wreater come to be understood, as 
opposed to merely explained. Understanding, like narrative, depends on the temporal 
dimension. Understanding, furthermore, is experiential; therefore, temporal structure is 
closely tied to experiential reality (Fish 982). Texts are realized experientially-that is, in 
time. Furthermore, conversation occurs in time, and readers may be said to converse with 
texts. Assuming, then, that the primary task of the theorist or critic of hypertext is not to 
explain the text from the outside, but to inhabit it, she may choose to write, perhaps in a 
first-person narrative, about the experience of being in the text, or the understanding 
gained of the text and of herself. In other words, the wreater can write about the 
conversation she had (or is having) with the text. 
The notion of a conversation between reader and text relates to my claim, made in 
chapter 1, that hypertext is a kind of"cyborg literacy." Cyborgs are "cybernetic 
(feedback-controlled) systems" (Haraway 164). Thus, when a person is engaged with 
another entity-whether it be human or nonhuman- there is a cybernetic feedback loop, 
and this loop engenders self-reflective understanding, as opposed to explanation/analysis. 
A conversation, then, is essentially a feedback loop, as the participants modify, extend, or 
challenge one another's words (or texts). Objectivist epistemology does not recognize a 
feedback loop between knower and known, subject and object, self and other. Under this 
model, the ideal subject neither influences nor is influenced by the object; objective 
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reality is known from a safe distance and represented to others. But based on the insights 
of feminist epistemology, we can argue that the knower and the known, as well as the 
reader and the text, constitute a cybernetic system. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, cyborg writing is not premised on writing an 
"origin story," or re-presenting something absent. Cyborg writing does not support the 
cult of originality, which is premised on denying the influence of time, along with the 
influence of other entities. The cybernetic feedback loop does not permit static 
representations; therefore, time, along with narrative and conversation, is an essential 
ingredient in cyborg writing. In other words, the cyborg must be narrated, or written in 
time and space- or more accurately, in space-time. 
The cyborg is not a Cartesian; cyborg experience is not premised on objective 
distance or the privileging of the spatial over the temporal dimension. The cyborg, again, 
is forever partial. By contrast, organic wholeness, inasmuch as it eliminates temporality, 
is the dream of an uncontested, nonpartial reality. Given the influence of time, or the 
dynamic nature of space-time, the cyborg's vision is always partial; that is to say, the 
cyborg is not concerned with complete or finished representations of reality. Haraway 
writes, "A cyborg body is not innocent; it was not born in a garden; it does not seek 
unitary identity and so generate antagonistic dualisms without end" (180). To be born in 
a garden suggests the notion ofbeing born alone in an idyllic space, without social 
construction, mediation, or interpretation-or without being engaged in conversations. In 
other words, in cyborg writing we move from representation to conversation. 
Understanding calls for narrative. "Second-person," socially situated understanding, 
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or situated objectivity, is gained through engagement with others, or "conversation" in a 
broad sense. Conversation, in fact, may serve as a metonymy for all interpersonal 
engagement. 2 Conversations, like narratives, are temporal; they require time. It follows, 
then, that engaged understanding may be distinguished from the voyeuristic, non-
narrated gaze. The gaze, in contrast to conversation, does not need a narrative--or 
dramatistic action in the Burkean sense; it can be purely spatial and static, as in gazing at 
photographs, or nearly static in the case of a plotless pornographic film. The pleasure of 
the gaze, or "fetishistic scopophilia[ ... ] can exist outside linear time as the erotic instinct 
is focused on the look alone" (Mulvey 1450). The look, as discussed previously, was the 
privileged epistemic mode for Plato and also Descartes, and mainstream Western 
philosophy has consistently denigrated, and also feminized, narrative. 
Mythos and Logos 
Narrative and analysis constitute an important polarity in the history of Western 
thought and education. On one level, narrative and analysis may be equated with the 
noetic worlds of mythos (i.e., the consciousness formed by the oral narration of myth, 
legend, and poetry3) and logos (i.e., the consciousness formed by the written word or 
dialectical logic). While the terms mythos and logos carry a variety of meanings in 
different contexts, I am concerned here with mythos and logos as "noetic worlds," or 
2 I use the word metonymy, rather than the more general term metaphor, because conversation is an aspect 
or attribute of interpersonal engagement. In metonymy, a part stands for a whole. 
3 The Greek word lexia is the plural form of lexis-"word" or "speech." The root of lexis is legein-"to 
say" as well as "legend." Logos also means "word," although it has a number of other meanings. In this 
discussion, I am using logos in the sense of the logic of the Socratic dialectic. 
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spheres ofmind (Ong 119). Jarratt argues, contrary to binaristic theories of classical 
scholars such as Eric Havelock and Walter Ong, that these two these two noetic worlds 
overlapped in Greece, and most likely elsewhere, at least since eighth century BCE. 
While it is true that mythos was the predominate mode of enculturation in pre-literate 
Greece, logos and rational argument were not invented along with the alphabetic script in 
fifth-century Greece (Jarratt 32).4 While the fifth-century Sophists were skilled 
dialecticians, they, like the Homeric rhapsodes that preceded them, knew the power of 
oral narrative. But Plato's radical proposal was to place logos above mythos. Jarratt 
argues, "For Plato, the kind of consciousness required for distanced, critical analysis 
would take the form of the dialectical method, built on the structure ofhypotactic logic" 
(34). Plato, through the voice of Socrates, associated mythos with sophistic oratorical 
rhetoric, which he characterized as shrewd deception and flattery ( Gorgias 71; Phaedrus 
142).5 But even Plato, who was, of course, full of contradictions, used narrative to great 
effect; yet he used narrative to promote logos. The same cannot be said of Aristotle, who, 
in works such as Poetics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Metaphysics, created a wide gap 
between poetic and prosaic discourses (Jarratt xvi, 34). And, at least since the thirteenth 
century, mainstream Western philosophers have followed Aristotle in keeping logos and 
mythos separate, which has served to marginalize narrative and poetry 
4 In critiquing the Western, Enlightenment idea of history Linda Tuhiwai Smith writes, "Literac~ [ . . . ] was 
used as a criterion for assessing the development of a society and its progress to a stage where history can 
be said to begin. [ . .. ] History was the story of people who were regarded as fully human" (32). In other 
words, Western scholars implicitly regarded primary oral cultures as "pre-fully-human." 
5 Bizzel and Herzberg edition. The Rhetorical Tradition. 
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But now, in order to advance a feminist rearticulation of rhetoric, the logos!mythos 
border needs to be crossed from both sides. Mythos need not replace logos or push logos 
to the margins. Mythos must simply be placed on an equal footing with logos. In making 
such a move, feminist rhetoricians would be following the example of the Sophists 
(Jarratt 39). 
Furthermore, straddling or smudging the mythos/logos border would serve to break 
the dominance of spatial epistemologies. In Orality and Literacy , Ong argues that 
writing, and especially print, has promoted the spatialization of thought-i .e., thought is 
spatialized on the surface of the printed page (117 -132). The "shift from oral to written 
speech is essentially a shift from sound to visual space" (Ong 117). Writing transformed 
logos, the word, from its original aural mode to a visual or graphic form. As such, logos 
became highly geometric (consider the Pythagorean theorem); therefore, logos is at home 
on the surface of a page or scroll. While logos, insofar as it has been taken over by 
writing and print, seeks firm borders (e.g., the edges of a printed page or scroll, the 
covers of a book), mythos, the aurally based noetic world, is inextricably linked to cycles 
and continuity. Consequently, mythos, to the extent that it transgresses, or "bleeds over," 
textual borders, may be associated with intertextuality. Moreover, given the emphasis on 
cycles, the concept of mythos intersects productively with traditional constructions of 
"the feminine." Along with the common association with the menstrual cycle, which may 
be essentialist, an argument can be made that the modem, middle-class notion of 
"women's work," which generally translates as domestic work, is cyclical; that is to say, 
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the daily domestic chores begin all over again every day. By contrast, modem, 
nonagricultural "men's work" is often organized around projects that have definite 
completion dates. Consequently, based on a combination ofbiological and purely cultural 
factors, women, on average, may have a greater appreciation than men for mythos. 
Finally, to complete this chain of associations, we can observe that traditional "women's 
work" is highly recursive or repetitious, very much like the process of (re)reading the 
lexias of a hypertext. As I claimed in the previous chapter, literary hypertexts usually 
cycle rather than conclude. Hypertext, in its most creative articulations, is intertextual 
and cyclical. 
It is important to note, however, that in making these associations one risks 
reinscribing oppressive, gendered binaries, such as the division between public and 
private spheres. We must not naively celebrate the cyclical, "mythic" nature oftraditional 
women ' s work. For third-wave feminisms, it is vital to bring men into traditionally 
"feminine," domestic spheres, and ultimately to de-gender the public and private 
spheres- i .e., the Greek polis and oikos, which are associated with logos and mythos, 
respectively. 
The binaries of mythos/logos and understanding/explanation are related-and both 
binaries may be productively blurred. That is, inasmuch as understanding is situated in 
space-time, there is no need to (try to) control space. By contrast, explanation tends to be 
static and spatially controlling. In the empiricist mode, space becomes a static 
background for moving objects. The laboratory model, for example, is premised on the 
need to keep (feminine) nature under control in a secure space where it can be analyzed. 
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Space, as a static background, enables objective observation and analysis to take place. 
For instance, if time is used to measure an object's movement through space (or 
velocity), then space must be treated as a static background-space cannot be moving 
along with the objects under observation. In other words, the relation between the spatial 
and the temporal dimensions is important because if space can be treated as static, objects 
can be measured in time. One can then produce propositional (X-knows-that-p) 
knowledge (e.g., "I know that planets move in elliptical orbits."). Code claims, "For 
positivist epistemologists, sensory observation in ideal observation conditions is the 
privileged source of knowledge, offering the best promise of certainty" (RS 25). One way 
to bring conditions closer to the ideal is by controlling space, which leads to an objective 
"view" of reality; therefore, the visual-spatial epistemology attempts to reduce the 
temporal dimension so that "truth" can be situated in space. An interesting connection 
with print technology is revealed in Ong's assertion that "print situates words in space 
more relentlessly that writing [that is, handwriting] ever did. Writing moves words from 
the sound world to a world of visual space, but print locks words into position in this 
space. · Control of position is everything in print" (121 ). 
The problem with the objectivist paradigm is that the still spatial background does 
not exist. Space-time moves. We might envision a person trying to draw a straight line 
between two points on a chalkboard that slides under the pressure of the chalk. Such a 
line would be, at best, curved, rather than the paradigmatic shortest distance between two 
points. One is reminded here of Joyce's concept of the "hypertext contour" as "the figure 
of changing change" ( Othermindedness 43). The knower is situated in space-time, or in 
120 
the text, rather than standing outside the system, and space-time cannot be controlled 
from "the inside." Knower and known, or subject and object, are both situated within the 
same space-time. To illustrate this point, I cite below a statement from "Buzz-Daze and 
the Quotidian Stream" where Carolyn Guyer speaks of a dialogic exchanged between two 
characters in Quibbling: 
I think of this interchange as a fairly commonplace occurrence, a situation where 
people are in a sense collaborative artists, people creating themselves, Hilda and 
Robert, in narrative juxtaposition to one another. That's inside the story. In the 
literary lump of the fiction, the thing that doesn't exist without a reader, the 
reader/writer creates Hilda, Robert, and herself, in space-time. It is exactly the 
same process used by any writer of a literary lump." (unpaginated online text) 
In summary, the connection that I wish to make between the mythos/logos dialectic and 
hypertext theory is that the hypertext wreater and the text, insofar as they constitute a 
cybernetic system, share the same space-time. This fact leads to a radical revisioning of 
the writer-reader-text rhetorical triangle, as I have argued throughout this study. 
The Place of First-Person Narrative 
I decided to write myself into five literary hypertexts because a feminist theorization 
of hypertext must be personal. Keller reminds us of the 1970s feminist credo "the 
personal is political." She then extends this notion to make the revolutionary claim that 
"the scientific is personal'' (9). And as cited previously, Lunsford refers to feminist 
rhetors' commitment to "naming in personal terms" ("On Reclaiming" 6). Likewise, 
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Glenn speaks of "current institutional, intellectual, political, and personal values" that 
inform rhetorical history (6). Accordingly, it is my contention that an adequate 
theorization of hypertext must be personal; it must break down the masculinist 
dichotomies of subject/object, reason/feeling, fact/value, masculine/feminine, 
rhetor/audience, and so on. Moreover, such an engaged approach entails the use of first-
person narrative, rather than objectivist analysis, in writing up the "findings," or tentative 
conclusions, of the study. Code, in advocating narrative as an antidote to objectivist 
analysis, writes that "once epistemologists recognize the locatedness of all cognitive 
activity in the projects and constructions of specifically positioned subjects, then the 
relevance of narrative will be apparent as an epistemological resource" (WCSN 170). In 
other words, all cognitive activity is located in space-time, and narrative-or the 
conversation between writer, reader, and text-expresses this locatedness far more 
effectively than analysis ever could. 
Analysis, nevertheless, remains essential to scholarship; it may, in fact, be 
incorporated into a hybrid narrative-analytic, or narranalytic, mode that refrains from 
objectivist distantiation, or "distanciation" (Ricoeur 113).6 In other words, narrative may 
be analytical and analysis may be narrated. Moreover, first-person narrative, like all 
writing, has ethical implications. Specifically, writing in the first-person allows me to 
claim and take full responsibility for my analysis. Narrative also helps the writer to 
account for the process of analysis, as opposed to pretending that an argument springs 
6 For Ricoeur, "distanciation [ . . . ) establishes the autonomy of the text with respect to it author, its situation 
and its original addressee" (113). 
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into life fully formed like Athena from Zeus's head. My sense ofanarranalytic mode of 
writing is similar to what Code calls "storied analyses" (RS 177). Joyce also classified his 
two essay collections as a "theoretical narrative, both a narrative of theory and a text 
theoretically at least a narrative" (OTM 3). To cite one more example, bell hooks stated, 
"[F]undamentally I believe that combining the analytical and experiential is a richer way 
of knowing" (89). 
A first-person narrative-analysis-which must be distinguished from the analysis of 
narrative (i.e., narratology or literary criticism)-allows the private and public realms to 
overlap. The private realm typically features first-person language, which is suitable for 
documenting the lived experience of the writer, whereas the public realm, which tends to 
feature analysis, calls for a more impersonal rhetoric. But, as Foss, Foss, and Griffin 
write in their discussion ofStarhawk's rhetoric, the "idea that there is only one possibility 
for the realm of rhetoric-the public realm that embodies patriarchy, with its 
characteristics of division, hierarchy, and power-over-is too limiting" (187). That is to 
say, feminist rhetoric does not privilege public discourse and analysis over private talk, 
"gossip," or narrative. 
Narrative is central to both feminist rhetoric and feminist epistemology. For instance, 
Gloria Anzaldua remarked, "[F]or me, writing has always been about narrative, about 
story[ .. .]. Theory is a kind of narrative. Science-you know, physics-that narrative, 
that's a hit on reality" (Lunsford, "Toward a Mestiza Rhetoric" 4).7 As Anzaldua's 
7 Lunsford, rather than Anzaldua, is cited here because the Anzaldua quote comes from an interview 
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statement indicates, scientists have no choice but to narrate their experimental procedures 
and results, although they usually do so in the most objective manner possible, typically 
relying heavily on the passive voice and referring to themselves in the third-person. 
Scientific prose, then, is designed to conceal or even erase the subject, or agent, as the 
writer does his best to remove all traces of his presence from the final scientific product.8 
Of course, my main concern in this study is not merely narrative or even literary 
narrative in general, but hypertextualliterary narrative. From this standpoint, it is 
interesting that as Code advocates narrative in scholarly writing her choice of words 
overlaps with the vocabulary of hypertext theory. She asserts, "Storytelling[ ... ] presents 
loci for identification and differentiation, agreement and dispute, and presents them over 
a textured range of possibilities which are linked, yet contingent and available for assent 
or refusal" (RS 167-168). The "loci for identification and differentiation" may easily be 
envisioned as lexias, or writing spaces, in a hypertext, and the notion of "linked, yet 
contingent" possibilities is obviously quite hypertextual. One may also clearly discern 
associations with hypertext theory in a statement Code makes on disciplinary narratives 
in epistemology: "There is no linear story to tell of feminist interrogations of 'the 
epistemological project,' no single, unbroken narrative line with a beginning, middle, and 
end" (RS 169). Again, feminist narratives, and especially feminist hypertext narratives, 
tend to cycle rather than conclude. 
conducted and published by Lunsford. 
8 I use the masculine pronoun advisedly in this sentence to highlight the masculinist orientation of modem 
science. 
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The methodology I am advocating here may be objected to on the grounds that first-
person narrative is relativistic and not rigorous enough for legitimate scholarship. Insofar 
as relativism is denigrated on the grounds of subjectivity, it is deemed incapable of 
producing real knowledge. On this view, objectivity must be vigilantly enforced if 
practical or scientifically valid knowledge is to be produced, and it is imperative that the 
idiosyncrasies of the investigator be neutralized, to the greatest degree possible anyway, 
by rigorous experimental design. Investigators be interchangeable, in other words. For, 
according to binaristic thinking, if one tampers with objectivity, even a little bit, one 
necessarily falls into the abyss of relativism. 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the falling metaphor is gendered; therefore, 
the phrase "falling into relativism" has definite implications for a feminist theorization of 
hypertext. Yet relativism is not necessarily a bad thing, as long as objectivity is not 
entirely rejected, which would constitute objectivism rather than objectivity. For feminist 
epistemologists "taking subjectivity into account does not entail abandoning objectivity" 
(Code, RS 49). Objectivism is premised on the erasure of all traces of subjectivity (Code, 
WCSN 51-52). Yet, taking subjectivity into account is actually a far more realistic, 
empirical approach than the traditional practice of ignoring the investigator or knower, 
given that such objectivity is a fiction at best. After all, if the subject did not matter, 
scholarly credentials and institutional affiliation, or ethos, would not matter. 
The stark either/or perspective, which attempts to erase the subject, is not only 
fallacious, it actually hinders the advancement of theory by preserving the hegemony of 
mainstream epistemologies and methodologies. The fallacy lies is in presenting 
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objectivism as politically or ideologically neutral. As Code argues, "The relentless 
denigration ofrelativism [ . .. ] suppresses any suspicion that 'universalism' and 'anti-
relativism' might themselves be political rather than purely epistemological 
requirements" (RS 188). Objectivism, in other words, is no more politically neutral than 
relativism. 
Relativism and Difference 
Implicit in relativism is a respect for difference, or an acknowledgement of the 
otherness of others. The drive for unity, by contrast, can be quite oppressive insofar as it 
is premised on sameness. Haraway, for example, complains of "unity-through-
domination or unity-through-incorporation[ ... and] the unintended erasure ofpolyvocal, 
unassimilable, radical difference" (157, 159). Differences tend to be erased when they do 
not fit into existing models or commonplaces. For instance, McClintock was 
misunderstood by eminent geneticists of her time because of"'tacit assumptions'-an 
implicit adherence to models that prevents people from looking at data with a fresh mind" 
(Keller, A Feeling 178). McClintock' s methodology, as well as her worldview, was 
premised on respect for difference without division or dichotomization. Keller wrote that, 
for McClintock, 
Difference constitutes a principle for ordering the world radically unlike the 
principle of division and dichotomization (subject-object, mind-matter, feeling-
reason, disorder-law). Whereas these oppositions are directed toward a cosmic 
unity typically excluding or devouring one of the pair, toward a unifying, all-
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encompassing law, respect for difference remains content with multiplicity as an 
end in itself. (163) 
A unity that devours "one of the pair" is inimical to feminism, inasmuch as feminism 
valorizes relationship, connection, and difference. Hence, the otherness of the other must 
be acknowledged and respected. 
One important connection between McClintock's perspective and hypertext theory is 
that hypertext makes room for difference, while the conventional single-authored text 
tends to squeeze out difference and inconsistency. The principle of multiplicity ought to 
be central to hypertext theory, particularly a feminist hypertext theory. The hypertext 
wreater, to borrow Keller's words, "remains content with multiplicity as an end in itself." 
As discussed in chapter one, conventional text is a kind of"zero-sum game" (Douglas, 
EOB 20); that is to say, when a different, divergent statement is articulated, it replaces the 
previous statement. The "old" word, sentence, claim, or narrative line is erased as the 
"new-and-improved" one is written; therefore, the writer cannot argue two contradictory 
positions at once. According to the logic of the zero-sum game, each addition is balanced 
by a subtraction, or erasure, with the result being the maintenance of the status quo-i.e., 
the classically coherent text. In other words, the conventional print text is singular rather 
than multiple, and as such it encourages the view that only one truth is possible at a given 
time and/or place. Hence, Douglas argues that print "makes us all, more or less, into 
objectivists or positivists, regardless of our intentions" (EOB 20). In hypertext, by 
contrast, a writer may write as many conflicting lines of argument or diverging narratives 
as she wishes; she simply inserts a hyperlink and writes a new tangent. In the 
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multiperspectival text, then, contradiction need not be erased. 
Multiperspectival epistemologies, as well as multilinear texts, reject objectivist 
division and distantiation. While individual persons, as material beings, are separate from 
one another and should be respected as such, they need not be socially or 
epistemologically divided from one another. As Keller writes, "Division severs 
connection and imposes distance; the recognition of difference provides a starting point 
for relatedness" (Reflections 163). Such a position is congruent with an ethics of care and 
respect because, even as it features the collective or community, it enables a kind of 
understanding that does not erase the individual. In other words, difference "invites a 
form of engagement and understanding that allows for preservation of the individual" 
(Keller, Reflections 164). Feminisms, then, must avoid totalizing positions, or 
philosophical or theoretical positions that erase difference (Haraway 159). 
Here is perhaps where the intersection of feminist epistemology and hypertext is 
most salient. As discussed previously, hypertext is premised on multiplicity-multiple 
texts, multiple readings, multiple authors. Therefore, the arguments I make in the 
hypertextual narranalytic portion of this study (i.e., the "data" stored on CD, not chapter 
4) need not be internally consistent or supported in a hierarchical fashion, as in the 
Toulmin model. Since I am not bound by the conventions of print, or the rules of the 
zero-sum game, I am free to make two or more "mutually exclusive" claims on the same 
subject. I might also make a claim and not support it. I can digress and develop a line of 
argument as far as I may wish, even if it completely contradicts another argument I've 
made elsewhere in the text. Or I might begin to develop an argument or tell a story and 
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abruptly abandon it, perhaps in mid-sentence. Closure and internal consistency, then, are 
not at all necessary in hypertext. The logic of hypertext is not the logic of conventional 
text. 
Representationalism Meets Hypertext 
In objectivist epistemologies, knowledge is represented as explanation. But taking a 
"second-person~' stance (Code, WCSN 80-87) entails treating a hypertext as a living 
organism, and this epistemological position yields understanding rather than 
explanation--or to avoid the binary, partial understanding and/or partial explanation. 
Accordingly, since full explanation is not necessary, I have not attempted to represent 
Quibbling, Patchwork Girl, or any of the other hypertexts considered in this study. A 
study of literary hypertext need not try to represent that work, for to represent a literary 
work implies an effort to control its multiplicity. Any representation will account for only 
a small part or a single instantiation of the entire work. 
Literary hypertexts are read one lexia at a time; therefore, the hypertext as 
constructed by the wreater, or the network oflexias, exists only in that wreater's mind. 
The single Iexia "flickers" before the wreater and then recedes back into unreadable code, 
but a pattern of lexias may be held in "suspended animation" in a reader's mind. 9 When 
the wreater presses the enter key or clicks the mouse to bring up a new lexia, the lexia 
that was "present" becomes "absent"-that is, the lexia shifts from a readable surface 
9 SeeN. Katherine Hayles 's "Virtual Bodies and Flickering Signifiers" and "Print is Flat, Code is Deep." 
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pattern to a "deep," umeadable code. Again, the text is a pattern, not a presence; the 
network of lexias is a pattern held in suspension in the wreater' s mind as a more or less 
amorphous gestalt-i.e., a global sense of the text. Hayles speaks of"the informational 
structure that emerges from the interplay between pattern and randomness," and she goes 
on to argue that "randomness is involved because it is only against the background or 
possibility of nonpattern that pattern can emerge. Whenever pattern exists, randomness is 
implicit as the contrasting term that allows pattern to be understood as such" (76, 78). 
The text, then, is experienced as a dynamic interplay of pattern and randomness. The 
textual patterns, in other words, are transient (Hayles, "VB" 89). Furthermore, given that 
patterns are held in a sort of transient suspension in the wreater's mind, they are unlikely 
to be recovered or repeated--or replicated in the scientific sense. 
Of course, one might read a hypertext many times and attempt to represent those 
encounters in a single critical essay or even a collection of essays, but the representation 
would remain partial. Critics who seek to represent a hypertext author's intentions will 
likely focus on the connections between lexias, or the design implicit in the links; 
however, those links are indeterminate, inasmuch as the wreater is free to follow or not 
follow them. Furthermore, a critic attempting to represent a literary hypertext would, 
following the logic of print, attempt to present it as a whole; yet wholeness is the dream · 
of an uncontested, non-partial reality. Each text, like each person's lived experience, is 
irreducible to a single, coherent meaning; the text is a contested site, and one 
representation never completely erases contradictory representations; other texts remain 
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visible below the surface as in a palimpsest. 10 
Writing, particularly since the seventeenth century, has been driven by 
representationalism-i.e., the belief that a remembered experience or no-longer-present 
reality can be symbolically or linguistically re-presented, that is, made present again. A 
biography, for example, is designed to re-present a life that is inaccessible in itself A 
postcard featuring a photograph or painting of the Eiffel Tower is supposed to make this 
object present to a person who cannot visit the actual tower. According to 
representationalism, to see is to know; to see an object itself or the representation of that 
object is to know it. 
The technology of writing, at least as it has been employed in the West, is supposed 
to allow writers to master reality or nature-i.e., to "capture" reality like a realistic 
painter captures a scene, or to fix reality in space; writing has been used this way at least 
since Aristotle began to systematize the discourses of logic and science, and especially so 
since the Enlightenment. A closely associated phenomenon, discussed in Decolonizing 
Methodologies by Maori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith, is that, since the fifteenth century, 
the technology of writing has been used by Western colonizers to represent and to 
oppress indigenous peoples throughout the globe, for example, by using the colonizer' s 
texts to educate indigenous children (35-37). Of course, the same may be said of Roman 
imperialism and rhetoric, which, as an administrative rhetoric, served to facilitate 
10 My first encounter with the word palimpsest was in Michael Joyce 's Othermindedness, where he uses the 
term "present-tense palimpsest." John F. Barber also uses the palimpsest metaphor in "Following in the 
Footsteps of the Ancestors: From Songlines to Illuminated Digital Palimpsests" in New Words, New 
Worlds. 
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imperial administration. Indigenous peoples are fixed on a hierarchy of value and also in 
a geographical space-that is, fixed on a map that often does match their movements-
very much like words are fixed on the surface of a page, which returns us to the theme of 
space-time. Tuhiwai Smith argues, 
Space is often viewed in Western thinking as being static or divorced from time. 
This view generates ways ofmaking sense ofthe world as a 'realm of stasis' , 
well-defmed, fixed and without politics. This is particularly relevant in relation to 
colonialism. The establishment of military, missionary or trading stations, the 
building of roads, ports and bridges, the clearing ofbrush and the mining of 
minerals all involved processes of marking, defining and controlling space. (52) 
Thus, the mastery of reality, nature, and indigenous peoples are all associated in the same 
project-i.e., the attempted control of an uncontrollable Other. Representationalism is 
supported by a rhetoric of control. Naming, measuring, and map-making are but a few 
means of achieving a tenuous control over a multiple, mobile reality. 
By dividing reality, nature, or lived experience into discrete units, the chaos of life 
may be brought under some degree of control. Words, sentences, paragraphs, pages, 
chapters, books, and so forth constitute one category of discrete, measurable units. A 
singular narrative line is another discrete unit. And although a hypertext lexia is a discrete 
unit, it is the connections between lexias (i.e., the hypertextual patterns) not the 
individual lexias, that are most important in the hypertext wreating experience. But, 
again, this pattern only exists in a particular wreater's mind. Consequently, the hypertext 
narrative cannot be controlled like sentences and paragraphs fixed on a page. 
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A crucial tool of representationalism is the unilinear narrative. Through unilinear, 
singular, or serial narrative we represent reality as we have experienced it or as it might 
be experienced; we re-present what is temporarily (or temporally) present to our senses 
and minds. Allesandra Tanesini argues that representationalism is a fundamental tenet of 
mainstream epistemology: "According to this view, when we think about knowledge we 
must think of a world composed of objects-with-causal-properties which individuals 
attempt to know. Thus, we have individuals on one side, and things on the other" (9). The 
paradigmatic objects with causal properties are medium-sized objects. But what is lost or 
erased in linear, cause-and-effect, analytic logic, as well as in linear narrative, is the 
complexity of interactions between entities, or the web of relations that constitutes lived 
experience. As Hayles argues, the relations between entities, rather than the entities 
themselves, constitute reality as we know it ("FM" 3). Furthermore, most relationships 
are far too complex to be adequately represented by cause-and-effect logic or serial 
narratives. 
Both representationalism and conventional authorial intention break down in 
hypertextual environments. Hypertext authors do not know precisely what their readers 
will read because they do not know the manner or order in which their texts will be read. 
And in the case of a text composed for a read-write interface, the author does not know 
what the reader may write into the text or what links may be added or deleted. Thus, in 
Ricouer's terms, the reader appropriates the text-appropriation being the counterpart of 
distantiation ( 113). 
Admittedly, a very similar argument could be made about conventional text: Every 
133 
reader reads the text as she chooses and makes the text her own, and the author has no 
control over the way readers interact with the text. As Judith Fetterley discusses, one may 
"become a resisting reader rather than an assenting reader" (996). That is, a reader may 
resist the author's intention or read against the grain of a work. Every work is instantiated 
by readers as a text; therefore, once a work is published it is out of the author's hands. 
Accordingly, in distinguishing between work and text, Barthes asserts, "The author is 
reputed the father an owner of his work: literary science therefore teaches respect for the 
manuscript and the author's declared intentions[ ... ]. As for the text, it reads without the 
inscription of the Father" (903, emphasis added). In an interesting parallel, Haraway 
claims that "cyborgs are not reverent; they do not re-member the cosmos" (150). In other 
words, for the cyborg, as well as for the postmodem reader, the "original text" is not of 
compelling interest. 
Although Barthes was referring to avant-garde print literature, and he cites mostly 
French authors (e.g., Proust, Genet, Bataille, Mallarme), the read-write hypertext 
interface takes the process of textual appropriation beyond what is possible in print. With 
such an interface, authors retain very little control over their representations. Again, the 
wreater is free to rearrange lexias, add or delete links, annotate and edit text, add entire 
new sections of text, and so forth. Hence the actual words on the scr~en, not merely their 
intended interpretation, may be changed. In sum, despite author-control features such as 
Storyspace's guard field, it is difficult to argue that hypertext authors retain as much 
control over their literary representations as the conventional author does. 
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Linear Perspective 
On the following pages I discuss the historical foundations of representationalism, 
along with the connections between representationalism and hypertext theory, feminist 
epistemology, and feminist rhetoric. 
Representationalism is closely linked to Renaissance linear perspective. In the early 
fifteenth century the invention of mathematical linear perspective allowed for the 
translation of three-dimensional natural phenomena onto two-dimensional surfaces, 
producing virtually realistic copies. According to Berger, "[T]he metaphorical model for 
the function of painting at this time was the mirror" (The Moment 16). In other words, 
Renaissance linear perspective was founded on the classical principle of mimesis-the 
faithful imitation of nature. 
For Renaissance scientists and artists "the essence of physical reality was understood 
in tem1s that could be reduced to basic mathematical principles" (Dauben, unpaginated 
online text). In their devotion to mathematics, Renaissance artists and scientists were 
rediscovering the geometric, spatial orientation ofPythagoras and Plato. Moreover, the 
rediscovery and elaboration of mathematical principles led to a profound cultural 
reorientation. As Joseph W. Dauben states, "It is clear that renaissance [sic] artists were 
seeking a new world, thanks in part to mathematics and the new perspective, literally, 
that mathematics provided." Mathematical linear perspective, which was primarily a tool 
of graphic artists and architects, was later combined with Descartes' philosophical 
dualism to create "Cartesian perspectivalism," also known as the representational theory 
of knowledge (Bolter and Grusin 79). Thus, since the mid-seventeenth century 
135 
"philosophers have understood knowledge in terms of representations" (Tanesini 9). 
In terms of the present study, the crucial point is that only from a distance can 
something be seen as a whole, or in perspective. Berger argues that the Renaissance 
"attitude towards nature" was based on "the underlying faith[ .. . ] that the eye, if used 
properly, could reveal the truth about the objective world" (Toward Reality 100). In this 
case, the proper use of the eye implies distance. Linear perspective produces the 
representation of a whole object from a distance. From an up-close, engaged position, 
one's vision is partial. For example, a pillar, an arch, or a door may be seen, but the entire 
frontal view of a large building cannot be seen without the observer backing up some 
distance, or assuming a "better" vantage point. Thus, objective distance is believed to be 
requisite for a true or complete representation of the other. Representationalism is 
premised on a clear subject/object split, which implies that the ideal observer is not at all 
caught up in the representation ofthe other. That is, the self, even the unconscious self, 
must not be projected onto the other; the subject must not distort "reality" in any way. 
Cartesian perspectivalism dominated Western culture from the mid-seventeenth to 
the early twentieth century by allowing the Cartesian subject to control space from a 
single vantage point (Bolter and Grusin 24). It must be emphasized that this single 
vantage point lies outside the frame of the picture; the viewer is not included or 
implicated in the picture. One of the most famous examples of linear perspective is 
Leonardo da Vinci's Last Supper, which gives a clear sense of an observer standing just 
outside the represented scene (Figure 3.1). The implied observer stands outside the frame 
yet in a central position-i.e., on a line perpendicular to the table in Leonardo's painting. 
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The viewer has a privileged vantage point from which to take in the whole scene. 
Furthermore, this single vantage point is closely associated with the singular, 
phallocentric narrative. More directly: The implied viewer of Leonardo's painting is 
male. Moreover, inasmuch as Christ is clearly the central figure in the painting, the 
viewer may identify with Christ. 
By contrast with the viewer of the Last Supper, the hypertext wreater is, for all 
intents and purposes, positioned inside the frame/text. Furthermore, the wreater's position 
is not central; she or he stands within the frame and off-center. One might compare the 
hypertext wreater' s position to that of the implied viewer of a Cubist painting, such as 
Picasso 's Les Demoiselles d'Avignon (Figure 3.2). Berger asserts that in Picasso ' s Cubist 
work "there is no longer a centre upon which the whole picture is focused. [ ... As] you 
look at the Picasso, you can allow for the reality of the scene being recognized from any 
viewpoint" (Toward Reality 103-1 04) . Cubism, in other words, is multiperspectival. As 
Berger writes, "The Cubists established the principle of using multiple viewpoints within 
the picture" (11 0, emphasis original). If the picture has no center or pre-established focal 
point, the viewer necessarily stands off-center. In addition to the viewer' s position being 
inside the picture and off-center, it is also partial. Thus, in a Cubist picture, the "spectator 
has to fmd his place within the content whilst the complexity of the forms and the 
'discontinuity' of the space remind him that his view from that place is bound to only 
partial" (Berger, The Moment 25). The view is partial because the "truth" ofthe world or 
nature cannot be captured by vision alone. The Cubist's "sense ofthe truth had gone 
beyond the immediate evidence supplied to their eyes" (Berger, Toward Reality 101). 
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Along with the implied viewer's off-center position, the flatness of representation 
violates the Renaissance principle of depth (Gaggi 17). In other words, there is no visual 
depth because the viewer, being inside the frame, is not far enough removed from the 
image. In Cubism, the "viewing-point ofRenaissance perspective, fixed and outside the 
picture, but to which everything within the picture was drawn, has become the field of 
vision which is the picture itself' (Berger, The Moment 22). Hence, rather than 
experiencing a firm sense of spatial orientation and depth perception, the viewer of 
Picasso's painting is likely to feel disoriented, very much like the hypertext wreater. 
Hypertext is fragmentary and multiple because the wreater's position is mobile rather 
than fixed; the wreater moves around inside the text, as if she were inhabiting a virtual 
reality environment. Analogously, Berger writes, "The Cubists were concerned with 
movement and wanted to prove that space itself was a process" (Toward Reality 102). In 
other words, both the hypertext wreater and the viewer of a Cubist painting experience 
space as a process that they themselves move within, as opposed to a screen onto which 
objective reality, or substance, may be projected. The emphasis on process over 
substance in Cubism is close to what Hayles discusses as pattern over presence. Hence, in 
the following quote from Berger, we might substitute the word pattern for process and 
behavior, and presence for substance: "Darwin, Marx, Freud, were all concerned with 
revealing new processes, while the advent of modem physics meant, exactly, that the 
notion of substance had to be replaced by the notion of behavior" (1 02 ). 
With hypertext, virtual reality, and Cubism, one's sense of the ''mindbody" changes. 
As I stated in chapter 1, citing Hayles, "the body" is the human form seen from without, 
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and as such it is a cultural construction, while "embodiment" is the subjective, inner 
experience of one's physical form. But beyond the body/embodiment binary lies the 
mindbody, which is the integration of the body and embodiment (Hayles, "FM" 3). The 
mindbody begins with the inner sense of embodiment and extends outward to the 
surrounding environment through the experience of relationality and pattern; that is, as 
patterns are experienced within and without the body/embodiment binary dissolves. 
The inside/outside binary breaks down when we shift from presence to pattern. From 
the perspective of the conventional presence/absence binary, the wreater's position is 
paradoxical or ambiguous, inasmuch as the wreater is partially inside and partially 
outside the text-i.e., partly present in and partly absent from the text. Analogously, for a 
participant in virtual reality the physical body, called "meat" in William Gibson's 
Neuromancer, remains outside the virtual space. From the more sophisticated perspective 
of pattern/randomness, however, the paradox dissolves; the patterned experience ofthe 
mindbody simply extends into the surrounding environment, even into a virtual 
environment. The inside/outside binary is simply not relevant-it doesn't make sense-
from the perspective of the mindbody. 
Modernist literary criticism was formulated with within the context of the 
presence/absence binary, according to which neither the author nor the reader are 
permitted inside the literary work. Authorial intent may not be taken as a significant 
presence, and the reader's affective response is not a reliable indicator ofthe quality of a 
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work. 12 Modernist criticism, furthermore, strives to account for the work as a whole. But 
critics of modernism question "the assumption that there is a sense, that it is embedded or 
encoded in the text, and that it can be taken in at a single glance" (Fish 982). Insofar as 
critical distance is required to take in the work as a whole, the reader/critic must stand 
outside the text. Hence, the "goal is to settle on a meaning, and the procedure involves 
first stepping back from the text, and then putting together or otherwise calculating the 
discrete units of significance it contains" (Fish 982). The procedure Fish critiques is 
thoroughly Cartesian, inasmuch as it relies on distance, spatial orientation, and reducing 
complex phenomena to discrete units. 
A hypertext that appears on a screen one lexia at a time cannot be taken in "at a 
glance." By contrast with a hypertext, one can easily and quickly scroll through a linear 
digital text without affecting the order of the text at all; the page sequence, if there are 
page numbers-or simply the sequence of sentences and paragraphs-remains the same. 
In a hypertext, by contrast, the sequence of lexias is indeterminate. Even if the sequence 
can be tracked or recorded, different readings yield different sequences. Thus, inasmuch 
as the entire text cannot be taken in at a glance, the seeing-is-knowing metaphor breaks 
down with hypertext. 
The Tactile Epistemic and Virtual Touching 
The gaze belongs to the visual epistemic. But in contrast to the dominant visual 
12 1 am alluding here to the intentional and affective fallacies as formulated W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. 
Beardsley. 
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epistemic, Irigaray claims that woman prefer to know through touch rather than sight 
(1468). Knowing by touching might be called a tactile epistemic. Knowing another living 
organism comes through interaction, that is, by getting up-close. This perspective 
amounts to an embodied epistemology. One cannot come to know another living being by 
remaining apart, and the same principle applies to the process of coming to know a text. 
In arguing that one must get up-close in order to know another, I do not wish to 
exclude electronic, or "virtual," human contact. Experiences of the mindbody change 
with technological and cultural changes. Hayles asserts, "Given market forces already at 
work, it is virtually[ ... ] certain that increasingly we will live, work, and play in 
environments that construct us as embodied virtualities" ("VB" 91). Two or more people 
might come to know each other intimately over a distance of thousands of miles through 
an electronic medium such as a MOO, a chat room, or e-mail. There are many avenues 
for overcoming distance, and distance is not always physical, as two people who are quite 
close physically may be miles apart emotionally or cognitively. 
The argument that physical proximity is necessary to get to know another person, or 
that physical touching is necessary, only makes sense within the context of the 
presence/absence binary. Hence, feminist rhetoricians who wish to intervene in the 
masculinist rhetorical tradition might shift their focus from presence/absence to 
pattern/randomness and from body/embodiment to the mindbody. Relationships are 
patterns, and physical proximity, or presence, is not a necessary element of a relationship. 
Thus, in emphasizing the tactile epistemic, I wish to incorporate "virtual touching" on an 
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equal footing with physical touching. A relationship is the experience of a pattern 
between two or more entities, and virtual touching is founded on the experience of 
pattern-finding, constructing, intervening in, and altering patterns. With regard to 
hypertext, then, active hypertext wreaters who intervene in textual patterns may be said to 
virtually touch the text. 
An engaged wreater converses with the text, rather than analyzing or explaining it 
from a distance. Knowing is not just seeing, or even being seen. Knowing involves, 
among other experiences, listening and being listened to, seeing and being seen, and also 
(virtual) touching. Knowing is intersubjective because the knower is also known. In 
Martin Buber's teims, this encounter is an I-Thou relation rather than an l-it relation (5); 
it is not a subject-object encounter, but an intersubjective relationship-i.e., an 
intersubj ective pattern. 
Visual perception of an object, such as a full frontal view of a large architectural 
structure, is supposed to grant a viewer knowledge of that object. But rather than merely 
seeing an object, corning to know a hypertext involves the ordering the lexias, or 
constructing the text, which suggests increased user-engagement. By way of the interface, 
the user touches the text. That is, by touching the keyboard and manipulating the mouse, 
the user touches the text in a virtual sense-yet the word "virtual" need not imply a lesser 
experience because there is no other way to touch electronic text. Obviously, electronic 
text cannot be physically touched or "nailed down." Hence, in a hypertextual 
environment, (virtual) touching-is-knowing might supplant the ancient seeing-is-knowing 
metaphor. 
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Seeing and Controlling 
Feminist theorists, including those seeking to rearticulate feminist rhetoric, are 
obligated to interrogate or complicate binaries, such as the visual epistemic/tactile 
epistemic binary. I do not wish to argue that the visual epistemic is insignificant or that 
(virtual) touching ought to take precedence over seeing. Nonetheless, the hegemony of 
the visual epistemic must be challenged. Moreover, given the significance of 
conversation in feminist rhetorics and epistemologies, the aural epistemic must not be 
"overlooked." 
The long history of visual metaphors has rendered them intuitive; that is to say, the 
seeing-is-knowing metaphor has been naturalized and established as common sense. But, 
from a feminist or postmodem perspective, the drawback of the visual episternic is that it 
encourages knowers to think of themselves as separate from the known-i.e., as subjects 
spatially distant from objects. In other words, the principle of objective distance and the 
seeing-is-knowing metaphor are inextricably linked. We even refer to ideologies and 
philosophies as a "worldviews." 
The visual epistemic is central to Platonism. In the allegory of the cave, for instance, 
the sun represents truth, and light enables philosophical vision (The Republic, Part 7, 
Book 7). Yet, a fundamental contradiction in Platonic philosophy, which is brought out in 
the Phaedrus, concerns the visual epistemic--or more specifically, literacy. Writing and 
reading are fundamentally visual and spatial, but Plato privileged speech, which is aural 
and temporal, over writing-all the while writing some of greatest literary-philosophical 
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works in Western history. Nonetheless, no matter how eloquently Plato discounted the 
visual-spatial techne of literacy in favor or the (elitist) oral dialectic, his epistemology is 
thoroughly visual-spatial. For Plato, as well as for Descartes, to know is to see clearly. 
We see what something or someone means. Hence, the Platonic-Cartesian epistemology, 
or its recent manifestation, twentieth-century positivism, "produces the folk-wisdom that 
enjoins people to go and see for themselves, it upholds the assumption that 'seeing is 
believing,' and grants overriding credence to 'eye-witness evidence"' (Code, RS 167). 
Eyewitness evidence, then, is consistently granted far more credibility than mere hearsay. 
Hearsay, which we may classify as an aural epistemic, has been consistently 
denigrated by dominant Western cultural institutions, most obviously in the courtroom. 13 
Moreover, hearsay is also feminized and trivialized in the notion of gossip. Furthermore, 
conversation and gossip occur in the temporal dimension. Thus, given the tendency of 
one element of a binary opposition to eliminate the other, the logical culmination of a 
visual-spatial epistemic would be the exclusion of the aural-temporal epistemic from all 
elite or serious cultural institutions and functions. In addition to legal injunctions against 
uncorroborated hearsay, we have the traditional schoolroom injunction against talking. 
Durable, privileged (and privileging) knowledge, according to this paradigm, is taken in 
visually through written texts, despite the fact that students are also expected to spend a 
great deal oftime listening to teachers. But even the word lecture means to read to an 
audience from a written text. 
13 To qualify this claim, I should note that I recently learned that hearsay is admissible in U.S. military 
courts. 
144 
While knowledge is taken in through the eyes and the ears, 14 knowledge, at least in 
cultures controlled by written texts, is not generally considered to be generated by 
conversation. Insofar as listening is valued, it is listening without talking. In other words, 
one-way, mono logical, often hierarchical information flow has traditionally been 
privileged over dialogue and colloquy. Plato's criticism of literacy was based, in part, on 
the assumption that the reader cannot converse with the written text (Phaedrus 140). The 
text may "speak" to readers, but readers are not to speak back to or question the text-the 
text teaches and the student silently learns. Consequently, the idea of a wreater writing 
herself into a text is a heretical notion for mainstream Western epistemology. 
The closer one approaches to an other, as in writing oneself into a text, the less 
control one is likely to retain over that other; that is to say, as the self draws closer and 
becomes implicated in the other, control slips away. Thus, if a person, entity, or text is to 
be controlled, it must be clearly other. Consequently, control from a distance, or "remote 
control," is a primary value of objectivist epistemologies. The Panopticon, a concept 
invented in the early-nineteenth century by Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham and 
popularized and elaborated by Michel Foucault, comes to mind here. The ultimate 
surveillance technology, the Panopticon (root meaning, all-eye), allows seeing without 
being seen. 15 The Panopticon has received a great deal of attention within cultural 
14 Paul of Tarsus (St. Paul) wrote, "So then faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God" 
(Romans 10: 17). 
15 In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault writes, "We know the principle on which 
[Bentham's Panopticon] was based: at the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower[ .. _.] 
pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is di~id~d into 
cells, each of width extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the mstde, 
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studies, critical theory, and other fields. But with regard to hypertext, the point I wish to 
make is that while the overseer in the Panopticon occupies a (phallic) tower in the center 
of a circular architectural structure, I have claimed that the hypertext wreater, like the 
viewer of a Cubist painting, is positioned off-center. In other words, the off-center 
position is not a position of control. 
From Places to Spaces 
I outline below a vision of a literary hypertext as a space rather than place. Michel de 
Certeau draws a very productive distinction between places and spaces: 
A place (lieu) is the order (of whatever kind) in accord with which elements are 
distributed in relationships of coexistence. [ .. . ] The law of the 'proper' rules the 
place: the elements taken into consideration are beside one another, each situated 
in its own 'proper' and distinct location[ .. .]. A space exists when one takes into 
consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables. Thus space is 
composed of intersections ofmobile elements. [ ... ] [I]n relation to place, space is 
like the word that is spoken. (117) 
Spaces, then, are dynamic; they are "polymorphously perverse," featuring highly mobile, 
unstable elements. The multiple, nomadic, promiscuous self is such a mobile element. 
corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from 
one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in 
each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of the 
backlighting, one can observe from the tower [ ... ] the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. 
They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized 
an constantly visible. [ .. . ] the Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the 
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Margaret Morrison speaks of"the jiggliness, the dynamic itself of constantly slipping in 
and out of subject positions, so that one never knows who or what one is with any 
certainty or how one is being perceived. [ ... ] [O]ne constantly enriches and affirms life 
by continuing to be mobile" (213). Promiscuous subjects do not stay in their proper 
places. De Certeau states further that a "space is a practiced place. Thus the street 
geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into space by walkers. In the 
same way, an act of reading is the space produced by the practice of a particular place: a 
written text, i.e., a place constituted by a system of signs" (117). 
It is important to understand, however, that places are not transformed into spaces 
merely by being used; they have to used, at least sometimes, in ways other than intended 
by their designers or produces. For instance, a city street grid is transformed from a place 
to a space only when drivers begin to break traffic laws or walkers begin to J-walk or 
otherwise break the rules laid down by the city planners. As long as walkers strictly 
follow the rules, that place remains a place. De Certeau writes that "one can analyze the 
microbe-like, singular and plural practices which an urbanistic system was supposed to 
administer and suppress" (de Certeau 96). In other words, disobedient, unpredictable 
actions, by working against the grain of imposed regulations, produce spaces. 
Referencing Kenneth Burke's pentad (GM 136), we can say that human subjects, even 
when they are relatively weak, are able to act purposefully within spaces, as opposed to 
being moved as objects within places. 
peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without 
ever being seen" (200-202). 
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De Certeau's work is to a great extent a critique of consumerism. He argues that 
consumers, due to their alienation from or nonparticipation in the dominant system of 
production, often use tools or products in ways that are contrary to their designs. De 
Certeau presents an example, in the form of a historical case study, to elucidate how 
consumers often subvert the designs of producers, in this way becoming producers 
themselves: 
Thus the spectacular victory of Spanish colonization over the indigenous Indian 
cultures was diverted from its intended aims by the use made of it: even when 
they were subjected, indeed even when they accepted their subjection, the Indians 
often used the laws, practices, and representations that were imposed on them 
[ ... ] for ends other than those of their conquerors; [ ... ] they subverted them from 
within- not by rejecting them (though that occurred as well), but by many 
different ways of using them in the service of rules, customs or convictions 
foreign to the colonization which they could not escape. (31-32) 
These "rules, customs or convictions" might be called nomoi- i.e., the informal, 
provisional, orally transmitted traditions of the alien's land of origin, as distinguished 
from the official, written, permanent, "natural" laws, or logoi, enforced in the 
alien/nomad's current residence. In other words, nomos is kairotic, while logos has 
pretensions to universality.16 
16 See Susan Jarratt's Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured (pp. 74-79) for a discussion of 
nomos and logos in relation to feminism. 
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To expand on this theme, we can turn to Mary Louise Pratt's discussion of Felipe 
Guaman Pomade Ayala, an early seventeenth-century Andean scribe living under 
Spanish imperial rule. Guaman Poma, whom Pratt describes as "a conquered subject 
using the conqueror's language to construct a parodic, oppositional representation of the 
conquerors own speech," wrote a letter to King Philip III of Spain consisting of almost 
eight hundred pages of written text and four hundred pages of captioned line drawings 
(584). This epistle, titled The First New Chronicle and Good Government, never reached 
its addressee but was discovered in the Danish Royal Archive in Copenhagen in 1908. 
Pratt writes, "To grasp the import ofGuaman Poma's project, one needs to keep in mind 
that the Incas had no system of writing. [ .. . ] Guaman Poma constructs his text by 
appropriating and adapting pieces of the representational repertoire of the invaders" 
(589). Echoing de Certeau, Pratt goes on to state, "While subordinate peoples do not 
usually control what emanates from the dominant culture, they do determine to varying 
extents what gets absorbed into their own and what it gets used for" (589). 
Guaman Poma himself may be characterized as a site of articulation, or nodal point, 
between two discourses. As Franyois Lyotard writes, "[A] person is always located at 
'nodal points' of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be. Or better: 
one is always located at a post through which various kinds of messages pass" (15). The 
nodal point is not a site of original creation, but rather a site of translation and 
transformation. Each nodal point, like each text, is multiple, fragmented, and partial. My 
point, then, is that the hypertextual wreater is a site of articulation, the site at which a 
textual multiplicity comes together. Without such nodal points, texts do not even exist. 
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This critical perspective might allow the old (early-nineteenth-century) romanticism, 
which was founded on the unitary, autonomous self (harkening back to the "Renaissance 
man"), to finally give way to a more promiscuous orientation, as reading and writing take 
on the qualities of humble bricolage. 
Following Code, I maintain that feminist researchers and writers should take their 
subjective positions into account, as opposed to writing from a distanced, self-effacing 
perspective. Moreover, those who have been defined, or positioned, by other, more 
powerful social agents, must strive to reclaim, reconstruct, or construct their own 
(multiple, contradictory, partial) identities. Such feminist-authored texts might be 
described as "autoethnographic." As Pratt writes, 
Guaman Poma's New Chronicle is[ ... ] an autoethnographic text, by which I 
mean a text in which people undertake to describe themselves in ways that engage 
with representations others have made of them. Thus if ethnographic texts are 
those in which European metropolitan subjects represent to themselves their 
others (usually their conquered others), autoethnographic texts are representations 
that the so-defined others construct in response to or in dialogue with those texts. 
(585). 
We might characterize such a text as a patchwork or bricolage, Claude Levi-Strauss' 
term for a work of art or cultural practice assembled from "odd and ends" that are ready 
at hand. We may associate bricolage, which is a kind of recycling (Levi-Strauss 17-22), 
with the notion of"repurposing," as this term is used by webpage designers-i.e., "the 
taking of content that already exists (as digital files, printed or broadcast materials) and 
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re-formatting them as Web page content" (Client Help Desk). 17 A bricoleur is one who 
"makes do" with available materials and tools rather than creating from scratch. Guaman 
Poma's text, in other words, was assembled from bits and pieces ofhis native discourse 
and that of the Spanish colonizers. Feminists might undertake similar projects using the 
raw mater~als, including technologies and texts, originally created to serve the interests of 
the mainstream, patriarchal West. 
Immediacy and Hypermediacy 
At this point it may be useful to introduce two terms analyzed by Bolter and Grusin: 
immediacy and hypermediacy. 18 Immediacy and hypermediacy are defmed, respectively, 
as "the transparent presentation of the real and the enjoyment of the opacity of media 
themselves" (21 ). In other words, immediacy signifies direct, urJmediated experience, 
whereas hypermediacy, as the polar opposite of immediacy, flaunts the opacity of media. 
The general principles of immediacy and hypermediacy are not original to Bolter and 
Grusin. The words transparent and opaque are essentially synonymous with immediate 
and hypermediated, respectively. According to the logic of immediacy, the subject looks 
through, and perhaps past, the medium, whereas with hypermediacy the subject looks at 
the medium. 
17 Client Help Desk. QLM Marketing. 30 June 2002. 
<http: //www.clienthelpdesk.com/dictionary/repurpose.html>. 
18 A third concept discussed by Bolter and Grusin is remediation, "the representation of one medium in 
another" ( 45); however, this concept is less germane to the present discussion than the concepts of 
immediacy and hypermediacy. The concept of remediation is Bolter and Grusin's main theoretical 
contribution, although their discussion of immediacy and hypermediacy is illuminating. 
151 
Historically, immediacy has been privileged over hypermediacy. "In formal terms, 
the desire for immediacy is the desire to get beyond the medium to the objects of 
representation themselves" (Bolter and Grusin 83). Immediacy, furthermore, makes 
substantial use of mathematical linear perspective, inasmuch as these techniques are 
employed to represent the unmediated gaze. The problem, at least from an absolutist 
standpoint, is that pure immediacy is unattainable because all experience is mediated to 
some degree; that is, all experience is characterized by varying degrees of opacity. As 
Bolter and Grusin claim, "[T]here is nothing prior to or outside the act of mediation" 
(58). Language itself mediates between language users and reality. The nervous system 
also mediates sensory experience. Immediacy, in other words, is a utopian dream. 
Representation is mediated on some point along a continuum from immediacy to 
hypermediacy. On the immediacy end of the continuum, representation is nearly 
unfiltered, while on the hypermediacy end representation is heavily filtered. In immediate 
representation, ideally, the space between subject and object is transparent- nothing gets 
in the way. Classical representation, then, strives to be as nearly direct as possible; 
directness is a prime virtue. Transparent immediacy, furthermore, is atemporal, inasmuch 
at it serves to conceal both the artist and the process of creation (Bolter and Grusin 25). 
How a work came to be is unimportant; therefore, the passage of time tends to be 
ignored. Only the finished product is worthy of notice. 
The immediacy-hypermediacy continuum is also thoroughly gendered. Bolter and 
Grusin argue that "technologies of transparent immediacy based on linear perspective[ .. 
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.] may all be enacting the so-called male gaze, excluding women from full participation 
as subjects and maintaining them as objects" (79). I will go further and argue that the 
immediacy-hypermediacy continuum is definitely gendered. Hypermediacy and women 
have much in common; or more precisely, the logic ofhypermediacy and the Western 
ideal of"woman" have much in common. Immediacy, by contrast, is a predominately 
masculine ideal, and mathematical linear perspective enacts the controlling, voyeuristic, 
masculine gaze. According to Bolter and Grusin, "The logic of immediacy has perhaps 
been dominant in Western representation, at least from the Renaissance until the coming 
of [twentieth-century] modernism, while hypermediacy has often had to content itself 
with a secondary, if nonetheless important status" (34). We may easily substitute the 
words men and women for immediacy and hypermediacy in the above quote. Thus, with 
slight revision, the statement becomes: "Throughout Western history, women have had to 
content themselves with a secondary, if nonetheless important status." I should 
emphasize that when I use the terms men and women, I am referencing the West's 
dominant constructs of masculinity and femininity. In other words, I am referring to 
gender rather than sex, and also the body rather than embodiment or the mindbody. 
By convention, the bodies ofmen fall on the transparent end of the continuum, while 
women's bodies are constructed as more or less opaque. For example, among the 
contemporary Western middle class, men's clothing is generally perceived as utilitarian, 
whereas women are often expected to "accessorize." According to the logic ofthe 
mind/body split, ·which assigns mind to man and body to woman, men are more likely to 
be looked through than looked at. In other words, men's clothing is supposed to be easily 
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ignored so that we may focus on the man's mind. By contrast, a woman's clothing, like 
her body, is often perceived an end in itself-i.e., something to be looked at and 
commented on. An example may be taken from Carol Mattingly's discussion of her 
archival research in feminist rhetoric: 
As I studied nineteenth-century records, I could hardly miss the numerous 
references to women speakers' appearance and its significant relationship to 
ethos. [ ... ] [N]early every primary source I read[ .. . ] repeatedly highlighted how 
women speakers looked, especially what they were wearing [ ... ] . [T]he absence 
of such allusions to men[ ... ] made clear that evaluating women by masculine 
standards provides a glaringly incomplete understanding of the issues women 
speakers negotiated; the gendered depiction of women-the focus on their bodies 
and dress as they struggled for representation and power-determined ethical 
acceptance to a degree men never had to consider. [ ... ] Accounts of women 
speakers detailed their dress and appearance before presenting their words-if, in 
fact, they considered their words at all. 
In a similar vein, bell hooks writes: 
The person who is most powerful has the privilege of denying their body. I 
remember as an undergraduate I had white male professors who wore the same 
tweed jacket and rumpled shirt or something, but we all knew we had to pretend. 
You would never comment on his dress, because to do so would be a sign of your 
own intellectual lack. The point was we should all respect that he's there to be a 
mind and not a body. (137) 
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It is vital to understand that dress, accessories, and the body itself are media-they 
mediate identity and ethos. If we temporally bracket considerations of class and race 
men are typically granted a great deal more license when it comes to their outward 
' 
appearance-their clothing as well as their body shape or size. In general, men are looked 
through far more often than they are looked at, and men marked as professional or 
intellectual are especially likely to be look through. By contrast, even female 
intellectuals, as indicated by Mattingly's research, are more frequently looked at than 
through. In other words, the subject positions occupied by women tend to fall toward the 
hypermediated end ofthe spectrum, although a moderate degree of mediation is, of 
course, far more common than full-blown, perhaps deliberately hyperbolic, hypermediacy 
(e.g., in popular culture, Madonna or Cher). 
Hypermediacy is a visual style that "privileges fragmentation, indeterminacy, and 
heterogeneity" (Mitchell 8; qtd. in Bolter and Grusin 31 ). Thus, the fragmented body, as 
illustrated by the Patchwork Girl image (Figure 3.3b), is hypermediated. Such visual texts 
may be deployed to thwart masculinist control, which suggests that hegemonic points of 
view, or privileged vantage points, may be undercut. In film, for example, if one must 
visually attend to rapidly shifting shots of particular scene, or even different parts of a 
body, the sustained voyeuristic gaze becomes a harmless "glance" (Bolter and Grusin 
81). The image flickers before the viewer, as opposed to sitting still as a passive target. 
Flickering implies a succession of moments or the passage of time, whereas the 
controlling gaze is static and spatial-i.e., atemporal. 
Although I have associated immediacy with masculinist epistemologies, I am not 
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arguing that hypermediacy, its complement, is necessarily a feminist value. If this were 
the case, women would always welcome the masculine gaze. Rather, my position is that 
feminism should go beyond the binary opposition of immediacy and hypermediacy--or 
in other words, feminism might hover at a level between "earthy" hypermediacy and the 
"ethereal" immediacy. Feminists may choose to emphasize immediacy or hypermediacy 
in different rhetorical situations. At times, direct, clear communication is the best option, 
while at other times "rhetorical flourishes" or other forms of indirectness, perhaps even 
tactical masquerade, may be warranted. 
Historical Patterns 
Scholars have been discussing transparency and opacity for a long time. In a work 
published several years prior to Bolter and Grusin's Remediation, Richard Lanham 
presented a transparency/opacity polarity very much like Bolter and Grusin's 
immediacy/hypermediacy polarity. In his "bi-stable" matrix, Lanham places 
unselfconscious and selfconscious on opposite sides of a spectrum, with "ordinary life" 
falling mostly in the middle of this spectrum (Lanham 14-15). Transparent and opaque 
artistic works are classified, respectively, as unselfconscious and selfconscious. Lanham 
argues that (transparent) philosophy and (opaque) rhetoric have played off of each other 
throughout the history of Western thought and education, with one holding sway over the 
other at different historical moments. Lanham argues that the Greek philosophers, 
particularly Plato and Aristotle, championed transparency, while the Sophists preferred 
something closer to opacity (15). That is, while the philosophers did their best to look 
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through media (e.g., language, style, narrative, the body, delivery), the Sophists 
foregrounded rhetorical media. The lyrical, "spellbinding" language of Sophistic rhetoric, 
probably best exemplified in Gorgias' Encomium to Helen, may be classified as opaque 
(i.e., hypermediated), while the spare prose of Aristotle's Rhetoric or Politics is much 
closer to the transparent (i.e., immediate) end of the spectrum. 
Under the Platonic-Aristotelian historical hegemony, philosophy has been privileged 
over rhetoric. While the Sophists had endowed rhetoric with a sense of autonomy as a 
legitimate way of knowing, Plato and Aristotle, and later Augustine, would place rhetoric 
in the service of philosophy. Hence, although Lanham does not explore this issue, the 
polarity of rhetoric and philosophy is deeply gendered. As Jarratt has observed, insofar as 
rhetoric, or Rhetorica, is denigrated as cookery, cosmetology, or practical knowledge, it 
is closely associated with the Western ideal of woman (xvi). By contrast, philosophy has 
been consistently constructed as masculine. As is well known, Plato classified rhetoric as 
a mere "knack," akin to the domestic arts mentioned above, rather than a legitimate, 
masculine techne such as medicine (Gorgias 70-71). And in fourth-century BCE Athens, 
as in our own era, cooking and cosmetology, insofar as they were domestic arts, were 
associated with women. 
Mediated Interfaces 
But what does all of this have to do with literary hypertext? First of all, hypertexts 
are multiple texts, and within the context of digital technology "hypermediacy manifests 
as multiplicity" (Bolter and Grusin 33). First-generation, text-rich hypertext may be 
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classified as hypermediated to the extent that the wreater must actively engage with the 
interface. Storyspace's windowed interface, moreover, expresses multiplicity; it disperses 
rather than unifies space. As Bolter and Grusin argue, the "windowed interface does not 
attempt to unify space around any one point of view. [ ... ] The multiplicity ofwindows 
and the heterogeneity of their contents mean that the user is repeatedly brought back into 
contact with the interface" (33). The Storyspace interface encourages the wreater's view 
to "flit" between several types ofwindows, writing spaces, and the four graphical views 
(i.e., map, tree map, outline, and chart), hence disrupting the static gaze. 
I have argued that engagement, as opposed to objective distantiation, is a feminist 
stance. In this regard, (feminist) conversation and touch may be contrasted with the 
(masculinist) voyeuristic gaze, although tllis construction should not be taken as a hard-
and-fast binary opposition. Both conversation and touch entail reciprocal, mutually 
transformative action. And with respect to interface design, the more mediated the 
interface, the more reciprocity, or user-action, it requires. The Storyspace interface is 
anything but llldden or automated; it requires a high level of user engagement, inasmuch 
as the wreater must engage with the interface to construct the narrative. Single lexias 
must be strung together, or assembled, into a hypertext narrative (or narratives). Thus, 
with respect to user-engagement, Storyspace may be tentatively classified as a 
hypermediated textual environment. 
One the other hand, first-generation, text-rich hypertext has definite qualities of 
immediacy, inasmuch as the wreater concentrates on reading alphanumeric text rather 
than attending to multimedia. Although Storyspace does allow for still graphics, 
158 
animation, and sound files, insofar as an author chooses to forego these features, the 
interface becomes more transparent. In other words, while the Storyspace author is free to 
compose a text anywhere along the transparent-opaque spectrum, by limiting the 
multimedia, the author can position the text somewhere between transparency and 
opacity- the author will have to decide which position along the continuum best serves 
her purpose. Given that the wreater must engage with the windowed interface, Storyspace 
hypertexts are already significantly mediated, and to add multimedia would push the 
hypertext further to the hypermediated end of the spectrum. The medium is always more 
or less foregrounded in a Storyspace hypertext; therefore, a feminist author need not fear 
that by limiting herself to alphanumeric text she will unintentionally replicate the 
immediacy of conventional text. 
An interface, then, can fall anywhere along the transparent-opaque spectrum. An 
interface on the opaque, or hypermediated, end of the spectrum may be classified as more 
"rhetorical" than "philosophical." In contrast, the seamless, transparent interface would 
be more philosophical than rhetorical because the user looks through this interface at the 
all-important "content." The transparent interface, in other words, follows a masculinist 
logic because very little media stands between the user and the content. 
According to the logic of immediacy, not only are the artist and the creative process 
concealed, but the observer hides as well. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
voyeur must be concealed to derive maximum pleasure or excitement from looking. The 
spectator must be erased, which allows what Haraway called "the conquering gaze from 
nowhere" and "the god-trick trick of seeing everything from nowhere" (188, 189). In 
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formalist schools of literacy criticism, which I have characterized as masculinist, both the 
reader and the author are erased; the text is all that matters. Thus, the rationale for using a 
read-write hypertext interface is that writing oneself into the text is an effective means of 
preventing the erasure of the reader- assuming, of course, that the reader chooses not to 
be erased. The reader engages in a dialogue with the text, as opposed to being subjected 
to an oration by the autonomous text. As the reader becomes personally implicated or 
invested in the text, conversation and (virtual) touching replace passive looking and 
listening. 
To sum up the argument of this chapter thus far, it may help to line up two sets of 
contrasting terms (Figure 3.4). As I explain below, these pairs should be taken as 
complementary points on a continuous spectrum rather than as binary oppositions. 
Historically, due to the successes ofPlato, Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, and the 
Enlightenment, the items in the left column have been privileged over their counterparts 
on the right. Nonetheless, this schematic may still be (mis)interpreted as reifying binaries. 
Hence, I must reiterate that these items are the abstract, idealized extremes of spectrum; 
between the poles are various "shades of gray." For example, the post-gender cyborg 
straddles the border between masculine immediacy and feminine hypermediacy. In an 
effort to name these shades of gray, I have, somewhat in fun, listed four neologisms 
below the midpoint of the spectrum: rhetorosophy, proetry, narranalysis, and 
seriociational text. 
"Extreme meet." This, according to Burke, was Coleridge's favorite maxim 
(Philosophy of Literary Form 3). Emerson also said, "Extremes meet and there is no 
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better example than the haughtiness ofhumility." 19 With regard to my own argument, the 
point I wish to make in citing the above statements is that transparency and opacity are 
transformed into one another at their polar extremes. Lanham speaks of an 
"AT/THROUGH reversal[ ... or] oscillation" (43). He sees a pervasive purpose/play 
reversal, or an oscillation between use and ornament, in postmodemism and the digital 
arts (43-51). We may also think ofthe AT/THROUGH oscillation as a figure/ground 
reversal. For example, in much of Andy Warhol's work, consumer culture's objects of 
use (e.g., Campbell's Soup cans) were taken out oftheir primary context, where they 
were looked through, and represented within a frame to be looked at. As use becomes 
ornament, or as figure and ground trade places, reality is defamiliarized. Yet it is far more 
common to work from the other direction, turning ornament into use, as when objects of 
conspicuous consumption (e.g., fur coats, Rolex watches, limousines) are used primarily 
as signs to establish or maintain one's place in a social hierarchy. 
To push this argument a step further, we can say, taking a nominalist position, that 
the opposing concepts do not even exist, except as words; they are simply abstractions. 
Immediacy and hypermediacy, masculine and feminine, prose and poetry, and so forth, 
do not exist in reality; they are merely words, or labels, for two positions, or points, on a 
line.20 We might also call these words "placemarkers." As Guyer writes, "Closure, 
19 I have so far been unable to track down the original sources of the Coleridge and Emerson quotes. An 
indirect source of the Emerson quote is Bartlett's Familiar Quotations. lOth edition, 1919. Available online: 
http://www.bartleby.com. Coleridge may have actually borrowed "Extremes meet" from Louis-Sebastien 
Mercier's "Les extremes se touchent." Tableaux de Paris (1782), vo/. iv. title of chap. 348. 
20 Here I am drawing on the much-discussed work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, particularly their 
discussions of the rhizome and smooth and striated spaces in A Thousand Plateaus. Carolyn Guyer also 
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resolution, achievement, the objects of our lives are inventions that operate somewhat 
like navigational devices, placemarkers if you will" ("Buzz-Daze," unpaginated). In an 
effort to convey this nondualistic reality, I will offer as an alternate image, or metaphor, 
the Mobius strip, invented by mathematician August Ferdinand Mobius (1790-1868). To 
form a Mobius strip (Figure 3.5), one takes a long strip of paper and fastens the ends 
together, but in a special way. By giving the paper a half-twist before joining the ends, 
one joins the back side of the paper to the front side, which produces a continuous, one-
sided object (Bogomolny, unpaginated). Such an image conveys what I mean by one end 
of a polarity being transformed into its complement. 
Scripts and Archetypes 
A critic might question the uniqueness of hypertext on the grounds that there has 
always been interaction between readers and texts, as readers are called on to "write" the 
"unwritten" portions of the text (Iser 956). As Iser argues "no author worth his salt will 
ever attempt to set the whole picture before his reader's eyes. [ .. . ] without elements of 
indeterminacy, the gaps in the text, we should not be able to use our imagination" (961). 
The reader, in the act of interpretation, uses her imagination to "write" the unwritten parts 
of the text; that is to say, the reader collaborates with both author and text to complete the 
text. As Barthes argues, "The Text asks of the reader a practical collaboration" (904). 
Hence, the conventional divisions between author, audience, text, and context do not hold 
refers to this text in her essay "Buzz-Daze Jazz and the Quotidian Stream." I will expand upon this theme 
in subsequent chapters. 
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for either modem print literature or literary hypertext. A reader who writes a portion of 
the text cannot remain distant from that text; she must be up-close and engaged, or in the 
same context, in order to fill in the textual gaps. The difference between the conventional 
text and hypertext must be based, then, on something other than the reader's "writing" of 
the unwritten parts of the text because all texts, especially modem literary texts, require 
such reader engagement. 
The electronic read-write hypertext interface takes the reader's engagement with the 
text to another level--or in a different direction , to avoid the hierarchical implications of 
"another level." The unwritten parts of a hypertext are written in a literal as well as a 
metaphorical sense. As discussed previously, there is a danger in conflating reading and 
writing; therefore, I wish to make it clear that in using the terms "wreater" and 
"wreating" I do not mean to conflate reading and writing. Reading and writing are 
distinct processes, and wreating differs from both. Thus, I am arguing for an affinity 
between reading and writing, as opposed to identity. To conflate reading and writing is to 
deny the otherness of the text (Dasenbrock 244). But the masculinist reader, rather than 
attentively listening to and conversing with the text, imposes his will or interpretive 
frame onto the text; he lays his (male) interpretive frame over the (female) text. We might 
also cite Ricoeur's claim that "appropriation does not imply the secret return of the 
sovereign [male] subject" (113). 
To tease out the difference between literally and hermeneutically "writing" the 
unwritten portions of a text, a different terminology may be helpful. Accordingly, at this 
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juncture I wish to make a distinction between what I call the script and the archetype of 
the script (or simply the archetype). The script may be defined as the readable 
orthographic marks on the page, whereas the script's archetype is the idealized script 
protected by copyright law. The script may be sold in the marketplace, but the script's 
archetype is transcendental and intangible. 
As discussed previously, works and texts are quite distinct from one another. The 
text is a function of interpretation, while the work is a literary artifact protected by 
copyright law. Now, in the case of conventional text, the archetype and the work are, for 
all practical purposes, identical. But the hypertext work is not the same as the archetype. 
In fact, as I discuss further below, hypertext has no archetype. If the work and the 
archetype were identical, there would no justification for inventing a new term. 
One difficulty with the concept of the archetype is that it is common for there to be 
several extant "original" manuscripts of a particular literary work, and different 
"authorized" versions of a work may be copyrighted and sold in the marketplace. So 
which is the genuine authorized version, or which script can claim the true archetype? 
My answer to this dilemma is that any copyrighted conventional work has an archetype, 
inasmuch as the archetype is simply a product of copyright law. Thus, the fact that many 
different copyrighted versions of a work may exist does not pose a problem for the 
concept of the archetype of the script. 
In conventional print as well hypertext, the role of the reader is to hermeneutically 
perform the text. The performance is a creative collaboration between text and reader. In 
the language of drama, the reader would be the actor who performs, or interprets, the 
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writer's script. The text also has an analogue in the musical score, which must be 
performed if it is ever to come to life. Hans-Georg Gadamer claimed that "it is in the 
performance and only in it-as we see most clearly in the case of music-that we 
encounter the work itself, as the divine is encountered in the religious rite" (116). In 
adapting Gadamer's statement to my purposes, I have opted to replace the term work with 
text and argue that it is in the performance and only in it that we encounter the text itself. 
Here is my rationale for inventing the concept of the archetype of the script: Literary 
hypertext is distinguished from the conventional literary text by the fact that the hypertext 
script has no archetype. The script must not be conflated with the lexias. Since the lexias 
are seen one at a time, the script only exists as a pattern in the reader's mind. In other 
words, while all readers may be said to "write" the texts they read in a hermeneutic sense, 
this process is taken a step further with hypertext, as the reader not only imaginatively 
writes, or performs, the text but also assembles the script. The script as a whole, or the 
pattern of lexias, must be assembled by the wreater and held in her imagination. Thus, 
while the hypertext work (e.g., Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl) is definitely protected 
by copyright law, there is no way to copyright a hypertext script that is assembled by a 
reader and retained only in the reader's mind. Hence, what is protected in Patchwork Girl 
is the computer code underlying the work. 
Another difference between hypertext and conventional text is that, with the aid of a 
read-write interface, the hypertext script may be written in and changed, while the 
conventional script may only be written on, or perhaps over. Although readers of 
conventional texts do engage with scripts as they hermeneutically transform them into 
165 
texts, readers cannot substantially change the conventional script. While it is true that 
readers may add to a conventional script by writing marginalia or otherwise marking on 
the pages, this action does not touch the archetype. But since the hypertext script has no 
archetype to safeguard it, the writing the user does within a lexia actually changes the 
script. But again, such action has no effect on the copyright-protected code (i.e., the 
work); it doesn't change the product that others will purchase in the future. 
Even if one concedes the claim that a hypertext script differs from a conventional 
script based on its lack of an archetype, one might argue that hypertexts are no different 
than any other fom1 of digital script, inasmuch as digital scripts may be downloaded and 
freely revised or written in. But downloading a digital script is essentially equivalent to 
scarming a print script to turn into it a digital copy. The downloaded digital script and the 
scanned, or digitized, print script may both be freely revised; however, the archetype of 
the script is not touched by this process. For example, if a person downloads Pride and 
Prejudice from the World Wide Web and revises the script, this act has no effect at all on 
the copyrighted work. A second, significant factor is that a digitized script can be scrolled 
though in its entirety; the text can be taken in at a glance, so to speak, as in flipping 
through a print text. In the case of a hypertext, by contrast, the script is assembled from 
individuallexias and then "stored," if only as a general pattern, in the reader's memory. 
Thus, my answer to the conflation of the hypertext script and the digital script is that a 
conventional literary work published online still has an archetype, which is untouched by 
any electronic editing at the user end. 
To recapitulate: In chapter one of this study, as well as earlier in this chapter, I drew 
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a distinction between literary works and texts. I claimed that the work is the literary 
artifact protected by copyright law. The text, by contrast, is a function of interpretation, 
inasmuch as the reader hermeneutically "writes" the "unwritten" parts ofthe text in the 
process of reading the work. Subsequently, I introduced two new concepts: the script and 
the archetype of the script. With respect to the text, it may still be characterized as a 
function of interpretation. As Iser argues, the text is something that comes into being in 
the "virtual dimension" between the reader and the work (958). As for the conventional 
literary work, it may now be redefmed as the script plus its archetype. 
Scripts and Interfaces 
To make yet another fine distinction, or to split another hair, I now wish to 
differentiate between the script and the interface. In short, every script requires an 
interface, or material medium. The interface frames the script and allows it to be read. As 
such, the script and the interface must be distinct entities. A reader may choose to write 
on or over the words or illustrations on the page (i.e., the script), or she may opt to leave 
the script alone and write instead in the margins of the page or even on the cover or 
binding of the book; these other elements are what I am classifying here as the interface. 
In the case of conventional text, the interface is the material artifact that readers 
physically handle. The print interface is typically comprised, at a minimum, of ink and 
paper, and it often includes cloth, glue, cardboard, and string as well. I must emphasize 
that the ink on the page is not identical to the script. Ink, in and of itself, is not readable. 
The script is the readable orthographic marks on the page. The ink, therefore, belongs 
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with the paper and the other material properties that comprise the interface. Furthermore, 
if a script is not readable, it is merely ink; therefore, the script, like the text, is a function 
of interpretation. If a script is encountered by an illiterate person or by a speaker of 
another language, it is no more than ink. In other words, the script, like the text, has a 
relational ontology; reader and interface must come together in a hermeneutic act to 
generate the script. Likewise, reader and script must come together in a hermeneutic act 
to generate the text. 
Conventional text and hypertext, then, may be compared along five axes: work, text, 
script, archetype, script, and interface (Figure 3.6). With respect to the work axis, the 
five hypertexts I have selected for this study are all protected by copyright law; therefore, 
they are all legitimate literary works. A work is essentially a script protected by 
copyright; that is to say, the author's manuscript is raised to the level of a work by virtue 
of being copyrighted. The conventional work also gains a archetype at this point; it is the 
prototype faithfully reflected in all the scripts. The conventional script and the hypertext 
script differ, however, because the conventional script exists as a whole from beginning 
to end and may be taken it at a glance, while the hypertext script must be instantiated one 
lexia at a time and held in the reader's mind. The conventional script, then, is a copy of 
the archetype, and the conventional work is the script plus the archetype. But hypertext, 
again, has no archetype because it must be instantiated as a script (i.e., a network or 
pattern of lexias) by each wreater. A further difference between the conventional script 
and the hypertext script is that, with the aid of an electronic read-write interface, the 
hypertext script may be written in and changed, whereas the conventional print script 
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may only be written on or over. The conventional interface (i.e., the pages, ink, cover, 
etc.) may also be written on. With regard to the fourth axis, the text, conventional text 
and hypertext do not differ significantly. In both conventional text and hypertext, the text 
is a hermeneutic construction-performance of the reader, who of course must operate 
within the constraints imposed by the script. 
To come full circle now: In chapter 1, I cited Barthes' statement that "the work can 
be seen (in bookshops, in catalogues, in exam syllabi), the text is a process of 
• 
demonstration [ ... ] ; the work can be held in the hand, the text is held in language" (90 1 ). 
I now wish to revise Barthes' statements as follows : The interface can be seen (in 
bookshops, in catalogues, in exam syllabi), the text is a process of demonstration; the 
interface can be held in the hand, the text is held in language. Of course, the script is also 
a hermeneutic performance-construction. One must decode the script before she or he can 
construct the text. The script, however, cannot be held in the hands; it needs a material 
medium, or interface, to ground it. 
Again, the methodology of this study presumes that hypertext readers (or wreaters) 
are able to write themselves into texts. We may now revise our terms to say that the read-
write interface allows wreaters to write themselves into scripts. The text remains a 
hermeneutical construction, and ifwe wish we may speak of readers writing themselves 
into texts. But in this sense hypertext is no different than conventional text: both types of 
text come into being in the conversation between the reader and the script. The distinctive 
feature of an electronic read-write interface is that it allows readers to write themselves 
into scripts, thus becoming wreaters. 
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In the next chapter I discuss, in narranalytic fashion, the experience of writing myself 
into Quibbling, Patchwork Girl, Cyborg: Engineering the Body Electric, "I Have Said 
Nothing," and "Lust." 
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CHAPTER4 
A Narranalytic Reflection on the Wreating Process 
How does a reader make sense of a literary hypertext? What is to be done with it? 
One thing I cannot do in one chapter is undertake a close reading of five literary 
hypertexts-in this case Quibbling, Patchwork Girl, Cyborg: Engineering the Body 
Electric, "Lust," and "I Have Said Nothing." I do not attempt a comprehensive critical 
treatment on any of these texts, and at times it may even seem that I touch too lightly on 
them. However, a close reading of these five texts would call for an entire dissertation in 
itself, and this dissertation is not a literary study. My focus in this chapter is on the 
process of reading literary hypertext. In other words, my interest is rhetorical. I am 
interested the ways in which the Western rhetorical concepts of writer, reader, text, and 
context mutate in a hypertext environment. 
I have argued throughout this study that a hypertext should be treated as a living 
organism- but what kind of living organism? I have been troubled by the suspicion that I 
had put myself into the position of supporting the concept of a unitary organism, a 
principle critiqued by Haraway ( 150), among others. We typically think of organisms, 
such as ourselves, as unitary beings bounded by skin or some bodily surface, but I want 
to get beyond that kind of thinking. Thus, I fmd Hayles's descriptions of the extended 
mind and embodiment far more compelling than the old, commonsense ontology. 
It occurs -to me that a hypertext is a rhizome; that is the kind of living organism it is. 
In a literal sense, a rhizome is a modified plant stem which grows horizontally under the 
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surface of the soiL New growth then emerges from different points of the rhizome. Irises 
and some lawn grasses are rhizomatous plants. However, I am more interested in the 
rhizome as an idea or philosophical principle. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's 
concept of the rhizome has been discussed by several hypertext theorists and authors 
(e.g., Carolyn Guyer, Shelley Jackson, Diane Greco, Stuart Moulthrop, Johndan Johnson-
Eilola, George Landow, Michael Joyce, and Martin Rosenberg). As I discuss my 
relationship with these five hypertexts, I wish to foreground the concepts of rhizomorphic 
texts and rhizomatic reading. At a formal level, hypertexts have many characteristics that 
we could call rhizomorphic. "Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the 
rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways [and exits .. . ]. It has neither beginning 
nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and overspills" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 12, 21 ). This sense of always reading the middle is what I wish to focus on. 
In A Thousand Plateaus (1980, English translation 1987), a text that seems to have 
taken on near-scriptural status among many literary theorists, hypertext theorists and 
authors, feminists, social scientists, and philosophers, Deleuze and Guattari explain in a 
multitude of ways what they mean by the term rhizome: 
A rhizome as subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. 
Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes. Plants with roots or radicles may be rhizomorphic 
in other respects altogether: the question is whether plant life in its specificity is 
not entirely rhizomatic. Even some animals are, in their pack form. Rats are 
rhizomes. Burrows are too, in all their functions of shelter, supply, movement, 
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evasion, breakout. The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified 
surface extension in all directions to concretization into bulbs and tubers. (6-7) 
Jackson's Patchwork Girl gives an example of a rhizome in the lexia called "earwigs": 
"When I was 'young' [ . . . ] I turned over a leaf and found a massed and crawling nest of 
earwigs. I dropped the leaf and backed away from these creatures that appalled me singly 
not at all. What is dreadful about the plural? The swarm, the infestation." I have 
discussed in previous chapters the modernist propensity to measure all sorts of 
phenomena. The unbounded, immeasurable nature ofthe mass is threatening. Western 
empiricism has taught us not to trust or believe in anything that cannot be measured, such 
as mind or soul. And a common rhetorical tactic employed by demagogues is to 
characterize their enemies, or scapegoats, as a mass (e.g., a nest of vermin or the liberal 
media). Deleuze and Guattari go on to list a number ofrhizomatic principles, such as 
Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be 
connected to any other, and must be. [ .. . ] A rhizome ceaselessly establishes 
connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances 
relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles. [ ... ] Principle of multiplicity 
[ . .. ] There are no points or positions on a rhizome [ .. .]. There are only lines. [ . . 
. ] the notion of unity appears only when there is a power takeover in the 
multiplicity [ ... ] Principle of asignifying rupture [ ... ] . A rhizome may be 
broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, 
or on new lines. You can never get rid of ants because they form an animal 
rhizome that can rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed. (7-9) 
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This last example describes the founding idea of the ARPANET, the ancestor of the 
Internet. In the early 1960s, Paul Baran developed the idea for a "distributed network," or 
a "network composed of many nodes, each redundantly connected to its neighbor" 
(Hafuer and Lyon 58). The advantage of a distributed network is that it works around 
nodes that are down for service or congested with traffic. Baran also believed, rightly, 
that data traveling over a distributed network could be broken into "message blocks," or 
"packets," that would travel diverse routes from point A to point B; the data would be 
fractured at its point of origin and reassembled, or put back in linear order, at its 
destination (59-60). As the Internet and World Wide Web have developed, this non-
centralized, rhizomorphic design has proven to be quite powerful. 
Getting to Know the Text 
If I am going to spend time with another person, I have to decide what do to--or 
rather, we have to decide together what we are going to do. So when beginning a 
relationship with a hypertext, I must confer with the text to decide what we want to do. 
And even after this initial consultation, there is a continual negotiation as I learn what the 
text will allow or what is worth doing with the text. As Moulthrop writes, "The text 
gestures toward openness- what options can one imagine?-but then swiftly forecloses : 
some options are available but not others, and someone clearly did the defining long 
before you began interacting" (2514). When I first meet a person, I may imagine that she 
or he will be open to anything I propose, but I soon remember that human beings are not 
blank slates for me to write on. I can write with others but not on them. Analogously, a 
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text may be unwilling to do what I want or hope to do. For instance, it may be unwilling 
or unable to participate in certain actions, such as opening up a new lexia when I press 
Enter, because its author has not provided a default link. In that case, when I press Enter 
the computer just emits an annoying beep. My response to this exigency is usually to 
click the back button. But I might also press F9 to search the alphabetic list of lexias 
(Figure 4.1). I can also try using the Navigate menu to do a full-text search (Figure 4.2) 
or look at a map or outline view of the text. In other words, there are a variety of options 
open to me when the text declines to follow a default path, as well as when I do not find 
the default path personally interesting or engaging. 
Aside from using the text-search functions, there are two primary ways to read a 
Storyspace hypertext: One may press Enter or click the mouse inside a lexia, or one may 
select highlighted text links within a lexia. The first route tends to produce a more linear, 
or serial, reading- though certainly less linear than a conventional literary text; one can 
follow a particular narrative line for a number oflexias until in veers off into another 
narrative line. By contrast, selecting text links tends to produce a much more dispersed, 
sometimes incoherent reading. I, personally, find myself doing a little of both. I will press 
Enter or click the mouse to follow the default links for a while, but if a text link looks 
interesting I will click on that to see where it leads; however, I will often click the Back 
button to return to the previous path rather than follow a tangent indefinitely. I suppose I 
do not want to abruptly leave a narrative line that I've become invested in to read in a 
completely multilinear manner. On the other hand, if a particular narrative line does not 
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seem to be "going anywhere," I will click on a text link in search of something more 
interesting. 
Another option I have with an electronic read-write interface is to annotate the text 
' 
or leave traces of my presence in the text. I have annotated these five texts and also added 
many text links, trying to construct a personally meaningful reading. My annotative 
traces are marked by the word "NOTE," usually appearing at the bottom of alexia but 
sometimes at the top or in the middle as well (Figure 4.3). In the beginning I italicized 
these comments, but I discontinued this practice after encountering problems when trying 
to edit the italicized text. Later I began to bold face these notes. I have also nested lexias 
within the writing space labeled "Commentary" in each of the five texts. Thus, I have 
gone far beyond conventional annotation. For a closer reading than I present in this 
chapter, or to more closely study my personal engagement with the five texts, one may 
read the annotations and commentaries. 
Annotation creates a dialogue between reader and text. Again, if I am in a 
relationship or am engaged in a conversation, it is quite natural to extend or elaborate on 
my interlocutor's statements. I can say, "Do you mean ?"or "Oh, you mean 
----
. " I then pause as the other person responds, telling me if I am reading her right. 
Pauses are obviously necessary in conversation, but there may also be occasions when I 
feel compelled to interrupt, for example, if my interlocutor is spouting ignorant, hateful, 
or nonsensical remarks. In advocating interruption as a tactic for women in the struggle 
for agency, Nedra Reynolds speaks of the need to interrupt normative discourses "by 
drawing attention to all forms of silencing" (64). Also, if a conversation just does not 
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seem to heading anywhere or the same ground is being needlessly covered over and over, 
we might interrupt to adjust the course of the conversation or turn it in a different 
direction. 
Strategy, Tactics, and Timing 
When it comes to interruptions or responses, timing is everything. In other words, 
interruptions are kairotic; the right time must be chosen. Although the spatial dimension 
is inevitably a factor as well, we often have little control over where we are situated 
spatially. A couple of examples of well timed interruptions are Rosa Parks' refusal to 
move to the back ofthe bus in Montgomery, Alabama in 1955 and Sojourner Truth's 
"Ain' t I a Woman?" speech in Akron, Ohio in 1851. These interruptions were rhetorical 
acts that produced powerful historical discontinuities, redirecting traditional trajectories. 
Following de Certeau, we may classify these interruptions as tactics, which are the 
counterpart of strategies. De Certeau argues that strategies privilege the spatial dimension 
and spatial relationships, inasmuch as they depend on an established "place of power," 
whereas tactics have more to do with time: "Strategies pin their hopes on the resistance 
that the establishment of a place offers to the erosion of time; tactics on the clever 
utilization of time, of the opportunities it presents and also of the play that it introduces in 
the foundations of power" (38-39). In the language ofwarfare and games, tactics are 
defmed as operations within enemy or foreign territory. "The space of the tactic is the 
space of the other. Thus, it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized 
by the law of a foreign power. [ . . . ] In short, a tactic is an art of the weak" (de Certeau 
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37). Furthermore, tactics are performed at close range. "It does not have the means to 
keep to itself, at a distance[ ... ] It does not have[ . . . ] the options of planning a general 
strategy and viewing the adversary as a whole[ . .. ] It must operate in isolated actions, 
blow by blow" (37). Strategic space, by contrast, is an optic or even panoptic space. "It is 
[ .. . ] a mastery of places through sight. [ . . . ] To be able to see (far into the distance) is 
also to be able to predict, to run ahead of a time by reading a space" (36). So we are back 
to the feminist principle of acting in rather than acting on-i.e., living and working "up-
close and personal" with the other, as oppose to controlling the other from a safe 
distance. 
De Certeau emphasizes the temporal aspect of tactics because the spatial aspect, or 
where one happens to live or work, is often out of one's control. Shirley Wilson Logan 
took the title of one ofher essays, " 'When and Where I Enter ' : Race, Gender, and 
Composition Studies," from a statement by nineteenth-century educator Anna Julia 
Cooper, which expresses the concept of kairotic interruption quite well: "Only the Black 
woman can say 'when and where I enter, in the quiet, undisputed dignity of my 
womanhood, without violence and without suing or special patronage, there and then the 
whole Negro race enters with me" (qtd. in Logan 45). The where in this case is foreign 
territory, the space that women like Cooper and Logan, along with Rosa Parks, Sojourner 
Truth, and millions of other others, have been placed through no choice of their own. 
Tactics are short-term operations; they take advantage of opportune moments (de 
Certeau 37-39). Reading is also short-term activity, as the reader attends to short strings 
of text, and the short-term quality of reading seems to be accentuated in hypertextual 
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environments because the reader sees only short sections of text. But even in reading 
conventional text, we often become distracted and "lose our place"; however, the fact is 
that "reading has no place" (174). The reader occupies the intertext, the interstices 
between texts, and this way she "escapes from the law of each text in particular" (de 
Certeau 174). De Certeau speaks of"reading as poaching": 
Far from being writers-founders of their own place, heirs of the peasants of 
earlier ages now working on the soil oflanguage, diggers of wells and builders of 
houses-readers are travelers; they move across lands belonging to someone else, 
like nomads poaching their way across fields they did not write[ ... ]. Writing 
accumulates, stocks up, resists time by the establishment of a place [ .. .]. Reading 
takes no measure against the erosion of time (one forgets oneself and also forgets 
what he has read), it does not keep what it acquires, or does so poorly. (174) 
Reading, then, involves a process of forgetting-i.e., as we progress through lines of text, 
we retain only a hazy memory of the words we have just read. If a reader were burdened 
with perfect memory of everything she or he had read, the reading process would quickly 
grind to a halt. 
Strategy, or seeking to establish and maintain a place for oneself, is not necessarily a 
bad thing, as long as this place does not become a power base from which to oppress 
others. Strategic action seeks "first of all to distinguish its 'own' place, that is, the place 
of its own power and will, from an 'environment"' (37). De Certeau's argument, then, 
should not be taken as a glorification of weakness or marginalization. Moreover, writing 
oneself into a text is one means of establishing a personal space, and this act destabilizes 
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the passive consumerist position. De Certeau writes, "The child still scrawls and daubs on 
his schoolbooks; even if he is punished for this crime, he has made a space for himself 
and signs his existence as an author on it" (31 ). This child is overcoming readerly silence, 
just as one can do with an electronic read-write text interface such as Storyspace. By 
contrast, "The television viewer cannot write anything on the screen of his set. He has 
been dislodged from the product. [ ... ] He loses his author's rights and becomes, or so it 
seems, a pure receiver" (de Certeau 31 ). Thus, through a circuitous route, I've returned to 
one of the central themes ofthis study, described variously as writing oneself into the 
text, overcoming reading silence, and wreating. While I do not wish to treat texts as 
enemy territory or uncritically adopt de Certeau's agonistic metaphors, there is 
nonetheless a sense in which the conventional text is foreign territory-i .e., territory 
owned and controlled by authors, publishers, and printers. But the electronic read-write 
interface fundamentally alters the textual playing field, allowing readers to not only make 
tactical moves, which is also possible in conventional text, but to strategically stake out 
and occupy their own territory within the text. 
Interruptions, detours, spins, and spirals 
Hypertextual reading paths are subject to perpetual interruption; this is the rule rather 
than the exception, and these interruptions may be visualized as narrative detours, spins, 
or spirals. Narrative lines spin off into other lines, and the multiple spinning and spiraling 
trajectories of a hypertext may be associated visually with a fractal (Figure 4.4), a product 
of chaos theory. 
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The logic of association has been an integral part of hypertext theory since the 
beginning (e.g., Bush, Nelson, Landow, Bolter). In associating hypertext with fractals and 
spirals, it might be preferable to use animated graphics, because these would allow me to 
convey the sense of dynamic space-time. However, since this dissertation in being written 
for print, I am left with still images. On the other hand, animated graphics could not 
represent hypertext any more successfully or accurately than still graphics-that is, 
animation does not come any closer to the "real thing." The experience ofwreating 
hypertext cannot be represented, but I can associate this process with metaphors and 
images. Furthermore, the visual images I have chosen are as revealing for what they leave 
out, or for what is absent, as it is for what is present- and this is how association 
generally works; there is no one-to-one correspondence or identity between two entities. 
Once again, what we have is affinity rather than identity. 
As I indicated above, a number of hypertext authors and theorists have drawn on the 
work ofDeleuze and Guattari. In "Buzz-Daze and the Quotidian Stream," Guyer writes: 
[In] an essay called "The Smooth and the Striated"[ . .. ] Deleuze and Guattari [ .. 
. ] gave me something for which I had been looking almost fifteen years. [ . . . ] It 
has to do with[ ... ] the non-existence of abstracted dualities. [ .. . ] Female/Male, 
Night/Day, Death/Life, Earth/Sky, Intuitive/Rational, Individual/Communal. [ . .. ] 
We make these things up! The terms "smooth" and "striated,"[ ... ] are an attempt 
to generalize the easy concept of polarity in order to make it useful in trying to 
understand what really happens, that is, the constant transformations of one pole 
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into the other. What is important to recognize is not the impossible duality ofthe 
poles, but what happens between them. 1 
Here we are presented with another approximation of the Mobius Strip, which features 
what Guyer calls "the constant transformations of one pole into the other." Furthermore, 
we can now see that de Certeau's tactical action disrupts and interrupts striated space; it 
creates a bit of smooth space. Disruption (literally, to break apart) is obviously very 
closely related to interruption (to break in), but interruption connotes changing a 
discourse by entering into it-perhaps writing or speaking oneself into a dominant 
discourse-as opposed to acting on something from a distance. 
As Guyer's comments indicate, the principles of smooth space and striated space, 
which, along with the rhizome, are central to Deleuze and Guattari's thinking, do not 
constitute a simple binary. These "two spaces in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space 
is constantly being translated, transversed into striated space; striated space is constantly 
being reversed, returned to a smooth space. [ ... ] But the de facto mixes do not preclude a 
de jure, or abstract, distinction between the two spaces" (Deleuze and Guattari 474-75). 
In other words, we can contrast and analyze smooth and striated spaces (i.e., place them 
in separate positions on a grid) while never losing sight of the fact that they cannot be 
separated from one another. One of many examples of smooth and striated spaces offered 
by Deleuze and Guattari is the distinction between woven fabric and felt: 
A fabric presents in principle a certain number of characteristics that permit us to 
define it .as a striated space. First, it is constituted of two kinds of parallel 
1 Unpaginated online text. 
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elements; in the simplest case, there are vertical and horizontal elements, and the 
two intertwine, intersect perpendicularly. Second, the two kinds of elements have 
different functions; one is fixed, the other mobile, passing above and beneath the 
fixed. [ . .. ] Third, a striated space of this kind is necessarily delimited, closed in 
on at least one side[ . . .]. Finally, a space of this kind seems necessarily to have a 
top and bottom. [ .. . ] 
Felt[ ... ] proceeds altogether differently, as an anti-fabric. It implies no 
separation of threads, no intertwining, only an entanglement of fibers [ ... ] an 
aggregate of this kind is in no way homogenous: it is nevertheless smooth, and 
contrasts point by point with fabric. ( 475) 
One variety of woven fabric is embroidery, and Deleuze and Guattari make a direct 
contrast between embroidery and patchwork-hence the relevance to this study. 
Embroidered fabrics feature fixed and mobile elements. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, 
[E]mbroidery's variables and constants, fixed and mobile elements, may be of 
extraordinarily complexity. Patchwork[ .. . ] may display equivalents to themes, 
symmetries, and resonance that approximate it to embroidery. But[ . .. ] its space 
is not at all constituted in the same way: there is no center; its basic motif 
('block') is composed of a single element; the recurrence of this element frees 
uniquely rhythmic values distinct from the harmonies or embroidery (in 
particular, in 'crazy' patchwork, which fits together pieces of varying size, shape, 
and color, and plays on the texture of the fabrics). [ . .. ] An amorphous collection 
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of juxtaposed pieces that can be joined together in an infinite number of ways. 
(476) 
In composing her hypertext, Jackson did well to draw from L. Frank Baum's The 
Patchwork Girl ofOz (1913), as well as Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, or, The Modern 
Prometheus (1818). These texts offered the raw material for a brilliant feminist 
articulation of hypertext. 
The Patchwork Cyborg 
The complete title of Jackson's work is Patchwork Girl; or A Modern Monster, by 
Mary/Shelley, and Herself The hypertext is divided into five sections, which are 
presented as a subtitle: a graveyard, a journal, a quilt, a story & broken accents. The 
graveyard section describes the composition of the Patchwork Girl's body; a journal is 
written by (Jackson's) Mary Shelley and recounts the creation and early life of the 
Patchwork Girl; a quilt is a skillfully constructed patchwork from a number of texts (e.g., 
Frankenstein, The Patchwork Girl ofOz, Derrida's Disseminations, Cixous' "Coming to 
Writing," Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus, Haraway's "A Cyborg 
Manifesto," and Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition) with different fonts being used to 
denote different source texts; a story, written in the Patchwork Girl's voice, narrates her 
life and travels from Europe to California over a period of some 175 years; broken 
accents seems to written in the voice of an author who travels, like the Patchwork Girl, 
over Europe and the United States, with a laptop computer in tow; this writer is 
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impossible to "nail down" due to her fluid, highly mobile identity. For instance, she 
writes, 
I am not predictable, but neither am I random. I might very well be in the cafe 
predicted, and am- sitting in white light, espresso souring my mouth, jazz piano 
tinkling over a slurred bass line, as I read fragments of flyers taped to the walls-
but could equally be anywhere else, so if you think you're going to follow me, 
you'll have to learn to move the way I do, think the way I think; there's just no 
way around it. (think me)2 
This writer of broken accents lives for "the sheer pleasure of movement" (flow). In other 
words, she inhabits a smooth, nomadic space. 
A further contrast between smooth and striated space is that smooth spaces are 
experienced at close range, whereas one navigates striated space primarily by means of 
long-distance vision. I have argued previously that feminists tend to valorize relationships 
that are up-close and personal, or relationships in which the other is not kept at a distance. 
Thus, we return to the discussion of the tactile epistemic and the visual epistemic, though 
with a slight revision. Deleuze and Guattari use the term haptic, which Webster's defmes 
as "related to or based on the sense of touch," to describe smooth space; yet by haptic 
Deleuze and Guattari mean more than merely the sense of touch or a simple opposition 
between vision and touch. In discussing the aesthetics of smooth spaces, Deleuze and 
Guattari list two closely related characteristics: 
2 I have opted to cite Storyspace lexias as in-text citations without quotation marks because I found that the 
quotation marks create a cluttered text. 
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First, 'close range' vision, as distinguished from long-distance vision; second, 
'tactile,' or rather 'haptic' space, as distinguished from optical space. [ . .. ] [T]he 
Smooth is both the object of close vision par excellence and the element of a 
haptic space (which may be as much visual as auditory as tactile). The Striated, on 
the contrary, relates more to distant vision, and a more optical space-although 
the eye in tum is not the only organ to have this capacity. ( 492-93) 
The concept of haptic space allows me to complicate and extend the analysis of what I 
have previously called the tactile epistemic. For instance, we might speak of sound waves 
touching auditory nerves and light touching optic nerves, and this touching happens at 
close range in smooth space. From distances we do not have the same sense of being 
directly touched by visual or auditory stimuli. 
Greco quotes Deleuze and Guattari several times and mentions them by name in four 
lexias. In alexia labeled "rhizome," Greco, writes: 
A rhizome: disconnected, in motion, heterogeneous, yet at every point potentially 
connected to every other; not only that, but multiple, and a principle of 
"asignifying" rupture; just as when you try to divide a bunch of ants and find that 
they continue to agglomerate, even as you try to separate them-this mobile, 
continued resistance to separation or definition is a rhizomatic phenomenon. 
The cyborg, as Greco's hypertext demonstrates, is a kind of rhizome; it can mend its 
body with new parts, just like the ant hill that always comes back together after being 
separated. The amorphous, acentered character of the ant hill is perhaps its greatest 
strength. Similarly, the cyborg has no center because, through the extended mind, its 
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parts are dispersed throughout its environment. The cyborg is a pattern rather than a 
presence. Hayles writes, "The contrast between the body's limitations and cyberspace's 
power highlights the advantages of pattern over presence. As long the pattern endures, 
one has attained a kind of immortality" ("VB" 81). 
In the Introduction to Cyborg: Engineering the Body Electric, Greco writes, "This 
hypertext examines representations of the body in cyberpunk science fiction, in order to 
explore how fictional appropriations and reworkings of technology de-stabilize 
traditional notions of gender and identity" (why this project). We can see that Greco, like 
Jackson, is very concerned with the body. Greco goes on to write, "This potent 
combination of science fiction and technological fact in cyberpunk sf offers an escape 
from the physical body. It also comments on the boundaries of that body, as well as on 
the social reality that defines it. The body is, among other things, a social question" 
(potent). The body, for Greco and Jackson, is essentially a rhizome. But Greco differs 
from Jackson in focusing on the technological environment of cyberpunk fiction, as 
opposed to nineteenth-century Europe or twentieth-century America. Greco writes, 
The cyberpunk territory is a radically concrete landscape of the mind. Many of 
the narratives I explore in this hypertext involve journeys in which characters 
travel within a space that exists only within the domain of cyberspace- a 
technological construct that exists only as an extension of the computer user into a 
consensual realm of interaction with other users in other places, all linked 
together by a system of rapid-fire information transfer. (territory) 
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On the other hand, Greco and Jackson are linked by their explorations of textual spaces, 
inasmuch as the characters inhabiting cyberpunk fiction and the Patchwork Girl, along 
with Jackson's Mary Shelley and her other characters and personae, are texts. And if we 
consider the principle ofintertextuality, the textual universe is a rhizome. 
The Patchwork Girl is a rhizome as well as a cyborg; her body is also, for the most 
part, a smooth space, inasmuch as rhizomorphic space is smooth space. Echoing Deleuze 
and Guattari, she calls herself a "swarm": "I am made up of a multiplicity of anonymous 
particles, and have no absolute boundaries. I am a swarm" (self-swarm). As a swarm, the 
Patchwork Girl resembles the earwigs mentioned previously. However, all smooth spaces 
have some degree of striation, and the Patchwork Girl's scars are striations. We learn that 
"long cords of curdled, whitened tissue divided her torso into sectors as distinct as 
patches in a quilt" (I moved). Jackson's Mary Shelley goes to write in her journal, "I ran 
my fingertips along a seam that traversed her flank. It was tough and knobbled, yet slick. 
And it was hot[ ... ] it was hotter than the stretches of smooth skin it divided, as I proved 
by caressing both regions" (fingertips) .3 The scars hold the smooth space ofthe 
patchwork together. Without the seams, her body would fly apart-as indeed it does late 
in her autobiographical narrative. 
The Patchwork Girl acknowledges that to the casual observer she might appear to be 
mere "scraps," as she states, "'Scraps? Did you call me Scraps? Is that my name?"' 
(swarm). But this judgment need not have a negative connotation. As Deleuze and 
3 In Laws of Media, Marshall McLuhan referred to print as interactively "hot" and electronic media as 
interactively "cool." See Moulthrop's "You Say You Want a Revolution?: Hypertext and the Laws of 
Media" (2519). 
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Guattari write, in America, "toward the end ofthe [nineteenth] century patchwork 
technique was developed more and more, at first due to the scarcity of textiles (leftover 
fabric pieces salvaged from used clothes, remnants taken from the 'scrap bag'). [ ... ] It is 
as though a smooth space emanated, sprang from a striated space" ( 4 77). The scars, in 
other words, emanate from the Patchwork Girl's smooth bodily space. 
Greco mentions another ofDeleuze and Guattari's concepts: the Body without 
Organs: "Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari want to posit a Body without Organs: that is, 
a physical body toward which its owner takes a certain attitude that is rhizomatic. The 
body in this sense is a smooth expanse of pure desire" (body without organs). The body 
without organs (sometimes capitalized, sometimes not) ultimately reveals itself as 
"connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities. [ . .. ] [I]t is that 
which desires and by which one desires" (Deleuze and Guattari 161, 165). The body 
without organs, or BwO, is the dialectical counterpart of the organism, which is the 
organization of the organs. The BwO is not the opposite of the organs. "The organs are 
not its enemies. The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to 
the organization of the organs called the organism" (158). The organism is the source of 
the subject; it says, "You will be a subject, nailed down as one" (159). The BwO 
animates the nomad (and/or nomadic space), and nomads cannot be nailed down. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as the BwO is "pure," it is unattainable. "You never reach the 
Body without Organs, you c;an't reach it, you are forever attaining, it is a limit" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 150). The BwO strives to dismantle the organization ofthe organs; however, 
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the BwO must not be allowed to completely dismantle the organism because this ends in 
suicide or insanity as the strata ofthe organism collapse in upon themselves (161). 
We can now understand de Certeau' s analysis of strategies and tactics with reference 
to the body without organs. The BwO uses tactics in the enemy territory of the organism, 
and it must consider kairos, or good timing, as it destratifies the organism. The organism 
cannot be dismantled at all once or clumsily. "You have to diminish it, shrink it, clean it, 
and that only at certain moments" (162). Ifthe organism is dismantled clumsily, it 
quickly rebuilds itself, or restratifies, and reasserts its authority (Deleuze and Guattari 
163-64). We see in Patchwork Girl, towards the "end" of the autobiographical narrative 
(a story), the dismantling or the organism, but the Patchwork Girl, as a true cyborg, 
reassembles her organism by splicing in new organs. Hence, as I stated early in this 
chapter, I do not wish to argue that a hypertext is a unitary organism; it is rather an 
organism in flux, or rhizome, which is produced by the dynamic interaction of the 
organism and the body without organs. 
The body without organs relates to the issue of representationalism as well. "The 
BwO is precisely this intense germen where there are not and cannot be either parents or 
children (organic representation)" (164). Hence, the BwO is responsible for creatures 
such the "illegitimate" cyborg and the Patchwork Girl-that "hideous progeny" (hideous 
progeny). The crucial point that I want to make is that the logic of representation, or 
representationalism, privileges the object being represented over the representation-that 
is, one object is primary and the other secondary, or derivative. This binary, reductive 
logic takes us back to the Platonic formulation of mimesis, in which tangible, visible 
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reality is an imperfect copy, or analogue, of the transcendent Ideal. Representation means 
reproduction. The logic of association, by contrast, does not privilege one entity over 
another; nor is it binaristic; therefore, when I associate a hypertext with a fractal or a 
spiral neither the hypertext nor the visual image is primary. Deleuze and Guattari assert 
that "Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena 
of an entirely different nature. [ .. . ] Unlike the tree, the rhizome is not the object of 
reproduction" (11). Hypertext and the fractal are of entirely different natures, yet they are 
associable. 
Cyborgs do not reproduce; they don't need to. As Greco notes, in cyberpunk fiction, 
"technological-biological upgrades and replication replace reproduction" (appended), and 
in this discussion of hypertext I am not driven by mimetic logic. The cyborg is not a 
copy of a prototype or original; it is not a representation. The cyborg follows the logic of 
association, or patchwork logic, rather than representation or mimesis. Hence, the 
Patchwork Girl does not resemble her maker. In her journal, Jackson's Mary Shelley 
writes, "For despite the cold, she will not keep her clothes for long; romping like a 
hoydenish child of overgrown proportions she tears the confining garments from her 
form, baring her scarred and rag-tag flesh. [ ... ] She does not resemble me. But then I 
begin to wonder ifl still resemble myself' (appetite). The Patchwork Girl is a cyborg 
because her body is stitched together with needle and thread, or, in an alternate narrative 
path, she is created with pen, ink, and paper. The seams, however, quickly cover with 
scar tissue as she incorporates the (narrative) threads into herself. 
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Curves and Non-Reproductive Assemblages 
Reproduction is an important theme in this discussion because the cyborg is not a 
reproduction and it does not reproduce. It assembles parts; it is an "assemblage," like 
Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus (4). A rhizome spreads out laterally, as 
opposed to plunging deep into the earth in search of sources, originals, or prototypes. In 
other words, the movement or growth of the rhizome is paratactic rather than hypotactic. 
Paratactic texts are written by stitching or patching together multiple texts. Parataxis, 
then, is patchwork. 
Aside from the matter of visual representation, what one writes when augmenting or 
supplementing a hypertext (e.g., notes, annotations, journalistic reflections, tentative 
suppositions or working theories), should not be merely derivative of the other text (i .e., 
the copyrighted text); it is immediately integrated into the text and subtly changes the 
text. Thus, the primary/secondary text binary breaks down. The only criterion that 
matters is that the reader's text be associable with the other text, even if the only reader 
to make the associations is the writer of that text. The writer, then, may be her/his only 
audience. And while the marginalia written in a conventional print text shares some of 
these traits, with an electronic read-write interface the supplementary text is immediately 
absorbed into the script. As I argued previously, the hypertext script may be written in, 
while the script of the conventional text may only be written on. 
Associational logic allows us to go beyond mere explanation, because explanation is 
tied to representation. When relying on representation, we must find or construct the most 
accurate copies or closest analogues of whatever it is we wish to represent and explain. 
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But if we use associative logic, we are much freer to choose images, metaphors, or 
experiences that are comparable in some way, or that have some affinity, with what we 
are seeking to understand, rather than explain. Moreover, if I associate hypertext with a 
fractal image, it gives me a new perspective on, or appreciation of, fractals as well as 
hypertext. I do not simply use the fractal, in a parasitic fashion, as a means to better 
explain hypertext; the illumination is reciprocal. Association works both ways; it is not 
unidirectional. 
While reading Quibbling, I learned that the image of the curve is very productive 
metaphorically and metonymically. In an archetypical sense, the curve is culturally coded 
as feminine, and this principle has been reflected for centuries in artistic representations 
of the curves of the female nude. However, in the Western tradition most publicly 
acclaimed or remembered artists have been male, and the association of curves with the 
female body may simply be a product Western androcentricism. In other words, the 
curve, like woman, is categorized as other. The straight line is the default, and straight is 
synonymous with honest, frank, upright, undiluted, and so on. Heterosexuals are 
classified as straight, that is, normal. Crooked, of course, means dishonest. Other 
synonyms for crooked that I find in my thesaurus are warped, twisted, and bent. Even the 
word spin has, over the last decade or so, taken on a new, pejorative meaning-i.e., not 
telling the actual truth or not being straight with the public. 
I would like to reverse this negative connotation and talk about narrative spin as a 
positive, innovative feature ofliterary hypertext. One definition of spin is "to draw out 
and twist fiber into yam or thread." Storytellers spin yams and narrative threads. 
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Moreover, the ancient Greek rhapsodes were, literally, spinners, and their narratives 
varied with audience and situation. In other words, rhapsodic tales were kairotic. The 
difference between traditional storytelling and hypertext is that hypertext writers and 
readers tum narrative threads into felt, one of De leuze and Guattari 's examples of smooth 
space. Felt "is in principle infinite, open, and unlimited in every direction; it has neither 
top nor bottom nor center; it does not assign fixed and mobile elements but rather 
distributes a continuous variation" (Deleuze and Guattari 4 75-76). The nodes and links of 
hypertext do not have a fixed-mobile relation to each other. Both are potentially mobile. 
The process of reading conventional text, on the other hand, does have fixed and mobile 
elements: The script remains fixed from beginning to end while the reader's eyes move 
over the script. But with hypertext, the script, being divided into lexias, shifts its 
arrangement throughout the reading process. 
In Patchwork Girl, Jackson writes of"[f]allen angels[ ... ] twisting their bodies into 
unnatural shapes, cleaving in unholy unwholly marriages to animals, fish, birds, insects, 
mollusks, arachnids and others both for politics and for pleasure" (bad dreams). She goes 
on to describe fallen monsters who move "chaotically, in fractals, through spirals, 
percentages and hairpin turns, 'one step forward two steps back,' hopscotch, hokey-
pokey, double dutch, bass-ackwards, ride-a-cock-horse" (bad dreams). Quibbling 
contains a reference to Heta's "spiraling cunt" (brnklbeam of flesh). Elsewhere, Bridget, 
Heta's grown daughter, states, "Did you know, Mom, that it was once believed that 
people were born from a woman's intestines (the clear distinction between reproductive 
and digestive systems not yet made)? That labyrinths, and snakes, and spirals, and coils 
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were symbols of femininity, the mother, operating principle ofthe world?" (and blood). 
Heta is also associated with the waves that wash onto the shore of Lake Michigan, where 
she lives, and waves are curved: "For a long time Heta watched the cadence of Lake 
Michigan. She watched the waves glide in to shore on calm sunny days, waves with 
delicate ruffs of foam slinging to nets of crochet fanned out over the sand. She watched 
on windy days when the cold slapped her face and frisked her body, sky lowering and 
surf tearing furiously at the land" (water color). Elsewhere we read ofHeta and Priam 
walking alongside a river: "Anns hung loosely at each other's waist, Heta's lowering 
occasionally to palm a moving buttock, they spoke quietly, but mostly not at all, simply 
enjoying the early fall warmth and the swirl and wave of her long black skirt as they 
walked" (recognition). Hilda's skirt waves in a very similar fashion. Excluding my 
commentary, the word wave is mentioned in ten of Quibbling's lexias. Heta is a mother, 
and we learn that the "Mother-letter M (Ma) was an ideogram for waves of water" (wa-
wa). A hypertext may be considered feminine, or associated with archetypal femininity, 
insofar as it curves back on itself, or is recursive. Guyer speaks of how at a certain 
"depth, fictional warp begins to tum back on itself, the curve we're always looking for 
(more Help). The Mobius strip is similar, though not identical, to a spiral. Curves 
constitute haptic space. That is, curves are best perceived through touch. Even the curves 
of sound waves touch the ear drum. Merely seeing a curve, especially from a distance, 
cannot account for its richness. Thus, as I've noted before, Irigaray claims that women 
know best by touch; they know up-close, in haptic space. 
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Once I noticed the prominence ofthe curve motif in Quibbling, I started to link 
together most of the references to curves in this hypertext. (To find all of the lexias 
containing the word curve, either press Control-F and enter curve or use the navigate 
menu and select find text.) By making multiple links from my comment on curves,4 I 
have created a nodal point in the hypertext-a concept not to be confused with the single 
focal point of the conventional narrative. From this nodal point radiate, like spokes of a 
wheel, links to many of the lexias that contain a reference to curves. Recursive reading 
means turning back to such nodal points. However, one may also follow the curve text 
links (i.e., "curve" as highlighted text within alexia), never returning to the "curves" 
lexia I have added. I have followed the same procedure to link lexias containing a 
particular word in other hypertexts as well. For example, in Greco's Cyborg thirty-five 
lexias contain the word power, a number ofwhich I have tied together through text links. 
Hypertextual nodal points are turning points, or what Harpold calls digressions and 
points of detour, which we might also call contours. Thus, by creating nodal points, 
which have links leading away and returning, I am adding new contours to the text. 
Harpold speaks of a "dynamic interlacing of the [narrative] threads, each looping around 
the other at a central point of detour" ("Threnody" 177). We might visualize nodal points 
as recursive plateaus. Deleuze and Guattari "call a 'plateau' any multiplicity connected to 
other multiplicities by superficial underground stems is such a way as to form or extend a 
rhizome. We are writing this book as a rhizome. It is composed of plateaus" (22). As I 
discuss further below, in reading hypertext one reads for plateaus rather than a single 
4 The comment referred to here is located in the lexia labeled "curves." 
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narrative climax. While a linear text marches inexorably forward toward closure and 
death, recursive reading escapes narrative death. Thus, multiple plateaus are an 
alternative to the normative death-closure-ejaculation. 
A spiral may be formed by circling round and round nodal points, and as such the 
spiral may be associated with the wandering/wondering, nomadic text. In smooth, 
nomadic space, "movement is not from point to another, but become perpetual, without 
aim or destination, without departure or arrival" (Deleuze and Guattari 353). The spiral is 
made of cycles within cycles, which is analogous to the recursive hypertext wreating 
experience. The spiral has fascinated humankind for millennia. According to the Ancient 
Spiral website, 
Some of the oldest examples of human art are depictions of spirals, painted or 
carved into rock, often found in burial sites. Later, the Romans and Greeks used 
spirals as designs for vases and the columns in temples. The Celtic and Norse 
people were well known for the mysterious and repetitive designs found on their 
jewelry, clothing, weapons, objects of worship and everyday items. The Celts 
even painted spirals on their bodies with blue dye to intimidate enemies during 
battle. They also created forms of animals and plants twisting into impossible 
spirals, sometimes interlocking with other elements of the picture. 
I have referenced the above quotation because Hilda, one of the characters in Quibbling, 
seems to be a pagan, judging by the fact that she does a spiral dance: 
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At the top of this small hill, where it levels out into a large, square pad of 
asphalt, she performs her most personal and public ritual. It is one she has 
performed every day for some time now, always thinking that someone will 
eventually notice. 
As she walks across the square of asphalt, she makes a complete turn, never 
stopping, to check all 360 degrees of the sky. Her chin, arms, and skirt lift 
slightly as she turns, while her footsteps, moving forward and in a circle, trace a 
spiral on the earth. (spiral) 
New spirals, curves, contours, and plateaus may easily be added to a hypertext. By 
adding new links within a hypertext, as I have done with the word "curve" in Quibbling, I 
am able to create new contiguities in the text-that is, I can bring two lexias closer and 
alter the narrative trajectory. Deleuze and Guattari claim that smooth space features 
curvilinear trajectories (361). They speak of"Archimedean geometry, in which the 
straight line, defined as 'the shortest distance between two points,' is just a way of 
defining the length of a curve in a predifferential calculus" (361 ). In connection with the 
theme of the spiral, it is noteworthy that Deleuze and Guattari go on to speak of going 
from "a curvilinear declination to the formation of spirals and vortices on an inclined 
plane: the greatest slope for the smallest angle" (361). While I do not presume to 
understand the mathematics, it is clear that curves, spins, and spirals are defining features 
of smooth, haptic, nomadic space-time. 
Quibbling is a nomadic narrative; it does not have an Aristotelian plot (Landow 208). 
Given that the Aristotelian plot was fashioned after drama (e.g., Sophocles, 
198 
Aristophanes), it is far different than the novelist structure as it was developed centuries 
later. A novel may have many plots-not merely a main plot and subplots, which is 
hierarchical, but parallel plots. The map view of Quibbling shows that this hypertext is 
organized in three sections: lake, moon, and prairie-each of which has associations with 
Western notions of"the feminine." These three topoi serve as pivot points for the 
wandering text (Figure 4.5). 
The reader wanders (and wonders) through Quibbling, somewhat like the characters, 
such as Heta and Priam, both of whom live somewhat nomadic lives, taking temporary 
teaching positions. Given the time and space constraints of classical drams, the 
Aristotelian plot cannot afford to wander like a novel, but a hypertext can wander/wonder 
far more than a conventional novel. Thus, literary hypertext is more nomadic than the 
novel, and the novel is more nomadic than the classical dramatic plot. Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to the nomadic text as "a flow of children; a flow of walking with pauses, 
straggling, and forward rushes" (23). In other words, the flow of the text is discontinuous; 
it features conversational pauses. 
Lust and Promiscuous Wreating,· or The Logic of the Hyphen 
I move now to a discussion of"Lust," a short but difficult literary hypertext. In 
trying to make sense of a hypertext like "Lust," the first thing to recognize is that these 
texts cannot be read, they can only reread. 5 "Lust," being comprised of thirty-seven 
lexias, is a kind of poem, but the reader's purpose is not to explicate it-not explain it or 
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represent it, but to re/read it, and perhaps to rewrite it (Press F9 to see an alphabetic list of 
the lexias.). The "rhythm of recurrence" (Joyce, Othermindedness 120) is, in large part, 
what literary hypertext is all about. 
"Indulgence," a typicallexia in "Lust," reads as follows: "She aches from the gravel 
against her soft flesh. There is blood. She is nearly naked. She falls to her knees. She 
screams. She picks up the knife. There is blood. He does not speak." How does one 
re/read something like this? When I started re/reading "Lust" it made no sense. 
Patchwork Girl, on the other hand, was quite clear to me; I immediately grasped the idea 
that the Patchwork Girl was a hypertextual creature. The main problem with "Lust" is 
that I had and still have great difficulty figuring out who "she," "he," and "the child" are. 
In other words, it is difficult to separate, positioning, or assign the characters to their 
"proper" sectors on a narrative grid. It is difficult to superpose striations on this smooth 
text. From there/reader's perspective, there appear to be four characters in "Lust": an 
unnamed woman, John, Jeffrey, and a child. John and Jeffrey are referred to by name in 
one lexia each. The lexia labeled "John" states, "John had sand colored hair and eyes of 
sea. He drove a motorcycle, never wore a helmet. 'I am a dyed-in-the-wool Republican,' 
he said." The lexia "She and the Child" contains the text, "Dyed in the woolen blanket. 
Fraying ends. Fibers. Sand, gravel against soft flesh." Leitmotifs, such as the woolen 
blanket and fraying fibers, recur throughout the text, taking on many associations. The 
associations become entangled like the threads of felt. 
5 Intermittently, I will use the term re!read to convey the sense that reading is essentially rereading when it 
comes to literary hypertext. 
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As Ire/read "Lust," I began to wonder if the child was an aspect ofthe woman 
and/or one of the men. For instance, the lexia "she aches," reads, "She aches. She longs 
to sit. She sits, thighs naked, tugging at her shirt." And the lexia "Wishing" reads, "She 
wishes like a child that he had followed her and stayed that night. [ . .. ] The child aches. 
The child comes to her, nearly naked." From these lexias, I sense that the child is an 
aspect of the woman and/or one ofthe men. The pronoun references are thoroughly 
ambiguous, as in the following excerpt: "The child aches. The child comes to her, nearly 
naked. She speaks slowly, deliberately" (Wishing). Who is "she" in the foregoing text, 
the child or the woman or both? We are never told the child's gender. Other lexias 
indicate that the child is an aspect of one of the men. Another lexia reads, in part, "He 
speaks to her, asks her to follow him, to stay with him. Here he is like a child, slowly, 
deliberately" (Summer). The lexia "Aching" also tells us, "He speaks to her as a child, 
slowly, deliberately." 
It was only after re/reading or making many passes over the text that I formed the 
hypothesis that one or more of the adult characters might also be the baby. This 
hypothesis is supported by the juxtaposition of two excerpts: "Jeffrey had a past. He 
wrapped it around him like a blanket to keep him warm" (Jeffrey) and "The child is 
nearly naked, wrapped in a woolen blanket, toes flexing" (The Child Speaks). The 
hypothesis that Jeffrey is also the child may now become a working theory. This is what 
we do with hypertext: we form a hypothesis, test the hypothesis by re/reading, modify the 
hypothesis as needed, and finally settle on a working theory (Douglas, "Understanding" 
122-25). Of course, we do the same when reading conventional literature. We make 
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educated guesses about what is to follow, test those guesses by re/reading on, modify the 
guesses, and finally settle on an explanation that makes sense to us. A difficult hypertext, 
such as "Lust," simply makes this process more conscious or deliberate, as well much 
more recursive. 
I have re/read these five hypertexts, looking for patterns, recurrent themes, and 
similitudes, in this way constructing plateaus. In Quibbling, the fact that nearly all the 
characters are in some way artists links them together. Also, the mother-child relationship 
is another recurrent theme in Quibbling. Mothers create, and artists create. Of course, 
mothers create with fathers, and the female-male relationship is central to this text, as 
most of the characters are romantically paired, although not all of the pairings are 
heterosexual. In this sense, Quibbling resembles, in Jackson's words, a "patchwork quilt, 
a fabric of relations" (PG, research). 
One way ofre/reading a Storyspace hyperfiction is to do a full-text search for a 
character's name and simply re/read every lexia in which she or he is mentioned. 
Quibbling's cast of characters, which I compiled as I re/read the text, is listed in Figure 
4.6a. A few of my identifications are still tentative. The fact that in the listing of 
characters I have skipped lines between couples indicates that I am trying to separate and 
position the characters, or tease out the threads of felt. And because this list amounts to a 
positioning ofthe characters, I have also laid the characters out spatially, linking 
characters according to their associations (Figure 4.6b ). The reader, especially early in 
the reading, often does not know who is being described because the characters' lives are 
so similar. Again, the central motif is affinity, not identity. As Landow has observed, in 
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Quibbling "one perceives somewhat analogous situations, thus finding similarity, though 
not identity, in the lives of the different couples" (207). In terms of are/reading strategy, 
if we cannot distinguish between speakers, we may fall back on exploring similitudes. 
Similitude creates a different sense of arrangement-an arrangement common in the pre-
print, pre-modem era. Hence, the rhetorical canon of arrangement mutates with 
technological developments; it is remediated (Bolter and Grusin 45). Rhodes and Sawday 
write, "The early modern version of field theory and chaos theory is Montaigne's 
observation that 'toutes chases se tiennent par que/que similitude' (similitude binds 
everything together) ... The paperworlds of the poets ... derive imaginatively from a 
concept ofthe book of nature as a giant intertext of multiple connections and allusions" 
(13). In a literary hypertext were/read for similitude rather than linear coherence or 
cause-and-effect structures, narrative or otherwise. 
We might compare the notion of giant intertext to statement by Deleuze and 
Guattari: "The ideal for a book would be to lay everything out on a plane of exteriority 
[ ... ] on a single page" (9). Books do not remain within themselves as autonomous, 
Enlightenment subjects; they form rhizomatic linkages exteriorly. In the image of the 
plane of exteriority, we have a radically different sense of arrangement than ideals of 
internal consistency and completeness against which conventional texts are measured. 
"All multiplicities are flat" (Deleuze and Guattari 9). Hence, on the textual plane, the 
"single page" where these five hypertexts are spread out, I have constructed plateaus at 
the points where themes, images, and ideas intersect or may be associated. 
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Returning now to "Lust," one prominent theme in this text is the emotional 
oscillation between past and future, or more specifically patterns of remembering and 
expecting-wishing-longing. The experience of looking forward and back at once, the 
Janus-faced experience6, is central to "Lust," and the word remember appears in fourteen 
ofthe thirty-seven lexias. We rarely encounter the present in this hypertext, except as the 
backdrop for remembering or wishing. For example, the lexia "She Expects" tells us, 
"She remembers cold. She remembers traces of sweat, salty, windy. She expects him to 
come, nearly naked." An excerpt from "Try" reads, "She remembers him walking out of 
the room. She remembers following him. That night, she follows him. She remembers 
wishing he had stayed." In the two words "remembers wishing" we have the Janus-faced 
experience. 
One important object-sign in "Lust" is a blanket. By linking lexias together and 
rereading, I formed the working theory that remembering is associated with the blanket; 
that is, the frayed blanket is associable, though it may not represent, fraying memories. 
The blanket of memory is a textlile, and the fraying signifies forgetting. We read of 
"blankets of words, the fibers fraying" (Summer). We also learn that "Jeffrey had a past. 
He wrapped it around him like a blanket to keep him warm, to keep him safe from harm" 
(Jeffrey). The past is held in memory, and it may keep us warm and comfort us. 
6 
"January 1st was dedicated by the Romans to their God of Gates and Doors, Janus. A very old Italian 
God, Janus has a distinctive artistic appearance in that he is commonly depicted with two faces ... one 
regarding what is behind and the other looking toward what lies ahead. Thus, Janus is representative of 
contemplation on the happenings of an old year while looking forward to the new. Some sources claim that 
Janus was characterized in such a peculiar fashion due to the notion that doors and gates look in two 
directions. Therefore, the God could look both backward and forward at the same time." 
(http://www.novareinna.com/festive/janus.html) 
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However, Jeffrey's blanket is described, not as warm, but as cold steel: "The blanket of 
steel, less penetrable than the surface ofhis skin" (Jeffrey). The blanket, in tum, is also 
associable with the cold steel knife, as in, "She picks up the knife, thinks of his face, runs 
the smooth cold blade across the surface of her skin" (Knife). Continuing this associative 
chain, the knife/blanket is associable with the child, as indicated by the juxtaposition of 
"She picks up the knife" (Knife) and "The child does not speak. The child picks up the 
knife" (Touching). The proximity of the child and the knife, along with fact that young 
children are typically picked up by adults, suggests a blurring of the identity of child and 
knife . Although there is no mention of actually picking up the child, we are told 
elsewhere that "she carries the child" (Nearly Naked), and this doesn't appear to mean 
the woman is pregnant. In short, if she carries the child in her arms, she obviously picks 
him or her up first. Moreover, I wonder if it is the child in the woman, her inner child, as 
it were, who picks up the knife-. that is, does the woman pick herself up? We also learn 
that "He is smooth and cold" (The Child). Is this "he" the child, John, Jeffrey, the knife, 
or all of the above? Rather than an either/or logic, we seem to have the logic of the 
hyphen, from which we get terms such as John-Jeffrey-she-the child-the knife. The 
narrative lines of "Lust" resemble the interlocking, tangled threads of felt. The identities 
of the four characters are felt-like. "Felt is a supple solid[ ... ] It implies no separation of 
threads, no intertwining, only an entanglement of fibers[ ... ] What becomes entangled 
are the microscales of the fibers" (Deleuze and Guattari 475). The network of memory 
also resembles felt. 
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Memories, the Cyborg, and Saying Nothing 
Memory, or more specifically bodily or visceral memory, is a theme in Cyborg as 
well. In the lexia labeled "meat," Greco writes: 
The cyberpunk disposability of the body as 'meat'-ifyou lose yours, you can 
always get a new one- creates a social context in which the exploitation of these 
bodies carries no particular moral or ethical weight. It could be argued that 
prostitution, for example, no longer degrades the prostitute, or at least not in quite 
the same way. The technology separates her mind from her body so entirely that 
she may have no recollection of the event at all. [ . .. ] If you can't remember 
something, how do you know it really happened, especially when the only other 
witness has a very real interest in maintaining his silence, and your own? 
Cyberpunk fiction7 raises the question of where memories reside, where they are located 
in a spatial or spatiotemporal sense. The disconnection of mind from body, or more 
accurately the altered sense of embodiment, experienced as one jacks into the matrix 
implies the absence or erasure of bodily memory--or meat memory. A portion of my 
memory might reside on my computer's hard disk, or in a notebook on my bedside table, 
or on a note stuck to my refrigerator. Is memory stored externally any less mine than the 
memory stored in my brain cells? Not all memory is meat memory. Recalling "Lust," 
Greco writes elsewhere ofboth remembering and wishing: "Memory, like a still 
photograph, preserves the past in sets of timeless moments; similarly for history, for we 
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can always go back and re-read, re-call, re-visit, remember. This power over time is 
essentially and necessarily fantastic and imaginative; it recalls a time when the world was 
ours for wishing" (oh, chronos). To assert power over time is to spatialize time or to 
privilege the spatial over the temporal, which is referred to by de Certeau as the "triumph 
of space over time" (36). Thus, we can that say that memory works by spatializing the 
temporal flow of experience, assigning experiences and events to specific, separate loci 
on a grid. Temporal events can be placed within the frame of a photograph or painting, 
Deleuze and Guattari's optical space, and held there as long as the medium endures. 
Photography or, more specifically, film is an important theme in "I Have Said 
Nothing." Particular events are very often associated with remembered scenes from films, 
television shows, commercials, and even cartoons. For example, at one point Luke, a 
principle character, "watches the car snake off down Sunset through the bathroom screen, 
and it seems to him later that the car spent an incredibly long time receding. A little like 
that steady zoom that closes on William Holden in The Wild Bunch, so that he appears to 
be growing closer even as he's riding away, his silhouette fading into the distance" 
(Cooked Goose). Luke and the other characters in this hypertext live in a "hyperreality" 
where every experience is immediately absorbed into the world of simulation. Jean 
Baudrillard speaks of "the collapse of reality into hyperrealism, the meticulous 
reduplication of the real, preferably through anotherreproductive medium" (454). In 
hyperrealism there is no longer a binary opposition between the real and the imaginary 
(454). We might say that the real is caught in an endless feedback look with its 
7 Cyberpunk, a science fiction genre made famous by William Gibson's 1984 novel, Neuromancer, features 
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simulation. The hyperreal is "that which is always already reproduced'' (Baudrillard 
456). Yet, to get away from the idea of reproducing, representing, or counterfeiting an 
original, which is not what Baudrillard means by simulation, we might substitute the 
word replicate for reproduce. Digital technology, which is associated with hyperreality, is 
founded on exact replication rather than reproduction in the traditional sense of that term. 
Replication is neither reproduction nor representation. "The hyperreal is beyond 
representation[ ... ] only because it is entirely within simulation" (Baudrillard 456). 
"I Have Said Nothing," which with ninety-five lexias is longer than "Lust," features 
two death scenes, separated by eight years and approximately 1800 miles: Sherry, 
identified as Luke's girlfriend, is hit by a car when, in an intoxicated state, she steps into 
a busy Detroit street. Eight years later, Juliet, usually referred to as Jules, is killed, along 
with her sister Aleis, in an auto accident in southern California. Luke is present at neither 
scene. The unnamed narrator is Luke's brother (The narrator's gender is not given, but 
his language suggests that he is male-e.g., he calls Sherry "my brother Luke's piece."). 
Three other characters in the narrative are Laura, a friend of Sherry, and Jake and Clare, 
the parents of Jules and Aleis (Figure 4.7). Jake and Clare are badly injured in the auto 
accident but survive. Due to the ambiguous pronoun references, I had to re/read this 
hypertext for some time before realizing that Luke had two girlfriends, both of whom 
were killed. The deaths of Sherry and Jules, like the lives ofthe couples in Quibbling, are 
linked by similitude; therefore, their positions are not easily fixed. 
distopian visions of a technology-controlled future. 
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Along with memory and film, death is a prominent theme in "I Have Said Nothing." 
In alluding to Sherry's death, one characters states, "It runs over and over in your head, 
like the loop of film in the Volvo commercial, with the crash dummies bouncing forward 
in unison, choreographed in slomo like an overcranked version of Swan Lake or an Esther 
Williams number" (Run over). Here memory is a loop of film running over and over in 
one's head. While death is central to the narrative, it appears that death cannot be 
described or narrated. Death is silence, or nothing-thus the title of the hypertext: "I 
Have Said Nothing." Douglas shows us that this title was adapted from a quote from 
Augustine of Hippo: "I have done nothing but wish to speak: if I have spoken, I have not 
said what I wished to say" (But I have said nothing). 8 Wishing assumes the place of 
actual speech for Augustine. That is, wishing displaces speech, just as memory and 
desire, or wishing (perhaps even lust), overdetermine the present moment. The 
connection between the movies and death may be that the movies have desensitized late-
twentieth-century Americans (or "W estemers" or people of the "First-World," including 
the Japanese )9 to the reality of death-images and dramatic representations, or 
Baudrillard's simulacra, have overcoded and displaced the reality of death. The narrator 
informs us, 
Hell, we were weaned on the economics of death according to Hollywood. On 
the four o'clock movies wedged in between school and dinner, on the early 
evening and late Saturday films that kicked around on the UHF stations, you'd 
witnessed maybe eighteen thousand deaths. Shit, maybe thirty thousand: it 
8 Douglas does not name Augustine's text. 
209 
depended on how many times you'd watched The Wild Bunch. (We were 
weaned). 
Films, television shows, commercials, and cartoons have taught us to expect narrative 
closure. We know how the Bugs Bunny cartoon will end, and we might think we know 
how our own lives will end. Our lives are overcoded by the narratives of popular 
entertainment. The lexia "Bound to happen" states, 
Shit, it was bound to happen, I suppose. Too much gin, too many Vivarin-
remember how we used to eat those getting ready for exams? And the belief that 
nothing can touch you: the cars will always scream toward you like something out 
of a Warner Brothers cartoon. But they'll stop just like that too: the cowcatcher 
of the locomotive quivering just inches away from Bugs Bunny and the whole 
nine yards. 
Death itself has been absorbed into hyperreality, even as an object of aesthetic 
enjoyment. Baudrillard claims, "The consummate enjoyment [iouissance] ofthe signs of 
guilt, despair, violence and death are replacing guilt, anxiety and even death in the total 
euphoria of simulation. [ .. . ] Every closed system protects itself in this way from the 
referential and the anxiety of the referential" ( 456). To replace is a re-place or dis-place, 
to take something's place. Simulacra move into the place once occupied by guilt, despair, 
violence, and death-or what used to be reality, the no-thing that now resides outside the 
closed system of simulation. 
9 I am trying to avoid the colonialist binary of "developed" and "developing" nations. 
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Starting from the cover page, labeled "I Have Said Nothing," the default path for this 
hypertext always leads the lexia labeled "But I've said nothing" at which point the default 
path ends. At "But I've said nothing," which contains the Augustine quote, the reader can 
click on the Links button and choose between two links: What? and Exeunt.10 Selecting 
What? brings up the lexia "A story"; pressing Enter one more time takes me to "The 
End," which states, in bold face, "That's all she wrote"-a statement with at least two 
meanings: it is another way of saying DOA, but it can also be read as "That's all the 
author wrote," which is not even true. If at "But I've said nothing" I select the Exeunt 
link, it brings up the lexia "Random sweepings," which reads, "The fairest order in the 
world is a heap of random sweepings. - Heraclitus." Eight default links later I return to 
"But I've said nothing." 
When I reach "The End," I can backtrack, look at the list of links, do a text search, or 
press F9 to find a lexia that looks interesting, but the default path ends. I interpret this 
dead end in the default path as silence or nothing; it may signify the failure of narrative, 
or the inability of signifiers to signify death. Likewise, the Augustine quote may be 
interpreted as a comment on the inability of signifiers to fully represent (re-present) 
signifieds, or the fact that signifiers always miss the mark; signifiers only refer to other 
signifiers within the closed system of simulacra. 
Still another interpretation for the words "I have said nothing" is that writers do not 
say anything; readers are needed to speak the text. To speak the text is another way of 
saying to perform the text. A writer can put orthographic marks on a page, but until a 
10 I am not counting the text link from the word "nothing" because I added this text link myself to tie 
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reader translates these marks into a meaningful text, the marks are just ink on paper. 
Ultimately, the writer is silent; only the reader speaks. The premise that has informed this 
study is that the reader has a relationship with a living text. Now, in this relationship the 
text is silent; it says nothing; therefore, the reader must speak the text. 
Death itself, as a referential reality, is re-moved to a place outside the circle of 
hyperreality. Baudrillard speaks ofthe "end of metaphysics and the beginning ofthe era 
ofhyperreality" ( 457). The real is dis-placed, dis-located, dis-lodged; it becomes a 
nomad. The feedback loop ofhyperreality is characterized by "a process of instant 
renewal whereby reality is immediately contaminated by its simulacrum" (Baudrillard 
457). There is an excess of simulation, as death scenes play over and over in film, but 
death itself is nowhere to be found; it is absent or absence. As the hypertext tells us, "All 
that vicarious experience, that immense education we receive in death[ ... ] it all signifies 
nothing. You understand only absence" (All that vicarious). The lexia labeled ' is 
completely blank; it says nothing, and the road map, an option in the Storyspace menu, 
indicates that this lexia precedes "The End" in six different reading paths. 
Additionally, the silence (i.e., the lack of a default link from "But I've said nothing") 
may relate to the stillness behind the "flickering signifiers" of film. Like hypertext lexias, 
filmic images flicker, but each image is actually a still. The illusion of the motion picture 
is produced by the rapid sequence of still images; yet hypertext differs from film in that 
the still images (lexias) are sequentially indeterminate. As a reader, when I reach a "dead 
end" lexia, I am forced to attend to that lexia alone rather than automatically bringing up 
together the lexias that contain this word. 
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another lexia. My default reading path is interrupted. Furthermore, inasmuch as I must 
click on the Links button, look at one of the graphical views, or take some other action to 
bring up another lexia, I am confronted by the interface- that is, the interface shifts from 
background to foreground. 
At "The End," there are eight links listed under the Links button: Thanatopsis, 
Wh ich?, How?, Which ?, Who ?, Exeunt, Artifacts, and Why ? The first time I read this 
hypertext I started at the top link and went down this list, and I found that each link, with 
the exception of the How?, brought me back to "But I've said nothing." The How? link 
brings the reader back to "The End" after 14 links without passing through "But I've said 
nothing." I found that after selecting Thanatopsis and following the default path, it takes 
eighteen links to return to "But I've said nothing"; Which is six links away; the second 
Which, fourteen; Who, thirteen; Exeunt, ten; Artifacts, twenty; and Why, six. Although I 
have added a number of text links, these links do not affect the default paths. I've drawn 
a flow chart of these paths (Figure 4.8) to suggest the highly recursive, even spiraling, 
nature of this particular hypertext. 
Like Patchwork Girl, the theme of dismemberment appears in "I Have Said 
Nothing." In three sequentiallexias, the narrator states, 
Do you know what happens to you when a Chevy Nova with a 280 engine hits 
you going 75 miles an hour?- It fractures your collarbone; your scapula; your 
pelvis; your sacral, lumbar, thoracic, and cervical vertebrae. - It splinters your 
ribcage, compressing your liver, kidneys, spleen, stomach, intestines, lungs, and 
heart. - It fractures your skull and bruises your brain. -It causes massive 
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hemorrhaging, throws the heart into cardiac arrest and hurls your central nervous 
system into profound shock. It breaks every bone in your body. Including your 
head. (Anatomy, Anatomized, Every one). 
If Sherry were a cyborg, like the Patchwork Girl, she might be able to repair her broken 
body, to stitch it back together, but she is not a cyborg-unless we classify as a 
technology the drugs and alcohol she regularly consumes. 
In Cyborg, the word memory appears in five lexias, and I have assigned the keyword 
memory to each of these. Forget occurs in eleven lexias; remember, in three; wish, in ten; 
f antasy , in twelve; desire, in fifteen. Of course, "re-membering" has a special connotation 
in cyborg literature (Haraway 150). On one level, the "member" is the penis or phallic 
signifier. Re-membering is also about reclaiming a lost past or utopian origin, but the 
cyborg has no origin story; it is assembled, not born. The cyborg, like a hypertext, is an 
assemblage, a rhizome. 
As for wishing, the cyborg, insofar as it is rhizomatic, is strongly influenced by the 
body without organs, which, as mentioned previously, is pure desire. Pure desire is 
promiscuous; it seeks connections indiscriminately. I am interested in the concept of 
promiscuity because it is highly gendered; that is to say, given comparable lifestyles, a 
woman is far more likely than a man to be classified as promiscuous. In fact, men who 
have multiple sexual partners are more likely to be considered virile than promiscuous. In 
other words, the adjective promiscuous is applied to males and females asymmetrically. 
We may infer from a statement by Jackson's Mary Shelley that the Patchwork Girl has 
promiscuous traits: "She will ask one question, then another, and before long we will be 
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discussing blackberry preserves, sorcery, or Homeric odes, with a merry disregard for 
relevance-or perhaps because to her these things are all equally pertinent" (learn). yet 
the Patchwork Girl voices a more common sentiment while gazing at her image in a 
mirror: "The impious intermarriage of graphic symbol and letter bred teeming monsters 
of language. Old stories must not be blended promiscuously and without distinction, as 
east, west, south, and north in a chaos-manner" (at the mirror). In other words, according 
to conventional thinking, east, west, south, and north must be kept in their proper places 
on the geometric grid; they mustn't slide around. 
In literary hypertexts we often do not know who is talking, or rather whose words we 
are reading. We also may not know who is being referred to, as pronouns are used 
ambiguously, or promiscuously; this is especially true in "Lust," but Quibbling and "I 
Have Said Nothing" also feature a significant amount of pronoun ambiguity. Why is this? 
Why confuse the reader? My first hypothesis was that not knowing the speaker or 
writer's identity may force the reader to attend to the language rather than the speaker's 
socio-politically contingent credibility. Pronoun ambiguity, as well as ambiguous identity 
in general, has the potential to radically subvert the culturally constructed links between 
speaker and word, writer and text, ethos and logos. We can't rely on the ethos of the 
speaker or envision the speaker-at least not until we figure out who is speaking. Ethos is 
tied to subject positioning on the grid, and some positions are obviously more privileged. 
Hence, if male voices have more authority than female voices, it may be in the interest of 
women to conceal the speaker's gender or even to conceal the speaker's identity entirely, 
at least for part of a narrative. Rather than tracing text back to a speaker, or source, the 
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reader attends to how fragments of text articulate, how they join up, or edge each other. 
We trace the surface connections in the text rather than digging into the text for sources 
or roots. 
Ethos is deeply gendered, inasmuch as "good women" have traditionally not spoken 
in public; so Quintilian's ideal of the good man speaking well does not fit for women 
rhetors (Mattingly 1 06). Ethos, then, is problematic for women rhetors. One way to get 
around this problem is to write multivoiced texts, as in the hypertext practice of weaving, 
or more accurately patching, texts together, or mixing narrative voices. In Patchwork 
Girl, Jackson, writing in her own narrative voice, states, "At certain places in this web I 
have lapsed without notice into another's voice, into direct quote or fudged restatement. 
My subject matter seemed to call for this very unceremonious appropriation. Those with 
a stronger sense of personal property may wish to know who is speaking when" 
(sources). The principle of property-private, intellectual, or otherwise-is thoroughly 
gendered, inasmuch as women were considered the property of men for thousands of 
years, and still are treated as such in many parts of the world. As the Patchwork Girl says, 
"I belong nowhere. This is not bizarre for my sex, however, nor is it uncomfortable for 
us, to whom belonging has generally meant, belonging TO" (I am). Hence, subverting, or 
at least changing, the principle of intellectual property may be in women's interest. 
Insofar as she belongs nowhere, the Patchwork Girl is a nomad; she has no assigned 
position on the grid. 
It suddenly occurs to me that the notion-or I have been interrupted by the notion-
that lust is about the permeability of boundaries or borders. When one is experiencing 
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lust, the "nom1al" sense of self changes; the self overflows its conventional borders, 
inhibitions drop away, and a sense of oneness may be felt with the "object" of one's 
ardor. Actually, the subject-object split is compromised. The self-the unified, self-
contained, interiorized, Enlightenment self-is destabilized by the experience of lust. In 
lust we make connections exteriorly, as a rhizome. Margaret Morrison writes of"the 
precariousness and fluidity of subject positioning the masculinist signifying economy 
(that trap of a binary system) finds so dangerous to its rigidly potent efficiency" (206). It 
is it hard to overlook the phallic reference in the words "rigidly potent." Mystics, who 
often use the language of sex to describe their transcendent experiences, have referred to 
the "oceanic" merging with the other or with the universe. Consider Walt Whitman 's 
mystical exuberance. From this perspective, "Lust" may be read as an experiment in 
breaking down boundaries, or border crossing. The nomad does not recognize borders. It 
makes sense, then, that the reader should have trouble distinguishing one character from 
another. The characters blend into each other-again, rhizomatically, like threads of felt. 
In a more general sense, hypertext itself may be called lustful, as well as 
promiscuous. And, again, hypertext may be judged as guilty or sinful according to the 
textual-moral standards, or textual morality, of conventional text. As I write this, I am 
switching between this Word file, the "Lust" hypertext I have open in Storyspace, the 
pgatour.com website, where I am following the action in the second around of the 2002 
Masters golf tournament, and also e-mail. One might call this promiscuous wreating. 
Furthermore, in mentioning what I am doing right now, I am subverting the principle of 
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timelessness as it applies to mainstream academic prose. Promiscuous wreating might be 
a tactical move, in other words. 
I was reminded after sharing these ideas over e-mail with a colleague that I am not 
the first person to use the term "promiscuous" in reference to hypertext. Moulthrop 
writes, 
Hypertext is about connection-promiscuous, pervasive, and polymorphously 
perverse connection. It is a writing practice ideally suited to the irregular, the 
transgressive, and the camivalesque. Culturally speaking, the promiscuity of 
hypertext (in the root sense of 'a tendency to seek relations') knows no bounds of 
form, format, or cultural level. (2515-16) 
I like the definition of promiscuous as "a tendency to seek relations." Historically, some 
relations have, of course, been considered out-of-bounds. Some borders are not to be 
crossed, although such injunctions are applied unevenly based on gender, class, race, age, 
and so on. I particularly like Moulthrop's term, "miscegenation of discourses" (2516) for 
the way it revalues the term miscegenation. 
The Quotidian, Quibbling, and Interrupting/Responding 
A relation may be an alliance. Deleuze and Guattari write, "The tree is filiation, but 
the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposed the verb 'to be,' but the 
fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, 'and .. . and .. . and ... "'What Deleuze and 
Guattari call "the logic ofthe AND" (25) i~ parataxis; it is about surface-level relation, 
articulation, connection-not digging for foundations, sources, deep structures, or roots. 
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"The rhizome is an anti-genealogy" (11 ). By contrast, hypotaxis is a kind of "tree logic" 
(12). Trees dig deeply into the earth searching for nutrient sources, but they also rise 
upward, proudly displaying their individuality, their unique being, their I-ness. In 
Patchwork Girl, Jackson meditates on the permeable borders between past, present, and 
future. In a statement that seems to refer both to the experience of reading hypertext and 
the Patchwork Girl's life, she writes, "I am in a here and a present moment that has no 
history and no expectations for the future . Or rather, history is only a haphazard 
hopscotch through other present moments. How I got from one to the other is unclear" 
(this writing). The Patchwork Girl is a nomad, hopscotching through space-time. 
"Nomadology" is "the opposite ofhistory" (Deleuze and Guattari 23). 
Now, as so often, we are back to Plato, who viewed lust as incommensurate with the 
heights of philosophy. Lust might be a stepping stone to philosophy, as Plato argues in 
the Phaedrus and the Symposium, but ultimately lust must be sublimated-that is, made 
sublime (i.e., disembodied). It is feeling or emotion, so often, along with lust, attributed 
to women, that is responsible for promiscuous border crossing. The Patchwork Girl 
states, "The boundaries of strong feelings are maybe never clearly drawn, but most 
especially not for me. I had rediscovered sex-and I found it, everywhere" (sex) . Women 
have forever been accused of smudging the neat striations of patriarchal culture, and also 
not staying in their proper place; however, insofar as they are nomads, women do not 
have a proper place-i.e., property, a place that they own and control. 
There are topographical patterns in Quibbling: Lake Michigan, other lakes, Rocky 
Mountains, Flint Hills, Kansas, Wyoming plains, Missouri Hills, New England, river in 
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Midwest, and Spain. And, as I've noted, the text is also arranged by the three sections of 
lake, moon, and prairie. The reading is nomadic, like the characters. Places/topoi are 
important, but no single place is privileged over the others. This is a radically different 
way of reading or writing a text, as compared to the conventional plot, which is 
ultimately focused on a single event at a single time and place (e.g., the showdown in 
High Noon). The text resembles a fractal. Jackson's text is also nomadic, as the 
Patchwork Girl travels from her home in Europe to California and beyond. In "what 
shape" the Patchwork Girl refers to a decision that turned her "from a would-be settler to 
a nomad." 
Quibbling may also be classified as a quotidian narrative. Quotidian, used as an 
adjective, means everyday or ordinary; it can also be used as a noun, as in referring to the 
quotidian. The quotidian is non-universal; it privileges the particular over the universal, 
the timely over the timeless, the situated over the abstract, the rhetorical over the 
philosophical. The lexia "all day" reads, "The gossip, family discussions, letters, passing 
fancies and daydreams that we tell ourselves all day in order to make sense of things. 
They are not quite like myths, or fairy tales, or literary fiction. They are instead the 
quotidian stream." The act of quibbling may itself be characterized as quotidian. Agnes, 
another character in Quibbling, is also associated with quotidian waves. Guyer refers to 
Agnes 's problem about being in a daze. She seems to think that being by herself 
in a new place has a predictable rhythm, sort oflike waves on a shore[ .. .]. Nice 
rhythm. We like this, no problem. But when B.B. was with her, there was some 
sort of striated imposition on her daze, a buzz, or interference of complex 
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mixtures. [ . .. ] The paradoxical nature of buzz-daze, of the complex mixtures of 
polar impulse, predictably becomes less of an enigma when we don't look too 
hard, that is, when we go along every day turning fragments into wholes, the 
quotidian stream. ("Buzz-Daze and the Quotidian Stream") 
Going along every day turning fragments into wholes may be interpreted as a 
quintessential feminine experience, but for Agnes attending to B.B. while taking in a new 
environment causes a buzz-daze, which is a temporary disorienting condition that ends 
when the person experiencing it adjusts to new, complex stimuli. Furthermore, Agnes 
might be described as a "mobile," or nomadic, element-i.e., a constituent of smooth 
space. 
Based on conventional occupational differences, mainstream, heterosexual, maternal 
women typically deal with the quotidian, while their male counterparts are often 
interested in, or even obsessed by, the heroic or the hero narrative. The quotidian is 
characterized by fragmentation, discontinuity, and interruption-at least when viewed in 
tern1s of the normative, masculine standard. 
The daily life of"woman" (that is, the normative, maternal, heterosexual woman) is 
continually interrupted-by crying babies, visitors, telephone calls, unexpected errands, 
and so forth. Consequently, a woman's attention tends to flicker among a multitude of 
perceptions. As Reynolds writes, "Interruptions define the daily lives of working women 
who must negotiate second shifts, child care, and the sometimes blurry divisions between 
self and other, between work and home" (71). The stereotypic, paradigmatic man's life is 
much less subject to interruption. He may work for eight to ten hours without significant, 
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non-work related interruptions. Thus, the discontinuous narrative may be described as 
quotidian and "feminine," while the heroic narrative is much more unified, unilinear, and 
continuous. In other words, normative male and female working lives may be reflected or 
mirrored in different narrative structures. Moreover, the perpetually interrupted, nomadic 
life may be characterized as a curved life; it is indirect. There is curvature between point 
A and point B because the background of one's life is in motion; as exemplified by felt 
(the cloth), there is no division between fixed and mobile elements. Traditional "women's 
work" is repetitious and cyclical as well. Reynolds, in discussing "metaphors of theory as 
interruption" in cultural studies, states, "Those of us working at the intersection of 
feminism and composition can explore, without enforcing either silence or complicity, 
how interruption emphasizes discontinuities" (60, 71). 
The above characterization may be skewed, however. If the male life is taken as the 
norm, then the female life seems very discontinuous. By analogy, if conventional text is 
taken as the norm, hypertext looks very discontinuous. But if we reverse the order, then 
"women's work" becomes the norm and discontinuity becomes the ground rather than 
figure. The implication of this reversal is that men ought to be brought into the 
discontinuous, quotidian realm of women. Considering the complex nature of 
contemporary life, there is little justification for privileging the artificial, efficiently 
gridded, tightly scheduled, masculine life. Both men and women ought to share equally in 
the demands of unpredictable, fragmented, quotidian existence. 
Hypertext interrupts readerly silence. Patchwork Girl contains a lexia labeled 
"Interrupting D," in which the D stands for Derrida. Here Jackson quotes a sentence or 
222 
two from Derrida and then refutes or complicates Derrida's statement in some way. This 
format highlights the differences between oratory and conversation, as well as between 
conventional reading and conversation. When reading, just as when listening to a speech, 
we are not supposed to interrupt. As a number of scholars, including Derrida and Ong, 
have shown, written language reflects the Western oratorical (in contrast to 
conversational) heritage, which is a very white, male, middle- to upper-class tradition. 
Jackson' s interruptions ofDerrida are thus very subversive. 
By contrast, in African-American culture, audience participation, as in the call-
response, is normative. Call-response cannot accurately be tern1ed 'interruption,' for the 
concept of interruption only applies within a discourse settings where the silent audience 
is expected to remain silent. Geneva Smitherman defines the call-response process as 
spontaneous verbal and nonverbal interaction between speaker and listener in 
which all the speaker's statements ('calls') are punctuated by expressions 
('responses') from the listener. In the traditional black church, call-response is 
often referred to as the congregation's way of ' talking back' to the preacher[ ... ] 
But it is a basic organizing principle of Black American culture generally, for it 
enables traditional black folk to achieve a unified state ofbalance and harmony 
which is fundamental to the traditional African world view. (104) 
The call-response deserves attention by rhetoricians primarily because of the way it calls 
into questions traditional Western conceptions of audience, or more specifically, the 
dichotomy between active speaker/writer and silent listener/reader. As Smitherman 
writes, the "call-response seeks to synthesize speakers and listeners in a unified 
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movement. [ ... ] We are talking, then, about an interactive network in which the 
fundamental requirement is active participation of all individuals. [ . .. ] there is no sharp 
line between performers or communicators and the audience" (1 08). 
In this blurring of the borders between rhetor and audience, the temporal dimension 
appears to be privileged over the spatial dimension. Timing is vital in the call-response 
pattern, inasmuch as the responder must be in tune with the dialogic rhythm or kairos, 
choosing the precise moment to respond. In traditional Western rhetoric speakers/writers_ 
and listeners/readers occupy different spaces, literally, as when a speaker stands on a dais 
before a podium and the audience sits looking up. Similarly, writers needn't directly 
interact with their readers because their texts stand in for them in the reader's presence. In 
other words, authors and readers (producers and consumers) are assigned to separate 
spaces on the gridded plane of striated space. But this gridded space is blurred by the 
electronic read-write interface, and the temporal dimension moves to the foreground ; that 
is to say, when engaging with a read-write interface, the reader picks opportune moments 
in the temporal flow of reading in which to respond to the text's call. 
The rhythm of the call-response might be characterized as quotidian; it is an 
ordinary, everyday discourse modality, as distinguished from the rigidity of elite, 
masculine, striated literate culture. The quotidian is the reality of the "folk" or "people" 
rather than the exceptional, heroic individual. The quotidian narrative may be 
distinguished from the heroic narrative in terms of the experience of discontinuity, but all 
reading features discontinuity. Iser writes of the process whereby readers recreate texts: 
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The act of recreation is not a smooth or continuous process, but one which, in its 
essence, relies on interruptions of the flow to render it efficacious. When we look 
forward, we look back, we decide, we change our decisions, we form 
expectations, we are shocked by their non-fulfillment, we question, we muse, we 
accept, we reject; this is the dynamic process of recreation. (964) 
Again, looking forward and back, or the flickering glance 11 as distinguished from the 
steady gaze, is fundamental to reading-an ordinary process that is accentuated by 
hypertext. An interruption is a pause; it may also be compared to the interstitial space, or 
gap, between quanta, or packets of energy or information. Rather than a continuous, 
uninterrupted stream of information or text, hypertext features quanta in the form of 
lexias, or cells of text. Baudrillard asserts that in the world dominated by the code, 
digital, genetic, or otherwise, "space is no longer linear or unidimensional but cellular, 
indefinitely generating the same signals like the lonely and repetitive habits of a stir-
crazy prisoner. [ ... ] Life is now ruled by the discontinuous indeterminacy of the genetic 
code" ( 448-49). In other words, energy or information is chunked, and there are gaps, 
interstices, or interruptions between the chunks. 
The themes of a text, such as art or the quotidian in Quibbling, serve as nodal points, 
pivot points, plateaus, or positions from which to look forward and back. The text itself, 
insofar as it is a rhizome, may consist of lines and no points, but as readers we create 
pivot points that allow us to make sense of a text. Iser writes, "This [recreation] process is 
steered by two main structural components within the text: first, a repertoire of familiar 
11 I am alluding to Katherine Hayles's essay, "Virtual Bodies and Flickering Signifiers." 
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literary patterns and recurrent literary themes, together with allusions to familiar social 
and historical contexts; second, techniques or strategies used to set the familiar against 
the unfamiliar'' (964). In any text, the familiar occupies the background and the 
unfamiliar occupies the foreground. Reading is the process of setting the unfamiliar 
against the background ofthe familiar. Moving forward and back may be equated with 
shifting one's glance between foreground and background. We tie, or articulate, the new 
to the old. 
The quotidian may be defined as the oscillation between familiar and unfamiliar. But 
if, on occasion, nearly everything seems unfamiliar-that is, ifwe are overwhelmed by 
the new or strange- we experience "buzz-daze." The quotidian is subject to endless 
interruptions; it is not a steady state, but more of a flickering experience. Perhaps 
something is foregrounded when the flickering glance "catches" on it a moment longer 
than usual. 
These musings bring me back to my claim that hypertext defamiliarizes literacy. The 
familiar is made strange, which is a recurrent theme in Quibbling. Art estranges the 
familiar. The lexia "hands on him," reads "Priam thought her hands were sexy. He saw 
them as delicate and longer than they actually were. Her touch was animate with 
otherness, so strange and familiar." The word strange appears in sixteen lexias in 
Quibbling, while familiar is mentioned in six. 
To quibble is to evade the point of an argument by caviling about words. To cavil is 
to raise trivial and frivolous objections, in other words, to interrupt the continuous, 
seamless flow of the discussion. Women have, of course, been characterized as trivial and 
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frivolous, as well as incapable of engaging in rational argument. In "rational argument" 
or debate, one is not supposed to interrupt the other speaker. A "gentleman" waits for the 
other speaker to finish before speaking. Such a pattern encourages speakers to hold forth. 
Women, however, may be accused of gossiping and chattering because they talk over one 
another or engage in call-response, rather than following the "rational" male standard. Of 
course, if women are supposed to remain silent, any talking at all, especially in the 
company of men, may be construed as chatter or gossip (Romaine 122). The act of 
Quibbling creates gossipy, "little stories" as opposed to grand tales or metanarratives: 
"Like nm1ors or babblings, little stories[ ... ] undern1ine the law' s intentions because they 
ooze through the law's grids; the little stories (lived individually) do not speak 
unequivocally-they leak" (Morrison 207). Here Morrison may be alluding to gridded, 
striated space. 
A narrative composed of little stories has multiple plateaus rather than a single 
climax, and the hypertext reader is motivated by the plateau experience rather than 
closure. "A plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or end. A rhizome is 
made of plateaus. [ ... ] Each plateau can be read as starting anywhere and can be related 
to any other plateau" (Deleuze and Guattari 21-22). The heroic narrative, which I have 
contrasted with the quotidian narrative, has a center, a single event that unifies the 
narrative. In other words, the hero narrative is phallic. The quotidian narrative does not 
have a center; it is multiple, dispersed, and nomadic; there is no single event that serves 
as a focal point for the narrative, as Joyce's afternoon does with the auto accident 
(Landow 207). The singular, heroic event defines the heroic character; this event may 
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"make the man." The heroic quest is personal and individual; it is premised on separating 
from the community, the mother and all females (Fiedler 24-26). By contrast, quotidian 
reality is highly social, even promiscuous. The daily round of the traditional woman is 
social; she is enmeshed in domestic and community relations. At the end of Prelude IV, 
T.S Eliot writes, "Wipe your mouth, and laugh; I The worlds revolve like ancient women 
I Gathering fuel in vacant lots" (lines 14-16). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Situating Hypertext in Composition Studies, the University, and Beyond 
Literary hypertext, feminist epistemology, and feminist rhetoric each, in its own way, 
pri vileges multiplicity over uniformity, rigid consistency, and hegemonic "harmony." In 
other words, feminist artists, teachers, and scholars regularly engage in the deconstruction 
of totalizing systems and the construction of new types of associations that valorize 
d ifference. It follows, then, that feminists and others engaged in the promotion of critical 
agendas will not shy away from conflict; hence, I agree with Susan Jarratt's critique of 
schools of feminism that "vigorously reject argument on the grounds that it is a kind of 
vio lence" ("Feminism" l 06). Sally Miller Gearhart, for instance, claims that "any attempt 
to persuade is an act of violence" (195). Reasoned argument is eminently feminist; it is 
also necessary if one is not to retreat into separatism or quietism. It must be stressed, 
however, that truly feminist argument is open-ended and dialogic, as opposed to closing 
off arguments or silencing an opponent by getting in the last word. It is in this context 
that hypertext, a thoroughly open-ended medium, can be of great value. 
In this chapter I sketch out a vision of the feminist-informed composition classroom 
as a contact zone. Mary Louise Pratt defines contact zones as "social spaces where 
cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly 
asynm1etrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they 
are lived out in many parts of the world today" (584). With respect to race, we may still 
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be living in the aftermath of slavery, a fact not to be overlooked by white instructors. We 
are also haunted by ancient, oppressive gender codes, such as the principle of separate 
spheres. As Jarratt writes, 
Even when teachers announce the desire to create a particular climate, they can't 
neutralize by fiat the social positions already occupied by their students. [ .. . ] 
Differences of gender, race, and class among students and teachers provide 
situations in wruch conflict does arise, and we need to learn more than the ideal of 
the harmonious, nurturing composition class in our repertory of teaching practices 
to deal with these problems. ("Feminism" 113) 
We can go take this argument further by treating such conflicts as learning opportunities 
or teachable moments rather than problems. Contact zones, in other words, are ripe with 
learning potential. 
Computer technology in classrooms also introduces power asymmetries; that is to 
say, insofar as a computer encourages certain work habits and discourages others, it 
exerts power over its users. The computer creates a context for work (learning and 
teaching), just as the vestiges of slavery and the separate spheres principle influence 
contemporary educational contexts. It is only when users learn to use tools in innovative, 
unconventional ways that they take back some power, and a feminist approach to 
hypertext offers a "way in" to innovative uses of technology. 
Asymmetrical relations of power manifest in many other ways, such as the physical 
structure of the classroom. For example, upon entering a classroom on the first day of the 
semester, the teacher and the students immediately confront the power of the architecture, 
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as the design of the room encourages certain ways of learning and discourages others. 
The placement of the chalkboard or whiteboard behind the instructor's desk, the physical 
arrangement of computers or student desks (and whether they are moveable), the location 
of the door (and whether there is one or two doors), and so forth, all have effects on 
teaching and learning. More overtly, the fact that the teacher has control of the syllabus 
and the grade book is not lost on anyone. Each of these elements contributes to a 
complex, multilayered classroom context. 
These types of power asymmetries must be faced openly and, if possible and 
desirable, transformed. Pratt uses the idea of the contact zone "to reconsider the models 
of community that many of us rely on in teaching and theorizing and that are under 
challenge today" (584-85). The concept of the contact zone closely resembles what I have 
discussed previously as a Borderland-i.e., a site where, in Anzaldua's words, "two or 
more cultures edge each other" (19). The type of feminist pedagogy advocated in this 
study is political, in that it actively resists sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, 
ageism, and disability-based discrimination, yet it resists these forces, not by avoiding 
them, by unmasking and openly confronting them in the classroom. In other words, 
simple notions of community must be scrutinized. As Pratt argues, 
The idea of the contact zone is intended in part to contrast with ideas of 
community that underlie much of the thinking about language, communication, 
and culture that gets done in the academy.[ ... ] Languages [are] seen as living in 
'speech communities,' and these [tend] to be theorized as discrete, self-defmed, 
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coherent entities, held together by a homogeneous competence or grammar shared 
identically and equally among all the members. (590-91) 
This vision of the homogenized classroom community needs be interrogated because 
wi thout an acute awareness of difference, dissenting voices will be silenced. As Pratt 
states, "If a classroom is analyzed as a social world unified and homogenized with 
respect to the teacher, whatever students do other than what the teacher specifies is 
invisible or anomalous to the analysis" (592). In other words, differences are treated as 
anomalies or noise in an otherwise efficient, self-regulating system. The discourse of a 
contact zone may be framed as a clash between strategies and tactics, in de Certeau's 
sense of these terms. As stated in the previous chapter, the strong protect their positions 
(thei r places) through strategies, while the weak have recourse only to tactics. 
First-year composition can be a contact zone in at least two senses: It is a site where 
di fferent races, classes, and genders meet, but also a site where different genres and 
literacy technologies come together in a creative, tension-filled clash. Hypertext is also a 
contact zone technology, in that it has come into being on the edge between print literacy 
and electronic multimedia. The fact that hypertext is a contact zone technology means 
that those invested in print literacy will strive to articulate hypertext in ways that suit 
their interests. Corporations that produce telecommunications technology, government 
policy makers, university administrators, members of the entertainment and advertising 
industries, journalists, artists, anarchists and fascists, and innumerable others have their 
own ideas for how hypertext technology ought to be used, whether they use the term 
"hypertext" or not. Consequently, articulating a feminist theorization ofhypertext (and 
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having it embraced by others) is no simple task. But this is where rhetoric comes into 
play: I have to supply good reasons for why my vision of hypertext merits serious 
consideration. 
Feminist Pedagogies 
It may be useful at this point it to present a brief overview of feminist pedagogy. 
While there are many feminist pedagogies, we may point to a number of commonalities 
as we discuss feminist pedagogy in the abstract. According to Catherine Lamb, feminist 
pedagogy p~ts an "emphasis on cooperation, collaboration, shared leadership, and the 
integration of the cognitive and the affective" (195). The emphasis on cooperation and 
collaborative is fundamental to feminist pedagogy, yet feminist pedagogy cannot simply 
be subsumed into the broad class of social epistemic or social constructionist pedagogies, 
for these approaches to teaching do not necessarily feature gender as an analytic 
category; that is to say, one can be a social constructionist teacher without being a 
feminist. 
Bernice Maika Fisher, in No Angel in the Classroom, defines feminist pedagogy as 
"teaching that engages students in political discussion of gender injustice" ( 44 ). Fisher 
articulates feminist pedagogy as a consciousness-raising process and places it within the 
larger context of feminism as a social movement-the movement for gender justice (28) . 
According to Fisher, feminist consciousness-raising is a process involving two primary 
elements. The first aspect is a shift of attention-i.e., a change in perspective or new way 
of seeing oneself in relation to one's environment; this shift "may be triggered by reading 
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Gore argues that feminist pedagogy consists of social visions and instructional strategies, 
which are treated, respectively as "macro" and "micro" concerns. Gore writes, 
Unlike 'mainstream' pedagogical discourses, the critical and feminist work on 
pedagogy has addressed 'macro ' issues in schooling, such as the institutions and 
ideologies within which pedagogy is situated. Beginning from the premise that 
schooling is not neutral, critical and feminist approaches to pedagogy emphasize 
their own social vision(s) for education and schooling, in an attempt to connect 
the macro to the micro. (Struggle 4) 
Gore notes that mainstream? or malestream, pedagogies have their own (conservative) 
social visions, although they are not often explicitly stated or theorized, or they are only 
explicitly articulated after they have been challenged by critical or feminist pedagogies. 
In other words, until they are directly challenged, hegemonic social visions can remain 
invisible or unspoken. By contrast, the democratic, oppositional, and radical social 
visions undergirding critical and feminist pedagogies are foregrounded, often at the 
expense of concrete instructional strategies. But by focusing on both broad social visions 
and specific classroom practices, Gore argues, critical and feminist pedagogies are more 
likely to achieve their goals ( 4-6). 
Taking my cue from Gore, in this chapter I discuss my vision of hypertext's place in 
composition studies and the university1 and suggest a number specific instructional 
strategies for using hypertext technology in the classroom.2 
1 I use the term "the university" in this chapter to denote a cultural ideal-the ideal of the American 
research university as informed by ideal of the nineteenth-century German research university, as 
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Situating Feminist Composition Pedagogy within the University 
When the first-year composition requirement was introduced to American higher 
education, in the late nineteenth century, it was assumed, on most campuses, that 
composition programs would contribute to or support the global agendas of the 
university. In other words, it would function as a service course (Berlin 58-62). But by 
the early 1960s, compositionists had begun to tap in to the ancient discipline of rhetoric, 
which gave legitimacy to composition studies, and rhetoric-composition, or "rhet-comp," 
developed as a research field. 3 Furthermore, as it has emerged as a discipline, rhetoric-
composition has often worked against the hierarchical, androcentric design of the 
university; which is to say, composition studies has created a space within which to 
operate tactically, as opposed to being assimilated into the university, which is place-
i.e., a site of strength, stability, and conservatism. In other words, first-year composition 
inhabits a contact zone, a site where the powerful university and weak, nomadic, 
recalcitrant rhet-comp come into daily contact. And as long it insists on inhabiting this 
zone, rhet-comp can resist assimilation into the place of the university; hence, 
composition studies, especially if it influenced by feminists, will maintain its resident 
alien status indefinitely. 
distinguished from any actual university. "The university" is an abstraction used here for the sake of 
argument. 
2 See Appendix C for composition assignments based on Storyspace and Appendix D for a sampling of 
student comments on such assignments. 
3 According to James Berlin ("Contemporary Composition" 12), two early textbooks instrumental in the 
development of rhetoric-composition were Richard Hughes and Albert Duhamel's Rhetoric: Principles and 
Usage (1962) and Edward P.J. Corbett's Ancient Rhetoric for the Modern Student (1965). 
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I mentioned in a previous chapter de Certeau's argument that a grid of city streets is 
transformed from a place to a space only when drivers begin to break traffic laws or 
walkers begin to J-walk or otherwise break the rules laid down by the city planners. With 
this principle in mind, we can draw a parallel between de Certeau's discussion of the city 
and the present discussion of the university. According to de Certeau, 
The 'city' founded by utopian and urbanistic discourse is defined by the 
possibility of a three-fold operation: 
1. The production of its own space (un espace proper) : rational organization must 
thus repress all the physical, mental and political pollutions that would 
compromise it. 
2. the substitution of a now hen, or of a synchronic system, for the indeterminable 
and stubborn resistances offered by traditions; univocal scientific strategies[ . . . ] 
must replace the tactics of users who take advantage of 'opportunities' [ .. . ]. 
3. finally, the creation of a universal an anonymous subject which is the city itself 
[ .. .]. (94) 
Thus, the university, like the city, becomes a subject-a grand subject with a will of its 
own, which is carried out by the administration. Thus, de Certeau goes on to argue, 
"Administration [i.e., city administration] is combined with a process of elimination in 
this place organized by 'speculative' and classificatory operations" (94). In other words, 
that which does not further the aims of the city or resists classification is eliminated. 
Furthermore, one could argue that the university far surpasses the city in its use of 
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"speculative and classificatory operations." Professors (keeping with the classical ideal of 
the university) are paid, first of all, to speculate, and only secondarily to teach, and, of 
course, academic disciplines are rigidly classified. The first aspect, the privileging of 
speculation, or research, over teaching explains the notoriously bad undergraduate 
teaching at top flight research universities, and rigid departmentalization impedes 
scholarly cross-pollination and hurts students by fragmenting their educations. But one 
implication the poststructuralist analysis I have undertaken in this study is that rigid 
disciplinary classifications are ultimately subverted by the denizens of the university (i.e., 
professors, graduate assistants, and undergraduates), particularly within marginalized 
fields such as rhetoric-composition and women's studies. In other words, the smooth 
space created by "undisciplined" outsiders and newcomers inevitably bleeds into the 
striated space (or place) of the university. I return to this argument after expanding on the 
theme of the contact zone. 
Hypertext may facilitate the break down of what Nedra Reynolds calls "the rigid 
boundaries that separate life and politics inside and outside the academy" (71). Such 
claims are obviously controversial, and I am aware that the philosophical approach 
presented.in this study is far from uncontroversial. More specifically, the controversy has 
to do with first-year composition's status as a service course. What I mean is that if 
composition is a service course, rather than devoting time and energy to hypertext theory, 
feminism, and so forth, we should simply prepare first-year students for "higher level" 
courses. In the conventional, masculinist, hierarchical model, students take their "basics" 
before moving on (or up) to "more important" subjects. But ifwe reject the service 
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model, composition can be an end in itself. Composition, then, will not be a gatekeeper, 
adjusting students to the ideology of academia; it may subvert this ideology and the rigid 
stratification and compartmentalization (or departmentalization) of the four-year college 
curriculum. And this system ought to be subverted because it has a propensity to produce 
docile, politically alienated consumers, rather than engaged citizens. Students ought to be 
given the tools to shape their own universities and communities, as opposed to being 
passively shaped by them. Furthem1ore, rhetoric, if it can finally throw off Current 
Trad itional pedagogy, offers the foundation for this kind of active engagement. As 
Wayne Booth has argued, the English composition course might serve as the foundation 
of the university curriculum.4 In sum, with the aid of rhetoric, students and faculty might 
make the university less like a factory and more like a living, adapting organism. 
An additional factor, as suggested above, has to do with the rigid departmental 
structure of the university- a structure that impedes students' ability to make connections 
across disciplines. Relke states that "the chief obstruction to integration is not 
specialization, but rather, departmentalization." She goes on to claim that "the disciplines 
as we have constructed them are chiefly containment structures, while interdisciplinarity 
is a process. Students enter our classrooms as interdisciplinarians by inclination because 
they were born into a world that is not, for the most part, ordered and structured on the 
disciplinary model." While Relke is not unique in arguing for interdisciplinarity, she 
takes this argument a step further by addressing gender, claiming that women's and 
4 I haven' t yet tracked down the text where Booth makes this argument, although I have heard him make 
this argument in oral presentations. 
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gender studies offer models for interdisciplinarity. She argues that "feminist scholars are 
by definition interdisciplinarians, although many of them who work in traditional 
departments don't often get the chance fully to develop their interdisciplinary skills." 
Relke speaks of"the special nature ofwomen's studies: it's not merely one program, or 
even one department among many. Gender is a phenomenon that cuts across all 
disciplines, bar none. [ ... ] [W]omen's studies is the interdiscipline par excellence." 
Thus, given the rhetorical orientation of women's studies, we may move beyond Booth's 
position to argue that, not simply rhetoric, but an explicitly gendered rhetoric may serve 
as the interdisciplinary foundation of the university curriculum. Such a curriculum might 
integrate the humanities and the sciences, and, as Relke goes on to write, "[O]nly by 
creating a truly interdisciplinary space between the arts and the sciences can we hope to 
address social and scientific concerns together, and cultivate in future generations an 
interconnected vision ofknowledge, an understanding of knowledge as reverence for life, 
rather than mastery over it" (unpaginated). It is this "interconnected vision of knowledge" 
that is most truly feminist. 
Maps and Itineraries 
Closely connected to places and spaces are maps and tours (or itineraries). As 
summarized by de Certeau, Charlotte Linde and William Lobov studied the descriptions a 
group ofNew York residents gave of their apartments, and they divided the descriptions 
into two types: the map and the tour. "The first is of the type: 'The girls' room in next to 
the kitchen.' The second: 'You turn right and come into the living room."' Linde and 
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Lobov found that 97% of the descriptions were of the tour type (119). The tour is "the 
basis of everyday narrations," while the map is "a plane projection totalizing 
observations." The tour is associated with quotidian reality, or everyday experience, 
while the map is part of scientific discourse. Furthermore, "It seems that in passing from 
'ordinary' culture to scientific discourse, one passes from one pole to the other" (119). 
Science, in other words, is premised on the denotative mapping of nature or reality as a 
referent. 
According to de Certeau, maps and itineraries were once complementary, but since 
about the 15th century, "the map has slowly disengaged itself from the itineraries that 
were the condition of its possibility." The map, that is, became privileged over the 
itinerary. Prior to the elevation of the map over the itinerary, the "first medieval maps 
included only the rectilinear marking out of itineraries[ .. . ] along with the stops one was 
to make[ . .. ] and distances calculated in hours or in days, that is, in terms of the time it 
would take to cover them on foot" (de Certeau 120). Hence, the itinerary is temporal, or 
at least spatiotemporal, as distinguished from the wholly spatial modern map. The 
itinerary, moreover, is closely associated with tactical, smooth space. There is no proper 
place, or place of one 's own, on a tour. In sum, itineraries belong to quotidian reality; 
they narrate everyday, tactical operations carried out in foreign territory. 
Itineraries are part of the narrative language game, whereas mapping is a denotative 
language game. The term "language games," which Lyotard borrowed from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, means, 
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[E]ach ofthe various categories ofutterance can be defined in tem1s ofrules 
specifying their properties and the uses to which to which they can be put-in 
exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules determining 
the properties each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them. [ .. 
. ] every utterance should be thought of as a move in a game. (1 0) 
Moves are actions in the Burkean sense-i.e., they may be analyzed in terms of agents, 
acts, scenes, agencies, and purposes ( GM xv). Games, of course, have proper places, or 
scenes, such as a chess board, a physics laboratory, or a composition classroom. Hence, 
to make a move is to act with intention within a particular, codified scene. 
In contrast with everyday knowledge, scientific knowledge is founded on the 
denotative language game. But as Lyotard writes, "[S]cientific knowledge does not 
represent the totality of knowledge; it has always existed in addition to, and in 
competition with[ . . . ] narrative" (7). Scientific knowledge and traditional or customary 
knowledge (i .e., nomos) may be distinguished by "the preeminence of the narrative form 
in the formulation of traditional knowledge" (19). Narrative knowledge, then, is 
thoroughly social and dialogic. Lyotard states further that the "narrative tradition is also 
the tradition of defining a threefold competence-'know-how,' 'knowing how to speak, ' 
and 'knowing how to hear'-through which the community's relationship to itself and its 
environment is played out" (21). In stark contrast, "Scientific knowledge requires that 
one language game, denotation, be retained and all others excluded. A statement's truth-
value is the criterion determining its acceptability. [ ... ] In this context, one is 'learned' if 
one can produce a true statement about a referent" (25). My point here is that an itinerary, 
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as opposed to a map, allows one to break out of the masculinist trap of the denotative 
language game. In short, if composition is to be more than a service course, student 
competence must encompass, in Lyotard's words, "know-how, knowing how to speak, 
and knowing how to hear." Such an approach is fully congruent with composition as a 
study of language acts involving encoders, decoders, texts, and contexts (Lunsford, 
"Rhetoric and Composition" 79). 
Maps privilege the text over the writer, reader, and context. Thus, a conventional 
scholarly text is a kind of map, especially if it is written in the third-person. But a travel 
log, insofar as it takes subjectivity into account, is far different and offers the potential for 
a " thick description," as that term is used by Clifford Geertz (3). My point, then, is that 
we should teach students to write travel logs, in the fashion of the thick ethnographic--or 
better, autoethnographic (Pratt 585)- description, to narrate their encounters with texts. 
Such a practice, particularly if the travel logs were written in hypertext, would facilitate 
invention; that is, by tapping into the creative potential of paratactic, hypertextual 
arrangement, rhetoric might become truly epistemic. 
When a reader narrates an encounter with a text, she or he articulates a reading 
space. By contrast, when a reader analyzes a text impersonally or objectively, in effect 
saying, "This is what is present in the text" or "This is what other readers are likely to 
find when the go there," a map, or "thin description," of a place is drawn. S-knows-that-P 
statements are denotative utterances; that is, propositional statements are a kind a 
mapping, serving mainly to exhibit ofthe products of knowledge (de Certeau 121). In 
objectivist literary theory, the referent is the text, and criticism amounts to mapping a text 
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through the denotative language game. But, if rhetoric is truly epistemic, students ought 
to articulate spaces, rather than being passively influenced by places. In other words, 
subjectivity must be taken into account in order to counteract the displacement and 
erasure of the reading subject. 
The Storyspace read-write interface enables the creation of an itinerary or log of the 
reading experience, and using such an interface in the composition or literature classroom 
would allow students' reading habits and strategies, rather than just their writing, to 
become the subject of peer review and study. The reading and writing processes are 
intimately linked, yet the usual means of evaluating a student's understanding of or 
engagement with a read-only text is by assigning a separate piece of writing, as a critical 
essay written on a literary text. A major flaw of such assignments is that they are 
premised on the extraction from a text of a pre-existing meaning, or "content." Journaling 
may be presented as a better pedagogical option, butjournaling does nothing to blur the 
primary/s.econdary text border. We could also require that students write in their texts and 
then collect each of the texts and study the marginalia, but this is hardly a good option. 
The electronic read-write interface is plainly the best means of studying this type of 
engagement with a text, inasmuch as such a practice would tend to transform the text 
from a place to a space. 
Although a software environment like Storyspace would facilitate the kind of activity 
I am describing, just about any electronic textual interface would work to some extent. 
For example, when working with MS Word, one can use the reviewing tools to comment 
at length on a text. The comments appear in bubbles when the pointer passes over 
245 
highlighted text; the comments may also be read in a separate window at the bottom on 
the document and/or printed out, very much like endnotes. Yet this option preserves the 
primary/secondary text distinction, and the primary text remains central. An alternative 
would be to use the hyperlink function in Word to create comments or annotations in a 
separate file, and this option offers the possibility of creating true hypertext and breaking 
away from the authority of the centralized, primary text. But of course, the file must be 
written in or converted to Word format in order to use these options. Conventional texts 
posted on the Web, as many literary texts now are, would work fine once downloaded · 
and converted to Word format. 
Yet, in comparison to Storyspace, Word 's reviewing and hyperlinking functions are 
qui te cumbersome and constraining. For instance, Storyspace allows multiple links from 
a single lexia. A further step away from the authority of primary text may be taken by 
wri ting comments directly in alexia and linking from this text, either to existing lexias or 
to new lexias created by the wreater. 
Perhaps most significantly, when we read a student ' s essay, we see the finished 
product; we don' t see the groping after meaning, which we might see in an electronic 
read-write interface. By studying the tentative hypotheses, questions, exclamations, and 
miscellaneous annotations that a student writes within Stoiyspace lexia, a teacher may 
gain insight into the student's reading process. We may observe the evolution of the 
student's understanding or interpretative construction of a text. In contrast, the essay that 
is turned in after the reading process has been more or less completed may be compared, 
in Daniel Ferrer's words, "to the ashes remaining when the fire is consumed, or to the 
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footprints on the ground after the dance is over" (56). In other words, the electronic read-
write interface would allow one to study the student's engagement with a text from a 
genetic perspective-i.e., we can study how an essay came to be, rather just studying the 
essay as a finished (or revisable) product. 
One might argue that reading student drafts offers the same insight into a student's 
groping after meaning; yet in comparison with the comments written within a text by a 
reader as· she is directly engaging with that text, a rough draft is a polished piece of work. 
Furthermore, an essay draft or finished essay is decontextualized, or abstracted from the 
con/text from which it arose; it is also secondary and derivative, very much like the 
footprints and ashes in the above analogy. By contrast, comments, as well as more 
extensive text, written directly into a text are fully contextualized, and we need not draw 
a distinction between primary and secondary texts. 
Short-Term Texts and Invention 
With the conventional, thesis-driven essay we can, to a certain extent, contain and 
constrain what students write. By fixing the form we can contain the content, inasmuch as 
only certain things can be said in a conventional essay, along with certain ways of saying 
them. For example, given the traditional constraints, a student writer who expects her 
work to be accepted cannot make mutually exclusive or unsupported claims, write 
tangents that never come back to the main argument or topic, or write from multiple 
subject positions. Nonetheless, students are still quite capable of subtly subverting their 
instructors' intentions, creatively appropriating the "master's tools," or writing to a peer 
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audience below the instructor's "radar screen." But one question that arises is, Why not 
make such creativity easier? 
In rethinking the traditional essay, composition teachers might want to consider 
assigning single-page texts, which might resemble single memos or hyperlinked 
collections of memos, rather than traditional essays. One justification for such 
assignments is that these "short-term" student texts would present an opportunity to play 
with multiple subject positions. Each short text might express a different subject position, 
and this type of writing would be tactical-that is, opportunistic or kairotic. By contrast, 
the traditional academic essay is supposed to express, from beginning to end, a single, 
consistent subject position. As I noted in the previous chapter, tactics are short-term 
operations in foreign territory (de Certeau 37-39), and the foreign territory I am 
concerned with here is traditional academic text. 
The reason the traditional academic text (e.g., the journal article, research report, or 
student essay) is problematic is that it tends to shape students and scholars to its own 
ends, and in this sense the academic text may be compared to the university. In other 
words, the genre of the academic text is a powerful context. When students enter this 
environment they have very little power or authority; they must conform to the pre-
established conventions, the rules ofthis particular place. I do not mean to suggest that 
we should do away with traditional academic writing. Rather, we ought to make tactical 
incursions into this territory so that it does not solidify its authority to such a degree that 
it will never change or adapt to changing conditions. 
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A further justification for a shift to short-term, tactical student texts, including texts 
written inside other texts, is that in the paratactic juxtaposition of such texts rhetoric 
might be more readily experienced as epistemic. In the convergence of paratactic texts 
meaning is created and new insights come to the fore. Through the exploration of 
metaphor, metonymy, analogy, paradox, discursive gaps, serendipitous intersections, 
tangents, and so on, meaning may be discovered or invented. Of course, compositionists 
have recommended this type of activity to student writers for years. Donald Murray, for 
instance, urges students to "Play with words, images, facts. See if any of them connect. [ . 
. . ] Follow surprise or connection in your mind or on paper to see where your thinking 
with take you" (4). Murray goes on to describe the technique ofbrainstorrning, "a method 
of ex tracting from memory what you don ' t know you remember[. : .]and allowing these 
pieces of information to rub against one another" (7). A writing environment like 
Storyspace simply makes this process easier. Rather than simply reporting what is 
already known, in a denotative fashion, drafting in hypertext facilitates the creation of 
new knowledge. It also makes sense that many of these hypertexts be authored 
co llaboratively in order to further disperse the subject positions and increase the 
opportunities for invention. 
In advocating the composition of plural, paratactic texts, I am arguing for a 
substantial modification of the canon of arrangement, so as to allow arrangement to 
stimulate invention. Arrangement and invention, in other words, can be brought closer 
together, with each informing the other in the fashion of a feedback loop. I also want to 
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counteract the compulsion to erase and rush toward closure because the drive toward 
closure, which is a masculinist ideal, short-circuits the invention process. 
Hypertext is inimical to closure and origins; therefore, the classical disposition of 
introduction, body, and conclusion does not hold for hypertext. Hence, the deferred 
closure that is characteristic of hypertext has serious implications for traditional, Western 
rhetorical argument. As Pamela Gilbert asserts, in hypertext there "will be no closure 
other than that created by the reader's decision to stop interacting with the text-which 
wi II mean the demise of fonnal argument as we know it, since that is driven by closure" 
(260). Closure is essentially enclosure, inasmuch as it reflects the masculinist concern 
with territoriality; therefore, since closure alludes to the enclosing of territory (often 
tex tual or discursive territory), we might use the term (en)closure to signify this double 
meaning. In the hypertext contour, the world of"what's next" (Joyce, Othermindedness 
42), what's around the comer of the contour-that which cannot be enclosed-is pushed 
to the foreground. (En)closure is indefinitely deferred; therefore, denotative mapping, or 
the mapping of a referent, breaks down. 
(En)closure is a feature of expository writing, a genre in which an objective referent 
is kept clearly in view. Exposition, in other words, follows the rules of the denotative 
language game, with the referent being a text (in the broad, semiotic sense of "text" as 
any interpretable phenomenon). And while hypertext may be applied to exposition, 
expository writing limits the potential, or goes against the grain, of hypertext. As Gilbert 
writes, "hypertext structures meaning like collage----:-eonductively rather than in- or 
deductively, like exposition" (260). While exposition illuminates an objective referent, in 
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collage signifiers clash with (or edge up against) other signifiers. Moreover, collage 
foregrounds the gaps between the signifiers, and these gaps invite invention; that is, we 
produce text to fill in the gaps. 
Such an approach to composition works against the perfectionism and linearity of 
traditional pedagogy. As Burke claimed, human beings are "rotten with perfection" (LSA 
16). Perfection is a masculinist, modernist ideal, and it is premised on the erasure (or if 
not outright erasure, then assimilation) of non-mainstream and eccentric lines of 
development (e.g., non-western indigenous cultures, tangential ideas not included in a 
final essay draft). The final draft of a text, insofar as it is a product of a linear, 
perfectionist paradigm, represents the erasure and assimilation earlier drafts. 
Inventing and Storyspacing 
Many writers and researchers have shown that Storyspace is an effective invention 
too l. Working with small sections of texts (lexias), placing thoughts side-by-side, linking 
together related ideas, and reading and writing recursively are a few of the invention 
techniques facilitated by Storyspace. According to Murray, "Writing usually comes in 
fragments-details, hints, clues, collisions of information, half ideas and quarter ideas, 
bits and pieces of information, scraps that have fallen out of books, from TV or radio, 
from conversation at the next table or in another room. The writer plays with these scraps 
to see what they mean" (7). Personally, I often draft essays, conference papers, or 
chapters in Storyspace, a process I call "storyspacing." Once a significant body of text is 
generated, I can easily export the Storyspace lexias to a text file and then copy this into a 
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Word file. The next stage is to labor over the linear coherence of the text. But of course, 
in addition to this kind of anecdotal evidence, large-scale studies are needed before we 
can definitively state that storyspacing supports the invention process of student writers. 
Others have reported similar success using Storyspace as an invention tool. For 
instance, M . A. Syverson made the following statement: 
Storyspace was central to the process by which [my] dissertation was constructed. 
Although the dissertation took a conventional linear final form, I used Storyspace 
to scaffold the concepts and represent relationships among them. I had a box for 
each chapter, one for the abstract, one for 'notes on the fly ' and one called 
' concept map.' [ ... ] Storyspace was absolutely essential to the cognitive effort of 
keeping a large quantity of concepts, quoted material, notes, reflections, and 
relationships and also making some sense out of them. [ .. . ] [I]t is a great 
cognitive processing environment. 
It is as a "cognitive processing environment" that I see the most potential for Storyspace 
as a composition tool, and my own experience is congruent with Syverson's. For 
anecdotal evidence in support of Storyspace as a pedagogical tool, we can tum to a 
Courseware Review by Jeanie Crain published in Computers and the Humanities: 
Having used Storyspace for my own writing as well as in the writing classroom, I 
have come to appreciate its instructional value first hand. [ .. . ] Students were 
[ . .. ] led through a complex generative process into drafting, revision, and final 
products . Structure and detail were remarkable in final versions. [ . . . ] Storyspace 
is by far the best software I have seen for teaching writing as a process. [ ... ] The 
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software is as useful for advanced researchers as it is for undergraduate students. 
[ ... ] Storyspace encourages writers to work in the middle, at the beginning, or at 
the end of papers, which facilitates initial brainstorming. (13 7-141) 
As I've stated previously, hypertext is essentially about reading and writing in the middle. 
Beginnings and endings tend to present the most difficulties for students and professional 
writers, but a writing medium such as Storyspace offers a way around such problems. 
Innovations in classroom practice, such as those described by Crain, would be 
expected to leak out, as a sort of contagion, into other sites in the university and beyond, 
bleeding across traditional borders. In fact, echoing Moulthrop's statement on the 
"miscegenation of discourses" (2516), Johnson-Eilola argues that "hypertext represents 
the opportunity for an unparalleled blurring of discourses-a way to question not only the 
boundaries separating first-year students, advanced undergraduates, graduate students, 
and professors, but also those between academy and business, the sciences and the 
humanities, management and the line worker" (21 ). In other words, hypertext holds the 
potential to transform the places of the academy, science, and business into different 
kinds of spaces; hypertext technology may blur the borders between these discourse 
places, which amounts to altering a quite extensive map. 
As discussed in a previous chapter, conventional text, insofar as it is a zero-sum 
game, follows a linear logic that compels us to blot out one thing when something newer 
and better comes along. With conventional text, the revision process is ultimately 
motivated by the desire to erase previous drafts, or to pretend that earlier, inferior 
versions never existed, despite the fact that scholars are continually digging up and 
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studying drafts and earlier editions of texts to piece together their genesis. For such 
scholars, the electronic text presents crucial problems, given the ease of erasure. Yet there 
is no reason that student writers could not save drafts and link them together, allowing 
acentered, plural texts to replace the conventional, singular "final draft." For this kind of 
assignment MS Word's hyperlinking function would work quite well. 
In a hypertextual space, there is no need to erase an old text when a new one is 
written; the new text is just a new path or tangent that may or may not be followed. 
Therefore, as a pedagogical practice, students could hyperlink: a series of drafts, which 
would create a kind of palimpsest and present a new perspective on the writing process. 
In other words, the several layers of text could all be accessible. 
A technology cannot simply be used as a tool; it influences the agency ofthe user, 
fac ilitating some activities, processes, and goals and constraining others. A literacy 
technology, such as Storyspace, creates a context for reading and writing. Thus, in using 
any teclmology in a classroom, we need to consider the technology's degree of 
inelasticity or resistance to our plans. As Johnson-Eilola writes, "Hypertext (or any 
technology) is never neutral or transparent to our intentions" (14). Yet until we seriously 
engage with a technology we have no clue how that technology shapes our activities. The 
most naive attitude would be to assume that one can perform old, familiar activities more 
efficiently or better without that activity being substantially altered. The word processor 
is not a better or more efficient typewriter; it is a different machine. 
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Consumerism and the Discourse of Efficiency 
The political aspect of a feminist theorization of hypertext has to do with subverting 
the "discourse of efficiency" (Johnson-Eilola 85), which is directly linked to technology. 
As Lyotard argues, technology follows the "principle of optimal performance: 
maximizing output[ .. . ] and minimizing input[ ... ]. Technology is therefore a game 
pertaining not to the true, the just, or the beautiful, etc., but to the efficient: a technical 
'move is 'good' when it does better and expends less energy than another" (44). In 
economic terms, the main premise of the discourse of efficiency is that goods and 
serv ices, which now includes "content" (information) transported over the Internet, must 
travel from producers to consumers ever more quickly and smoothly, with minimal 
mediation or middlemen interference. Furthermore, the media of commerce, including e-
commerce, are assumed to be politically neutral; that is, computers and networks are 
simply tools. The more streamlined and "intuitive" the exchange process, the better. In 
advocating this system, Bill Gates has coined the term "friction-free capitalism" to refer 
to an ideal market condition in which every buyer knows every seller's price and every 
seller knows what every buyer is willing to pay (157). Gates looks forward to "a new 
world of low-friction, low-overhead capitalism, in which market information will be 
plentiful and transaction costs low. It will be a shopper's heaven" (158). The main 
problem with this vision is that it totalizes society under the ideology of consumerism. 
The controlling metaphor for society becomes the marketplace, and any person or any 
institution that refuses to conform to consumerism is treated as an anomaly and then 
simply ignored, which amounts to a de facto silencing. It is not uncommon to hear 
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schools and universities spoken of as marketplaces, which reduces teachers to the status 
of vendors. Thus, a major challenge faced by feminists committed to using technology in 
the classroom is to dis-articulate technology, and education itself, from consumerism and 
the discourse of efficiency. 
Consumerism needs to be countered by critical technological literacy. According to 
Cynthia Selfe, technological literacy, which is the foundation for critical technological 
literacy, refers to "the complex set of socially and culturally situated values, practices, 
and skills involved in operating linguistically within the context of electronic 
environments, including reading, writing, and communicating." The next step, critical 
technological literacy, "suggests a reflective awareness of these social and cultural 
phenomena." Critical technological literacy, then, "suggests a political agenda" (148). 
Refen·ing explicitly to consumerism, Selfe goes on to claim that English "teachers need 
to recognize that they can no longer simply educate students to become technology 
consumers without also helping them to learn how to think critically about technology 
and the social issues surrounding its use" (152). Critical technological literacy involves 
an interrogation ofthe discourse of efficiency, which is directly linked to the ideology of 
scientific-democratic progress. Selfe refers to the "ideological equation of science + 
technology= progress." And beyond this equation lie two more: "technology+ 
democracy (+ capitalism) =progress and technology+ education= progress" (116). 
Such equations are dangerous precisely because they are simple and seductive. But 
feminists and others committed to social reform and equity must complicate and 
problematize these easy equations. 
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A consumer society, ideally, functions as a self-regulating system or machine, and 
anything that impedes the efficient flow of goods and services is treated as friction or 
noise in the system. Efficiency becomes an end in itself, a self-evident good. Efficiency is 
also directly related to standardization and simplicity. Hence, when Gates claims that the 
future information highway "will simplify and standardize shopping" (159), the tacit 
assumption, or warrant, is that simplicity and standardization are good. Within this 
framework the student or scholar is positioned as a consumer of online content, as well as 
a consumer of the latest computer technology, rather than an engaged citizen within a 
democracy. This vision of democracy focuses almost exclusively on rights (above all, the 
right to consume) rather than encouraging a dynamic interplay of rights and responsibility 
and, therefore, produces politically disengaged, easily manipulated consumers. As Pratt 
argues, "Many of those who govern us display, openly, their interest in a quiescent, 
ignorant, manipulable electorate. Even as an ideal, the concept of an enlightened citizenry 
seems to have disappeared from the national imagination" (594). We might say that the 
enlightened citizenry has been erased from the national imagination just like the traveler 
has been erased from the map. But for pedagogy, the most salient consequence of 
consumerism, aside from creating addiction to the latest technology, is that it encourages 
students to become passive consumers of information, or content, as opposed to active 
participants in the classroom. Students ought to feel a responsibility to participate in the 
social construction of knowledge, as opposed to simply exercising their right to 
education/information. When students begin to express their own agendas and take 
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charge of their own educations, they immediately transform classrooms and universities 
hom places to spaces. 
Inasmuch as contemporary compositionists and their students have not created the 
first-year English requirement or department, they are in the position of users, or 
consumers, of what they have not produced. As de Certeau states, in spaces "imposed 
knowledge and symbolisms become objects manipulated by practitioners who have not 
produced them" (32). Such practitioners may be given to subversion of a priori designs 
or standards-a fact especially true for graduate teaching assistants, who are not yet fully 
identified with academe and, therefore, may choose to operate tactically within "foreign 
territory" (de Certeau 37). Feminists may also never fully identify with the university, or 
at least as long as it remains a patriarchal institution; hence, we might think of feminists 
as resident aliens in academe. 5 For, as Luke argued in 1999, "The hierarchical structure 
of masculinist models of doing business in the academy-whether in research, 
administration, teaching, funding and grant regimes, or publishing-remains virtually 
unchanged despite some 25 years of feminist attempts at intervention" (4). 
In discussing the transfonnation of places to spaces, de Certeau describes how a 
North African living in Paris[ ... ] insinuates into the system imposed on him by 
the construction of a low-income housing development or of the French language 
the ways of 'dwelling' (in a house or a language) peculiar to his native Kabylia. 
He[ . . . ] creates for himself a space in which he can fmd ways of using the 
5 The term "the university" is meant to denote an historically and discursively constructed idea or 
institution, as distinguished from a particular university. 
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constraining order of the place or of the language. Without leaving the place 
where he has no choice but to live and which lays down the law for him, he 
establishes within it a degree of plurality and creativity. (30) 
This passage is a description of the mestiza-i.e., one who practices the "art ofbeing in 
between" and has "countless ways of 'making do"' (de Certeau 29, 30). Similarly, first-
year composition has no choice but to be in the university, and the "laws" of Western 
higher education predate composition's entry into the system, but the mestiza 
compositionist can operate creatively and subversively within that institutional context, 
introducing creative noise into the self-regulating system. By working tactically within 
fault lines or seams, compositionists may even contribute to the system's deconstruction 
or transformation. 
My point, then, arguing from analogy, is that compositionists committed to feminism 
and innovative uses of technology may practice different, alien customs, and in this way 
operate tactically within the system of higher education, changing the system from within 
rather than simply rejecting it-inasmuch as rejecting the system would be self-defeating. 
In de Certeau's words, we may make use of"tactical ruses and surprises: clever tricks of 
the 'weak' within the order established by the strong" (40). Again, the tactical, creative 
use of commodities produced by others is fundamental to contact zones. 
Recalling a previous discussion, we can encourage student writers to compose 
autoethnographic texts. For, as Diana M.A. Relke writes, "[I]t's not so much the content 
of what we teach, but rather, what [students] make of it-make out ofit-that counts as 
knowledge." In other words, students can situate their own texts within the context of 
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their own lives, as opposed to writing from an anonymous perspective or reflecting in 
their writing their instructor's ideals. For instance, ifl introduce students to feminist 
theory, I may assume that they will use that theory to articulate feminist readings of texts; 
however, Pratt argues that writers take the tools offered by authority figures and use them 
selectively. Thus, while I may represent these students as budding feminists, they may 
represent themselves very differently-even while using the raw material of feminist 
theory. Autoethnographic texts "involve a selective collaboration with and appropriation 
of idioms of the metropolis or the conqueror. These are merged or infiltrated to varying 
degrees with indigenous idioms to create self-representations intended to intervene in 
metropolitan modes of understanding" (Pratt 585). Here "metropolitan" may be read as 
academic. 
Pratt ' s discussion of autoethnography and Felipe Guaman Pomade Ayala The First 
New Chronicle and Good Government also raises interesting issues with respect to 
audience. As Pratt writes, "Autoethnographic works are often addressed to both 
metropolitan audiences and the speaker's own community. Their reception is thus highly 
indeterminate" (585-86). A student text written for the instructor as well as the student's 
peers is, therefore, likely to have "highly indeterminate" reception; there may be complex 
layers of coding, although this kind of sophistication is more likely to appear in orally 
presented texts. Furthermore, we should not expect such texts to display a consistent 
voice or tone, or, in other words, to be written from a stable subject position, particularly 
when the newer media are used. For, as I've argued in previous chapters, multimedia, 
hypertextual technologies tend to work against stable, unified subject positions. 
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Hypertext may encourage students take up multiple subject positions; that is to say, 
promiscuous wreating may promote fluid, mobile subject positionings. In promiscuous 
wreating, the "alliance" between wreater and text is typically short-lived; it is fleeting 
like the tactical social or political alliances that, I would argue, third-wave feminists are 
particularly given to. 
In short, rhetoric-composition scholars have an obligation to seriously rethink the 
traditional essay in the light of new technologies. Nedra Reynolds argues, 
We need to offer students more and greater means of resistance to the thesis-
driven essay, rigidly structured paragraphing, and the reductive emphasis on 
coherence and clarity that still determine so much of academic writing and the 
service-course ideology of composition programs. For composition we need to 
rethink radically the forms of writing we find acceptable. (71) 
As mentioned earlier, this kind or rethinking may lead to a "breakdown of the rigid 
boundaries that separate life and politics inside and outside the academy" (Reynolds 71). 
Thus, hypertext has the potential to change readers and writers, along with composition 
pedagogy and the university itself. For instance, a read-write interface works against the 
passive consumption of texts. Just as we hope students feel a responsibility to participate 
in class discussions, readers may begin to feel a responsibility to write in the texts they 
read-both figuratively and literally. 
The promotion of multiple, fluid subject positioning relates to the fact that 
consumerism relies heavily on stable subject positions in the form of consumer profiles, 
i.e., "compilations of identifying information, preference information, purchasing habits, 
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and other information related to a particular consumer" (Federal Trade Commission). 
Consumer profiles are maps, and noise or friction in the consumerist system is caused by 
unstable subject positions, or subjects that move round nomadically on a map. Consumer 
profiles, moreover, position people as individual buyers; yet a feminist theorization of 
hypertext should foreground collaboration- i.e. , working with others and working with 
the technology-as opposed to venturing out alone on a "heroic" consumerist quest. 
Furthermore, collaborative alliances that are multiple and fleeting, or promiscuous, may 
defeat the mapping efforts of consumer pro filers . Short-term alliances may be considered 
temporary contracts, and Lyotard showed some prescience when he claimed in 1979 that 
"the temporary contract is in practice supplanting permanent institutions in the 
professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family, and international domains, as well as in 
po li tical affairs" (66) . 
The positioning of the subject on the social checkerboard begins early. According to 
Lyotard, "Even before he is born, if only by virtue of the name he is given, the human 
child is already positioned as the referent in the story recounted by those around him, in 
relation to which he will inevitably chart his course" ( 15). Yet such positioning is often 
constraining and even painful. Margaret Morrison speaks of her own history of 
depression as a 
dis-ease [ ... ] precisely that precariousness and fluidity of subject positioning the 
masculinist signifying economy (that trap of a binary system) fmds so dangerous 
to its rigidly potent efficiency. [ . .. ] Polyrnorphing in reading and writing, the ' I' 
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may be slipping messily among and exceeding the voyeuristic-exhibitionistic, 
public-private, inner-outer ... (those ubiquitous, ridiculous poles!). (206-07). 
Maps are powerless to contain "the excess polymorphing beyond the bounds of the 
subject as positioned" (Morrison 207). Rhizomes are polymorphous, and they cannot be 
contained by maps. 
One example ofthe strategy to inscribe or enforce stable subject positions is through 
a firm gender binary, a process which may be witnessed everywhere in popular American 
culture. Gender polarization, or widening the gap between normative femininity and 
masculinity, serves to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity. The masculinist social order has 
little tolerance for gender confusion or androgyny. With respect to consumerism, a person 
who straddles or smudges the border between masculinity and femininity is difficult to 
profile; s/he is a moving target. The same may be said for an individual who reads the 
Web promiscuously, rather than always visiting the same sites. As advertising moves 
online it becomes more narrowly focused or targeted, relying on stable, predictable 
buying habits. In fact, "Targeted advertising is the Holy Grail of the online advertising 
industry" (Meland, unpaginated), and it is premised on the reduction of uncertainty. 
Certainty, moreover, is utopian, for its ultimate goal is to predict the future. Literary 
hypertext, however, plays with uncertainty, using it creatively. Uncertainty, in other 
words, may serve as a kairotic, tactical opportunity, inasmuch as it frustrates the striating 
forces of consumerist culture. 
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Information, Scapegoats, and Standards 
Composition studies entails more than teaching students how to write; it has to do 
with helping students to construct their own understanding of the social and cultural 
contexts in which they live, or, in other words, to create situated knowledge. Hence, I 
endorse Jarratt's vision of"composition courses whose instructors help their students to 
locate personal experiences in historical and social contexts" ("Feminism" 121). A 
potential benefit to students of a feminist composition pedagogy is an enhanced 
awareness of one's multiple subject positionings, and such awareness is important 
because one's writing always arises from these subject positions. 
Under contemporary capitalism, information is supposed to reduce uncertainty. 6 In 
the words of Alan Greenspan, "The essential contribution of information technology is 
the expansion of knowledge and its obverse, the reduction in uncertainty" (qtd. in 
Ingram). In direct opposition to this agenda, which is simultaneously expansionist and 
reductionist, multiple, fluid subject positions heighten uncertainty. Borderlands, insofar 
as they are ambiguous, also create and sustain uncertainty. In this sense, Borderlands are 
more real than the artificial systems of economics. Lyotard, citing evidence from 
chemistry and mathematics, states, "It is not true that uncertainty (lack of control) 
decreases as accuracy goes up: it goes up as well" (56). Thus, if we equate accuracy with 
expansion of knowledge, Greenspan is wrong. The problem with the model of technical 
efficiency, or performativity, is that "since performativity is defined by an input/output 
6 Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, in A Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana: U of Illinois 
P, 1949), defmed information as the reduction of uncertainty. 
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ratio , there is a presupposition that the system into which the input is entered is stable" 
(Lyotard 54). Human subjectivity, however, is unstable. In other words, the self, insofar 
as it is a site of articulation, is a space rather than a place. For, as de Certeau claims, a 
pl ace "implies an indication of stability" (117). 
In the rhetoric of expansion and conquest, information can easily be treated as 
terri tory. As Lyotard wrote in 1979 (English translation 1984), "It is conceivable that the 
nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as in the past they battled 
for control of territory" (5). Expansion and reduction, insofar as the former is coded 
positive and the latter is coded negative, may also be treated as masculinist metaphors. 
The taking over of space is a masculinist ideal- expanding one's territory or province, 
assimilating or conquering others along the way. Brian Ponger discusses "the particularly 
masculine desire for the territorialization of space: it is the desire to conquer and 
protectively enclose space, the desire to make connections according to the laws of 
spati al domination.[ ... ] Loss ofthe control of space is the death ofmasculinity" (72). 
The discourse of "expanding global markets" is, therefore, thoroughly masculinist. 
In 1991, Bolter claimed that Western culture had entered "the late age of print" (3). 
While this phrase has become something of a mantra over the last decade, predications of 
the imminent demise of print seem to participate in the rhetoric of imperialism or 
colonialism. Gilbert, for instance, observes that "Often, the rhetoric of netting reminds 
one of colonial narrative-stories of exploration, expansion, acquisition and cooptation" 
(258). In this narrative, old ways oflife are replaced/erased by the ways of the colonizer. 
Upon entering the ancient territory of writing, the e-colonizer sets about replacing the 
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old, inefficient ways with a sleek, seamless electronic narrative. This rhetoric is founded 
on an either/or paradigm; however, either/or rhetorics serve little purpose in a 
postmodem age. There is no reason we cannot have both e-text and print; we can have 
both traditional, linear narratives printed on paper or written in pixels and subversive, 
multilinear hypertexts. Compositionists need to embrace multiple discourses and 
technologies, rather than attempting to conquer of the old ways by the "new and 
improved." 
A parallel to the colonialist rhetoric of hypertext theory can be found in the use of 
writing within the context of primary oral cultures. Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues that the 
wri ting of the West (i.e., conventional, unilinear text) has served the interests of 
empiricism, positivism, and the colonial rhetoric of control (35-36). 7 Writing, insofar as 
it establishes a sense of permanence, has a prestige or authority (ethos) denied to speech. 
The privileging of writing over speech is the defining feature of the "scriptural economy" 
(de Certeau 131-39): 
In very diverse ways, orality is defined by (or as) that from which a 'legitimate' 
practice-whether in science, politics, or the classroom, etc.-must differentiate 
itself. The 'oral' is that which does not contribute to progress; reciprocally, the 
'scriptural' is that which separates itself from the magical world ofvoices and 
7 By necessity, this dissertation follows the format of the conventional, unilinear text; however, like many 
others, I have tried to work against the limitations of this format by adding nonlinear elements, such 
footnotes, graphics, and appendices. I have also written much of this text in the first-person. But most 
significantly, I have used the Storyspace read-write interface to directly engaged with the five hypertexts, 
and I've given copies of these hypertexts to my dissertation committee. 
266 
tradition. [ ... ]Thus one can read above the portals of modernity such inscriptions 
as 'Here, to work is to write,' or 'Here only what is written is understood.' Such is 
the internal law of that which has constituted itself as 'Western' (de Certeau, 
134). 
Words that are left to float in the air, rather than being nailed down on paper, are easily 
ignored by literate people- a fact with serious implications for the oral promises 
exchanged (or oral contracts made) between colonizers and indigenous peoples.8 Hence, 
colonizers have a reputation, at least in Hollywood, for speaking with "forked tongue." 
My point, though, in tem1s of rhetorical theory, is that ethos is inextricable linked to 
dominant communication media. 
Just as colonial rhetoric subordinates orality to literacy, electronic text is construed 
by its critics as ephemeral and untrustworthy as compared to ink on a page. 9 Not only 
does hypertext exist in an electronic medium, which immediately places its authority in 
doubt, but the narrative syntax, which privileges parataxis, is far different from that of 
conventional print text. 
I argued in a previous chapter that hypertext may be construed as a "guilty" text. 
Closely related to this line of argument is the notion of the scapegoat. According to 
Burke, the scapegoat is the 
8 Plato's argument against writing in the Phaedrus might be interpreting as an expression of anxiety about 
the fate of the spoken word in a literate society. For instance, be might have been concerned about the 
status of oral contracts. 
9 Sven Birkerts ' general thesis in The Gutenberg Elegies (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1994) 
that in that electronic text is less trustworthy than print text. 
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representative or vessel of certain unwanted evils. The vessel, delegated to the 
role of sacrifice, must obviously be worthy of sacrifice. A few basic strategies for 
making him so may be listed: (1) He may be made worthy legalistically (i.e., by 
making him an offender against legal or moral justice, so that he 'deserves' what 
he gets). (2) We may make him worthy by leading towards sacrifice fatalistically 
[ ... ]. (3) We may make him worthy of a subtle kind of poetic justice, in making 
the sacrificial vessel too good for this world, hence of the highest value, hence the 
most perfect sacrifice. (Philosophy of Literary Form 40) 
Now, in applying Burke's scapegoat theory to hypertext and composition pedagogy, I am 
most interested in the first strategy-i.e., legalistic scapegoating. When we condemn 
students for breaking the rules of academic writing and condemn hypertext for breaking 
the rules of linear organization, as well as when we judge women guilty of violating all 
sorts of hegemonic masculine standards, we are using the legalistic scapegoating strategy. 
In other words, we are saying that hypertext is not following the rules ofthe territory (or 
place) of print and students are not following the rules of the university as a place. Places 
are essentially static, but they cannot resist dynamic forces indefinitely. Neither 
conventional, unilinear text nor the university, which for centuries has used that text as its 
life blood, can contain hypertext. Of course, the university might assimilate hypertext to 
the discourse of efficiency, but literary hypertext might frustrate this effort to at least 
some extent. 
If a student puts her feet on a desk or in some other way breaks the rules of the 
traditional classroom, she transforms a place into a space. Similarly, when one begins 
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using a technology in innovated ways, a place is transformed into a space. A space is a 
used, or lived-in, place. But when students transform a classroom place into a space, they 
risk being judged guilty. Intrepid students, then, are like "heroes who transgress frontiers 
and who, guilty of an offense against the law of the place, best provide its restoration 
with their tombs" (de Certeau 118). Such is the function of narrative. As de Certeau goes 
on to write, "Stories thus carry out a labor that constantly transforms places into spaces 
and spaces into places" (118). 
The point I wish to emphasize is that scapegoating creates the illusion of ideological 
innocence, or purity ofmotives, on the part of composition teachers and university 
administrators. We might compare Burke's description of gangster stories and hardboiled 
fiction , where "various forms of the disreputable character 'die that we may live'" (47). 
Thus, in characterizing literary hypertext as chaotic, incoherent, irrational, or even 
disreputable, we tend not to notice that, adapting Burke's words, we are "killing" the 
hypertext (i.e., the other) so that conventional text may live, or have life more fully. 
Simjlarly, in judging students guilty of violating the rules of academic writing, our 
students "die"-in a spiritual or cultural sense-so that we, who are deeply invested in 
the place of the print text, may live. It is also noteworthy that when our students condemn 
hypertext for its chaos or incoherence, they are simply doing what English teachers have 
always taught them to do. 
With respect to pedagogy in general, we may judge our students guilty ofbeing 
undisciplined, lazy, unmotivated, or even dishonest-traits which have historically been 
applied to coloruzed peoples. We might assume that these characterizations or value 
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judgments have nothing to do with ourselves or the politics of higher education, which is 
thoroughly raced, classed, and gendered. Such judgments, then, would be 
decontextualized. Our students are not intrinsically unmotivated or dishonest or 
undisciplined; they are only judged so in terms of our received standards. 
Burke makes a further distinction between two types of scapegoating: "explicit 
ritual" and "pseudoscientific objectivity": 
[In] explicit ritual, the vessel is formally appointed; but in its concealed 
pseudoscientific variants, where one's vices are simply projected upon the 
scapegoat, and taken literally to be an objective, [ .. . ] intrinsic attribute of the 
scapegoat (a scientific fact about the scapegoat's true nature), there is less 
incentive to discounting. A ritualistic scapegoat is felt both to have and not to 
have the character formally delegated to it-but a pseudoscientific scapegoat, 
endowed by projection without an explicit avowal of the process, is felt purely 
and simply to have the assigned character. ( 45-46). 
In pseudoscientific scapegoating, then, we refuse to admit consubstantiality with the 
other. The guilt or sin of the other is treated an as intrinsic attribute of the other, rather 
than a product of our own, often arbitrary legalistic standards. Moreover, inasmuch as 
both conventional text and hypertext are constituted by the acts of reading and writing, 
or, in other words, as long as they are both literate spaces, they are consubstantial. The 
scapegoating of hypertext, then, may be construed as a projection from conventional text 
of its unwanted or disowned attributes. Hypertext is conventional text's disowned other, 
its unruly, promiscuous, indecorous sister. 
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As academics, we live in the culture of the book-the linear, hierarchical print text. 
We live in gridded, striated space. Print text is a decidedly standardizing force, and the 
more adamantly we seek to maintain the standards of tightly crafted, hierarchical, 
unilinear prose, the more strenuously we will condemn smooth texts such as literary 
hypertext. 
So, as teachers of writing, what are we supposed to do? Throw out all received 
standards for academic writing and just accept whatever our students happen to produce? 
Of course not. If this were the case, education itself would be meaningless. Standards, per 
se, are far from harmful. In fact, standardization is often necessary, such as when 
mechanical components must work together and be interchangeable. Or consider the 
value of standardized spelling. Yet, despite the fact that standardization makes life easier 
and better in innumerable ways, standards can easily ossify and become dysfunctional or 
oppressive, and in this case they need to be interrogated. For example, we need a standard 
computer keyboard, but the current standard may not be the best arrangement, 
considering that it was originally designed to slow down typing on a mechanical 
typewriter. Thus, with respect to composition pedagogy, my own modest proposal is that 
we 1) teach students to use hypertext as an invention strategy, as in "storyspacing," 2) 
assign the composition of single-authored and collaborative hypertexts, and 3) expose 
students to literary hypertext, including texts written from a feminist perspective. The 
rationale for these practices is that they may serve to invigorate composition studies or, in 
other words, to prevent composition studies from lapsing into a complacent rigidity. In 
the face of rapid technological change, there is a very real danger of falling back on the 
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old, familiar ways, completely disengaging from the troubling new technologies. But 
radical, feminist hypertexts might be studied alongside conventional texts. As I've stated 
before, the goal of feminist hypertext or a feminist theorization of hypertext need not be 
the replacement of conventional text with hypertext, in the manner of an agonistic, 
either/or rhetoric. The primary value of a feminist articulation of hypertext, as I see it, is 
that it throws into relief conventional, dominant literacy technologies. As a marginal, 
though emergent, genre, literary hypertext represents a privileged standpoint from which 
to understand conventional textuality. 
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CHAPTER6 
Tentative Conclusions 
The fundamental premise underlying the theorization of hypertext presented in this 
study is that writing-all modes of writing, not just hypertext-is gendered, and a 
secondary assumption is that all writing is political. While it is true that most hypertext 
theorists have, to varying degrees, touched on gender as it relates to hypertext or rhetoric, 
in the present study gender has been the central concern. I am most interested in the 
gendered ways in which we engage with texts as both readers and writers. I have argued 
for a convergence ofthe fields of hypertext theory, feminist epistemology, and feminist 
rhetoric. More specifically, I've argued that the conjunction of hypertext theory and 
fem inist epistemology facilitates a rearticulation of feminist rhetoric. While hypertext 
has, of course, been at the core of this study, the arguments made and conclusions drawn 
may apply to a wide variety of texts. 
As I have engaged with the five hypertexts considered in this study, my early 
assumption that conventional texts as well as hypertexts are a unique class of others that I 
can relate to and work with has been confirmed. Texts are but one class of other that 
human beings engage with on a daily basis, and the ways in which we engage with or 
relate to others are deeply gendered. Ifwe think of masculinity and femininity as unstable 
points or spectra on a Mobius Strip, the normative masculine approach to others is to treat 
them as medium sized objects- i.e., things to be explained, controlled, and used. By 
contrast, the normative feminine approach to others is to treat them as subjects to be 
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engaged with and understood. From a feminist perspective, it is vital to keep in mind that 
the otherness of the other must be respected. An effective reader cannot impose her or his 
will on a text or treat it as a blank slate to be written on. I have no desire to nail down 
' 
master, or penetrate deeply into texts. I am more interested in the superficial borders and 
edges of texts-i.e., those places where texts edge up against one another. In other words, 
I am interested in texts, as well as technologies, as contact zones and borderlands. 
The otherness of the text can be respected without taking a distanced, analytical, 
voyeuristic position. A text may be an other, but it is an other that readers and writers are 
intimately engaged with; that is, to be reader or writer (or wreater) is to be enmeshed in a 
web of texts, or a textual multiplicity. Through the extended mind, as discussed by 
Hayles, the wreater and text come together in a cybernetic feedback loop. Text and 
wreater get inside, or inform, one another. 
In exploring hypertext I have departed from conventional practice, which analyzes 
the differences between conventional text and hypertext as media, by inquiring into the 
relationships between hypertext and people-specifically, people who read and write 
literary hypertext. And I have used myself the primary subject of this study; that is to say, 
I have reflected on my own encounters with literary hypertext. Thus, rather than 
comparing two different textual media, I have studied my own experiences in reading 
(and writing myself into) five hypertexts. I maintain, therefore, that an adequate 
theorization of hypertext must be personal; it must break down the masculinist, 
Enlightenment-era dichotomies of subject/object, reason/feeling, reader/writer, fact/value, 
masculine/feminine, and so on. 
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Moreover, such an engaged approach entails the use of first-person narrative, rather 
than objectivist analysis, in writing up the "findings" of the study. Feminist hypertext, in 
other words, is transgressive; it crosses borders and creates new ways of reading and 
writing; it also takes a fresh look at the analysis/narrative binary. Along with narrative, 
the emphasis on conversation is important to hypertext theory, and an electronic read-
write interface, such as Storyspace, facilitates a shift from classical oratorical rhetoric to 
a more conversational mode. Furthermore, these conversations are multiple and 
multilinear. 
I have endeavored to address a significant gap in hypertext scholarship. Literary 
works, at least in formalist schools of criticism, have often been treated much like other 
medium sized objects, or located on the same ontological plane as apples, chairs, and 
billiard balls. This practice has encouraged critics to attempt to know literary works in an 
objective, "scientific" way. But far from hunting and controlling the text as prey, as 
discussed by Rushing, I've argued that engaging with a hypertext is more like knowing 
another person, or at least some type of living organism. I have also used the principle of 
the rhizome to elucidate the nature of this living organism. Hypertexts are indeterminate, 
shifting, and resistant to final interpretation. And insofar as they are rhizomatic, human 
beings are mercurial, shifting, sliding "texts"; we shift identities, or "shape shift," as we 
move into and out of different contexts. Hence, knowledge and understanding of human 
beings and hypertexts is always provisional. 
As a student of rhetoric, I am primarily interested in the shifting dynamics of writer, 
reader, text, context- along with the issue of gender. Moreover, the context I am most 
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concerned with is literary hypertext. The methodology of this study has been premised on 
the need to counteract the silencing of the reader, which is encouraged by the conventions 
of print publication, classical (oratorical) rhetoric, and teacher-centered pedagogy. The 
tradition of classical rhetoric has relied heavily on the binary of the vocal rhetor and the 
silent audience. Consequently, reading and writing are typically treated as vastly 
dissimilar activities. But in the course of this study, a vision of feminist rhetoric has 
emerged that features a blurring of the borders between writer, reader, and text. With the 
aid of an electronic read-write interface, readers are able to write themselves into texts, 
thus becoming wreaters. Implicit in the notion of the wreater is that, rather than being 
silenced by texts, the wreader takes an active role in constructing the texts; that is, the 
wreater makes meaning as opposed to being passively shaped by texts. 
The textual intervention enacted through a read-write hypertext interface, such as 
Storyspace, is significant on several levels . Perhaps most importantly, this approach 
directly addresses the modernist bias for studying literary texts in an objectivist, purely 
analytical manner. With conventional literary texts as well as literary hypertext, a 
fem inist stance calls for active engagement with the text, rather than standing outside the 
text as a "disinterested" critic or theorist. In other words, the encounter with hypertext is 
fundamentally different from the conventional relationship between readers and texts 
because hypertext calls into question mainstream subject/object dichotomies. 
When a person is engaged with another entity-whether it be human or nonhuman-
there is a cybernetic feedback loop, and this loop engenders self-reflective understanding, 
as opposed to explanation/analysis. A conversation, then, is essentially a feedback loop, 
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as the participants modify, extend, or challenge one another's words (or texts). Thus, 
drawing on the insights of feminist epistemology, I have argued that the knower and the 
known, as well as the reader and the text, constitute a cybernetic system. Moreover, the 
hypertext wreater and the text, insofar as they constitute a cybernetic system, share the 
same space-time, or context. This fact leads to a radical revisioning of the writer-reader-
text-context rhetorical schematic, which is so deeply engrained in composition theory. 
The conclusions I have drawn here are quite tentative and provisional. I see this 
study as foundational. I have laid the groundwork for a scholarly project that may occupy 
me for years to come. 
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Appendix A: Figures 
(!] ~ JX: Show links r Show text 
dl[~ 
~ ,l:l 
*l ~ 
• ~ ·y 
~ 
• I 
Figure 1.1: Storyspace map view, Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl 
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Figure 1.2: Storyspace outline view, Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl 
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Figure 1.3: Storyspace treemap view, Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl 
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Figure 3.1: 
Leonardo da Vinci. The Last Supper, 1493 
Convent of Santa Maria delle Grazie Milan 
Tempera on plaster 
460 x 880 em (15 x 29ft.) 
Figure 3.2 
Pablo Picasso. Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. I 907. 
Oil on canvas,8' x 7' 8" (243.9 x 223 .7 em) . 
The Museum of Modem Art, New York. 
Acquired through the Lillie P. Bliss Bequest. 
Photograph ©1997 The Museum of Modem Art, New York. 
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N.;~vigate Bool<mark Text Windows Help 
Figure 3.3a: "her" from Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl 
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Figure 3.3b: "hercut" from Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl 
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Immediacy 
Masculinity 
Philosophy 
Prose 
Analysis 
Serial Text 
Post-Gender Cyborg 
Rhetorosophy 
Proetry 
Narranalysis 
Seriociational Text 
Figure 3.4: Immediacy-Hypermediacy Spectrum 
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Hypermediacy 
Femininity 
Rhetoric 
Poetry 
Narrative 
Associational text 
Immediacy 
Masculinity 
Philosophy 
Prose 
Analysis 
Serial Text 
Figure 3.5: 
The Mobius strip 
Post-Gender Cyborg 
Rhetorosophy 
Proetry 
Narranalysis 
Seriociational Text 
Mobius strip image borrowed from Alexander Bogomolny, Mobius Strip. 
http://www.cut-the-knot.com/do you know/moebius.htmJ. 
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Hypermediacy 
Femininity 
Rhetoric 
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Narrative 
Associational Text 
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Conventional Literary Electronic Literary 
Text Hypertext 
Work copyright -protected copyright-protected 
archetype computer code 
Text function of interpretation function of interpretation 
Archetype prototype of the script; does does not exist 
not change if the script is 
altered 
Script readable orthographic readable orthographic 
marks on a page or screen; marks on a page; has no 
exists as a whole from archetype; is read one lexia 
beginning to end; with a at a time with no pre-
electronic interface it is read established sequence; may 
by scrolling and full-text be written in and changed 
searches; copy of archetype, 
but may be written on or 
over and changed with an 
electronic interface 
Interface ink, pages, cover, glue, computer keyboard, mouse, 
binding; may also be monitor, multiple windows, 
electronic writing spaces (lexias) 
Figure 3.6: Characteristics of conventional literary text and literary hypertext with 
electronic read-write interface 
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She wishes he had stayed with her. She wishes H~ 
stayed that night. 
The morning comes. Summer sun, heavy, falling c 
knees, facing the child . 
The child aches . The child comes to her, nearly m 
NOTE: Who is the child? She wishes like a child 
Aching 
boundaries 
Collling 
COMMENTARY 
Counting 
Crjling 
Dave 
Fibera 
He and lhe Child 
He Expects 
He lidens 
He Wishing 
How 
In noce 
Indulgence 
Innocence 
Innocent 
Jelfrey 
John 
Viait 
Figure 4.1: Alphabetic list of Storyspace lexias reached by pressing F9. 
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Cancel 
Sutch For. I knife 
.:.,._ct. 1-anJ kltJ'Wood--
Counting 
Jeff"" 
Knile 
Aching 
Innocent 
In noce 
r ll)nOfe caae 
Figure 4.2: Storyspace search tool 
Indulgence 
The Child 
Touching 
Note 
r Search -gin notes 
r Search titlea 
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e had followed her and 
et fibers . She is on her 
ks slowly, deliberately. 
30Sepro 
DeuAg-
Here we go. I'll start ANOTHER lETTER How cum the things I envy ue nevenni:ne? HAl I'll bet you say the 
se1ne thing. Oh well. you know that I re~yfeel yo1ire the only one who has ever known me end I'll never have you 
so why live? I reelly hate to admit it but our's is really the classic Romantic problem of the ages and whats worse is 
ah forget it. 
NOTE: From Be a. This alludes to Henry and Muguet's relationship, and possibly Heta and Priam's. 
Figure 4.3: Example of a note written into a Storyspace lexia 
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Figure 4.4: Fractal 
292 
Figure 4.5 : Quibbling "Title" map view 
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Heta-artist, Pr~am's lover, lives part-time on Lake Michigan shore, teaches art part of the year in 
Cheyenne, mamed more than once, has (at least) two children · 
Priam-Heta's lover, ex-priest, art teacher at Catholic boy's school, married Catherine three years after 
leaving the priesthood, has a temper, Jane/Cora's brother 
Catherine-Priam's wif~, editor in a. publishing house, abused as a child, gave up baby for adoption at age 
eighteen, does not speak m the narrative, she and Priam are childless, associated with St. Catherine, model 
for Margaret (at least in part) 
Bridget-Heta 's daughter, knits sweater for husband Ben 
Ben- Heta's son-in-law, Bridget's husband 
Gabe-Heta's son. Art student 
Hilda-artist, works in office but is stifled by the atmosphere, has a Catholic education but seems to be a 
pagan (does spiral dance), associated with medieval nun Hildegarde Von Bingen, considers Cy a potential 
lover 
Cy- friend of Hilda, works in a cubicle downstairs from Hilda, tells Hilda he might love her but they are 
not lovers because he seems to be afraid to fall in love, plays piano and has various artistic talents 
Agnes-artist, once worked in a bookstore, friend ofBea, rides motorcycle 
Will- 26-year-old musician/artist, Agnes's lover 
Bea/B.B./Beatrice-friend & correspondent of Agnes, Hilda, and Angela; bisexual, appears to have a 
daughter and a deceased husband; becomes a nun in middle age and is referred to as Beatrice rather than 
Bea or B.B, seduces Cora. 
Cora/Jane-Priam's sister, young nun, left St. Mary's College, befriended by Heta, seduced by Beatrice, 
visits Priam at his school to discuss art classes, changes name to Cora when she becomes a nun. 
Jake/Jacob-Angela 's husband, pilot, not a reader, very good with hands (large hands most prominent 
feature) 
Angela-Jake 's wife, friend ofBea, bookish, unworldly, attended convent school; she and Jake are very 
different, have different tastes, and often misunderstand each other; they live in Kansas 
Margaret-15th century nun in hypertext narrative written by Priam, 20 years old, in convent since age 6, 
from aristocratic family, compared to/modeled on Catherine, also compared to Heta, falls in love with 
Henry 
Henry- chaplain who works harvesting grain with Margaret, falls in love with Margaret, compared to 
Priam (partially modeled on him) 
Werther/Wert-friend ofPriam and Heta (obvious allusion to afternoon, a story), only mentioned once 
Figure 4.6a: Quibbling cast of characters 
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Bea!B.B./ 
Beatrice 
Figure 4.6b: Quibbling 's cast of 
characters 
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Catherine 
Unmanned Narrator-sibling (sister/brother?) ofLuke, musician 
Luke-brother of narrator, musician 
Sherry- Luke's girlfriend, killed after stepping into a busy Detroit street 
Juliet/Jules-Luke's girlfriend after Sherry, dies in California auto accident 
Aleis- Jule ' s sister, also killed in the auto accident 
Clare-Jule's mother, seriously injured in auto accident that kills her daughters 
Jake-Jule 's father, Clare's husband, also severely injured in the auto accident 
Laura-friend of Sherry (very minor character) 
Figure 4. 7: Cast of characters for J. Yellow lees Douglas 's "I Have Said Nothing." 
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I Have Said Nothing 
+ 18 lexias 
+6lexias 
+10 lexias 
+ 14 lexias 
+ 13 lexias 
+10 lexias 
+20 lexias 
+6 lexias 
Figure 4.8: Partial flowchart for "I Have 
Said Nothing" 
But I've Said 
Nothing 
Exeunt 
Thana tops is 
Which? 
Which? 
Who? 
Exeunt 
Artifacts 
Why? 
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Appendix B: Exported Storyspace Iexias 
"LUST," by Mary-kim Arnold 
(Lexia titles appear below the dashed lines.) 
Prologue 
Nearly naked 
thi s summer night 
sweet and heavy, 
he comes to her. 
This night, she follows him, 
sweat between them 
They speak of the child 
and the summer sun 
with words that yield 
to the touch. 
COMMENTARY 
How 
How does one read something like this? A text like "Lust" cannot be read; it can only reread, as Joyce 
states. "Lust" is like a poem, but the reader's purpose is not to explicate it--not explain it, but to read/reread 
it, and perhaps to rewrite it. 
boundaries 
It occurs to me that the notion oflust is about the precariousness or permeability of boundaries. When one 
is experiencing lust, the "normal" sense of self changes; the self overflows its conventional boundaries, 
inhibitions drop away, and a sense of oneness may be felt with the "object" of one's ardor. Actually, the 
subject-object split breaks down. The self--the old, unified Enlightenment-- is experienced as unstable 
while one is in lust. 
In this light, then, "Lust" may be read as an experiment in breaking down boundaries, or border-crossing. 
Hypertext itself may be called "lustful." It might also be called "promiscuous." 
Indulgence 
She aches from the gravel against her soft flesh. There is blood. She is nearly naked. She falls to her 
knees. She screams. She picks up the knife. There is blood. He does not speak. 
He Wishing 
He remembers wishing he had stayed. He walks out of the room, she does not follow this night. 
NOTE: He and she seem to be identical. This is the only space where he wishes he had stayed. In the 
others, it is she who wishes he had stayed. 
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He tries to speak to the child. He tries to remember how it happened. He tries to remember her face her 
flesh. He remembers the tearing. He remembers the blood. He remembers the child. ' 
She had fallen to her knees. He walks out of the room that night. She follows him This night, she 
follows him home. She cries like a child. 
He Expects 
He was nearly naked, except for the baseball cap. He does not speak to her. 
He expects her to come to him. 
NOTE: Dave wears a baseball cap. This is Dave because Dave is a keyword for this space. 
Penis 
They are undressed. 
He touches. 
She screams. 
He touches. 
She walks away. 
He follows her. 
She does not speak. 
He undresses her. 
He does not speak to her. 
There is tearing. 
There is blood. 
She does not speak. 
He Listens 
He asks her to try to remember. 
She tugs at her shirt. He expects her to come like this. 
NOTE: A baby would tug at her mother's shirt, wanting to be picked up. 
She remembers his face. She is sun warmed. She remembers her soft flesh against the carpet. 
She does not remember the child. She does not speak of the child. She speaks slowly, heavy and cold. 
He listens, watches her eyes deliberately avoiding him. Watches her lips twitch as she speaks to him. He 
does not speak. She falls silent. 
She clutches her knees. 
She walks out of the room. 
He does not follow. 
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In noce 
That night, she follows him. Her feet hurt. She picks up the knife, drops to her knees. He talks to her. 
She watches the knife. He walks out of the room. She follows him. 
Innocent 
She follows him that night, running into the street, blindly, tears streaming down her cheeks, heaving 
wildly. She is barefoot, the gravel hard against the soft flesh of her soles. 
He looks at her as if he has expected her to follow him like this, naked except for the long cotton shirt. 
She picks up the knife, holds it, cold, smooth, heavy, runs the blade across the surface of her skin. She 
walks toward him. He walks out of the room. 
NOTE: She also picks up the baby. 
He walks out of the room and she follows him, that night, she follows him as he walks out of the room. 
She wishes he had stayed. She calls out to him. 
He expected her to come to him like that, nearly naked. 
Innocence 
She follows him that night, running into the street, blindly, tears streaming down her cheeks, heaving 
wildly. She is barefoot, the gravel hard against the soft flesh of her soles. She runs on, sees him walking. 
She slows to a brisk walk, trying to catch her breath and tugs at her nightshirt, riding up between her naked 
thighs. She rakes her fingers through her hair and follows him home. 
He looks at her as if he has expected her to follow him like this, naked except for the long cotton shirt. 
"For god's sake, sit down." 
I don't want to sit. 
This Night 
This night is sunless. There is sweat between them. They are undressed. The blanket is fraying. Woolen 
fibers. 
NOTE: Memories are fraying. I hypertext might be analogous to a frayed blanket. A blanket is a text/ile. 
Remembering 
She remembers his face from a long time ago. 
NOTE: To remember is to put back together, to reassemble fragments that have fallen apart in time. 
Th~ Child Speaks 
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The child doe.s not remember. The child does not speak. The child is nearly naked, wrapped in woolen 
blanket, toes flexmg. 
NOTE: The child does not remember. Maybe only the adults, or the she and he, remember? 
Is the child wrapped in memories and/or words. Remembering and speaking are interchangeable here; they 
are paradigmatic units. Words are remembered/spoken. The child does not speak/remember. The thing is to 
find paradigmatic units. 
To remember is to piece together the frayed fabric of the blanket/text. 
Dave 
Dave was a guy's guy. He hung with the boys. He wore a baseball cap, only touched her when they were 
in bed. He called her "dude" and told her that she didn't understand "penis things" . 
Jolm 
John had sand colored hair and eyes of sea. He drove a motorcycle, never wore a helmet. "I am a dyed-
in-the-wool Republican", he said. 
Jeffrey 
Jeffrey had a past. He wrapped it around him like a blanket to keep him warm, to keep him safe from 
harm. The blanket of steel, less penetrable than the surface of his skin. 
I told him it didn't matter to me, I wanted to know all of him, not just the good things, the dark side, too. He 
to ld me I had seen one too many movies. 
NOTE: The blanket is analogous to the past, something remembered. This blanket/past also keeps them 
warm. Memories are warm. When she remembers, she is not alone? The blanket is also steel, which is cold 
rather than warm. The knife is steel. 
Michael 
Orange juice kisses and summer sun -- she remembers him with a faint longing, wanting nothing like 
love, nothing like sweat or wind. And when the traces of salty sweet [sweat?] lay on her skin like a blanket 
of breath and tears, she thinks ofhim, thinks of him, always thinking ofhim. 
I fmd it difficult to be alone with you now. I find it difficult to be alone. 
NOTE: Orange juice is a reference to morning. 
Is she just one person--a kind of Trinity? She is alone with him and just alone. He may not be present at all, 
except in her memory. 
He and the Child 
He is gentle with the child. Speaking softly, deliberately, muscled arms embracing soft naked flesh. 
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Summer 
She is aching. She wants to sit down. She sits on the carpet, touches her toes. 
He speaks to her, asks her to follow him, to stay with him. Here he is like a child, slowly, deliberately. 
There is no mourning. They do not speak. There are no screams. There is no blood. That night, there are 
no tears . There are blankets of words, the fibers fraying. 
The summer sun is sweet and heavy. 
NOTE: Blankets of words? It is a blanket of memories, the past. A text. 
Coming 
She comes to him, undressed. She undresses him. She does not speak to him. She runs the blade along 
the surface of her skin, cold, smooth. She tears . There is blood. 
Then there is morning. 
NOTE: The blade seems analogous to Jeffrey's blanket, which would make the blade also analogous to the 
past and words and memories . To run the blade along the surface of her skin might be simply to think about 
the past. This is a nice metaphor even Arnold didn't intend it. 
The Child 
He is a child. NOTE: OK, he is a child, at least here. 
He speaks deliberately, following her home, walking to her door. 
He is smooth and cold. NOTE: The knife blade is smooth and cold. 
She is nearly naked, except for the long cotton shirt. 
He looks at her, expecting her to follow him. 
He walks away. 
She wishes he had stayed. 
Aching 
He is very civil, cool toward her. He speaks to her as a child, slowly, deliberately. She watches his eyes 
avoid her consistently. She watches his mouth twitch as he speaks. She blinks hard as if to erase the image. 
She sees the knife. She touches the knife. She runs it across the surface of her skin. Cold, heavy, smooth. 
She holds the knife, the soles of her feet stinging from pavement, flexing toes against the carpeting. Lets it 
drop to the floor, gentle thud as it falls. Watches it fall. Watches it lay on the carpet, glistening, taunting. 
She kneels to the floor. Lowers her head into her hands. He walks out of the room. 
If only you had stayed 
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NOTE: She appears to be the child here, with her toes flexing, etc. 
Nearly Naked 
He holds her, nearly naked, wrapped in blankets, toes touching. Fibers touch her flesh. She aches. She is 
longing for his flesh, sweat, sweet and heavy. 
NOTE: The touching signifies contiguity, closeness, borders edging against one another. 
She carries the child. She does not speak to him about it. He expects her to come. He comes inside that 
night. She remembers. 
NOTE: She carries the child, and he comes inside her. Maybe he is the child she carries inside her? Corning 
would not mean ejaculation in his case. 
Counting 
She counts to ten, breathing slowly and deeply. 
She screams. She picks up the knife, thinks of his face. She touches the blade, running it gently across 
the surface of her skin. 
I don't remember anything else. 
"Try." 
I can't. 
NOTE: "Remember" occurs in 14 lexias; so it is important. 
Try 
She tries to remember how it happened. She remembers his face. She remembers her flesh, his flesh. 
NOTE:. This may be the same flesh. 
She remembers him walking out of the room. She remembers following him. That night, she follows 
him. She remembers wishing he had stayed. 
She remembers almost naked, he does not speak to her. 
She remembers cool, smooth, heavy. 
She remembers tears. 
She remembers screaming. 
She remembers morning. 
She and the Child 
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Dyed in the woolen blanket. Fraying ends. Fibers. 
NOTE: John is a dyed-in-the-wool Republican; he also has sand-colored hair. 
Sand, gravel against soft flesh. 
She remembers being put on hold. 
She remembers very fast. Very fast wind in the hair of sand. 
She remembers cold. 
He speaks to her slowly, deliberately. 
She remembers the child. 
Fibers 
He remembers her with longing. He remembers watching too many movies. He remembers her, nearly 
naked, arms, legs, entwined, and he, too, undressed, soft flesh. 
He follows her home. He walks her to the door. Movie-style kiss. Orange juice. Naked thighs. 
They do not speak to each other. 
Morning. 
NOTE: Orange juice and morning are linked. 
She 
She smells of sun and oranges. She is warm, windblown and smooth. She is nearly naked. 
She Wishing 
His face is soft like a child's. NOTE: When someone screams they seem to be the child. 
She touches his face, running her hands across the surface of his skin. He is undressed. 
She undresses him. She does not speak to him. She does not touch him. 
He screams. He does not remember morning. 
Summer sun and the child. 
NOTE: The author seems to be playing with the ambiguity of pronouns. 
Crying 
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He tries to understand, driving very fast very fast. He follows her. She is running ba f, t 1 · 
· t ft f1 h ft , re oo , grave eatmg m o so es , so toes. 
There is blood on his carpet. The fibers are soaked in blood. 
He tears at the carpet like a child. 
He cries like a child. 
NOTE: Is the child someone separate, or an aspect of one of the adults? 
Knife 
She picks up the knife, thinks of his face, runs the smooth cold blade across the surface of her skin. 
NOTE: Does this simply mean she is thinking of the past? Jeffrey had a past. 
Touching 
He touches her. He touches the child. The child screams. 
NOTE: The child and her seem identical here . 
She touches the blade of the knife to him, cold, smooth. He does not speak. 
He screams. The child does not speak. The child [She] picks up the knife. There is no blood. 
NOTE: Is the knife the child? Does she pick up and carry the child? 
There is no child. NOTE: Does she pick up the knife and leave? 
There is only morning. 
Things 
He does not speak to her. 
He touches. 
She does not speak. 
She only screams. 
Penis Things 
He undresses her. 
She undresses . 
He is undressed. 
Morning 
Their arms are entwined. They are undressed. They speak slowly, deliberately. They remember morning 
and the summer sun. They speak to the child. 
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They are sunwarmed and undressed. The child is nearly naked, sitting on the carpet. 
They long for morning. 
NOTE: They and she may be the same person. 
She Expects 
Morning and the summer sun. She has no need for blankets. Her flesh aches from the gravel. 
NOTE: She has no need for memories/the past. Or she has no need for words. This makes more sense 
considering the following. 
She remembers cold. 
She remembers traces of sweat, salty, windy. 
She expects him to come, nearly naked. 
NOTE: Expecting is obviously important. It may the opposite of remembering. Expecting/remembering 
binary. Future/pqst. Maybe expecting has something to do with the cold blade? 
She Aches 
She aches. She longs to sit. She sits, thighs naked, tugging at her shirt. 
She falls to her knees. She counts to ten, slowly, deliberately. He is heavy. He is cold. 
His carpet is stained with blood. There are loose fibers. She tries to speak to him. She can only scream. 
NOTE: OK, she appears to kill him here. But is this Jeffrey? 
Before it says that the child aches. 
Wishing 
She wishes he had stayed with her. She wishes like a child that he had followed her and stayed that 
night. 
The morning comes. Summer sun, heavy, falling across the carpet fibers. She is on her knees, facing the 
child. 
The child aches. The child comes to her, nearly naked. She speaks slowly, deliberately. 
NOTE: Who is the child? She wishes like a child. 
Notes 
Note 
Touching, speaking, screaming, walking away, nearly naked, following, talking 
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Note 
She has killed him. 
Note 
Nouns--knife, carpet fibers, gravel, flesh, feet, orange juice, sweat, blood, tears, screams, the baby, naked 
thighs, shirt 
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"I Have Said Nothing," by J. Yellowlees Douglas 
We were weaned 
Hell , we were weaned on the economics of death according to Hollywood. On the four o'clock movies 
wedged in between school and di!Uler, on the early evening and late Saturday films that kicked around on 
the UHF stations, you'd witnel)sed maybe eighteen thousand deaths. Shit, maybe thirty thousand: it 
depended on how many times you 'd watched The Wild Bunch. 
Do you remember Sherry? 
Remember Sherry? My brother Luke 's piece: the one who got into that godawful tangle with him at 
Paycheck ' s in Hamtramck. The one who threw that half-empty bottle of Beefeater Gin at his head when he 
told her to stop drinking. The one who folded up like an old coat and skidded flapping down the length of 
the basement wall when he elbowed her square in the solar plexus. 
Hell, you remember Sherry, I'm sure. 
The thing is, she's dead. 
He took home artifacts 
He took home artifacts: the soiled underpants ornamented with nylon lace, the pair of sparkly blue socks 
she was wearing, a barrette that had been knocked into the gutter-he wasn ' t even sure if it was hers or not. 
He slept with this collection heaped under his pillow, along with one of the pair of spike heels she 'd been 
wearing, a six inch number which may or may not have been responsible for the accident. 
NOTE: Now we're talking about Sherry again. The reading path leads one to confuse Sherry and Jule. 
Anatomy 
Do you know what happens to you when a Chevy Nova with a 280 engine hits you going 75 miles an hour? 
Run over 
It runs over and over in your head, like the loop of film in the Volvo commercial, with the crash dummies 
bouncing forward in unison, choreographed in slomo like an overcranked version of Swan Lake or an 
Esther Williams number. You were both soused but, shit, when was the last time you played a gig without 
being fucked up? You wouldn' t care to take odds on that one. Besides, Sherry had learned how to be 
quietly fucked up, which was the one thing that counted. There 's nothing wrong with being out of your 
fuc king head, just as long as you 're not flamboyant about it. 
You remember her coming up to you, dog-like, awaiting words of praise, a little compensatory pat on the 
head for not chucking bottles of Beefeater gin at Paycheck's bar, or lobbing the remains of gin and tonic at 
the pinball machine in the back. And what did you tell her? 
Slipped 
You step off the curb, but those shoes your mother always bitched about-the ones your boyfriend called 
your "come-fuck-me" spikes-they grate against the concrete and you stagger. Just a half step. 
But more than enough. 
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But still you knew 
But still, you knew, as every kid did, that there was a definite, comforting order at work somewhere behind 
the scenes. The people you knew well, the ones whose names headed the rolling credits, the ones who had 
weeks named in their honor on the late-rught movie slot, the ones who were important, they stuck around 
for the action. 
The ones you barely knew or the ones you disliked-the spurned suitors and jealous deputies and cattle 
thieves, the Elisha Cooks and the ones without names, with forgettable faces or lousy teeth-they were 
thrown to death as a sop, something to stop the hunger pangs until the main course rolled around. 
There was a neatness to death there, an admirable economy to it. Principals lingered like the sun at a 
summer evening's end. Character and supporting actors fell like dusk around the winter solstice, their lives 
runlling out in a shot or two. Extras snuffed it, their goings as brief and unremarkable as fruit flies'. They 
dropped two or three to a frame, and we thought nothing of it. It was natural; it was expected; it came with 
the territory. 
Bound to happen 
Shit, it was bound to happen, I suppose. Too much gin, too many Vivarin-remember how we used to eat 
those getting ready for exams? And the belief that nothing can touch you: the cars will always scream 
toward you like something out of a Warner Brothers cartoon. But they'll stop just like that too: the 
cowcatcher of the locomotive quivering just inches away from Bugs Bunny and the whole nine yards. 
I guess she thought Warner Brothers took their ideas from life. 
Or life took its ideas from Warner's . C'est Ia meme chose. 
All it took 
Actually, it took a hell of a lot, if you ask me. It took about four quarts ofBeefeater gin as well as a 
handful of Black Beauties, not to mention incredibly bad timing. And six inch spike heels. 
Can we accept one? 
Death was life's silent partner, no more than that, and we took its presence for granted in everything we 
watched. 
So why did it catch us so unawares? Unscheduled, unannounced, unframed, it arrived around the time of 
the late show one night and was gone in less than fifteen seconds, like a cheap public service 
announcement. 
She was gone like one of those women in monster films, the ones who inevitably trip a half dozen times 
before the camera -twitching violently to simulate the ferocity of the oncoming beast--overruns them, 
and their lives, narratively speaking, are extinguished. How is it, we, who have witnessed eighteen 
thousand deaths, cannot accept one? 
Preferential treatment 
And my mother gave him preferential treatment: an endless supply of man-sized Kleenex, the thermostat 
cranked up to 85 degrees to keep him from shaking. 
The Old Lady even used Jarutor in a Drum on the bloodstains in his room, the ones he put t~ere after_ he 
slashed himself and used his wrist to write the first three letters of her name across the wall m a loopmg, 
feathery script before the blood dried out, and my mother prevented him from using more. 
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The blood stayed surprisingly red on the wall for about a week before he'd let my mother go at it. And 
when she encountered one of his usual, sticky skin magazines secreted under the bathroom vanity, she just 
gave a shudder of disgust and slid it back under again. 
It wasn't healthy 
It wasn't healthy, she said-Sherry's mother-about the way my brother was carrying on. Sleeping with 
his head jacked up about three yards off the pillow above an assortment of sparkly socks from K-Mart, 
Sherry's spiky "come-fuck-me" shoe (they never did fmd the other one), plus the coat she was wearing 
spread out all over the end of the bed. 
In the end, she came over one day and asked for it all back: you can ' t hang onto a load of cloth, any more 
than you can to flesh and blood. But I think she was concerned about his hanging onto a load of polyester 
fibers as if it were her flesh and blood. 
Anatomized 
- It fractures your collarbone ; your scapula; your pelvis; your sacral, lumbar, thoracic, and cervical 
vertebrae. 
- It splinters your ribcage, compressing your liver, kidneys, spleen, stomach, intestines, lungs, and heart. 
- It fractures your skull and bruises your brain. 
- It causes massive hemorrhaging, throws the heart into cardiac arrest and hurls your central nervous 
system into profound shock. 
All that vicarious 
All that vicarious experience, that immense education we receive in death from the headlines and the 
evening news, from the grainy photograph on the inside pages that transmits the unutterable grief of a 
bystander witnessing the spectacle of death. From snippets of history and comic books and feature films 
that have cinema audiences honking in unison into their Kleenex. And it all signifies nothing. You 
understand only absence. 
Your brother, who has brushed up against it in a crowd, had it elbow him in the ribs, jostle him on a 
platform as it made its way to greet somebody else, how much does he understand? 
Faint surprise 
Hardcore drinking problem. Seriously insecure. Mondo bucks. That was Sherry all right. When I go, she 
used to say, I want it to be fast. It sure as fuck was, as far as we know. Luke said, when he saw her face, 
there was only a faint expression of surprise on it-she was a major baby about pain. I wasn't there, so it's 
hard for me to imagine what that must have looked like. 
You could say that faint expressions of anything weren' t an overly familiar component of her particular 
repertoire. 
She hadn't 
If he were an articulate kind of guy, he'd have said that it was ironic. What he said instead was that Sherry 
hadn't been drinking that night, that she 'd behaved herself that night-by way of a change-that it was 
ridiculous that galumphy old Laura, who was such a notorious klutz, was the one who had made the 
opposite curb in one piece. 
310 
I guess maybe we should have read it differently, used what he said like an algebraic expression: for not 
drinking, we should attach a sort of unknown factor, like, "she never usually got fucked up after only two 
bottles of champagne and a few kamikaze," or something like that. 
But we didn't. 
I, for one, believed him. 
It was easier that way. 
Or oops! 
Perhaps you have trouble judging just how fast the oncoming car is traveling. 
The autopsy will indicate that your blood alcohol level was over four times the legal limit. 
The driver who hits you, a twenty-four year-old by the name of Charon, is just over the legal limit. 
That makes two drunks involved in a collision. 
Only she walks afterwards. 
He even 
picked out her grave site. Later, he told me, as we drove down Grand River one night, her old man had 
wanted to stick her in the ground any old place: he'd pounced at the first slot they'd offered him. "Next to 
fucking Telegraph, man." 
She 'd been killed on Telegraph, just a little inside the official Detroit city limits. Her old man probably 
thought Telegraph was a whole different ballgame, once you got out to the real chi-chi suburbs, like 
Birmingham. 
Every one 
It breaks every bone in your body. 
Including your head. 
He was obsessive 
about the funeral arrangements. He went to the funeral home to supervise her laying out, taking along with 
him her high school graduation photograph, to show them the way she'd worn her eyeliner and the rest. 
He'd chosen the last blouse and skirt she'd ever wear-nobody asked him why he'd selected that particular 
outfit-and he kept peering into the casket. He was screwing up his eyes-he'd already cried so much they 
looked as if they'd been leaking battery acid-and looking down at her chest. 
"Look," he said to anyone who'd listen. 'Those bastards who did her autopsy, they've fucking stitched her 
chest all crooked. Her sweet little chest." 
And then .. . 
And then . . . 
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Nothing. 
But this isn't all 
The guys with the EMS stand looking down at her. One of them nudges her with the tip of his high tops. 
Her right arm flaps slightly, the way a blow-up doll's might. 
"Shit, she's daid," he says. 
How do we defme death? 
You enter 
When you go over to her house, you step into her bedroom. A pair of her shoes are facing the bed. She left 
a little hoop of her hair inside a rubber band, lying alongside the princess phone on her bedside table. The 
line of really pathetic-looking stuffed animals that always looked ready to erupt into clouds of weevils 
seems to be waiting for her. The closet door is ajar. A can of flat Diet Coke is perched next to the bed. 
The fluffy quilt has the imprint of her little keester still on it. 
Give me five 
You tell her to g9 outside, not to bug you until you finish coiling up the cable for the junction boxes: the 
fucking roadies never get this right; they're always leaving one or two behind. She goes outside on auto-
pilot, but, hell, she's been driving practically on fucking auto-pilot since she was sixteen. 
If they ever breathalyzed her, they'd probably end up inscribing her level on the side, putting it in a 
showcase downtown, or something: Highest Blood-Alcohol Reading Ever Registered by A Still-Living 
Subject. 
That was the last time you saw her, really. The rest was all just blood and skin. 
Give me fie 
You tell her to go outside, not to bug you until you both cool off a little bit. You suggest that maybe the 
beach was the right kind of place for that. 
As for you, you'd do something worthwhile, like take care of all that Christmas bullshit. Why you said 
this, Christ only knows. You fucking hate Christmas, bullshit and all. 
That was the last time you saw her, really. The rest was all just blood and skin. 
Did she think 
Did she think: I am the story, its pivot, its source. It can't go on without me . .. ? 
In Psycho 
Yeah, Marion Crane thought that: the story was all about her, her guilt, her greed, her adultery. And just 
look what happened. She stumbled into the minefield of someone else's story-one that just happened to 
involve a schizo named Norman Bates. 
The rest, as they say, is history. 
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He was holding her feet 
Because the December night outside was freezing, literally-that was what had made her scamper across 
Telegraph Road:s let~al arteries,_ after all-Luke _knelt down at the curb and collected her into his lap. 
When the Detroit pohce found hm1, he was cradlmg her bare feet between his palms. 
The shoes had been knocked from her feet, he explained in quite a level voice, and he couldn't find them 
anymore. But she'd always hated the cold-she was quite a baby about it, in fact. 
Later 
Later he would come back looking for some things: the diamond earrings she'd been wearing when they 
set out that night but which never quite made it to the morgue. 
The octagon of skin she'd left against one curb, as opaque and delicate as a fragment of ice skimmed from 
the surface of a pond not yet frozen over. 
He had forgotten 
a conversation he 'd had with Sherry, one he'd repeated to you six months before. Now you remind him of 
it. 
After he'd argued violently with her-and your brother could be a real bastard at the best of times-she'd 
hugged him, impulsively. 
"What'd you do that for?'' he asked her. "I'm not about to hug you back right now, am I?'' 
"No," she 'd replied. "But that's okay: I hug my Daddy loads of times, and he never hugs me back." 
Jesus Christ 
he said, taking his foot off the accelerator, so that we were gliding gently to a halt, driving down the middle 
of Grand River in traffic, cars on all sides of us. 
"Jesus Christ," he repeated. You tried looking furtively into his side-view mirror to see if you're both 
about to get rear-ended by an irate driver. 
That's when he turned to look at you, full face . "I'd forgotten all about that." He started to cry again. 
Sometimes you forgot she was eighteen. 
Blam! 
You think it's a lark: you're bored, you toss a couple of airplanes made out of The Detroit Free Press into 
the air and watch the slipstream from the traffic speeding by whisk them along on miniature whirlwinds. 
You run into the median strip to retrieve one of them and toss it back the other way. 
But something happens on the way back across. You misjudge the distance, maybe, between you and the 
oncoming car. 
We could also say 
but that's not really the cause of her death. 
We could be clinical and insist that it's hypoxia. Her cells get starved of oxygen, and they die, in shoals, 
granted. 
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But that means she dies piecemeal, perception gradually getting snuffed out, sense by sense. Or it gets 
distorted- so she thinks she 's flying toward a bright light and all those other things doctors tell you are 
simply the reactions of a brain starved of oxygen. And not someone experiencing death and the liberation 
of her soul. 
We could say 
all cessation of cardiac activity. 
No evidence of any brain activity. 
Who thinks? 
Who thinks about Marion Crane and the money? Who 's still thinking of her by the time the credits roll, 
and Norman in his strait jacket and the Bates Motel have just flickered their way into the collective 
consciousness of almost half the twentieth century? 
Drew 
"Do you remember old Drew in Deliverance?" he says to you. 
"Sherry and I used to think it was real gross, the way that Jon Voigt kissed Drew before he pushed the body 
under. Kissing a dead guy like that." 
You don ' t need to answer him, just let him keep going. 
"Man, that's what I did. In the morgue. I kissed her everywhere. Everything. I even kissed her little box. 
There was a social worker in the room and all and I just didn ' t care. She wasn't a dead body-" He starts 
to cry once again. Anything else he had to convey to you is lost. 
But does it stop? 
But suppose the brain goes on for a while, its cells receiving all the million minute impressions that fuel its 
functions- it just doesn 't do anything with them. Maybe it goes on working for a bit, like the moment in a 
documentary you saw once about the Riga riots, where the cameraman gets nailed but his camera goes on 
recording its impressions, the lens lying on the cobbles, filming fleeing ankles and flares in the distance. 
Until the film runs out somewhat after his life does. 
No body 
Nobody. 
Later still, 
Later still, he'd come back looking for something else. When the moment was right, he stepped off the 
curb where he'd sat holding her feet the Saturday before. 
Ifthat's so 
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If that's so, then I hope she didn ' t hear them. 
In the ambulance 
They're in the ambulance heading toward the hospital. Its siren and lights are on, and it's pushing the 
speed limit, full whack. The EMS guys know she 's dead, but they're in a rush to get off their shift and 
back to the hospital, so they put them on. Technically, since she's a DOA, this thing should be going like a 
hearse through streets still dark with sleep. 
Inside, the sound of everything-the sirens, the medics, the steady hiss of the snow tires against the wet 
tarmac, everything-is drowned out by the sound of blood running from her ears, just like water running 
under a sluice. 
Tom Buchanan 
Somewhere, somebody else is going through this, the Tom Buchanan moment when he goes back to his 
covert little Harlem love nest and sobs over the half-filled box of dog biscuits left on the sideboard, after he 
watched Myrtle buy the farm under the wheels of his wife 's car. 
All the unfinished business, the pure messiness of life, always sticks around to haunt us. 
She walks 
And, anyway, when Marion Crane is quite dead and the crew wipes the Hershey 's chocolate syrup off her, 
Janet Leigh gets up and walks. 
And collects a fat check afterwards. All Sherry will collect are mites-and whatever insects and bacteria 
can survive in a steel vault lined with concrete, set into Michigan clay. 
The Old Lady 
My mother is there with him-she was pretty good about this kind of thing back then-and she grabs him 
by the belt loops ofhis SOl 's and yanks him toward her. 
"Just remember one thing," she says to him. "If you go over this time, you're taking me with you." 
All I collect are fictions . 
A story 
It's all just a story, something you can spin into a plot with memorable characters and a few good lines 
that ' ll stick in the craw and maybe even something approximating real closure, if you play your cards right. 
Then it'll be something tangible, something solid that exists Out There and maybe even gives somebody a 
few minutes' distraction from, say, riding the Lexington A venue local at rush hour zippered into the cars 
like sardines in a can, or the pitch of the high-powered whine of the dentist's drill-beard piercing the 
dreadful quiet of the waiting room just before your name is called. 
In short, something that has fucking nothing whatever to do with you. It's all just fiction. 
Tell me a goddarnned story. 
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Why? 
When I call him after the accident (we're talking about the second accident now), neither of us has any 
words to pass back and forth over the phone. 
Finally, he just says, ''Why." 
It 's not even a question. Which is good, because I don't have any answers for him. I could say something 
lame about people wasting their lives trying to make things matter. Or how we spend our days mistaking 
patterns for Order. 
But I say nothing. 
NOTE: Do we mistake patterns for order in hypertext? We crave order. Saying nothing leaves a gap--a gap 
between order and chaos? Order would be stillness behind the motion picture of life. 
The End 
That's all she wrote. 
Fucked up 
It 's like waking up from a blackout, after the shock. You can't quite get a grip on what the hell 'sjust 
happened, where all those lost moments and hours got to. You realize you're staring up at the night sky. 
And you hear his voice, over the screams: 
"Man, Sherry-this time you 've really fucked up." 
What? 
For a long time afterwards, whenever you two don't quite meet up on the phone, he can't seem to get the 
narrative order of events quite right. He keeps shuffling it around, until you realize neither of you know 
what it was anymore. 
One day he tells you that Jule berated the EMS guys all the way to the UCLA medical center. There 
doesn ' t seem to be any point in reminding him that yesterday he told you the police broke all the gory 
details to him about seven or eight hours after the accident, or that the day before he said they'd both been 
drinking. 
What he says is this: 
Deja vu 
That's his last memory of Jule, before they take her away, arguing weakly while the EMS guys rip open her 
shirt and cut through her bathing suit. 
The sound of her voice is reassuring. Death is for other people. It has nothing to do with us. 
You wonder 
Did she know? Did she have some faint nudge between the ribs, some vague tickle that life 's silent partner 
was going to call in his debts that afternoon? 
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Or was it just a coincidence? Like Sherry saying to the Old Lady, a few weeks before the accident: "When 
I die, it's gonna be fast. Like I didn't know what hit me." 
When he looks at Jake 
he realizes the utter impossibility of his ever having the words to tell him this. 
He has no inkling of what they would even sound like. 
You sit, you think 
You sit and think for a while, maybe forty-five minutes solid, about the ugliness of your primary urge-
which is to write all of this down. Somewhere inside you, through all the tears and the gastric juices 
churning away in your stomach, and the faint, sour taste of vomit you can't seem to rinse completely out of 
your mouth, somewhere, through all of this, your brain is ticking away like a metronome. 
This goes just before the climax, you're thinking. And, when your brother breathes audibly down the line 
for a moment or two, then says clearly: 
"I wish to Christ it'd been you. Why the fuck wasn't it you instead?" 
You know you 've really got a story. This is simply the grain that irritates. You hear it. And then again 
you don't. 
Yet he knows 
that the only person in the world who is going to break the news to Jake is sitting in his chair. 
Last night, in the parking lot, a guy with a shitty Saturday Night Special had jumped him. When he found 
Luke didn't have a shred of fucking paper on him-nothing, nada-he was so disgusted he didn't even try 
to pistol-whip him. Now, looking at Jake's lips curling up around the tube in an attempt at a smile, he 
wishes the guy had fucking bashed his skull to kingdom come. Given him retrograde amnesia. Tossed the 
coroner another stiff for the fridge. Three foil boxes back at the goddamned house. 
Through the jungle ofiV 's and feeding tubes and snarl of catheter and ventilator, Jake's fingers are 
scrabbling at the slate. 
They give you far too much to eat in here, he writes. 
Random sweepings 
The fairest order in the world is a heap of random sweepings. 
- Heraclitus. 
This time, 
This time he calls Sherry's mother. 
He wakes her up at three am and she answers the phone with a voice all rusty from sleep. And he tells her, 
he tells her how he was responsible for Sherry's dying. 
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And, in the end, you say nothing. 
But I've said nothing 
I have done nothing but wish to speak: 
ifl have spoken, I have not said what I wished to say. 
- St. Augustine 
NOTE: Is this a problem with signifiers and signified, the fact that signifiers always miss the mark? 
Squealing 
You're listening to her ranting about the jaws oflife and how she's going to come back with a gun and kill 
all the gawkers who stood around waiting to watch her die. 
From the sound of it, most of them would be ready to join the AARP by then. 
But if you stop 1\stening to her voice, then you tune into the exchange between the EMS guys, looking at 
each other. "Man, baby, we give you something for the pain, we gonna lose you." One of them gives her a 
local, and there's a little pause, like being put on hold. Then they start cutting: they bisect her right up 
under the ribcage and start cauterizing the bleeders. 
Then it hits you, what they're preparing for is another DOA. 
She always 
had a distinctive voice-Jule did: dry, sarcastic, with a little stylized drawl drawing out the phrases, a way 
of speaking that you always figured she'd invented to make her stand out from everybody else in Detroit. 
There ' s no reason for you to believe this particular version more than any other. Nobody was able to tell 
you which EMS crew hovered over her in her last quarter hour, and no one is exactly stepping forward and 
volunteering. Maybe even her last words hadn ' t sounded that different from what came out of any other 
accident victim's mouth. In the end, these last words probably all sound the same-after you've heard your 
fust fifteen or twenty versions of them. 
Pain. 
De.lusions. 
Regrets. 
Longing. 
Disbelief. 
Terror. 
You envision the crew that heard them already enjoying collective amnesia by the time they'd finished 
signing the papers and sat down with some hot coffee in the ER. 
Squeaking 
Beyond a certain level, we're all infinitely interchangeable. In the room next to your's, the mattress 
squeaks like the leafsprings of your old man's Mustang, when it ratchets over potholes. 
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He calls you 
on New Year's Eve. There's such a long silence on the phone after you pick it up that you assume 
automatically it's an obscene call and you get ready to slam the phone down at the first hint of audible 
breathing. It's an unusually silent pause, though, with just a hint of rushing white noise at the back of it 
that suggests, maybe, a trans-continental phone call, so you hang on. 
"I think Jake 's flipped," he says, fmally. 
Jule 's father can 't speak-he's hooked up to a respirator and he's in traction-but he can scratch out 
messages on a little slate strapped to the side of the bed. When Luke went to see him, he 'd struggled to 
chalk out a message. 
I think I'll go take a walk and get my paper, he'd written. 
"He's cracking up," Luke says . 
Then it hits you 
-he's not going to pieces: he's trying to make a joke. But Luke can' t see it. 
That's because when Jake looks at Luke, be sees his daughter's boyfriend looking hollow-eyed, slumped 
over in the visitor's chair, the kind of morose, bang-dog type nearly always in need of a bit of cheering up. 
He can't even begin to imagine what Luke sees when he looks across at him. When Luke looks at Jake, he 
doesn ' t see someone who will never walk again. What be sees is a man who hasn ' t yet realized that the 
two daughters he saw on Christmas day are now two tidy piles of ashes lying in two gold foil boxes, stowed 
in a rented house somewhere in North Hollywood. 
NOTE: Did Jule and her little sister die? 
Save him 
Save him from what? be wonders. 
But you know what she meant. 
Save him from himself. 
Two more drunks 
This time, there are two more drunks. 
Only they're driving sports cars and beading down Sunset in the opposite direction. Going about 60 miles 
too fast. 
This time, there's another DOA. 
This time, there's another trip to the morgue. 
Only there 's no one to hold his hand. 
No one to wipe the bloodstains off the walls when be tries to squeeze rusty graffiti onto them. 
No one to kick up 'the thermostat. Or to stop him from shaking. 
This time there aren' t even any skin magazines for comfort. 
Or someone to prise the mementos mori from his grasp. 
Nada 
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In the end, none of it works. I can 't get into his head and even when I try to project his thoughts, the voice 
remains indelibly mine: there's no escaping it. I can only guess about her, about either of them. 
Their deaths touch me like a stroll through the Holocaust Museum, where your consciousness seems to 
stutter in the face of the enormity of it all, all those private histories snuffed out, death dropped on residents 
like a mailshot. You blink, try to refocus your eyes, but human sight just wasn't made for that kind of 
acuity. 
So you move on. And think of the enormity that divides you from all those others. 
NOTE: Is it that death cannot be narrated? It is beyond our powers of narration, which is how we make 
sense of things. To say nothing is to refuse to narrate what can't be narrated. 
One phrase 
He hears it over and over in his head. It's the squeal of the monitor. It's the white noise over the radio in 
the EMS cab. It ' s the noise the axles make, the whine of the jumbos passing overhead on their way to 
LAX. Later it will be the sound of the steam thumping in the radiators. The phrase barked by the 
neighborhood dogs. 
I'm dying, she says. Save him instead. 
Get it down 
By now, you 've got this down. You've got it down, big time. 
You realize 
there are loads of things you never knew you never knew. 
It just happens that you can ' t communicate any of them. 
This is it 
So this is it, this is what it all amounts to, I'm going to kiss the fucking world goodbye with these assholes 
in the back of an ambulance screaming its way through the bowels of LA. I don't even know where we 're 
going, and I'm going to go out feeling someone dragging a scalpel across my stomach, paring me like an 
apple . I can feel everything, every little pop and rip and, as it goes on, all I hear is the squeal of my 
monitor cutting across all sound like a blanket of noise. Like a pig being butchered. 
And you think, ifl 'd known all this-known I was guying to buy the farm before I hit thirty, surrounded by 
a bunch of guys who only give a flying fuck about me because they're being paid a lousy hourly wage-I'd 
have snatched at life with twenty hands. Or ten. Or even two. 
Instead of just one. 
You start not making 
it. You haven ' t the faintest idea of what dying feels like, so you don't think to yourself, you know: This is 
it, I'm starting to die. 
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The first thing that clues me in is the way the EMS guys are screaming at each other. For a few seconds, I 
try to tell myself that maybe these guys are pissed off, what with handling bodies and shit all the time and 
probably not making too much money to boot. Then the guy monitoring my breathing and heartbeat says, 
right out loud, that they're losing me. 
They wire me up, get an IV into me and I'm screaming the whole time, I think, I'm begging these guys to 
shoot me up, put me under, do something for the pain. It's fucking killing me. 
There 's a woman there and she seems to be the only one who remembers that there's a head attached to this 
body in pain-maybe nobody else gives a fuck, I don't know. She says, "That's right, honey, we put you 
under now, we gonna lose you," and she gives me a local. She might as well have jabbed me with a 
hypodermic full of water or something. I'm losing too much blood and they're going in before they get to 
the trauma unit, to prep me for the operating room. 
That's when I realize I'm bleeding to death. 
Get over 
You never quite get over it: the way people replace living things with other living things. A year after the 
accident, your brother' s back in his bedroom tussling with somebody else on the mattress that probably still 
has the come stains he used to brag about inscribed on it. They used to be Sherry's. Now (if the Old Lady 
could ever talk him into stripping the bed and washing the sheets) he'd probably attribute them to Jule. 
Mate 
You think maybe this is why people go through wedding rites, muster their friends and relatives and 
acquaintances up as witnesses: to make sure they'll feel squeamish about prematurely reneging on all the 
promises they've just made. 
It ' s because humans know they 're fundamentally incapable of mating for life. 
Later that afternoon 
he goes down to the morgue and finds them waiting for him in two little gold foil boxes, like bath salts 
from Bonwit's. 
Then he has a fight with Aleis' boyfriend-who wants to take what's left of her back with him to Santa 
Fe-over the ashes. 
I could die 
Later on-he can't get the chronology straight, but you understand by this he probably means weeks rather 
than days-Clare will tell him what Aleis had said on the way out to the beach by way of mending a few 
fences. Aleis was, after all, the one who'd got pissy about the situation with the sleeping bag. It was to 
have been her first Christmas away from Uganda; she'd been working in hospitals there as a volunteer for 
five years. 
"I loved my job, I love my family, I love my life," she said. "I've had a really good life, you know? If I 
died today-hell, I wouldn't be sorry." 
In court 
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they will later establish that the kid had been swigging from a mostly empty bottle of champagne and that 
he 'd been racing the Probe his daddy'd given him four days earlier with another sixteen year-old down 
Sunset. You know, whoever reaches the beach first wins. 
Problem was, there were about six lights in the way and about a hundred and forty cars. 
One of them happened to be hers. 
The police arrive 
This is no neurotic mother's nightmare imaginings in the seconds before the wayward son or daughter 
shows up on the stoop, made a few minutes late by an unduly long midnight clinch or something of that ilk. 
You see, he 's been there before. 
Nope 
It all depends, I guess, on whether you 'd choose to spend your last second as a conscious being mulling 
over something completely banal. Or to spend it with your eyes trained on the Death Express, as it hurtles 
toward you at half the speed of light. 
Personally, I'd opt for the banal approach. 
Neither 
Neither of them ever saw what hit them. You think. There was just that faint surprise on Sherry's face, as 
if the perception hadn't quite had the time to register before her brain basically got blasted inside her skull. 
The impact of the accident knocked Jule unconscious-nobody in the car had the few seconds necessary to 
register the presence of a new Ford Probe hurtling toward them across the yellow line. 
Would you choose the same? 
NOTE: These are two separate accidents. 
In the ambulance 
They split us up, I guess they decided that we had enough trauma to keep three units busy. You don' t think 
about these things. 
On TV, it's always so easy, the EMS guys run in with somebody strapped to a gurney and they whip you 
straight into the ER and that's it. Someone opens you up and, in the next scene, you're smiling vaguely 
from between the bedsheets, you know, in some fucking private room with, like, banks of flowers all over 
the place, practically hanging off the goddamned ceiling. 
Nobody tells you they're going to treat you like a sorry sad sack of shit, that they've got to stick needles 
and pipes and every other fucking thing in you to prep you for the trauma unit. 
Nobody lets on that you might not make it. 
No, they won't 
Her last words will be-they didn't make sense at the time, she seemed to be in the best shape of all of us, 
moving around and talking and all-
I'm dying, save my sister, save my sister. 
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I'd rather not remember this part. 
There it is 
Your brother replaces one body with another. Once in a while, he talks about the state of her body in its 
cement-lined vault, but mostly, he resumes living with Juliet exactly as he did with Sherry. 
He buys an alligator-a caiman, actually-and smuggles it out to California in a styrofoam cooler. 
They collect stray cats that play hockey with the occasional eggs the iguanas leave around. 
The caiman plays in a kiddie pool in their backyard in North Hollywood. 
Time passes. 
Less 
Maybe less than even you do. 
You would revere absence. He buries it. 
In somebody else. 
NOTE: Who is speaking here? Whoever it is is speaking to the sister (or brother) of Luke. She is a 
musician. 
Get a knife 
They collect in little puddles, standing about five feet away from the rental car and they look at the four of 
us like we're something in the fucking zoo, or an exhibit of the car Jayne Mansfield got beheaded in. You 
can take your pick. I start screaming at them to get me out of the car, because I can't move anything and 
the thing wrapped around my chest is killing me. And I ain' t talking figuratively. 
But they've all watched too many sixty second spots, where the questions are always easy and the answers 
come thick and fast. Release the safety catch at the front, they keep saying. It should be under the dash. 
Either the car never fucking had one to begin with, or it's now part of what probably looks like a 
Giacometti from the outside, so this is a big help . This starts some major fucking head scratching. They all 
stand around some more, and I keep screaming: I'm calling them all cocksuckers and motherfuckers, I'm 
threatening to come back with a 9mm later on and blow their brains out, but it doesn't do any good. 
Finally some old lady comes out with a great whacking kitchen knife, and some guy with a tattooed tear 
leaking out the corner of his eye takes it from her and starts sawing away at the strap through the broken 
window. He stops and clears the glass with the toe of his Pumas and carries on with the sawing. It seems to 
take about a half a century and, while I'm waiting, I stare at the tear on his face. 
It falls 
This time around-everything falls to Luke. The first time, Sherry's mother and brother and sister had 
converged to form a protective ring around him. Because he had loved her probably more than anybody-
or needed her more desperately in his own way than anybody else could imagine needing her, at any rate-
they'd pitied him and commiserated with him and suffered alongside him. 
This time, though, he was alone. The girls, sitting up in front, had suffered hardcore internal damage; in 
the back, her parents' skeletons had snapped like cocktail pretzels-they were left with fewer bones 
unbroken than broken. Keeping watch over their bedsides, he doesn't know what to do, he can't decide. 
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NOTE: There has been a second accident. This time Luke is at home and Juliet was with her sister A leis 
and their parents, who were in the backseat. In the first accident Sherry got hit while trying to cross a road. 
When the moment 
of truth arrives, however, he responds without hesitation. He spent the morning over at the morgue, trying 
to persuade somebody, any white coat that looked as if it possessed a shred of authority, not to cremate the 
girls before their parents regained consciousness. Then he headed over to UCLA in time to catch Clare just 
coming out of surgery. 
When he sees her on the gurney he feels something like reverse suction working on his viscera. Everything 
seems to be bucking upwards-and he's still willing it back down when Clare opens her eyes. He tries to 
focus on a bit of skin that isn't puffed black with trauma, then settles on her hair. Her eyelids flutter, she 
focuses miraculously-Clare always was fucking tough as an old nail-and asks how her girls are. He 
doesn ' t miss a beat: his voice is as steady and dry as always. 
"They're hanging in there," he says. 
Cooked goose 
My brother's vis~era, to put it delicately, have been bugging him. So he consigns himself to the john for 
the afternoon while Jule takes Aleis, and her two parents-physically fragile but feisty as hell-along with 
her through the LA traffic. He watches the car snake off down Sunset through the bathroom screen, and it 
seems to him later that the car spent an incredibly long time receding. A little like that steady zoom that 
closes on William Holden in The Wild Bunch, so that he appears to be growing closer even as he's riding 
away, his silhouette fading into the distance. 
He guts the goose for Christmas dinner. Then he cooks it. 
He cooks the stuffing and doles out the cranberries. 
And rakes every last leaf from the lawn. 
And feeds the cats. 
And the iguanas and the caiman. 
He even checks the oil in his dilapidated Nova. 
And then he waits for the police to arrive. 
Eight years later 
while the wheel's still spinning, the little ball drops into Luke's particular slot again-only, in this 
particular game of chance, he doesn't rake the chips in; they get swept out from under his nose. 
After a botched appendectomy (which included a nightmare scene in the recovery room that involved 
waking to the Four O'Clock Movie right at the moment when Tony Curtis as Houdini gasps out the 
promise, "I'll come back ... I'll . . . come . . . back . .. "as he dies from peritonitis-just down the street, it 
turns out, from Luke's old house back in Detroit,) he declines to accompany his girlfriend of seven years to 
Zuma Beach. 
There had been another argument, the night before. Something-a cat or an iguana or maybe even the 
caiman-had dropped a little calling card in the bottom ofher sister, Aleis' , sleeping bag and, apparently, 
lots of shouting and yelling had ensued. He didn't say whether any lobbed bottles of Beefeater gin had 
figured in it. 
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You never saw 
Remember how they say that? "He never knew what hit him." The Old Lady always said it almost 
triumphantly, as if she were somehow one up on the unfortunate parties under discussion by knowing what 
had hit them in the end. Maybe she was right. 
The way you figured it, not knowing what hit you put you in a position of not only utter helplessness but of 
absolute ignorance. An acquaintance of mine once told me about a friend of his who 'd died in that incident 
involving an inbound L-1011 and windshear at Dallas-Fort Worth. "I imagine her talking about her 
grandchildren to her seat-mate, looking out the window, getting all excited about seeing Dallas," he said. 
"She was like an insect before it gets swatted." 
At Christmas 
Over Christmas, while you ' re staying in New York at a hotel on the Upper West Side, you drop by to 
change your clothes late one afternoon and happen to notice that the message light next to the phone is 
blinking. You go into the voice mail system and play back the message recorded in your sister-in-law's 
scratchy voice. 
It tells you another one of your brother's girlfriends has been killed. 
It happens 
I think of it happening in slow motion, like something out of a bad imitation of Sam Peckinpah-or a 
Volvo commercial, take your pick. But it must have happened real fast, because, when all of us came to 
after what was maybe, I don' t know, five, ten seconds, Aleis is the fust one to speak. 
"Jules, what happened?" 
These will be her last words. 
Move 
You can' t. There's some bullshit about the passive restraint giving way if you get pitched forward, so you 
don ' t, you know, get your shoulders both dislocated or anything like that. It happens in accidents where 
you get hit head-on. 
But the restraint thing locks up-or maybe the whole car got so fucking pretzeled up that it did go slack 
and then seized up. All I know is it locked around me, like some kind of goddarnned giant boa constrictor, 
stretched right across my ribcage. It's like it gave a gentle little squeeze to my heart and lungs, you know, 
then wrapped its tail around my spleen and guts. 
Now the neighborhood comes out to play. There 's nothing like a wreck to bring 'em all outdoors-better 
than a sideshow. Or watching your next door neighbor beat his wife's face into hamburger while you stand 
back behind your kitchen or Jiving room screens and suck your teeth in disapproval, but never call 911-
why bother, what's the use? 
The wreck- us- it's a real spectacle without the guilt. It has nothing to do with you, it's like it just 
happened to wash up in your neighborhood. 
Kinda like teevee. 
COMMENTARY 
This is my commentary. 
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film 
Film and late night movies are important. 
Silent Partner 
"Death is life's silent partner." Beautiful line. 
Facts 
stats 
There are about 99 lexias in the original hypertext. 
The default path always leads to "That's all she wrote." 
Cast 
Cast of characters: 
Narrator--may be female, musician 
Luke--brother of narrator 
Sherry--Luke's frrst girlfriend; she is killed crossing a road 
Laura--friend of Sherry 
Juliet/Jules--Luke's second girlfriend; dies in auto accident along with Aleis. 
Aleis--Jule's sister, who is killed in the auto accident 
Jake--Jule's father; he and his wife are injured in the same accident 
Clare--Jule's mother, Jake's wife 
Notes 
behind scenes 
There is no stillness behind the motion of the scene. Space doesn't stand still for us to draw on it, to map it. 
A reader would not know that I have added this lexia unless slhe looked at the map view. 
space moves 
Space moves. Hypertext space moves, too. One way this movement is expressed is by using the guard 
fields. For example, the default link from lexia 1 may go to lexia 2, but after the reader has gone from lexia 
1 to 2 once the default link can change to lexia 3. Thus the reading path or text moves, somewhat like the 
ground shifting under one's feet. 
late show 
The late show is a prominent motif. 
nothing 
Death has nothing to do with us; it is a fiction. This is a central leitmotif. Are we dissociated from death 
because of the movies? Or is everything a narrative? Douglas is interested in narratology. Death cannot be 
narrated. But fictions are narrated. 
second accident 
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It's the second accident even though this is a multilinear text--the accident that kills Jules and Aleis and 
badly injures their parent. 
simulacrum 
The movies may be a simulacrum, a simulation more real than the real. (Baudrillard). The characters in this 
hypertext are living in hyperreality. 
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Cyborg: Engineering The Body Electric, by Diane Greco 
The complete !ext of Cyborg: Engineering the Body Electric prints outs to sixty-one 
pag~s at 10 po_mt !ont. ~ecause of this length, aside from the title page, I have only 
copied the lex1as m which I have written notes or commentary. 
start here 
table of contents 
- Introduction 
- Your Body is Meat 
- Machine Dreams 
-Mind, Body, Anti-Body 
- Cyborg Visions 
- Communication & Control 
-Writing the Cyborg 
- What Do Cyborgs Know? 
COMMENTARY 
The edge is metonymic. See lrigaray. 
Tactics are timely, opportune actions taken in foreign territory. Strategy involves long-term planning from 
a stable base of power. Tactics are about resistance to power. 
Shelley Jackson wrote, in an e-mail to me, that she is concerned about internalized control. 
4. Do you think that the Patchwork Girl's fragmented, multiple nature 
>allows her to slip out of the masculine, controlling grasp, or perhaps to 
>evade the voyeuristic male gaze? In other words, is there a freedom in 
>fragmentation or multiplicity? 
I think there is a potential freedom in fragmentation and multiplicity, 
though I'm not sure it has to do with evading other people's control; I'm 
more concerned about the control exerted from within that shuts off 
options and makes us one-dimensional and boring in our attempt to lay our 
hands on a unified, secure self. I was trying to propose a cheerfully 
decentered way of composing a self. 
Being-with, power-with ... This is the key to cybernetics and the cyborg. 
"Technology is visceral." This means there is no separation, no distance, between the human and the 
machine. 
328 
Forgetting is an integral part of reading. We read with short-term memory, forgetting one string of text as 
we proceed to the next. Only rereading shifts text to long-term memory. 
Power is an important theme in the text, with 35 lexias containing this word. Power is about establishing a 
place, a stable base of of operations. From such a place, strategy, rather than mere tactics, are possible. 
Cyborgs to not reproduce; they are not copies of an orginal or prototype. There is no ideal or perfection or 
the fall. 
In the digital world, reproduction is supplanted by replication. Reproduction belong to the old analog 
world. 
The cyborg, with its extended mind, may be rhizomatic; it can mend itself with new parts, just like ants will 
always come back together if separated. The cyborg really has no center, because its parts may be scattered 
all over the world. The Patchwork Girl is also a kind of rhizome; she is called a "swarm." 
student 
Shelley Jackson also studied with Landow at Brown. 
potent 
Of course, science fiction has always traded in possible worlds. But the difference, with cyberpunk, is that 
the world envisioned is often very difficult to distinguish from the familar concrete-and-speed landscape of 
late-twentieth century urban industrialized nations. And the technology is always just another 
breakthrough away. In cyberpunk, the world is not only possible, but just visible on the techno-horizon. 
This potent combination of science fiction and technological fact in cyberpunk sf offers an escape from the 
physical body. It also comments on the boundaries of that body, as well as on the social reality that defines 
it. The body is, among other things, a social question. Cyberpunk answers to that question are 
characteristic of both the technology itself and the socio-cultural milieu of late twentieth century post-
industriallandscape in which the narratives are embedded. 
NOTE: Shelley Jackson is also very concerned with the body. 
symbolism 
"Through cybernetics, the symbol is embodied in an apparatus- with which it is not to be confused, the 
apparatus being just its support." 
NOTE: The apparatus is an interface, for example, the pages of a book. 
desire 
We desire. 
We wish to possess what we desire. 
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Getting what you want involves strategy; the harder question, which I will leave aside for the moment, is 
which strategy to choose. Strategy is the manipulation of reality to achieve a pre-specified end; this 
manipulation reconfigures the world, makes it different from what it was before. 
Strategy also involves tactics, which are the concrete local processes involved in getting what you want. 
Both strategy and tactics intervene upon the world; but this intervention is only purely functional unless 
you start thinking about what you want and why you want it in the fust place. 
And that's when you might begin thinking in terms of representation. If you want a trip around the world, 
an atlas will not do- but if you took that trip, what good would it do you unless you could point to an 
atlas later and say "I was there"? Making your experiences comprehensible to others means making those 
experiences expressible. And if reality is fundamentally social, then all reality is representation in one way 
or another. The phenomenal world exists, but in such an underdetermined way that we take our minds to it 
in order to figure it out for ourselves. 
NOTE: Greco's definitions of strategy and tactics are different than those of Michel de Certeau. 
I disagree with Greco's claim that reality is fundamentally social. Much of our reality is social, but not all of 
it. A toothe ache is not social; proprioception is not social. These kinds of experiences do not need to be 
represented to others through language in order to me realized. 
cyborg 3 
Because virtual worlds create discursive spaces in which the boundaries of the self are fluid-
intermingling with the consciousness of others, often machines -this project uses cyberpunk science 
fiction to explore the image of the cyborg as a confluence of information technology and social interaction 
that promises to make and remake us into what we perhaps already are. 
NOTE: Is she claiming that machines have consciousness, or is this a premise of cyberpunk fiction? 
closure 
In its inevitability (and perhaps even necessity) the technological disaster bears down on us like one_of 
those steam-powered locomotives that used to horrify us in Bugs Bunny cartoons on Saturday morrungs. 
But what exactly was the disaster in the cartoon? Just the waiting, since we all knew Bugs would pop right 
back up again, re-inflated, immune. 
NOTE: Douglas' "I Have Said Nothing'' contains a similar reference to Bugs Bunny. 
writing the cyborg 
Constituting the cyborg body means writing it. But the cyborg body has already been ~itten or i~scri?ed 
in a very special way; not only do technological devices mark the cyborg, but they con~titut~ her td~ntlty as 
the interpenetration of organism and machine, fantasy-creator and the created fantasy, mscnbed wnter and 
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her own text. If technology is our fantasy cathexis of the body, the cyborg, as the product of both bodily 
reality, techno-fact and science fiction, is a rootless child sprung from a tradition that cannot claim her as 
its own. She represents the other- fantastic, monstrous, frightening- that has always already been 
denied. 
NOTE: The cyborg is rootless because it is a rhizome rather than a tree. 
bio as destiny 
But unlike the essentialist critics of the past who implied that one's biology must restrict one's destiny, no 
one forces or delimits the intimate relationship between her body and her self; "cyborg" is an identity she 
chooses on her own, with an eye toward its limits as well as it possibilities. 
NOTE: We don't necessarily choose to be cyborgs. Amputees don't choose to have a prosthesis instead of a 
leg. 
perpetuum 
The perpetually self-undermining nature of the cyborg perspective attests not to its uselessness but to the 
challenging nature of all claims to knowledge and the need to evaluate those claims regardless of the 
limited nature of the evaluation. 
NOTE: Deleuze and Guattari argue that nomads, bands, and gangs undermine institutional power; they do 
not have an office of leader that is filled by a line of people, like our presidency. Leaders, or chiefs, are 
more like stars, who reign for a while but eventually fall out of favor and are replaced by someone with 
more charisma. So there is no state separate from the people, no office that outlasts the leader; leadership is 
unstable. So the self-undermining of the cyborg is akin to the nomadic social organization. The cyborg is 
rhizomatic, then. 
There is no center of power in nomadic society---no Washington, London, or Rome. Authority is dispersed. 
A hypertext also has no center. 
passing 
When it comes to self-representation, the cyborg recognizes that what holds true in one perspective may not 
count as truth in another. Self construction, who or what one is, largely depends on where one situates 
oneself-in a particular society, as a particular self, with particular means of justification for that self-at 
the time. From the perspective of the cyborg, all representation is in one important sense mis-
representation, or passing; because the cyborg so radically alters the integrity of some original, all self-
representation is construction of a fictional persona, and there is no reliable physical instantiation on which 
to rely for proof of identity. 
NOTE: There is no original; the cyborg is not a copy of a prototype; it is not a representation. The cyborg 
follows the logic of association rather than representation or mimesis. 
appended 
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In cyberpunk, sex takes on an entirely new meaning: it is a meat-function, the inevitable result of living 
with the demands of physical body. If technological-biological upgrades and replication replace 
reproduction, sexual desire and even genitals are useless as an appendix, a residue from an earlier time 
when the body needed to be sexual in order to reproduce itself. "All the meat," thinks Case in 
Neuromancer, "and all it wants." 
hey, send me back .. . 
NOTE: Reproduction is an important theme here. The cyborg is not the product of reproduction and it does 
not reproduce. It assembles parts; it is an assemblage, like Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus. 
hacker anti-body 
Whereas the cyborg literally incorporates the tension between self and body, the non-cyborg body loses out 
in the dystopic cyberworlds of William Gibson and other cyberpunk writers. In cyberspace, the mind is a 
commodity- a cowboy hacker is paid to travel in cyberspace with his consciousness, not his physical 
body- but the body itself (apart from the brain, the wetware force behind the mind) is disposable. 
NOTE: Consciousness is the experience of embodiment. 
meat 
The cyberpunk disposability of the body as "meat"- if you lose yours, you can always get a new one-
creates a social context in which the exploitation of these bodies carries no particular moral or ethical 
weight. It could be argued that prostitution, for example, no longer degrades the prostitute, or at least not in 
quite the same way. The technology separates her mind from her body so entirely that she may have no 
recollection of the event at all. Think about it. If you can't remember something, how do you know it 
really happened, especially when the only other witness has a very real interest in maintaining his silence, 
and your own? 
NOTE: Cf. remembering and wishing in "Lust." The cyberpunk disconnection from the body means the 
absence or erasure of body memories. 
virgin 2 
Yet the technology is intrusive; it destabilizes the boundaries of person and world that we normally take for 
granted. Despite the hope that an agent can use the technology to her advantage, the danger remains: the 
body is a space to be colonized. 
NOTE: The boundaries ofthe self fray. 
maps and tracings 
In place of the privileged meaning, a mapped identity emerges; connection is not about making links from 
one place to another, but about allowing the points of connection to say something about the spaces in 
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between. In this sense, the body becomes a site of dynamic mapping in and on which every point is 
potentially hot, live, generative, explosive - the body as hypertext. 
NOTE: This is the rhizome. The distinction of maps and tracings comes directly from De leuze and 
Guattari. However, a rhizome has no points, only lines. 
intimacy/borders 
Similarly, Molly's control of the seduction scene in Neuromancer reflects her ability to name and create 
(for) herself. This control stems in part from the way she uses the technology embedded in her own body to 
increase her power to arouse. Molly rewrites the technology in this scene in such a way that its effects are 
far from its intended use, and this re-vision of the potentialities of the machine to include the erotic 
underscores Molly's creative capacities in shaping the role technology plays as a part of her identity. 
NOTE: Using a technology in a way other than its intended use is a tactical move, according to de Certeau. 
In this way the consumer breaks out of the pattern of passivity constructed by producers. 
interface design 
Unlike the essentialist critics of the past who implied or argued that one's biology must determine one's 
destiny, no one forces or delimits the relationship between the cyborg body and her self; "cyborg" is an 
identity she chooses on her own, with an eye toward its limits as well as it possibilities. (Essentializing the 
cyborg: imagine that! The cyborg body at the center of the inquiry- and not even a body, not the way one 
might usually think of it ... no biology, save technology; yet no technology that is not socially produced, 
with a history, a semiotics, a significance that can be articulated and explained.) 
NOTE: We might say that the cyborg actually resists identity, if identity is .a stable self as opposed to a 
rhizome. The Patchwork Girl certainly resist identity. What we have is an affinity between parts, not a 
unified identity. Striated space is delimited. Smooth space is open and fluid. 
isomorphism 
NOTE: These are examples of analog technology. If we punch a typewriter key harder, we get a darker 
letter. The same does not happen with a computer keyboard. 
"This signal may be the tap of a key, to be reproduced as the tap of a telegraph receiver at the other end; or 
it may be a sound transmitted and received through the apparatus of a telephone; or it may be the turn of a 
ship 's wheel, received as the angular position of the rudder." 
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Patchwork Girl, by Shelley Jackson 
As with Cyborg, due to the length of this hypertext (78 pages printed out in 10 point 
font), I have decided to copy on the lexias in which I have written notes and commentary. 
her 
title page 
PATCHWORK GIRL; 
OR, 
A MODERN MONSTER 
BY MARY/SHELLEY, & HERSELF 
a graveyard, 
a journal, 
a quilt, 
a story, 
& broken accents 
hidden figure 
I know too that if what my studies instructed me of a coming resurrection is true (though I do not believe it, 
for have I not done in history and formed a human chain of one between life and death?) the restoration of 
bodily wholeness for the rest of you will rend me apart. Jennifer, Bronwyn and the rest will sit up from 
their graves in the little cemetery where I was born and where I will, where I now, where I have many times 
awaited my "death", and in front of them all I will come apart paragraph by paragraph. If all quotes remain 
tethered to their sources by however tenuous filaments , so my parts. My face will explode into fragments: 
eyeballs roll back to Tituba, teeth fly like sideways hail to the empty gums of Walter and Judith, sorting 
themselves as they go (molars to Judith, incisors to Walter, who ate only wine biscuits and blancmange). 
My fmgers will heal themselves back onto the stumps of their various donors. I will be an afterimage 
glowing at the points of origin of my many flight paths. A Cheshire aftercat. An unchalked outline. 
Metaphors will be called home for good. There will be no more likeness, only identity. 
NOTE: She is talking about affinity vs identity. 
earwigs 
When I was "young" (though all my parts were old) I turned over a leaf and found a massed and crawling 
nest of earwigs. I dropped the leaf and backed away from these creatures that appalled me singly not at all. 
What is dreadful about the plural? The swarm, the infestation. Is it that, without the necessary limits of 
any discrete entity, the swarm seems only accidentally, not essentially bounded in size? That it becomes a 
fragment of an infinite quantity, suggesting infinity despite its own accidental measurements, just because 
those measurements are accidental? 
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When I ran from the nest of earwigs, was I escaping a universe packed from seam to seam with them? 
Shiny pronged lozenges struggling against one another. Assembling into crystalline structures, insect 
architectures. The earwig as building block of matter, instead of the orderly playground of the atom, where 
the little balls roll and roll in circles. In place of the play of electrons: the quiver of segmented legs, 
twitching against their neighbors. 
NOTE: The earwigs are a rhizome. 
COMMENTARY 
Patchwork Girl commentary 
quotidian 
Quotidian--ordinary, everyday--is an important theme in Quibbling. 
bowsprit 
This same image appears in Quibbling. "The wind from the Great Lake blew her hair in awkward clumps 
across her face. She turned directly into it, suddenly transforming to bowsprit maid, hair flying back, chin 
jutting" (onadune). 
harpold 
Harpold observes, "if you take apart a knot, there is nothing inside it. [ . . . ] We can turn around and around 
that moment and never close the wound it covers. [ .. . ] Knots hold together the bandages of the 
dismembered body, but they do not heal its wounds" (177-78). The text remains a dismembered corpus. 
Haraway 
ironic 
Haraway: 
AN IRONIC DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR WOMEN IN THE INTEGRA TED CIRCUIT 
This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. 
At the centre of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg. 
What kind of politics could embrace partial, contradictory, permanently unclosed constructions of personal 
and collective selves and still be faithful, effective- and, ironically, socialist-feminist? 
af:fmity 
Haraway: 
Fission Impossible is the name of the affinity group in my town.(Affinity: related not by blood but by 
choice, the appeal of one chemical nuclear group for another, avidiy.) 
The recent history for much of the US left and US feminism has been a response to this kind of crisis by 
endless splitting and searches for a new essential unity. But there has also been a growing recognition of 
another response through coalition - affmity, not identity. 
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Tills identity marks out a self-consciously constructed space that cannot affirm the capacity to act on the 
basis of natural identification, but only on the basis of conscious coalition, of affinity, of political kinship. 
And of course, 'women's culture', like women of colour, is consciously created by 
mechanisms inducing affinity. The rituals of poetry, music, and certain forms of academic practice have 
been pre-eminent. 
cut text 
Normally, the writer places him or herself in the gaps between source texts, and this produces the illusion 
of seamless, consistent, mono vocal text; that is to say, the fundamental multiplicity ofany text is sutured 
together or sutured over with the writer's identity, ego, or ethos. Harpold claims, "Suturing describes a 
closing of the gap in language by the subject's assumption of the place of the gap" ("Threnody" 176). 
Harpold is referring here to the gaps between signifiers in any signifying chain. In other words, every time I 
quote another text I add a new signifier to the signifying chain of my own text. However, there are gaps 
between these signifiers--gaps which scholars are taught to suture over with their own writing and their 
own ethos, ideally producing a seamless text. In this way source texts are overcoded. Overcoding, or 
interpretation, is a reductive process; it is to reduce the multiplicity of the text to a single consistent 
meaning. To overcode is to construct another stratum over a text, to hold it down, as opposed to releasing 
the text through connection--or, in other words, creating what De leuze and Guattari call a "line of flight" 
(3-4 ). Primary texts are compressed beneath many strata of secondary, critical texts. But rather than 
reducing or compressing a primary text, rhizomatic writing connects to and extends a text; therefore, the 
primary text/secondary text dichotomy text breaks down. 
disjoint 
Harpold: "Entering the web requires a confidence in a myth that presumes connections can be made 
between dismembered portions of a corpus that are, on an elementary level, disjoint" (Threnody 176). 
fractals 
Fractals and spirals are important in this text as well as in Quibbling. 
reduction 
Interpretation is reduction of multiplicity. We construct meaning by reducing uncertainty. 
miscegenation 
Unholy/unholly marriages create the miscegenation of discourses. 
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QUIBBLING, by Carolyn Guyer 
Again, due to the length of this hypertext (156 pages printed out in 10 point font), I have 
decided to copy on the lexias in which I have written notes and commentary. 
Title 
lake 
A cove of a Jake is more comprehensible than the lake itself. Yet a cove does not exist separately from 
the lake, flowing out into and being filled by it. 
Whatever we can understand about a cove may be held in one's hand, but the lake remains blessedly 
incomprehensible, coming out and going in. 
moon-dew 
If you heard that a witch you know uses moon-dew to lay incurable curses, you might think it was dew 
gathered in moonlight that she employs. But you would be wrong. No indeed, moon-dew is something 
else altogether, something rare and difficult to obtain. My question is, once a witch is able to procure 
some, how does she keep it? Powdered? Must be, how else to preserve it? 
Well, let's see. I could simply put a link here, so you could fmd out. Some of you really like the 
mystery part don't you? But on the other hand, I'm a woman telling this, and I'd rather just say that moon-
dew is the first menstrual blood of girls, collected during a lunar eclipse and traditionally used for laying 
incurable curses. Obviously, not often. 
NOTE: The moon and sea are connected because of the tides . 
Good! 
NOTE: Heta and Cora/Jane talking? Yes. 
"OK. Now about you. How are you and Priam doing? Are you alright?" 
"Well, he never apologized after that- you remember- that last horrible fight, but it's like everything 
he's done since then has been an apology." 
"GOOD!" 
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If this were film, imagine this is film, there would be laughing, just women's voices laughing quietly 
together, intermingled sound like the swirl of healing herbs in water, and maybe a camera shot from inside 
a room toward the door which leads to another room. Alright, alright, it's a European film. 
and blood 
NOTE: Spirals, women, blood 
It's a bloody thing. As Erin Moure says, "There is so much about blood." denial, denial, denial 
And shit, there is so much about shit, same denial. My mother says that men don't like to hear women 
say shit, but she is of a different generation, isn't she? 
Did you know, Mom, that it was once believed that people were born from a woman's intestines (the 
clear distinction between reproductive and digestive systems not yet made)? That labyrinths, and snakes, 
and spirals, and coils were symbols of femininity, the mother, operating principle of the world? that reading 
the intestines of an animal was divination unremoved from real experience? The blood the shit. It was OK 
back in those days. 
Do you remember, Mom, the long days and nights we were together in the hospital, both concerned 
primarily with your shit? Literally, it was the fluid of life. You passed the stages of embarrassment 
quickly, though remained always aware of the irony of so much concentrated attention on the functions of 
your bowels. You almost died. We read your intestines every hour, divining, casting spells. We are real 
witches, your voice telling me now, in this distant present, of a new lover, of the Mediterranean Sea, the 
living proof. 
son 
The weakness of men strained through him. How little a mother can really do against the world's 
influence. He must have baseball, and especially coaches. He must ride bikes with the other boys who 
taunt each other to more and more dangerous stunts. (On the one hand,) he will listen to his mother who is 
shocked at a game called "Smear the Queer" and who lectures him about how wrong it is, insisting he call 
the game something else. He does what she says, but soon, of course, he realizes the impossibility - the 
absurdity- of following her directions, and goes back to using the real name of the game with his friends . 
NOTE: Is this Gabe? Yes, the path browser gives the clue that lexia is talking about Gabe, Heta's son. 
boy into man 
She came to believe, sometime during Gabe's twenty-second year, that the real difference between a 
boy and a man could be signified by how well he understood his mother. As a child, Gabriel listened 
carefully to what she said, understood her meaning directly (even iflater he decided what she suggested 
was untenable in the real world of other boys). All of his life, until recently, she had claimed him to be the 
only male who understood her without employing an interference shield. This was the "thing" Heta 
imagined existed between her words and men's minds. They always had their interference shields up. If 
they ever got what she was saying at all, it usually took time. The time required to make it their own idea, 
she supposed. But if they finally got it, that was alright with her. She didn't want to own anyone. Just talk 
with them, listen to and be heard. 
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Is this what women mean when they say, I don't know my own son anymore? She felt her heart to be 
finally and fully sundered when her words came flying back at her, blown by the righteous wind of a young 
man's indifference. This is what happens. 
NOTE: Why is this lexia not linked to anything? 
B.B. daze 
Once while Agnes was visiting B.B., they were running some errands around the small New England 
town when Bea turned to Ag in snappish irritation and said "You seem to be in a daze. What's the matter?" 
And, indeed, Agnes had been lagging about a step behind, not attending very sharply. She was hurt by B.'s 
remark, and spent the afternoon alone trying to understand what a daze was. She fmally came to think of it 
as being split among places. It was always hard to be in a new place with someone else, because new 
places require a little transitional adjustment, an exercise in orientation. If you could be by yourself in a 
new place, the known and unknown have a natural play, overlapping, merging into one synchronous 
experience. But if someone else is with you, the rhythm takes on a buzz, like static interference; thus the 
appearance of a daze. Do you see? 
NOTE: Buzz-daze is Carolyn Guyer's term; it is about hypertext, feeling disoriented in HT. 
teen angels 
NOTE: from Agnes 
7 Oct 81 
Third day, and I can't believe I made it. 
Layered everything on again, but the temp. kept dropping and the rain and wind never let up. Had to stop 
at every Comfort Station cum HoJo on the New York Thruway just to get my extremities unbent and 
moving again. At fust, the stops were only 20 to 30 miles apart which was exactly how long I could stay 
on the bike with soaking wet gloves and the temperature hovering at freezing. Near Utica I thought I'd 
have to quit. Water got inside my boot and it was 45 miles to the next HoJo. Also my jeans were wet to 
the knees and the seams of my raingear had soaked through so the seat of my jeans were wet too. I was 
ready call it quits and call Bea when the Teen Angels appeared. A very young couple in biking gear, 
standing together in Howard's lobby. I know god sent them. They were going almost the same place as 
me. They thought it would only take a couple more hours (I knew better, but still, HOPE!) They helped 
me tape plastic bags over dry gloves, and then fastened my chin strap for me. The three of us took Albany 
rush hour literally by storm. Cold, rain, ice, and gloom, nothing to it! 
Ah, god, 16 hours for the day. Bea's landlady had chicken soup with matzah for us. 
beloved bowls 
During her first long winter of learning pottery, Agnes also discovered beloved bowls. These were two 
or more hand-pinched bowls made from the same ball of clay, one to keep, the other to give to someone 
you love. Beloved bowls suited her sense for ritual so perfectly Agnes set off on a long series of them, 
years of them. 
Her first pair of beloveds was for herself and B.B. She used white porcelain inlaid with pale celadon 
and formed them after the Japanese model of seasonal tea bowls. She made them Spring, and named them 
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Sea Willow. They emerged from the kiln a satiny bone white with delicate waves of green all through, and 
each had a small pink "kiss of the kiln god" on the outside, one of those accidents of firing considered to 
be a blessing. 
Two weeks after sending Bea's to her, Agnes held in her hands a letter telling what it was like for her 
friend to receive the bowl. It had arrived the same day Beatrice returned from the Boston hospital where 
she learned her husband of three months was dying of cancer. She was completely alone, no friends to hold 
her, except now the curve of the bowl. 
NOTE: The bowl is feminine, curved. 
cora perHa 
NOTE: Could be Priam speaking, if Priam is Cora's brother. 
You've probably noticed Cora sometimes has a small facial tic. Well, it's just a minor nerve disorder now, 
but when she was a child it was much more serious, and in second grade she had a grand mal seizure on 
the school playground right in the midst of the crowd of children who always surrounded the nun reigning 
over recess. She told me not long ago that she can still remember how it felt rising back to consciousness, 
the outerspace sound in her ears, the nightmarish view of dozens of faces peering down at her from the sky, 
the hot scrape of asphalt beneath her bare palms and calves, and Sister Michael Marie, looming over her, 
fright in every pore. I remember this nun, I can just imagine her being all black alarm like ink spilled on 
today's book report. 
nun and priest 
Note: Punished by silence, which is white 
He had not called for many days. Punishing, she was sure, though he would have convinced himself it 
was for some other reason. Perhaps something romantic - like proving that their love could survive silence. 
He would like this reason. He would not like the idea that he was punishing her. But the Jesuit in him 
(this mark, a tatoo, or the irreversible bleach ofbaptism on one's soul) did indeed punish. 
While she waited, she kept thinking about the first time they had made love. What it was like to tuck 
into his body, be enveloped by him. How she laughed with utter delight at his shocked expression and the 
stem, ridiculous word, "Naughty!" when she had ventured the notion of a nun and priest making love - and 
then brought it to life by performing it with vigor. She believed he was delighted, too, with her delight and 
animation. 
NOTE: The nun and priest is a reference to the other narrative, the 15th century narrative, which Priam 
writes. 
Still he did not call, and she knew perfectly well the answers to her own questions: where is he? why 
this? 
and silence 
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It lasted forever. Each day a long slow drag of razor-edged ice, like broken glass, drawn through her 
skin. The kind of pain you get outside of and watch in amazement, all the while feeling it completely in· 
slicing spasms. She was two women, keeping herself company against the white. 
NOTE: white silence 
forbidden 
She frequently dressed as if she had a nun's habit in mind. Black and very dark blue were the favored 
colors. Or razor white. The fabric never clung, but draped, describing form by intimation, compelling the 
wearer to subtle, fluid movement. It was the tension made by apparent modesty dramatically clothed that 
gave her a peculiar sensuality. Like a child cutting her eyes beneath heavy lashes, or a nun's sidelong 
glance across her shoulder. 
NOTE: She resembles a lake, dark, with fluid movements. 
waves at play 
Waves coming in to shore can behave quite strangely. I suppose there are patterns, maybe even names 
for them, but they never seem quite the same to me. One time I saw them actually trying to leap forwards 
and backwards over each other like children tumbling, learning how to play that game. 
NOTE: This seems like a metaphor for hypertext. Jackson compares HT to hopscotch. 
daily weave 
Through her days, spent mostly without his presence, Heta played with seeing through the Priam filter. 
What would he think of this person? Really, Priam? I don't know, I think he's not so simple as that. He 
would say such-and-such about that situation. Oh, you're such a cynic, she'd laugh, that's not the only 
thing that could happen you know. 
But always she played this game in order to compare Priam's colors with her own. Conversations with 
him, he not physically there, but literally there. One cannot make a life without knowing the daily detail. 
The smell of a Sunday morning, shared. In bed together at night, the sound of surf through an open 
window. Tome-like glances in crowded places. She tried to fill the lacunae she felt, bringing him to her, 
living with him, then sending the fabric back to him in the mail, or over the phone. Little by little, bit by 
bit, their life together filled, the patterns becoming more complex. Still, it was not enough. 
NOTE: "Little by little, bit by bit, their life together filled, the patterns becoming more complex." This is a 
description of reading this hypertext. This is the quotidian stream. 
bmk/cora's visit 
Date: 06-15-89 23 :01:23 EST 
To: PriaM 
Subj : Cora 
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From: Heta22 
What kind of "little disagreement?" I bet she doesn't get over things all that easily. I know I only met her 
that once, but she seemed fragile to me. Or maybe just very vulnerable. What did she say about the 
program? 
NOTE: Are Jane and Cora the same person? Yes, Jane was her name before she became a nun. 
brnkJthe hazard 
Date : 07-19-90 20:30:03 EST 
To: PriaM 
Subj: good question 
From: Heta22 
well, it seems to me she's already given up her peace by loving him at all. They're headed for trouble no 
matter what. If she stays, she won't regain what she had. Nor can Henry stay if Margaret does. They can't 
be in the same abbey as they are, and not love. Nor can they stay there and love. People are alerted to 
them. 
Do I understand your question? You know they're going to marry, but you're worried that Henry will abuse 
her in some way afterwards? Depends on what you mean by abuse. He has every sanction in the world to 
abuse her physically. It was *recommended* back then. But even if he doesn't do that, he might become 
silent and withdrawn- though really, he's no Abelard. And besides they would have to go far away to 
start over, so they would probably turn more toward each other. 
How can we know? That's the hazard, isn't it? 
NOTE: Guyer is getting at gender differences here, but it also relates to hypertext--not knowing what's 
coming next. 
brnkJiknow 
Date: 06-12-90 21:35:12 EST 
To: Heta22 
Subj: re the hard kind 
From: PriaM 
File: M&H12jun90.sit 
yeah, it's what i've been telling myself too. here are latest revisions. decided to leave in some of the words 
and phrasing in parens. at least for this week. who knows. very risky. never get published. but in 
switching the whole thing over to hypertext, all these alternatives i want to leave in begin to work. though 
now, in this fonn, it *for sure* will never get published. who in hell publishes computer fiction anyway? 
let alone reads it. 
Catherine's deep into a project at work right now. I showed her some of this, and she was appreciative. 
But she's preoccupied, not here a lot - even when she is - so we haven't discussed Mag & Hen much. 
NOTE: HT allows multiple narrative paths, alternatives. 
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werther daze 
"What's wrong? You look in a daze." Wert eyed Heta across the top ofhis sandwich. They had taken 
her to eat the moment she had arrived for this, her first visit. "You don't seem yourself." 
She looked sideways at him and tilted her head. "What would you like me to be? I'll be whatever you 
want." It was an automatic response, self-protective, not really meant as a jibe, but Priam started teasing 
with "Oooo" and a smirking grin. His friend was blushing and Heta was thrown offbalance even more 
than before. She looked at Werther and in a quiet voice that tried to make up for the misunderstood 
remark, said "I'm not sure where I am yet. Give me a little time, that's all." 
NOTE: She is in a buzz-daze. 
news 
They ate c-store sandwiches while sitting in folding lawn chairs on the little concrete slab of a "patio" 
outside Heta's room. They could watch the lake from there. 
"No, uh-uh, The Academy's co-ed. They have boys now, for a long time." This bit of surprising 
information drew an exasperated gesture from Heta. 
NOTE: They're talking about St. Mary's College. The girl wants to be a nun. 
"Another one down. Now that we've gotten to be so 'equal,' it seems we have no place of our own at all 
anymore. We know they don't really have us as equals but sometimes I think in order to make it seem so 
they actually subsumed us, took everything away. Really. I mean it. No schools of our own, no grace in 
our families, just lots of new little men, shoulder pads in place, bows tied up tight at our necks, and skirts -
SKIRTS! They've turned skirts into the dirtiest unfeminine thing of all. Like yellow stars, they must be 
worn now by 'professional women' to identify and place them immediately." 
The girl leaned forward, she was not used to this kind of talk. 
power 
"But French is such a beautiful language. And so many people do know French. What about them?" 
"Well, what? Are they going to be insulted?" 
Heta couldn't help smiling. "Yes, I guess that's the idea. But you know, some people do try to remedy 
this problem They put footnotes, or endnotes, sometimes parentheses right in the text." 
"Still feels like 'Oh, I know you don't know this, so I'm going to put the answer here for you.'" 
"Well? There's no way to do it right? What else is left?" 
"I don't know. All I know is that whenever I read the books they tell us at school, I get mad. But when 
I try to see what I'm mad about, nothing's there.'' 
NOTE: Is Heta talking to her son Gabe? 
343 
ditching it 
"You really ditch it with that one. Never have to go beyond admitting you're wrong: can't help it, by 
definition, male condition, all that." 
"Well even it were possible for me to understand, to grasp, so to speak, it wouldn't be possible for me to 
write it. Hegemony being what it is, no matter how I write my truth, I write it, so she will always be in 
relation to a male authority. No escaping it, as long as the masculine voice is the authoritative voice, he 
can't write a real and equal woman." 
"So I guess what I should be hounding you about is why you aren't using hypertext." 
"Hardly. You said yourself men have owned this from its inception. You know perfectly well it's more 
difficult than that." 
NOTE: Who is speaking? Is she talking about the feminist possibilities of hypertext? Yes. 
bathing 
Her showers were long and ritualistic, probably those of a tub bather in a different time. She used loofa, 
and facial exfoliant, and liquid lavendar, she sanded her feet, washed her hair in herbs, and simply stood 
under the stream imagining a waterfall, or someone massaging her shoulders, her back, her thighs, she 
could easily reach orgasm in a shower if she wanted to. 
Hilda needed her evening shower she said to wash away the day. Her days were like that. She hadn't 
thought yet about the body and soul really being one, but she would have a friend one day who would 
assure her this was true. It was then she would understand another of her reasons for long showers. 
NOTE: Hilda resembles Margaret. Both look forward to bathing at the end of the day. Margaret might have 
been a pagan like Hilda if Europe hadn't been Christianized. 
more Help 
Many readers ofhyperfiction find it easier to orient themselves in a work by first reading through the 
default or "automatic" path if one has been set up by the originating author. I recommend this kind of 
initial approach as much or more for finding one's own reading rhythm in a multiple fiction as for 
discovering an author's intentions. 
There are other ways to go about it, however. In this Storyspace Reader you can move around directly 
in the topography of the text. That is, click on the title of a box you want to look at, and then click the 
"pop" tool - in the center of the directional arrows- to open it (this same tool closes the text box). You can 
go as deep as you like in this way by double-clicking in the lower portion of any text box, which opens an 
area where more boxes are held. Remember that each box has two functions: it can contain text and it 
can hold more boxes. 
If you choose to read Quibbling in this way, you will eventually find a number of boxes with no links 
going in or out. They can only be reached by exploring the territory of the text. At this depth, fictional 
warp begins to tum back on itself, the curve we're always looking for. 
NOTE: The warp is the lengthwise yam or fiber that is crossed by the woof. 
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color theory 
Additive system primaries: red-orange, green, blue-violet 
(these are the three kinds of cone cells in 
the human eye) 
applies to color created by beams oflight, also 
known as generated light. ex: color television, 
stained glass, color computer screens, etc. 
together the primaries produce white light 
additive secondaries: magenta, cyan, yellow 
Subtractive system primaries: magenta, cyan, yellow 
describes the color effects that result 
when light is reflected from an opague 
object 
together they produce black 
subtractive secondaries: orange, green, violet 
NOTE: Primaries and Secondaries are reversed for both systems creating a 
mirror image 
Color Qualities: hue, saturation, and value 
Hue is the color (red, blue, yellow, etc.) 
Saturation refers to strength of hue and has three variations: tint, shade, and tone 
Tint refers to a hue mixed with much white (ex., pink) 
Shade refers to a hue mixed with black 
Tone refers to a hue mixed with grey 
Value refers to where a hue falls on a grey scale. White is at the top, making tints high value, and black is 
at the bottom make shades low value. 
info taken from The New Dyer 
COLORLESS: etiolated 
will explain 
NOTE: Agnes talking about Will. 
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He plays with death all the time and can talk a good suicidal. We really do want each other, ache and long 
for each other in the best old folk song tradition. Star-crossed love and all that. But ifl were to leave, I 
know I would not go to him. If I made that kind of drastic decision, it would have to be totally selfish. I'd 
have to do it for me me me. I don't mean he'd be excluded from my life. But he would have to come to me. 
I'd go someplace where the art is hot and heavy and I could learn something. NY, Chicago, or LA. Or even 
Europe. I'd love to have him with me. He is an artist himself. Mostly in music. But everything else, too. 
Like me. We are both Capricorns, but I think I have more Air. He is so Saturnine. Ahjeez he gets me hot. 
We haven't made love for a year. He got himself a case of Herpes. What do I do with that? 
classic problem 
NOTE: from Will 
30 Sep 80 
Dear Ag-
Here we go. I'll start ANOTHER LETTER. How cum the things I envy are never mine? HA! I'll bet you 
say the same thing. Oh well, you know that I really feel you're the only one who has ever known me and 
I'll never have you so why live? I really hate to admit it but our's is really the classic Romantic problem of 
the ages and whats worse is ah forget it. 
Something else funny. There's 2 things. -Now I underline stuff about death in books which is a pattern for 
people that "do it" also in colleges you look for the people that crack. It happens all the time up here even a 
guy I knew. But I hate to fit into groups and the people that kill themselves in college is a group. 
I should come up with a new angle. How about MAN FALLS INTO RIVER OF ICE CHUNKS WHILE 
JOGGING OVER BRIDGE. naw I'm teasing. wow. I just realized I'm not really writing you a letter I'm 
just thinking on paper. 
NOTE: There may be a time difference between this narrative and others in this text. This letter is from 
1980. Priam and Beta's letters are from 1989-90. Bea could be Beatrice the nun; she just becomes a nun 
later. 
classic ltr 
30 Sep 80 
Dear Ag-
Here we go. I'll start ANOTHER LETTER. How cum the things I envy are never mine? HA! I'll bet you 
say the same thing. Oh well, you know that I really feel you're the only one who has ever known me and 
I'll never have you so why live? I really hate to admit it but our's is really the classic Romantic problem of 
the ages and whats worse is ah forget it. 
NOTE: From Bea. This alludes to Henry and Margaret's relationship, and possibly Heta and Priam's. 
safe gift 
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Print throwaways and offtakes from the presses where he earned his living. Beautiful things he knew 
Agnes would enjoy and appreciate, and maybe most important, keep. He often gave her things in order to 
keep himself safe. 
NOTE: about Will 
iron man 
A large iron nut and bolt picked up from the railroad tracks on one of his midnight meanderings. The 
form appealed to him, and he thought of her instantly when he held it. A long cylindrical stem with a 
domed head on it, and threaded onto the base, a massive square nut that allowed the whole thing to stand 
upright, at a slight angle. He spent the entire night cleaning it, and sanding it, and painting it in many 
layers of bright red enamel. He was genuinely startled when she remarked on it's blatant sexuality. He 
hadn't noticed. Innocence of a satyr. 
N OTE: Will may be associated with the color red, the color of iron. 
pt/will3 
She'd heard of curved penises, but his was the only one she'd personally known; long, at least eight 
inches, and slender, like the man himself, with the subtle upward arc of a scimitar. 
N OTE: Curved rail and curved penises. Curved female body, bowls. Will is associated with sensuousness. 
sister 
Folded newspaper brought down hard on the table. "No!" Priam clenched the paper, pointing it at his 
sister Jane. "You're wrong. This isn't your convent school. These kids need to learn how to get along out 
there, in the real world outside a godfucking ghetto." Jane turned her head away slightly. She was only 
here on a visit, hadn't intended to argue with Priam. She knew he was now at the point of being cruel, 
something he always forgave himself for if it was done in the heat of an argument. She could continue to 
press her point about the young men, boys really, in his program; she could just get up and leave the room, 
or she could wait quietly for the stripe to fall. Whatever she chose, the rest of the afternoon would be ugly. 
"We don't need some Cora-come-lately stepping in telling us how to run this program. " Her head 
dropped and she wished for a veil to hide the pain. Priam turned and stalked from the room. Everything 
went white for a while. 
NOTE: Everything went silent. Cora may be Priam's sister, and she may be the link between Priam and 
Heta. Heta meet Cora right before she became a nun. 
cora jane by bro 
Cora- of course it was Jane then- was just too young, only six you know, she was a year younger than 
the others in her class, she was too young to realize after she had the seizure on the playground that it was 
something that would mark her for the rest of her school days. She was always outside everything anyway, 
always shy and awkward, I watched her gradually move more and more inward with her books. Oh, I don't 
mean she was completely friendless. There were one or two girls, on the edges like herself, who clung 
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together with her all through grade school. Actually, when Cora conceived the idea of becoming a nun, no 
one should have been surprised. She already was one. Personally, I think she believed it would be how she 
could show everyone that they didn't really know her. That she could be dramatic and central. Not even 
movie stardom would have the cachet of a convent. I swear, I think, even then, she believed being a nun 
was the epitome of womanhood. She secretly loved the grand gesture. 
NOTE: The name of this lexia indicates that Cora/Jane's brother is Priam. 
falling robe 
black crepe robe falling slightly open 
he sees white 
lunule 
first curve of dune 
promising in the dark reaches 
knolled promontory 
NOTE: Woman's body as topography. 
birthmark 
The shoreline, in deep winter, row upon row of ice dunes, in the late afternoon light, looking more like a 
seasonal gathering of nunataks, or echoing queues, arty video, of Catherine's breasts as she lay on her back, 
arm thrown behind her head. 
Strange thing to think here in Heta's yard. But these ice peaks are not like Heta's breasts, at any time, 
lying back, sitting up, or kneeling over me. Her breasts are more fluid, almost too soft, and sometimes 
long, like drops, when she leans over, or like twin crescent moons when she lies propped on one arm. Heta 
may love all this ice, feel compelled in some strange way by it, but she could never be Durga, or the Ice 
Queen. The port wine stain which pours down her inner right thigh tells all. 
NOTE: Who is speaking? Priam? Yes, Priam. Catherine seems to be Priam's ex-lover/ex-wife. 
astride 
Margaret used Henry's extended foot and arm to lift herself onto the horse behind him. Gathering and 
dividing her skirts to fall evenly on each side, she swung one leg over the horse blanket and sat both fmnly 
astride and modestly covered. She had only to hold lightly to his tunic for their evening ride home from the 
fields. After working each day of the harvest by his side, and then returning to the abbey as the sun 
disappeared, Margaret would sometimes have the fleeting sensation of an ordinary [quotidian] life. 
NOTE: Margaret is a nun, I think. Yes. 
widder 
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They watched, two interlopers on a hill overlooking the village. They had been walking and collecting 
herbs for the abbey when a crowd of people gathering below took their attention away from each other and 
the task at hand. A long procession of men carrying what appeared to be a stripped tree trunk made their 
way together with their burden to an open grassy mound at the edge of the village. The men then began 
setting the tree into a hole obviously dug for this purpose at the center of the hillock. Margaret and Henry 
glanced at each other in silent recognition, then stared again at the activity below. The tree trunk was 
strung around with flowers and herbs, and from the top where a plume of branches had been left uncut, 
flowed long scarves or ribbons of red and white. When this gay pole was firmly in place, the crowd began 
to dance around it strewing flowers and boughs of greenery all about the mound of grass. "Perhaps we 
should return to the abbey," said Margaret. But she did not move her eyes away from the celebration, and 
Henry remained very still as well. "I've never seen one," he murmured. 
NOTE: Pagan maypole celebration, disapproved of by Christians. Thoroughly phallic. cf. the cigar box. 
magjrnl 7-7 
Jrnl July7, 1990 
These two, again. Margaret insists to Henry, as Catherine does to me, that she does not need children of 
her own. There are other ways to live a life. How can I disagree? Maybe Hemy can, back there in those 
days. But I cannot persist with Catherine. It is utterly against the rules now. We cannot say that a 
woman's destiny is biological. But I don't mean that. I don't have children of my own either, so can only 
remember the things people have told me, try to build some truth from it. How often I've seen the evidence 
that parents can redeem the pain- even the deep horrors- of their childhood by making things different for 
their own children. It's the ongoing years of effort to right things that change who we are. Oh, my 
Catherine. 
NOTE: Priam's journal 
magjrnl7-15 
Jrnl July 15, 1990 
Henry is obviously moving toward the thought of marriage. It would mean terrible sacrifice for them both. 
Perhaps most for Margaret. She loves him, but has accepted conventual life, finds peace there. How can 
she know that it might be better for her to remain than to run off with her man? She is no Heloise after all. 
But Hemy would be good to her, he wouldn't tum the brute. Would he? 
NOTE: Priam is comparing himself to Henry. 
magjrnl7-16 
Priam's journal 
Jrnl July 16, 1990 
349 
Must be careful here in imposing my own memories of leaving on Henry. His situation is very different. 
There is far less similarity between his potential departure and my own than there is between Margaret and 
Catherine, or even between Margaret and Heta. His is a different age, the circumstances not even close. 
He loves Margaret, his only reason. For me, it was a vaster dissatisfaction, and a matter of personal, ethical 
rift with the Church hierarchy. Henry knows nothing of such, just that he loves Margaret and must leave in 
order to have her. 
NOTE: Is Priam an ex-priest? Yes. 
rnagjml 7-21 
Jml July 21, 1990 
Again and again in the writing of this, I think of the connections with both of them. Catherine, and how 
she's lil5:e Margaret in some ways, and indeed, how Henry and I are similar in relation to them each. 
Admittedly we take a protective stance, she is so injured, so vulnerable, but also a kind of reverence for 
what she knows thereby. I know that should be respect, not reverence, but I must be honest. It is reverence 
for her pain. 
But then, Heta. When this started, it was she I turned to, for her artistry I suppose, because I could trust her 
thinking. Trust her distance? Oh, Heta. I don't think I want it to be that way. Yet it is, and does not, can 
not change. Even the sharing of this writing must be done in distance, in physical absence. The .constraint 
on our love, no less than medieval. 
NOTE: Is Catherine Priam's ex-wife, or even his current wife? 
mag jml 8-29 
Jml Aug 29, 1990 
Sometimes writing this stuff is like being in a daze. the shifted, split focus; the overlay and 
interchangeability of reality and invention. Altered state? jeez. No wonder they all drink. 
NOTE: Reference to "buzz-daze." Priam is writing a hypertext. 
piano time 
She could never keep classical music straight. Which piece was this? Maybe the dread Czemy? 
Instead, she would remember how hesitantly he had begun playing, but how bravely he had offered in the 
first place. They sat in the acoustic recital room, Cy at the piano, Hilda primly seated in a straightbacked 
chair, an audience of one, rapt attention on her face, ignoring the embarrassed smile on his. 
"It's OK. Just warm up a little. Everyone has to warm up." She watched his fmgers move on the keys, 
thinking of the time she'd been told that people who watched a guitarist's fingers were rude. She always 
watched anyway. 
He played. She watched, seeing he was a sensitive pianist when she wasn't there. When he stopped and 
turned on the bench to face her, she wanted him to play more, but waited. "You know I'm probably in love 
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with you," he said, "but I don't think I can love you. I'm very afraid of hurting you. I think I'm crazy. 
Someday I'll come looking for you and you won't be there." 
Hilda stood up. "I'll always be here." As she turned to leave, her turquoise skirt swung wide. 
NOTE: Swinging, flowing skirts are a recurrent leitmotif. They are analogous to the waves on Lake 
Michigan. This is a kind of dance; it is rhythmic. Waves have crests and troughs. Think of sound waves. 
Music is patterned sound waves. Waves exist in space-time. Maybe HT is about going from particles to 
waves, as in quantum mechanics. Particles or points are placemarkers along the wave or Mobius Strip. 
Masculinity and femininity are such placemarkers. They are resting places (topoi). 
mother/father 
NOTE: This is the Mobius Strip and a spiral. This is the prairie. 
This is the land of extremes, the place where existence twists. Here it is the empty paradox unbearable to 
human agency. The people who lived here for so long did not resist the truth, and so erected no megaliths. 
But lately, another people, pale and determined, descendants from the land of eternal megaliths, a people 
who would eventually produce cities of towering edifice, have here thrown up seed-filled phalli, white and 
stolid in their own image, against the unacceptable otherness. The horror of separation. 
Mother and Father. Earth and Sky. Like children, we try to make bridges between them, bind them 
together, never understanding the inextricable bond of difference. We sigh with relief and pleasure when 
they hold hands. We sigh. The comfort of rain, joy of glinting pond. 
COMMENTARY 
This is my commentary. 
cast 
Cast of characters: 
Priam--lover ofHeta, art teacher at Catholic boys school, Jane/Cora's brother 
Heta--artist, lives part-time at Lake, teaches art part-time in Cheyenne. 
Cy--piano player, loves Hilda 
Hilda--Cy's lover, works in office, seems to be a pagan--does spiral dance 
Bea/B.B./Beatrice--friend/correspondent of Agnes and Hilda, bisexual, becomes a nun and seduces Cora 
Cora/Jane--nun, seduced by Beatrice, friend ofHeta, from St. Mary's College? Priam's sister? 
Gabe--Heta's son? Art student 
Ben--Heta's son-in-law; Bridget husband 
Bridget--Heta's daughter; knits for husband Ben 
Jake/Jacob--Angela's husband, pilot, doesn't read 
Angela--Jake's wife, bookish, friend ofBea 
Agnes--artist, once worked in a bookstore, friend ofBea 
Will--lover/husband of Agnes, 26 yr old musician/artist 
Margaret--nun/cellaress in medieval hypertext narrative, written by Priam, based on historical figures in 
15th cent. 
Henry--priest/chaplain who works with Margaret in the fields 
Catherine--ex-wife of Priam? 
Werther/Wert--friend ofPriam (obvious allusion to Afternoon, a story) 
making sense 
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How does a reader make sense of this HT? What is to be done with it? 
I don't feel empowered when I read Quibbling. I feel more like I'm in a buzz-daze. When we are in a buzz-
daze we have to reorient; we have to change our customary, automatic way of dealing with reality. 
quibble 
To quibble is to evade the point of an argument by caviling about words. To cavil is to raise trivial and 
frivolous objections. Women have, of course, been characterized as trivial and frivolous, as well as 
incapable of engaging in a rational argument. Quibbling interrupts the logical stream of an argument. 
flicker 
The background is the quotidian; yet the quotidian is subject to endless interruptions. The quotidian is not a 
steady state, but more of a flickering experience. Interruptions in the gaze produce the flickering sensation. 
But bow does something come to the foreground? Patterns come to the foreground. A pattern is essentially 
a recurrence--a regular, often predictable recurrence. The unexpected or surprising comes to the 
foreground. An interruption is a pause; and pauses are necessary in any conversation. It seems that the 
foreground tends to be absorbed into the background, or accommodated, familiarized. The unfamiliar is the 
foreground, and the familiar is the background. The quotidian is also familiar. In any text, the familiar 
fonns the background and the unfamiliar moves to the foreground. Reading is the process of setting the 
unfamiliar against the background of the familiar. 
topography 
There are topographical patterns in this HT: Lake Michigan, other lakes, Rocky Mountains, Flint Hills, 
Kansas, Wyoming plains, Missouri Hills, New England, river in Midwest .. . The reading is nomadic, like 
the characters. Places/topoi are important. This is a radically different way of reading or writing a text, as 
compared to the conventional plot, which is ultimately singular and focused on a single event at a single 
time and single place (e.g., Afternoon). 
The text resembles a fractal. 
quotidian 
Quotidian--everyday, ordinary. Heta's life, or just Heta, is analogous the quotidian waves of Lake 
Michigan, which she lives by. This hypertext is quotidian. Women deal with the quotidian, while men are 
interested in, or even obsessed by, the heroic. 
The hero narrative has a center, a single event that unifies the narrative. In other words, the hero narrative is 
phallic. The quotidian narrative does not have a center; it is multiple and dispersed; there is no single event 
that serves as a focal point for the narrative, as Afternoon does with the auto accident. (Landow 207) 
The singular, heroic event defines the heroic character; in James Joyce's short stories it is the epiphany. The 
hero is also a loner. His heroic quest is personal and individual. It is often about separating from the 
community, the mother and all females. By contrast, quotidian reality is social. The daily round of the 
traditional woman is social; she is enmeshed in domestic and community relations. 
interrupt 
A further difference between the heroic and the quotidian concerns interruptions. The daily life of "woman" 
(that is, the maternal, heterosexual woman) is continually interrupted--by crying babies, visitors, telephone 
calls, unexpected errands, etc. The stereotypic, or paradigmatic, man's life is much less subject to 
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interruption. He may work for 8 hours without significant interruptions. Thus, the discontinuous narrative 
may be more quotidian and "feminine," while the heroic narrative is unified, unilinear, and continuous. 
Men's and women's work, in other words, is reflected in the different narrative structures. 
The interrupted, nomadic life may be characterized as a curved life. It is indirect. There is curvature 
between point A and point B because the background of one's life is in motion. 
Traditional "women's work" is repetitious and cyclical as well. 
spheres 
By bringing men into "woman's sphere," we may place him in a more discontinuous environment or life-
narrative. The separate spheres, or the public/private split, is in large part a creation of industrial capitalism, 
which kept the woman at home while sending the man to work outside the home. However, even in ancient 
Greece there were strictly enforced separate spheres for men and women. But maybe this was only true in 
the urban centers like Athens. 
When theorizing about quotidian and heroic narratives, it is important to not reinscribe oppressive 
gendered binaries; this is why men must be brought into traditionally feminine spheres. We should not 
simply celebrate the discontinuous, interrupted quality of the traditional woman's work and life. 
familiar 
Artists make the familiar unfamiliar, making the old new and surprising--so familiar and so strange. 
Perhaps something is foregrounded when the flicker "catches" on it a moment longer than usual. 
Who's Talking 
In literary hypertexts we often do not know who is talking, or rather whose words we are reading. Why is 
this? Does it force the reader to attend to the language rather than the speaker? The speaker/language (or 
writer/text) link is gone. We can't rely on the ethos of the speaker or envision the speaker--at least not until 
we figure out who is speaking. And if male voices have more authority that female voices, it may be in the 
interest of women to confuse conceal the speaker's gender or even to conceal the speaker's identity entirely, 
at least for part of a narrative. 
Ethos is deeply gendered, inasmuch as good women have traditionally not spoken in public. So 
Quintillian's image of the good man speaking well does not fit for women rhetors. Ethos is problematic for 
women writers and speakers. 
This has something to do with the HT practice of weaving texts together, mixing voices. 
curves 
The curve is a prominent motif in this hypertext. It is very productive metaphorically and analogically. 
Spirals and cycles are closely associated with curves. Also the crescent of the moon, the curve of the hull's 
horns ... Essentially, the curve is feminine. And hypertext may considered feminine insofar as it curves 
back on itself. It is recursive. The Mobius strip is a spiral. 
Curves are best perceived tactilely. Seeing them doesn't fully account for them. Thus lrigaray says that 
women know best by touch. 
contiguity 
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By adding links the reader creates contiguity in a hypertext. I am able to bring two lexias closer together or 
create a whole network of lexias, as I have done with the text link for curve. This is paratactic (w)reading. 
Parataxis creates a nomadic reading experience. De leuze and Guattari speak of "nomadic thought" (Landow 
208). The reader wanders through the text. 
Items that are spatially contiguous are often assumed to have a logical connection or to "go together." 
nomadic 
Qwbbling is a nomadic narrative; it does not have an Aristotelian plot (Landow 208). This is interesting 
because Heta and Priam both live somewhat nomadic lives, taking temporary teaching positions. The 
nomadic life is subject to many interruptions. 
Guyer's words 
smooth & striated 
From Guyer's essay "Buzz-Daze Jazz and the Quotidian Stream." 
I want to jump over to a sidebar of cerebration which a friend loaned to me during the writing of 
Quibbling. It's aQ essay called "The Smooth and the Striated" by Deleuze and Guattari, a couple of those 
French thinkers found to be irresistible by most American hypertext literati. In this work, the masters of a 
thousand plateaus gave me something for which I had been looking almost fifteen years. A way of holding 
a perverse knot that Agnes and many of the characters in the fiction would continue to worry. It has to do 
with, god help us, the non-existence of abstracted dualities. By this I mean all the usual, traditional 
representations: Female/Male, Night/Day, Death/Life, Earth/Sky, Intuitive/Rational, lndividuaVCommunal. 
The list goes on as long as consciousness itself. We make these things up! The terms "smooth" and 
"striated," as used by Deleuze and Guattari in their essay, are an attempt to generalize the easy concept of 
polarity in order to make it useful in trying to understand what really happens, that is, the constant 
transformations of one pole into the other. What is important to recognize is not the impossible duality of 
the poles, but what happens between them. 
space-time 
From "Buzz-Daze": 
You might say it's What We Learn, what we actually experience in space-time as we conceive ourselves, as 
we conceive space-time. "Smooth" and "striated," then- representing poles that don't exist- can be 
understood in only quick strokes of words, nothing that settles too soon or stays too long. Pierre Boulez, 
who actually coined the terms for a musical model, said," . . . in a smooth space-time one occupies without 
counting, whereas in a striated space-time one counts in order to occupy." Now here is an image I can grasp 
immediately. It correlates directly with my own sense as an artist that the process of creating ourselves 
always involves two polar events: Acceptance and Control, that is, occupying without counting, and 
counting in order to occupy. 
waves 
From "Buzz-Daze" 
We are, all of us, creative beings. But what we create isn't, by itself, what keeps us tumbling. Learning How 
is the combinative impelling force, where refrain arises. Always the reason to learn something is to learn 
something else. Closure, resolution, achievement, the objects of our lives are inventions that operate 
somewhat like navigational devices, placemarkers if you will. We go on like waves unsure of the shore, 
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sometimes leaping backwards into the oncoming, but always moving in space-time, always fmding 
someplace between the poles that we invent, shifting, transforming, making ourselves as we go. 
BuzzDaze 
From "Buzz-Daze": 
Maybe we should go back to Agnes's problem about being in a daze. She seems to think that being by 
herself in a new place has a predictable rhythm, sort of like waves on a shore, "occupying space" washes in 
and washes out. Nice rhythm. We like this, no problem. But when B.B. was with her, there was some sort 
of striated imposition on her daze, a buzz, or interference of complex mixtures, B.B. insisting on Agnes's 
attention, directing her presence as it were (isn't this what always happens when we're with other people? 
that's when things get complicated). 
HildaRob 
From "Buzz-Daze": 
I think of this interchange as a fairly commonplace occurrence, a situation where people are in a sense 
collaborative artists, people creating themselves, Hilda and Robert, in narrative juxtaposition to one 
another. That's inside the story. In the literary lump of the fiction, the thing that doesn't exist without a 
reader, the reader/writer creates Hilda, Robert, and herself, in space-time. It is exactly the same process 
used by any writer of a literary lump. 
quotidian 
From "Buzz-Daze" 
The paradoxical nature of buzz-daze, of the complex mixtures of polar impulse, predictably becomes less 
of an enigma when we don't look too hard, that is, when we go along every day turning fragments into 
wholes, the quotidian stream, 
contour 
From chapter 3 
The problem with the objectivist paradigm is that the still spatial background does not exist. Space-time 
moves. We might envision a person trying to draw a straight line between two points on a chalkboard that 
slips and slides under the pressure of the chalk. Such a line would be, at best, curved, rather than the 
paradigmatic "shortest distance between two points." One is reminded here ofJoyce's concept of the 
"hypertext contour" as "the figure of changing change" (Otherrnindedness 43). 
prelude 
"Wipe your hand across your mouth, and laugh; 
The worlds revolve like ancient women 
Gathering fuel in vacant lots." 
T.S. Eliot, from "Prelude IV" 
metonymy 
We might say that entities or concept that are associated by metonymy are part of the same rhizome, or 
they are linked rhizomatically. Metonymy means "using one entity to refer to another that is related to it" 
(Lakoff and Johnson 35). Related and associated may be taken as synonymous here. Ifl were to say 
"hypertext is a spiral," I would be using metaphor. But if I say "hypertext may be associated with a spiral," 
I am using metonymy. I am placing hypertexts and spirals in a contiguous relation. In metaphor, one terms 
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absorbs the other-e.g., hypertext is absorbed into the spiral; it becomes a spiral. The same cannot be said 
for metonymy, where two terms are given equal status. 
color 
The characters in Quibbling are also associable with colors (Figure 4.?). Given the artistic theme of this 
text, colors take on special significance, as Guyer makes clear in the lexia "color theory" and also in 
"kites," which has text links to many lexias labeled by color. Many of these lexias contain folkloric and 
mythic references to colors. It is unusual in Storyspace hypertexts for two or more lexias to have the same 
label, but in Quibbling no less than ten lexias are labeled "red," as one can easily learn by pressing F9. Four 
lexias labeled are "green." By pressing Ctrl-F and then selecting color from the keywords, one can fmd a 
few of the many lexias that concern color. I have added color to the keywords list, but I have not assigned 
this keyword to all of the lexias that relate to color. 
colors 
black--letter A, Heta? 
white--silence, male, cold, age, letter E, Priam? 
red--passion, love, female, letter I, Will? 
blue--letter 0 
green--heath and healing, letter U, 
ethos 
The traditional concept of ethos may be as good a place as any for feminist rhetoricians to begin an 
interrogation of mainstream, masculinist rhetoric . Ethos is simply not the same for men and women. Public 
men are respected. Caretaking, maternal women are respected. Credibility is frrmly tied to gender. 
Credibility is deeply gendered. In order for women to gain credibility in any pursuit other than the 
traditional maternal duties, they must "do it like a man"--whatever "it" is--writing, speaking in public, 
running a business, doing research. 
On the other hand, a public woman can play a maternal role (e.g., Mother Jones) . If a woman takes on 
social problems from a maternal position, she is far more likely to be accepted. 
power 
Landow writes, "Quibbling sharply contrasts with Joyce's Afternoon[ ... ]. In contrast to Afternoon, which 
uses the resources of hypertext to assign even more authorial power to the reader, Quibbling tantalizes 
readers into wandering through its spaces in unexpected ways" (Hypertext 2.0, 205). Quibbling is 
seductive. 
I'm not sure what Landow means by this. Later he says that Guyer allows more the reader control and 
power. It would make more sense for Landow to say that in Afternoon Joyce grants himself more power as 
the author. 
Does "Lust" grant more power to the writer with 'its confusing narrative? 
affinity 
The different couples in the text are linked by affinity. The reader often does not know who is being 
described because their lives are similar. The motif is affinity, not identity. Landow writes, "one perceives 
somewhat analogous situations, thus fmding similarity, though not identity, in the lives of the different 
couples" (HT 2.0, 207). The fact that they are all artists in some way links them together. 
fractal 
Fractal Design 
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Corbis.com 
fractal3 
fractal2 
spiral 
Spheres Floating in Whirlpool 
Corbis.com 
The spiral is an important motif in this text. 
"Some of the oldest examples of human art are depictions of spirals, painted or carved into rock, often 
found in burial sites. Later, the Romans and Greeks used spirals as designs for vases and the columns in 
temples. The Celtic and Norse people were well known for the mysterious and repetitive designs found on 
their jewellery, clothing, weapons, objects of worship and everyday items. The Celts even painted spirals 
on their bodies with blue dye to intimidate enemies during battle. They also created forms of animals and 
plants twisting into impossible spirals, sometimes interlocking with other elements of the picture." 
(http://www.ancientspiral.com/spirals.htm) 
MornsSons 
The mother-son relationship is a central motif for Guyer. 
cut text 
When theorizing about quotidian and heroic narratives, it is important to not reinscribe oppressive gendered 
binaries; this is why, as Nancy Chodorow argued in 1978, men must be brought into traditionally feminine 
spheres. As I argued previously, we should not naively celebrate the discontinuous, interrupted quality of 
the traditional woman's work and life. By bringing men into "woman's sphere," we may place him in a 
more discontinuous environment or life-narrative. 
Rhodes & Sawday 
"Print culture tended to produce a concept of the text as a relatively fixed and stable entity: the book. The 
great, multi-volumed, 'standard' editions of the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, for example . 
. . monuments to a belief in the stability of the printed word ... The computer, through its possibilities of 
interactivity, 'play' and the creativity of hypertext, is now rapidly that idealization of stability, and returning 
us to a kind textuality which may more in common with the pre-print era" (11-12). 
In a. larger sense, secondary orality or electronic media in general is responsible for this change. Hypertext 
is an aspect of the post-print culture. 
similitude 
"The early modem version of field theory and chaos theory is Montaigne's observation that 'toutes choses 
se tiennent par quelque similitude' (similitude binds everything together) . . . The paper:vorlds ofth~ poets . 
. . derive imaginatively from a concept of the book of nature as a giant intertext ofmulnple connectJons and 
allusions" (Rhodes and Sawday 13). 
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Similitude is affinity. This is a radically different sense of arrangment than the alphabetic list, as modem 
encyclopedias are arranged. So the canon of arrangement mutates with technological developments. 
Hypertext goes back to similitude, as distinguished from the linear or serial plot of the novel. In a literary 
hypertext we read for similitude, or affinity, rather than cause-and-effect structures. 
Spira!Dance 
EXERCISE 42: THE DOUBLE SPIRAL 
Ground and center. Visualize a double spiral. When you see it clearly, let it grow until you stand within it. 
and follow it inward, moving counterclockwise. R becomes a maze of high, clipped hedges, then a 
labyrinth of stone wans; its winding turns are the passageway to a hidden secret. As you move through the 
spiral, the world dissolves, form dissolves, until you are in the hidden heart where birth and death are one. 
The center of the spiral shines; it is the North Star, and the arms of the spiral are the Milky Way, a myriad 
of stars slowly revolving around the still center point. You are in Spiral Castle, at the back of the North 
Wind. Explore it in your imagination. See who you meet, what you learn. You are in the womb of the 
Goddess, floating free. Now feel yourself pushed and squeezed, moving out through the spiral, which is 
now the vaginal passage of rebirth. Move clockwise through the double spiral of your DNA. Now it 
becomes a whirlwind-fly with it. Let it become the twining tendril of a plant--a crystal--a shell--an orbiting 
electron. Time is a spiral--the cycles endlessly repeating, yet always moving. Know the spiral as the 
underlying form of all energy. As you emerge, let it return to its small. abstract, symbolic form. Thank it, 
and let it disappear. (http://www.tstonramp.com/-mauser/reclaiming/exercise.htrn#double-spiral) 
3parts 
Quibbling is organized in three sections: lake, moon, and prairie--each of which have association with the 
feminine principle. 
Starhawk 
"The Spiral Dance: A Rebirth of The Ancient Religion Of The Great Goddess. (HarperSanFrancisco, 1979, 
1989, 1999) This is the classic work that introduces the history, theology, and practice ofWitchcraft and 
earth-based spirituality. It includes basic magical training and outlines for seasonal and moon rituals. It's 
been updated twice with new introductions, notes and commentary." 
(http://www.starhawk.org/books.htrnl) 
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Appendix C: Storyspace Assignments 
Storyspace assignment #1 
This assignment is designed to facilitate invention; it is done during the pre-writing stage of 
drafting an essay. At this point each student will have an essay topic and a research question. 
1. Open Storyspace by going from Programs to Storyspace to Storyspace. 
2. Double click in the map window to make a writing space. Use the number 1 as the writing 
space title. If necessary, review the Storyspace User's Manual for instructions on creating and 
naming writing spaces. 
3. Go to file and save as. Using the filename inventl .ssp, save the Storyspace file onto your own 
diskette. 
4. Go to Document options in the file pulldown menu and select the boxes to make your texts text 
links a different color (See Figure 1). Also find the Preferences under the Edit pulldown menu, 
and make sure the keep windows open option is deselected so that windows won 't stack up (See 
Figure 2). Save regularly to make sure you don't accidentally lose all your work! 
5. You should already have a research question for your essay. Write that question in writing 
space 1. After you've written the question, close the space by clicking the x in the upper right 
corner. The writing space will save automatically; however, it is a good idea to save your 
Storyspace file regularly to prevent accidental loss of your work. 
6. Open another writing space and call it 2. In this space, write a tentative answer to your research 
question or a statement that might eventually lead to an answer. Close the space. 
7. Continue the same process with other writing spacing, calling them 3, 4, 5, and so on. The idea 
is to write down brief thoughts as they come to you. Brainstorm, in other words. 
8 . Once you have several writing spaces, begin linking them together. Make sure every writing 
space has a link leading away from it so that there are no dead ends. If necessary, refer to the 
Storyspace User's Manual for instructions on linking writing spaces. Also see Figure 3. 
9. When you reach the point at which you don't know what to write next, begin reading what 
you've written so far in the writing spaces. Click between the spaces and read until a new thought 
or connection comes to mind; then either add that idea to an existing writing space or write it in a 
new space. 
10. Fifteen minutes before the end of class, begin arranging your writing spaces in chronological 
order beginning from the upper right comer (See Figure 4). 
11. Select export under the file pulldown menu and export your Storyspace file to a text file (See 
Figure 5). Save your Storyspace file and close Storyspace. 
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12. Open the exported text file in WordPad; then copy and paste the text file into a Word file . 
This will give you a linear form of your Storyspace brainstorming, which you may use as a 
preliminary rough draft (or rough rough draft) of your essay. 
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Title I SAMPl 
~ Show Status Bar 
Label Font I Arial (!] 
Transition Effect 1.-n-o_ne _______ [!]J 
i Open text windows with... 
1 
I 
n Path Browser IX, control strip l ' 
· --·~-'! 
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Picture::s_and_(i!~P~hJcs-:: . _ J 
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17 Show space title 
Standard Text Font 
I Times New Roman [!] Size fi2[!JJ 
~~~ 
r Compass in control strip 
----------------
IX Highlight text links: n underline 
r bold 
.!!!fP' Color 
Magnify text by ro- points 
OK Jl L CANCEL ... l 
Figure 1: Storyspace Document Options 
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Auth01 name: 
-------------·-------···-·· 
IX Remelftber window positioM 
r: Keep windows open 
l5l' Show status bar 
()I Open text windows with control strip 
l5l Use Animation 
I CoiOfs .•• 1 
L 01( J Cancel r · 
Figure 2: Storyspace Preferences 
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Figure 3: Linked Storyspace writing spaces 
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Figure 4: Storyspace map view with the first writing space in the upper left comer. 
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0 Entire Document 
® This writing space 
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Figure 5: Storyspace Export Tool 
Export as: 
0 Text 
0 HTNl 
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CANCEL __ j 
Storyspace assignment #2 
For this assignment, each student uses Storyspace to revise her or his own essay draft. 
1. Open up your essay # 1 file. Use Save As to save it under a different name. Close the first essay 
#1 file. 
2. Put an extra space between the paragraphs; then divide up the paragraphs into smaller chunks 
so that you can make several Storyspace writing spaces. 
3. Open Storyspace by going from Programs to Storyspace to Storyspace. 
4 . Double click in the map window to make enough writing spaces for each of your text chunks. 
Name the writing spaces 1, 2, 3, . . . If necessary, review the Storyspace Manual for instructions 
on creating and naming writing spaces. 
5. Go to file and save as. Using the filename revisel .ssp, save the Storyspace file onto your own 
diskette. 
6 . Copy and pa~te your text chunks from the Word file into the Storyspace writing spaces. 
7 . Link the writing spaces together randomly-not in chronological order. Make sure all of the 
boxes have links going out from them as well as into them. Otherwise, you will have "dead end" 
spaces. 
Remember that the text pulldown menu has to be in the edit mode to write in the space and in the 
read mode to move around through the links. 
8. Start editing the text. Read the text in the spaces and see where you can change and/or add 
something. Elaborate and complicate your ideas. 
9. ;Review the Storyspace Manual for the procedure for making texts links. Use text links to go 
off on tangents from a writing space. That is, if there is a word or phrase that you can expand 
upon or take in a new direction, highlight it and make a text link to a new space. 
Remember to go to Document options in the file pull down menu and select the boxes to make 
your texts text links a different color. Also find the Preferences under the Edit pulldown menu, 
and make sure the keep windows open option is deselected so that windows won't stack up. Save 
regularly to make sure you don't accidentally lose all your work! 
10. Ten minutes before the end of class, select export under the file pulldown menu and export 
your Storyspace file to a text file. Save your Storyspace file and close Storyspace. 
11. Open the exported text file in W ordPad; then copy and paste the text file into a Word file . 
Save this Word file. 
12. On your own time, work on arranging the text you've generated into a coherent linear form. 
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Storyspace assignment #3 
For this assignment, the instructor may direct the students to an online text that can be copied and 
pasted into a word processing file. When I gave this assignment, I chose to convert a student 
essay from a different section of the same composition course to HTML format and put it online. 
Of course, I first removed the student's name and any other identifying marks. Below are the 
instructions I gave: 
1. Go to www7.twu.edu/-G_llclark/sample.htm 
2. Copy and paste the document into a new Word file. 
3. Put an extra space between paragraphs; then divide up the paragraphs into smaller chunks so 
that you can make about nine Storyspace writing spaces. Be sure to split up the second paragraph 
since it's the longest. 
4. Open Storyspace by going from Programs to Storyspace to Storyspace. 
5. Double click in the map window to make enough writing spaces for each of your text chunks. 
Label the writing spaces 1-9. 
6. Go to file and save as. Using the filename blowup.ssp, save the file onto your diskette. 
7. Copy and paste your text chunks from the Word file into the Storyspace writing spaces. 
8. Link the writing spaces together so that when you click on them (or hit enter) you will go 
around in a circle. In other words, connect the last space to the first. 
Remember that the text pulldown menu has to be in the edit mode to write in the space and in the 
read mode to move around through the links. 
9. Start editing the text. Read the text in the spaces and see where you can change and/or add 
something. This essay draft needs a lot of elaboration and complication; it is quite undeveloped at 
this stage. 
10. Use text links to go off on tangents from a writing space. That is, if there is a word that you 
can expand upon or take in a new direction, highlight it and make a text link to a new space. 
Remember to go to document options in the file pull down menu to make your texts links a 
different color. Also under the edit pull down menu, make sure the keep windows open option is 
deselected. Save regularly to make sure you don't accidentally lose all your work. 
Rationale: This assignment is designed to give you practice in blowing up an essay draft into 
small pieces so that you can play with the pieces to rework the draft. It is easier to work with 
small sections of a draft than to tackle the whole draft at once or to try to make comprehensive 
changes, especially if you are working with a lengthy draft. 
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Storyspace Assignment #4 
Open your copy of J. Yellowlees Douglas's "I Have Said Nothing." 
In ~e map view, create a new writing space and title it "Commentary." In this space you can put 
wntmg spaces containing your commentary on Douglas ' s hypertext. 
Begin reading the hypertext. When an idea comes to mind-the kind of idea that you might write 
in the margins of a print text-add it to the hypertext. There are a couple of ways to do this: You 
may either write directly in the writing space or create a commentary space to write in. 
Remember that the text pulldown menu has to be in the edit mode to write in the space and in the 
read mode to move around through the links. Also, if necessary, review the Storyspace User's 
Manual for instruction on creating text links. 
If you chose to write directly within an existing writing space, such as under Douglas's text, it is a 
good idea to mark your text with the word "NOTE." Typically, I use this method to write brief 
comments or annotations, and I use commentary spaces for more lengthy comments. If you create 
a commentary space, which should be nested within the larger Commentary space, you will need 
to make a text link from Douglas's text to this new space. You may also make one or more links 
from a commentary space to Douglas's text or to your own commentary. 
As a third option, you may use the note tool (the asterisk icon on the tool palette). The note tool is 
convenient because Storyspace automatically links notes to and from text. However, when 
dealing with someone else's hypertext, the note tool can create confusion because the author may 
also have created notes, and there is no way to differentiate your notes from the author's notes, 
unless you mark the text with NOTE or something. You also have no control over where 
Storyspace places notes. 
Rationale: The rationale for writing in someone else's hypertext is that it helps you to read 
actively, or to become a reader-writer (or wreater). Ultimately, the hypertext should become your 
text rather than being controlled by the named author. Your hypertext commentary may also 
serve as the beginning of a critical essay. 
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ppendix D: A Sampling of Student Comments on Storyspace Hypertext 
Thes~ comments were written by students in a Fall, 2001 first-year composition course, 
E nglish 1 023: Composition and Literature II. I have drawn from two sources: an assigned 
essay on Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl and an end-of-semester student evaluation of 
the course. I originally presented these comments in hypertext fonnat at the Annual 
Symposium in Rhetoric of the Federation of North Texas Area Universities in Denton, 
TX , February 8, 2002. Aside from correcting spelling and minor proofreading errors, I 
present the comments below as written by the students. 
H ypertext more closely resembles the type of writing I am involved with on a frequent basis. I 
may use the hypertext format in some of my future writings because of the randomness and 
freedom of it. Although the introduction to hypertext has improved my creativity skills, it did not 
improve my essay writing skills because it does not utilize the typical format. 
The introduction of hypertext was an unexpected bonus in this English class. Never had I heard of 
such a thing, but after playing around with it, hypertext seems so logical and basic.[ ... ] My 
exposure to hypertext will greatly aid in my method of composing because now I can attempt to 
write in a less traditional manner. 
Patchwork Girl showed me that all the random thoughts of writing can be brought together. 
Although I don't believe I would ever write anything using Storyspace, I know that I will utilize it 
to formulate my ideas [ ... ] The story itself caused me to delve deeply into the many facets that 
comprise everyone, and helped me find a sense of inner peace amongst the chaos of life. 
When I was first introduced to hypertext, I had a complete and total aversion to it. I abhorred the 
chaos of it, and fought to find some order. That's me. I must have order, schedules, post-it notes. 
Patchwork Girl changed my attitude--towards hypertext writing and the way I walk through life. 
There is an order to Patchwork Girl, just as there is an order to life. This class, and that story, 
assisted me in seeing that it doesn't have to be a succinct, military spit-and-polish type of order. 
Thank you so much for that. 
Throughout the semester I was a bit wary of hypertext and I didn't enjoy it very much until we got 
to Patchwork Girl. I believe the last paper was my best. It helped to develop and grow in my 
writing more than any other paper. [ ... ] There were so many hidden meanings and opinions, that 
the possibilities were endless. It made we think about the way we read books and the way our 
minds work and accept the norm. There were so many hidden meanings and metaphors that, like 
an endless hypertext, I could write an endless paper. 
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What I enjoyed most was learning about hypertext. This was completely foreign to me, yet I 
learned how to appreciate what was initially a challenge to me. 
At first attempting to read the hypertext story we were given and then later required to write 
about appeared to disregard all the rules we had learned in the first weeks of the class. It certainly 
was not closed-form writing; there was not an easily defined path to reading the material; the old-
before-new concept seemed to go out the window; and forget about any transitional words or 
phrases. But just as the first half of the semester had fallen into place, this concept and style of 
writing would also fall into place. Much like hypertext itself, the class discussions complemented 
by the in-class writings pulled the pieces together. [ ... ] In the end, learning about hypertext 
provided another tool to pull together haphazard thoughts and later fashion them into a 
meaningful paper. 
I have come to appreciate hypertext writing, although I didn't understand it too well [ ... ] I think 
it is an interesting way to approach fiction, but I think I'll stick to print. 
Hypertext has broadened my understanding of different types of writing techniques. Before this 
class, I had never been exposed to Storyspace or any kind of hypertext writing. Patchwork Girl 
gave me a whole new world to experience. I enjoy reading the stories and using my imagination 
to put the story together. 
Reading hypertext was something different. Some might say that hypertext is other than 
"normal."[ ... ] I have a new perspective on writing as well as reading. 
I really enjoyed working with hypertext. Reading Patchwork Girl really opened my mind to 
explore the different ways of writing and reading. Working with hypertext kept me reading to 
understand what was happening. Until I read a hypertext story, I thought that stories were written 
in a specific order. Hypertext does not have a specific beginning, middle, or end. This is why I 
was mentally active while reading a hypertext story. 
Thi~ class has changed my perspective on the subject of English in many ways.[ ... ] When the 
class first started and we read hypertext, I fought it because it was new and different, but also 
because it was reading. I have never enjoyed reading books[ ... ] When I read the hypertext the 
passages were short so they kept my focus, and the stories, although often confusing, were easier 
to understand from one space to another. I didn't have to keep returning to the previous space to 
comprehend the story, which I have to do when reading a print book. I know I don't have 
hypertext totally figured out, but this is one reading style that I'm willing to work with. 
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At first I was not very keen on hypertext. It is so disorderly. But once I started to read more and 
more of the story, and when I would try explaining hypertext to my friends, I realized how 
interesting and unique it is. I ended up enjoying the story, even though I am nowhere near 
finished with it. I even started to enjoy it more after writing an essay on it. 
In hypertext, the reader is asked to engage her brain. The reader must think and organize each 
word. There is no "down time" when reading hypertext. Even if something does not make sense 
at first, it might be explained in more detail in other spaces; therefore, the reader cannot throw out 
any information because it may be needed again. 
The first noticeable change in my writing was the complication of my ideas. The use of 
Storyspace allowed me to take a single idea and continue to expand outward. It helped me to 
brainstorm freely without immediately being forced fit those thoughts into a rigid outline. I could 
discard freely, add freely, and organize my thoughts into different views, adding structure to a 
mass of ideas. 
I really do thank my teacher for introducing me to different things like hypertext. This really 
encouraged me to think deeper. I feel totally embarrassed saying this, but I did not even know 
that hypertext existed until it was introduced in this class. This class not only helped me with 
English skills, it taught me that there are other things in the world besides print books that I can 
read. 
A hypertext is a puzzle. We are like Patchwork Girl when reading the story, moving around not 
knowing if came from the beginning or the end, just like Patchwork Girl lives her life. [ . . . ] In 
hypertext the beginning and end are unclear; you may begin reading in the middle and jump 
around to the beginning and then to the end--constantly "hop scotching" around, trying to settle 
the pieces and form and understanding of the hypertext as a whole. 
Beginning with skepticism about hypertext and especially Patchwork Girl, I have come to 
appreciate how the two link together. Shelley Jackson created Patchwork Girl with incredible 
imagination and skill that would not achieve its purpose and goal if printed as a print book. 
Shelley Jackson's Patchwork Girl is reminiscent of a story written by another Shelley, that being 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. In both texts, a monster is envisioned in the writer's mind and is 
physically created from scratch. However, hypertext creates a whole new dimension for 
"monster," allowing the reader to participate in her creation rather than just reading about it on 
the printed page. 
As the reader sees the hypertext story as pieces to a puzzle that may never end, the basis for 
reading the story may change. Instead of rushing through the links to find out what happens at the 
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end th reader may top nd try to understand the story better. As the reader comes to unde t d 
d ' ffi I' . f p h k . rs an th 1 rent qua 1t1es o ate wor trl, he may not be so quick to put her in a box. 
Patchw?rk irl i not really like a quil.t at al l, but more like the act of quilting. Quilting is not 
somethmg gener lly done by oneself, JU t as Patchwork Girl is not one person. 
Patchwork irl is every w man in the world . We are a multitude of personalities[ ... ] There are 
different situation in which w arc different people. We are the culmination of all our pasts and 
pr 
The e tatt r d pi c and craps f thoughts have also been compared to the individual pieces of a 
patchwork quilt . uilt historically have been important to the feminist tradition. It is a valued art 
form and an n-patriarchal way t record domestic history. In an art world dominated by men, the 
quilt tands as a uniquely feminine work. Qui Its are often pieced together to symbolically portray 
ariou mom nt in a p ri d of time. The e pieces speak something a little different to everyone 
who enc unt r them, much like no two peop le wi ll ever find the same meaning in Patchwork 
Girl nor will th y take the arne path through the text. 
I b cam a str nger writer when writing abou t hypertext because it allowed me to search for 
answ r on a le el d eper than 1 had before. 
Using t ry pace after writing the first draft of my essay allowed me to develop and incorporate 
ideas 1 never considered before. [ ... ] This class and Storyspace have allowed me to more 
creatively and intelligently expand the scope and depth of my writing. 
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